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This thesis examines Foreign Office planning for a post-war international organisation 
during the Second World War. It begins with Britain’s search for war aims in 1939 and 
1940 and ends with the signing of the United Nations Charter in June 1945. Three 
officials—namely Alexander Cadogan, Gladwyn Jebb and Charles Webster—are 
identified as the key figures behind the planning and negotiating stages. The thesis 
shines light on the indispensable contribution of these men as well as the Foreign Office 
in the creation of the United Nations Organization, arguing that the British role in this 
process has not been given its due weight in existing accounts. The thesis is best 
understood as a study of statecraft, based on archival research and using traditional 
methods of diplomatic history. It drills down further into the practice of ‘planning’, 
which became more important in Western foreign policy in this era, and it aims to draw 
out what contemporaries called a ‘grand strategy for peace’. More specifically, it 
describes a distinct method and approach of those British diplomats who were 
attempting to construct and craft the mechanics of the post-war international order (of 
which Cadogan, Jebb and Webster were the best exemplars). This approach relied 
heavily on a historical sensibility as it sought to square the competing notions of 
national interest, power politics and internationalism. While it does not lend itself to 
neat categorisation, their thinking and approach is described in this thesis as a form of 
‘realist-internationalism’. This particular approach grew out of the experience of the 
failure of the League of Nations and reflected a ‘great power’ view of international 
relations rooted in a specific reading of nineteenth-century diplomatic history. It was 
characterised by an attempt to place the British national interest, including the 
preservation of the Empire, into an internationalist frame. 
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On a mild January afternoon in London in 1946, the first session of the United Nations 
General Assembly was called to order. Rising to speak in Westminster Central Hall was Dr 
Zuleta Angel of Colombia, the chairman of the first assembly. To his immediate right on stage 
was Gladwyn Jebb, the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations.1 Below them were 
representatives from the 51 countries who had signed the United Nations Charter just over six 
months earlier, on 26 June 1945. In the audience was Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-
Secretary at the Foreign Office and Britain’s soon-to-be first Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, as well as Charles Kingsley Webster, on leave from his professorship at the 
London School of Economics and now advisor to the Minister of State at the Foreign Office.2 
For Jebb, Cadogan and Webster, the start of the proceedings marked the end of a planning 
process that had consumed almost all of their energy during the war.   
Only eighteen months before the first General Assembly, these three Foreign Office 
officials had sat down with their American, Russian and later, Chinese counterparts to negotiate 
the creation of an international organisation in the post-war period. There, the British plans 
which had been designed—mostly by Jebb, Webster and members of the Foreign Office’s 
Economic and Reconstruction Department—over the previous two years were presented by 
Cadogan, then the head of the British delegation to the conference. That meeting, which took 
place on the outskirts of Washington, D.C., between August and October 1944, marked the 
substantive origins of what would become the United Nations Organization. Even then, the 
story was far from complete. Deep-seated differences emerged and were remedied at the Yalta 
	
1  Gladwyn Jebb: Private Secretary to Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 1937-40; Ministry of Economic 
Warfare, 1940-42; Head of the Economic and Reconstruction Department, 1942-45. The thesis will only mention 
the wartime positions of officials in the Foreign Office.  
2 Alexander Cadogan: Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 1938-46. Charles Kingsley Webster: 
Stevenson Professor of International History at the London School of Economics, 1932–53; Foreign Research and 
Press Service, 1939-41, 1942-43; Director, British Library of Information in New York, 1941-42; Foreign Office 
Research Department, 1943-44; Economic and Reconstruction Department, 1944-45 
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Conference in February 1945, with the final details agreed upon at the San Francisco 
Conference later that summer. It had been an arduous process, yet one of great and lasting 
importance. Now each man, whether seated on stage or in the audience, could look upon the 
inaugural gathering in Westminster’s Central Hall with some relief and a sense of pride in 
knowing they had served invaluable roles in the making of a new international system to 
improve peaceful cooperation among nations. Understanding as they did the fate of the League 
of Nations and thinking back to previous precedents such as the Congress system established 
in 1815, they were also hopeful that the institution they had designed would prove more 
enduring. 
Despite their contributions, surprisingly little has been written about the work of these 
Foreign Office officials and their colleagues during the Second World War. The bulk of the 
historical accounts of the creation of the United Nations Organization focuses instead on the 
role of the United States. Moreover, when historians have addressed the British influence, 
much of the attention has been on the roles of Winston Churchill and his Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden, as opposed to the diplomats most responsible for the planning, drafting and 
negotiating. In this story, insofar as it is known, the less glamorous but essential work of 
bureaucratic statecraft—including the half-formed memorandum that never made it to the 
conference table, the wasted efforts and wrong turns—is often submerged. The statecraft of 
planning and peacebuilding was both a worthwhile endeavour and sometimes a murky and 
byzantine process in which ideas, interests and personalities were all intermixed—within and 
between the nation states involved.   
This thesis is the first sustained and dedicated treatment of the planning for a post-war 
international organisation that was undertaken by officials in the British Foreign Office during 
the Second World War. In terms of its chronological scope, the study begins with the search 
for war aims between 1939 and 1940—the launch pad of post-war planning efforts—and ends 
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with the signing of the United Nations Charter in June 1945. Over the course of nearly four 
years, as officials in the Foreign Office sought to ensure that the British national interest was 
secured and advanced in the post-war international system, planning for and negotiating an 
international organisation became an increasingly important foreign policy priority. Although 
their importance waxed and waned at different stages of this process, the thesis pivots around 
the roles of three officials in particular—Alexander Cadogan, Gladwyn Jebb and Charles 
Webster—arguing that they played the most important roles on the British side. While the 
thesis shines light on the indispensable contribution of Britain and the Foreign Office in the 
creation of the United Nations Organization, it serves, more importantly, as a study of statecraft 
and an insight into the way in which diplomats attempted to construct and craft the mechanics 
and structures of the post-war international order. 
Using the language of one contemporary diplomat, what emerges is nothing less than a 
British ‘grand strategy for peace’. This was an approach that was born in the worst period of 
the war—between 1941 and 1942—but which consciously sought to look beyond the military 
struggle and which, after coming to fruition between 1945 and 1946, created structures that 
served their intended purpose for many years thereafter. More specifically, in seeking to 
harness international enthusiasm for a new effort to order the world to serve specific British 
goals, the officials identified in the period are described as practicing a form of what the thesis 
describes as ‘realist-internationalism’. This was a broad-based but identifiable way of thinking 
about the international order that rested on a number of basic assumptions: that the national 
interest was best served by the establishment of an enforceable international peace; that 
historical study rather than well-meaning utopianism provided the best guide to international 
relations; that larger powers would be the makers and enforcers of peace but that room must 
be found to incorporate small states in the international community; and that great power 
politics could not be wished away but that its negative effects could be mitigated by creating 
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international structures that reflected power disparities. The overarching goal was that Britain 
and its Empire would not have its security threatened in such an existential way ever again. For 
that, it was deemed vital that the new international organisation would not succumb to the same 
fate as the League of Nations had done just a decade before. 
 
A Review of the Relevant Literature 
Previous scholarship dealing with the history of the United Nations is surprisingly light on the 
diplomatic origins of the organisation during the Second World War. The majority of these 
works on the early United Nations tend to focus on the international crises with which it had 
to deal in its infancy—among them the Greek Civil War, the Indonesian Revolution, and the 
Arab-Israeli War—while the creation of the organisation itself is given less attention.3 Some 
historians, such as Dan Plesch, have explored the wartime origins of the organisation, 
highlighting the ways in which the United States, in particular, worked to cultivate the United 
Nations alliance, and how this grouping worked to deliver the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the Bretton Woods system and the United Nations 
Charter.4 
To be sure, there were important economic, financial and relief structures established 
during this period and which were themselves ordering systems. The most famous of these, 
and ones which were linked to the discussion around a post-war organisation, were the creation 
of the UNRRA in 1943 and agreements reached at the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
	
3 Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, Volume I: The Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955 (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982); David L. Bosco,  Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making 
of the Modern World (London: Oxford University Press, 2009); Paul Kennedy, Parliament of Man: The Past, 
Present and Future of the United Nations (London: Penguin Books, 2007) 
4 Dan Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War II and Forged a Peace (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2011), p. 165. See also Plesch, ‘How the United Nations Beat Hitler and Prepared the Peace’, Global 
Society 22:1 (2008): 137-158; Plesch and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Introduction: Past as prelude, multilateralism as a 
tactic and strategy’, in Plesch and Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), Wartime Origins and the Future United Nations (New 
York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 1-14 
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Conference in July 1944.5 Important work has been published on these negotiations in recent 
years, giving rise to a body of work which more accurately describes the competing visions, 
the complex structures as well as the inherent limitations of the international order created in 
the final years of the war. The thesis engages with this literature to a certain extent, but its focus 
remains on the development of the larger post-war political and security structures deemed to 
be the foundation-stone of what was then seen as a workable international order. 
Within the scholarship that has examined the post-war planning which helped to create 
the United Nations in June 1945, there are two key dimensions which are given considerably 
less attention: the role of the United Kingdom and the role of those diplomats engaged in what 
might be called technical statecraft. Concerning the former, when historians have taken up the 
subject of the creation of the organisation, their examinations have been overwhelmingly 
weighted towards the role of the United States. Notable works by Douglas Brinkley, Townsend 
Hoopes, Ruth Russell, and Stephen Schlesinger have portrayed a process shaped and 
dominated by President Roosevelt and other political advocates of the organisation.6 Though 
	
5 See Charles Wesley Sharpe, ‘The Origins of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1939-
1943’ (Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2012). On the Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944 and the 
financial systems which it created, see Armand van Dormael, Bretton Woods: Birth of a Monetary System 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1978); Benn Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter 
White, and the Making of a New World Order (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013); Ed Conway, The 
Summit: The Biggest Battle of the Second World War—Fought Behind Closed Doors (London: Little, Brown, 
2014); Giles Scott-Smith and J. Simon Rofe (ed.), Global Perspectives on the Bretton Woods Conference and the 
Post-war World Order (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Eric Helleiner, Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: 
International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order (New York: Cornell University Press, 2016). 
For a recently published volume on the development of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, see Francine 
McKenzie, GATT and Global Order in the Post-war Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020). For a 
work examining the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, hosted in Hot Springs, Virginia, from 
May to June 1943, see Craig Alan Wilson, ‘Rehearsal for a United Nations: The Hot Springs Conference’, 
Diplomatic History 4:3 (1980): 263-281 
6 Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the U.N. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1997); Ruth B. Russell,  A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1958); Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the 
United Nations (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003) and ‘FDR’s Five Policemen: Creating the United 
Nations’, World Policy Journal 11:3 (1994): 88-93. See also Robert Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of 
Internationalism in America During World War II (New York: Atheneum, 1967); Michael Howard, ‘The United 
Nations: From War Fighting to Peace Planning’, in Ernest R. May and Angeliki E. Laiou (ed.), The Dumbarton 
Oaks Conversations and the United Nations, 1944-1994 (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and 
Collection, 1998), pp. 1-7; Lawrence Weiler and Anne Patricia Simons, The United States and the United Nations: 
The Search for International Peace and Security (New York: Manhattan Publishing, 1967); Georg Schild, Bretton 
Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American Economic and Political Postwar Planning in the Summer of 1944 
	 9 
the American contribution to the United Nations may have been the most important, this thesis 
serves as somewhat of a corrective to the scholarship which portrays the contribution of other 
nations as negligible.  
Other scholars, such as Thomas Campbell, Christopher O’Sullivan and Stephen 
Wertheim, have also examined the role of the United States; but importantly, their work has 
focused more on the contribution of diplomatic professionals—particularly officials working 
in the State Department—and how they helped to shape the Roosevelt administration’s post-
war policy.7 This thesis adopts certain characteristics of Wertheim’s approach, in particular.8 
First, it is similarly interested in the ‘below the radar’ work of the planners who drafted and 
then negotiated the structures of the international organisation.9 Second, he stresses the role of 
other motives than liberal internationalism in their efforts. In other respects, however, the 
argument advanced in this thesis counters that of Wertheim. His narrow focus on the United 
States reduces the agency of those other actors, namely the British Foreign Office, to a state of 
near passivity in American designs. Next, in seeking to question the liberal internationalist 
credentials of the founders of the United Nations—and stressing their neo-imperial aims—
Wertheim over-corrects the picture, creating an imbalanced view of what were complex liberal 
and realist motivations operating alongside one another.  
	
(London: Macmillan Press, 1995); Dorothy Robins, Experiment in Democracy: The Story of US Citizen 
Organizations in Forging the Charter of the United Nations (New York: Parkside Press, 1971); David Kay (ed.), 
The United Nations Political System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967) 
7 Texts focusing on the contribution of American diplomats include: Thomas Campbell, Masquerade Peace: 
America’s UN Policy, 1944-45 (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1973); Christopher D. O'Sullivan, 
Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008); Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist (New York: St Martin’s 
Press, 1997). Others include: J. Simon Rofe, ‘Pre-war Post-war Planning: The Phoney War, the Roosevelt 
Administration, and the Case of the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations’, Diplomacy & 
Statecraft 23 (2012): 254-279.  
8  Stephen Wertheim, ‘Instrumental Internationalism: The American Origins of the United Nations, 1940-3’, 
Journal of Contemporary History 54:2 (2019): 265-83.  
9 Erik Goldstein has referred to this as the ‘marzipan’ level. Quoted in J. Simon Rofe, ‘Prewar and wartime 
postwar planning: antecedents to the UN moment in San Francisco, 1945’, in Dan Plesch and Thomas G. Weiss 
(ed.), Wartime Origins and the Future United Nations (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 17.  
	 10 
Other scholars have set out to examine the complex interplay of competing forces 
which influenced the founding of the United Nations Organization. Glenda Sluga has written 
that the Second World War  
was the apogee of twentieth-century internationalism, when ‘international 
government’ renamed as ‘world government’ was a rhetorical commonplace. The 
significance of this apogee lay not in its utopianism but in the fine gradations of 
political realism inspired by the vogue for being internationally minded.10 
 
Sluga’s work is an important piece of intellectual history, yet when she examines the creation 
of the organisation itself, the diplomatic element is often undervalued.11  Similarly, Mark 
Mazower has sought to provide an ‘ideological prehistory’ of the United Nations in his work 
No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations.12 
Here, Mazower put forward several arguments which relate to this thesis. First, he noted that 
the idea of the United States as the sole creator of the United Nations was ‘something of an 
optical illusion’.13 Next, British intellectuals in the early twentieth century—and in particular, 
Jan Smuts and Alfred Zimmern—played crucial, if often overlooked, roles in the creation of 
the League of Nations and the United Nations. 14  Finally, their programme—and that of 
policymakers in Whitehall more broadly—towards both the League and the United Nations 
was one of ‘imperial internationalism’, in that it sought to preserve the British Empire in a 
‘democratic imperial order’.15 
Three years later, in a follow up work entitled Governing the World, Mazower 
broadened the scope of his study to include a discussion of internationalism from the early 
	
10 Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013), pp. 79-80 
11 In discussing the San Francisco Conference, for example, most of Sluga’s attention is focused on the role of the 
activists present, such as W.E.B. Du Bois, who, while important if often overlooked contributors to discussions 
about the Charter, did not account for its creation in June 1945. Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism, 
pp. 81, 89; Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, pp. 62-63 
12 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p. 18 
13 Ibid, p. 16 
14 He writes of his intention to challenge the idea that ‘the United Nations rose-like Aphrodite-from the Second 
World War, pure and uncontaminated by any significant association with that prewar failure, the League of 
Nations’. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p. 14. For his studies of Smuts and Zimmern, see ibid, pp. 28-103. 
15 Ibid, pp. 17-18, 21, 86, 192-194 
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nineteenth century to the present day. Though he abandoned some of his earlier claims about 
‘imperial internationalism’ being one of the primary influences on the British side, Mazower, 
in a chapter dedicated to the creation of the United Nations, described the way in which 
internationalist ideas were both the product of earlier conceptions and ones which ‘meshed 
with power politics in unpredictable ways’.  
Large international organizations such as the League of Nations and the UN did 
not grow up gradually. On the contrary, sponsored by Great Powers, their births 
were abrupt, and war was their midwife…Hardwired, therefore, into the new 
international bodies from the start was an inevitable tension between the narrower 
national interests that the Great Powers sought to promote through them and the 
universal ideals and the rhetoric that emanated from them.16  
 
But while Mazower’s work succeeds in highlighting the complex relationship between 
internationalism and national interest which defined much of the thinking about the post-war 
world, the way in which this played out in real time between 1939 and 1945 is discussed too 
briefly and, like his earlier work, does not focus on the all-important point of delivery—
namely, the diplomats responsible for the planning and negotiation.17 Moreover, on the topic 
of the creation of the United Nations, in particular, Mazower emphasises the role of the United 
States, while scarcely giving any credit to other powers, namely the United Kingdom. He 
writes, for example, that the rebirth of the League of Nations in the form of the United Nations 
was ‘thanks to the reengineering of the League that [Leo] Pasvolsky and his colleagues had 
carried out during the war’ and that American leaders ‘had done more than any other power to 
set [the UN] up’.18  
Mazower’s work thus continues a trend within the historical scholarship which gives 
considerably less attention to the role of other countries—especially the United Kingdom and 
	
16 Mazower, Governing the World, p. xiii 
17 Ibid, pp. 191-213; No Enchanted Palace, p. 18 
18 Leo Pasvolsky was Special Assistant to the US Secretary of State and Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group 
to Consider Post-War Economic Problems and Policies in the State Department. Mazower, Governing the World, 
pp. 212-13. More unfortunate are Mazower’s assertions that British diplomats only began ‘focusing seriously’ on 
plans for a post-war organisation in early 1944, and that the Economic and Social Council was entirely the work 
of the United States. See ibid, p. 198, 206.  
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the Soviet Union—in the creation of the United Nations.19 An exception to this tendency is 
Robert Hilderbrand’s exhaustive account of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which examined 
the negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China 
in the autumn of 1944.20  While it remains the seminal contribution to the history of this 
particular conference, Hilderbrand’s volume does not examine in detail the planning activities 
of the Foreign Office between 1942 and 1944, nor does it explore the work leading up to and 
including the Yalta and San Francisco Conferences. Outside of Hilderbrand’s study, the role 
of the Soviet Union in the creation of the organisation has been given very little attention by 
English-speaking scholars. Notable exceptions include Alexander Dallin’s book The Soviet 
Union and the United Nations and Geoffrey Roberts’s article ‘A League of Their Own’. Both 
serve as useful accounts of Soviet notions of internationalism and how this played into their 
diplomacy during the Second World War.21 
As for the scholarship relating to the role of the United Kingdom, these works have 
usually focused on individual statesmen (or, to a lesser extent, diplomats), as opposed to a more 
comprehensive treatment of the planning process which took place in the Foreign Office.22 For 
	
19 See for example, Adam Chapnick, The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005) 
20 Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar 
Security (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990) 
21 Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union and the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives 
(Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1962); Geoffrey Roberts, ‘A League of Their Own: The Soviet Origins of the 
United Nations’, Journal of Contemporary History, Special Section: Dumbarton Oaks in Historical Perspective 
54:2 (2019): 303-327. See also Charles Prince, ‘The Soviet Union and International Organizations’, American 
Journal of International Law 36:3 (1942); John N. Hazard, ‘The Soviet Union and the United Nations’, The Yale 
Law Journal 55 (1946): 1016-1035; David J. Dolff, ‘The Creation of the United Nations Organization as a Factor 
in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1943-46’ (Dissertation, University of Alberta Libraries, 2010). For an account which 
explores the role of France, see Andrew Williams, ‘France and the Origins of the United Nations, 1944-1945: ‘Si 
La France ne compte plus, qu’on nous le dise’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 28:2 (2017): 215-234; A.W. Deporte, 
De Gaulle’s Foreign Policy, 1944-1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 102-125 
22 Examples include: Adam Roberts, ‘Britain and the Creation of the United Nations’, in Roger Louis (ed.), Still 
More Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 
229-47; Geoffrey L. Goodwin, Britain and the United Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1957); Victor 
Rothwell, War Aims in the Second World War: The War Aims of the Major Belligerents, 1939-45 (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2005), pp. 64-85; Elisabeth Barker, Churchill and Eden at War (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 1978), pp. 204-217; Charles Webster, ‘The Making of the Charter of the United Nations’, History 
32:115 (1947): 16-38; William McNeill, America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-
1946 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953). Included among the many titles concerning British foreign 
policy at the Cabinet level are: Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Volume 
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example, E.J. Hughes has examined Churchill’s efforts to advance his own post-war vision, 
noting correctly that the Prime Minister was ‘one of the main obstacles to adequate British 
planning and to the actual establishment of the United Nations Organisation’. 23  Notably, 
Hughes is critical of Churchill’s views, calling them ‘seriously flawed’ and representing 
‘sporadic bursts of imaginative energy’ rather than anything resembling a coordinated 
approach. Had these ideas been accepted, Hughes argues, they ‘would have been fatal to the 
establishment of the United Nations’.24 Some of the evidence uncovered in the course of this 
research project supports this view. Other historians, such as Raymond Douglas, have 
examined the post-war thinking of prominent Labour Party intellectuals and politicians in the 
1930s and 1940s. In doing so, Douglas has offered one of the more extended examinations of 
the Foreign Office’s first major planning document in the autumn of 1942, as well as the 
Cabinet debate which this memorandum fuelled.25 While this thesis builds on one of the 
subjects of Douglas’s scholarship to some extent, it also counters one of his central 
arguments—namely, that the historian Arnold Toynbee ‘laid down the foundations of Britain’s 
United Nations policy’.26 Furthermore, Douglas’s work, despite its focus on some of the central 
figures within the Labour Party, does not examine in any rigorous way the detailed planning 
	
II (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1971) and op. cit. Volume V (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1976); 
Christopher Hill, Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy, October 1938 – June 1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991); David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41: A Study in 
Competitive Cooperation (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981); David Reynolds, Warren 
F. Kimball and A.O. Chubarian (ed.), Allies at War: The Soviet, American, and British Experience, 1939-1945 
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994); Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin: The War They Waged and 
the Peace They Sought (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957); Keith Sainsbury, Churchill and Roosevelt 
at War: The War They Fought and the Peace They Hoped to Make (New York: New York University Press, 
1994); Terry Anderson, The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944-47 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1981); Anthony Polonsky (ed.), The Great Powers and the Policy Question, 1941-45 (London: 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 1976) 
23  E.J. Hughes, ‘Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organisation’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 9:4 (1974), p. 194 
24 Ibid, p. 194 
25 Raymond Douglas, The Labour Party, Nationalism and Internationalism, 1939-1951 (London: Routledge, 
2004), pp. 97-135 
26 He writes that, ‘Foreign Office mandarins like Jebb did not devise their own framework for world government 
and press it upon reluctant Labour leaders, but rather appropriated, without attribution, ideas which those same 
Labour ministers had solicited from the F[oreign] R[research and ] P[ress] S[ervice] and for whose serious 
consideration by the government they were largely responsible.’ Douglas, Labour Party, pp. 106-107, 112, 118-
19 
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and complex negotiation undertaken by members of the Foreign Office between 1942 and 
1945. 
The works that are of most relevance to the thesis exist in a small and rather niche 
subset of scholarship that examines the work of individual diplomats—rather than the Foreign 
Office as a whole—in this period. The three diplomats identified as the key players in this study 
have all been the subject of individual studies. These works provide invaluable material for 
this thesis, although they address the specific story of the creation of the United Nations to 
varying degrees.27 Sean Greenwood’s biography of Gladwyn Jebb titled Titan at the Foreign 
Office has one chapter dedicated to Jebb’s work in creating the post-war international 
organisation, titled ‘The Brain Behind the United Nations’. The  work of Jebb and Webster 
forms the backbone of Greenwood’s writing in this chapter, which argues that, ‘at the core [of 
British planning] remained the working papers and structures which were the product of 
Webster’s and Gladwyn’s teamwork.’28 In explaining their approach to the post-war world, 
Greenwood writes that Jebb saw the organisation as ‘no more than a screen behind which the 
essential authority of the Great Powers would be concealed’, while Webster ‘represented more 
the idealist tradition of Woodrow Wilson’.29 These general characterisations are true to a 
certain extent, though they tend to mask the nuance inherent in both Jebb’s and Webster’s 
thinking. As will be argued, Jebb’s more realist thinking also incorporated internationalist 
elements, while Webster’s idealism was predicated upon certain fundamental notions about the 
balance of power. Though Greenwood’s book is an important contribution to the scholarship 
on the British role in the creation of the United Nations and is thus a foundational text upon 
	
27 T.G. Otte and Keith Neilson, in their biographical sketches of Permanent Under-Secretaries, have provided a 
useful account of Alexander Cadogan’s background and professional experience; and David Dilks’ edited 
collection of Cadogan’s wartime diaries is filled with essential context on the man, his work and his influence. 
See Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte, The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854-1946 (London: 
Routledge, 2006); David Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945 (London: Faber and Faber, 
2010) 
28 Sean Greenwood, Titan at the Foreign Office: Gladwyn Jebb and the Shaping of the Modern World (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), p. 200 
29 Ibid, p. 198 
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which this thesis rests, his account relies on a limited selection of Foreign Office archives, the 
majority of which were Jebb’s professional papers.30 It is the object of this thesis to undertake 
a wider, more comprehensive view of the Foreign Office planning for a post-war international 
organisation.  
A second foundational text is P.A. Reynolds and E.J. Hughes’s examination of Charles 
Webster’s contribution to the United Nations Charter, as described in their book entitled The 
Historian as Diplomat. Organised around the diary entries of Webster from 1939 to 1945, 
Reynolds and Hughes set out to describe both Webster’s contribution to the planning during 
the war, as well as the ‘processes through which British policy towards the creation of a new 
world organization after the Second World War came to be formulated’.31 This thesis agrees 
with a number of points put forward by Reynolds and Hughes in their analysis. As they rightly 
point out, Jebb, Webster and Cadogan weighed and prioritised the interrelated objectives of 
preserving British influence, maintaining peace in Europe and in the international system, and 
constructing an international organisation. Importantly, Reynolds and Hughes suggest that 
Webster tended to prioritise the international security and international organisation elements, 
whereas Jebb  was more concerned with maintaining British influence.32 They also mention 
the fact that the development of the post-war world organisation was the result of ‘an interplay 
among individuals and groups…with varying interests and objectives’, as well as ideas which 
grew up in an intellectual and institutional context, as opposed to, as Reynolds and Hughes put 
it, these ideas ‘springing fully-fledged from the mind of Webster like Aphrodite from the sea-
foam’.33 These stemmed from a recognition, they note, that planning for the post-war order 
‘involved looking behind pressing day-to-day problems to the imagining of future global 
	
30 Greenwood, Titan at the Foreign Office, p. 431 
31 P.A. Reynolds and E.J. Hughes, The Historian as Diplomat: Charles Kingsley Webster and the United Nations, 
1939-1946 (London: Martin Robertson, 1976), pp. 107-8 
32 Ibid, pp. 85-6 
33 Ibid, p. 89 
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constellations…[requiring] an insight into the deep underlying trends and tendencies in the 
onward march of world history’.34  
At the same time, this thesis also aims to revise certain points—some minor, others 
fundamental—which stem from the fact that, as they themselves admit, the study was ‘drawn 
very largely from a single source’.35 Among them is an argument advanced that Alexander 
Cadogan was not involved with the planning process until April 1944, when, in fact, he was 
involved in varying degrees throughout. Elsewhere, Reynolds and Hughes paint a picture of 
Jebb and Webster’s plans serving as the opposition to Churchill’s regionalism.36 While this is 
largely correct, their account ignores the extent to which regional designs were initially a part 
of the Economic and Reconstruction Department’s plans between 1942 and 1943. Perhaps most 
importantly, Reynolds and Hughes, at times, overstate the importance of Webster in the 
planning process. They write that ‘the ideas that had been developed largely by Webster out of 
his historical knowledge and insight…eventually formed the basis for the instructions to the 
group of British negotiators at Dumbarton Oaks.’ This assertion is later followed up by a 
seemingly contradictory statement, namely that ‘in a broader and more rounded frame the role 
of Webster might seem to bulk less large.’37  
Crucial to the study of these wartime diplomats and officials is an understanding of 
their own intellectualism as it relates to matters of international history and politics. Though 
Reynolds and Hughes go some way in articulating certain aspects of Webster’s worldview, 
other scholars such as Ian Hall, have examined Webster’s international thought more in depth. 
In his article ‘The Art and Practice of a Diplomatic Historian’, Hall described certain tenets of 
	
34 Reynolds and Hughes, Historian as Diplomat, p. 88 
35 Ibid, pp. 107-8 
36 Ibid, pp. 98-100 
37 Ibid, pp. 100, 108. Other scholarship has highlighted Reynolds and Hughes assessment of Webster’s role in 
planning for the United Nations. See Inderjeet Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative 
Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 102-104  
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Webster’s intellectualism, and in particular, how his approach to historical study shaped his 
thinking on international politics. In fitting in with one of the main themes of this thesis, Hall 
is correct to note that Webster’s views were ‘heterodox’ and do not fit into ‘realist’ or ‘idealist’ 
categories.38 Added to this is the extent to which he drew upon history and specific historical 
figures—among them Castlereagh, Palmerston and Woodrow Wilson—who helped to shape 
his approach to British foreign policy and international institutions.39 Where this thesis differs 
from Hall’s study, however, is in the attention it gives to the way in which Webster’s thought 
translated directly into his proposals for a future world organisation.  
Though there has yet to be a detailed examination of the planning that took place within 
the Economic and Reconstruction Department during the Second World War, there are several 
scholars who have contributed to an understanding of the department’s work during the war. 
The first is British legal historian Brian Simpson, whose book Human Rights and the End of 
Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention examines the creation of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Britain’s role throughout.40 
Spanning over 1100 pages, Simpson’s work, in theory, focuses on the legal history of the 
convention, yet his scholarship wades, impressively so, into diplomatic history. As such, he 
spends time examining the way in which the Foreign Office, and in particular the Economic 
and Reconstruction Department, addressed the question of human rights, domestic jurisdiction 
and colonial trusteeship within their planning during the war. 41  These subjects, while 
fundamental to the wider history of the creation of the United Nations Organization, are not 
dealt with in detail here. Instead, the thesis relies more on the existing scholarship around these 
	
38 Ian Hall, ‘The Art and Practice of a Diplomatic Historian: Sir Charles Webster, 1886-1961’, International 
Politics 42 (2005): 470-490, here pp. 480; 486-7 
39 Ibid, pp. 480-84 
40  A.W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European 
Convention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
41 Ibid, pp. 221-272. He has argued that it was not until after the war that the Foreign Office began to show more 
interest in the question of human rights. See ibid, pp. 44-45, 243-248 
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themes while focusing on the primary political and security dimensions of the future 
organisation.42  
The second major study which touches on the work of the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department is Julian Lewis’s comprehensive examination of British post-war 
strategic planning.43 Despite focusing on the evolution of a wider defence strategy, as opposed 
to the planning which went into the creation of the United Nations Organization, his study is a 
meticulous account which touches on the character of British foreign policy during the war. 
The thesis agrees with certain aspects of Lewis’s account. He writes that, until the Normandy 
invasions in June 1944, the Foreign Office ‘dominated’ long-term planning within the British 
government, yet these officials, he writes, were often not recognised by the key decision-
makers.44 He also points out that Foreign Office officials, namely Nigel Ronald and Richard 
Law, were those responsible for encouraging the Chiefs of Staff to begin considering post-war 
plans.45 Elsewhere, his discussion of the numerous planning bodies and inter-departmental 
committees—as well as the way in which he traces the memoranda (including the Four Power 
Plan and the United Nations Plan) which they produced—provides a body of scholarship which 
buttresses much of the research found in this thesis.46 
	
42 Another essential text is William Roger Louis’ Imperialism at Bay, in which he traces the origins of the 
trusteeship system of the United Nations, and in doing so, reveals important insights into American anti-
imperialist motivations and methods, as well as British suspicions and attempts to curtail challenges to its empire. 
Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 1941-1945: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977). On the subject of the Economic and Reconstruction Department’s early work on 
relief and reconstruction problems, see Sharpe, ‘The Origins of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration, 1939-1943’, pp. 236-280, 328-457. 
43 Julian Lewis, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942-47 [2nd 
edition] (London: Frank Cass, 2005) 
44 Lewis writes that, ‘Schemes could be drawn up on a grand scale in the fairly sure knowledge that the people 
who really mattered had neither the time nor the inclination to give them their attention.’ Lewis, Changing 
Direction, p. 335 
45  Nigel Ronald: Head of the General Department, 1939-42, Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
(Economic), 1942-47. Richard Law: Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, 1941-43; Minister of State, 1943-
45 
46 For an example see Lewis, Changing Direction, pp. 10-44 
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At the same time, the thesis also pushes back against some of Lewis’s more critical 
arguments concerning the Foreign Office. He writes that the plans of British diplomats 
expressed ‘political pipe-dreams’ all while ignoring the realities of a hostile Soviet Union.   
It would appear that, to some extent, the Foreign Office gradually became a victim 
of its own propaganda and a dupe of its own wishful thinking, quite apart from the 
pressures upon it to mirror American enthusiasm for the United Nations ideal. Cut 
off from the realities of power, the diplomats mistook the shadow for the substance 
of international relations.47 
 
The structure of policymaking with the Foreign Office, he says, led to policies which came 
about ‘almost haphazardly according to which individual bestirred himself on a given question 
at a given moment’.48 Lacking in his study is an account of the way in which the Foreign Office 
sought to balance its own plans with that of the United States and Soviet Union. Indeed, the 
extent to which British planning for the post-war period changed in response to contact with 
the ideas and plans of American and Soviet diplomats—not to mention those of the Dominion 
governments as well as the western allies—is crucial to the wider history.  
The thesis therefore seeks to break new ground in the literature concerning Britain and 
the creation of the United Nations by offering the most comprehensive assessment to date of 
the work of Foreign Office officials associated with the planning, drafting and negotiation 
stages. This study is best understood as a work of traditional diplomatic history, and it is best 
classed with the work of historians of British foreign policy. On the one hand, it models itself 
on approaches undertaken by Zara Steiner, T.G. Otte and Keith Neilson, all of whom have 
made extensive use of Foreign Office, Cabinet and personal archives to explain how the 
Foreign Office and individual officials arrived at certain decisions of foreign policy.49 The 
	
47 Lewis, Changing Direction, p. 337 
48 He contrasts this with the system overseen by the Chiefs of Staff, who, he claims, were able to provide ‘straight 
answers to straight questions’. Lewis, Changing Direction, p. 338 
49 Examples include: Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969); T.G. Otte, The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Keith Neilson, ‘Orme Sargent, Appeasement and British Policy 
in Europe, 1933-39’, Twentieth Century British History 21:1 (2010): 1-28  
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focus on the diplomats and officials responsible for foreign policymaking, in particular, is an 
approach which has long been encouraged by historians such as Herbert Butterfield, who wrote 
that, ‘These sub-governmental, sub-ministerial actors in the drama are bound to be the real 
objective of a genuine enquiry into British foreign policy; and the real secrets and the real 
problems are situated in the very nature of things at this level.’50  
The study relies extensively on the records of the Foreign Office and Cabinet—housed 
at the British National Archives in Kew—as well as the personal papers of the central 
protagonists, located in Cambridge and London. The papers of other individuals associated 
with the planning and negotiation stages, such as Eden, Lord Halifax and Arnold Toynbee, are 
also referenced at various points in this work. Entries from the edited diaries of a number of 
officials and statesmen, among them Alexander Cadogan, Charles Webster, Oliver Harvey, 
Ivan Maisky and Edward Stettinius, constitute vital sources for much of this research and are 
drawn upon throughout the work.51 The memoirs of Eden, Jebb, and Cordell Hull, among 
others, were taken into account, though reference to these are limited given the way in which 
hindsight can alter opinions.52 The same can be said for the published works by Jebb and 
Webster which appeared in the years after 1945.53  
Because the thesis is primarily focused on the post-war planning which took place 
within the Foreign Office during the war, there has been limited reliance on the records of other 
governments involved in the creation of the United Nations, most notably the United States 
	
50 Quoted in Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), pp. 1-2 
51 David Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945 (London: Faber and Faber, 2010); Reynolds 
and Hughes, Historian as Diplomat; Gabriel Gorodetsky (ed.), The Maisky Diaries: The Wartime Revelations of 
Stalin’s Ambassador in London (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015); John Harvey (ed.), The War Diaries 
of Oliver Harvey, 1941-1945 (London: Collins, 1978); Ben Pimlott (ed.), The Second World War Diary of Hugh 
Dalton, 1940-1945 (London: Johnathan Cape, 1986); Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring (ed.), The 
Diaries of Edward Stettinius Jr, 1943-46 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975) 
52 Gladwyn Jebb, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1972); Cordell Hull, The 
Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Volume II (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948); Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: 
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53 Gladwyn Jebb, ‘Review of Reynolds and Hughes’ Historian as Diplomat’, International Affairs 53:3 (1977): 
479-481; Charles Webster, ‘The Making of the Charter of the United Nations’, History 32:115 (1947): 16-38 
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and Soviet Union. The records of State Department officials, most notably Sumner Welles and 
Harley Notter, were consulted but are referenced sparingly. 54  The American documents 
included within the Foreign Relations of the United States volumes are relied upon at various 
points, especially when examining bilateral or tripartite meetings in which British officials 
were involved.55   
 
Structure of Foreign Office planning  
In addition to ideas and individuals, the study also deals with the more mechanical and 
technical aspects of the international order built out of the war—and the decision-making 
processes which fed into this. The British role in the creation of the United Nations was as 
much the product of planning as deliberation, the latter taking place both within and outside 
the British government itself.56 The planning of the Economic and Reconstruction Department 
had to weather the critique of other officials in the Foreign Office, Cabinet ministers (and their 
respective government departments), the Dominion and allied governments, and most 
importantly, the American and Soviet governments. Indeed, the United Nations Organization 
itself was the product of a complex process of diplomacy. The thesis will examine this process 
along with the planning activity itself, but before doing so, it is worth outlining some of the 
policymaking and decision-making structures which existed within the Foreign Office.  
From 1942 onwards, the Economic and Reconstruction Department remained the 
engine room of planning for a post-war international organisation. Gladwyn Jebb, as head of 
	
54 The papers of Sumner Welles are located at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York. The 
papers of Harley Notter are housed within the US National Archives at College Park, Maryland. See also Harley 
Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975) 
55 Specifically, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1941, Volume I; 1942, Volume I; 1943, 
Volume I; 1943, Volume III; 1943, Conferences at Washington and Quebec; 1944, Volume I 
56 In the conduct of relations with other governments, the Foreign Office also worked with the Colonial Office, 
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respectively. David Dilks, ‘The British Foreign Office Between the Wars’, in B.J.C. McKercher and D.J. Moss 
(ed.), Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939: Memorial Essays Honouring C.J. Lowe 
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this department, was instrumental in defining its brief, which extended from an initial 
responsibility for relief and reconstruction matters to eventually addressing the most important 
questions of a post-war international political and security order. Beginning in 1943, he began 
to involve Webster in the planning process for a post-war international organisation, and from 
this point forward, they remained the two most influential planners within the Foreign Office. 
Jebb and Webster were joined by other junior officials, among them Paul Falla and John 
Coulson, yet their contributions, as this thesis will make clear, were more limited.57 
Throughout the process, the department’s memoranda were subject to a larger review 
by departments within the Foreign Office, a bureaucratic process which allowed other 
influential diplomats—many of them with their own ideas of what a post-war order might 
resemble—to offer constructive criticism. The first port of call for documents produced by 
Jebb and Webster was Nigel Ronald, the Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs whose 
responsibility included economic issues. Ronald’s feedback, often in the form of long hand-
written minutes, was vital to the shape that Jebb and Webster’s plans ultimately took. From 
there, papers produced by the Economic and Reconstruction Department were often circulated 
to political departments where senior diplomats such as Frank Roberts (Head of the Central 
Department), Christopher Warner (Head of the Northern Department), or Nevile Butler (Head 
of the American Department) were able to offer their comments.58 Each of these departments, 
and especially their senior officials, viewed the Economic and Reconstruction Department’s 
memoranda through the lens of their respective briefs; but at the same time, officials tended to 
take into account a wider strategic view, one which involved long-term calculations about the 
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58 Frank Roberts: Central Department, 1941-43; Head of the Central Department, 1943-45; British Ambassador 
in Moscow, 1945-48. Christopher Warner: Head of the Political Intelligence Department, 1941; Head of the 
Northern Department, 1942-46. Nevile Butler: British Embassy in Washington, 1939-1941; Head of North 
American Department, 1941-44; Assistant Under-Secretary, 1944-47 
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future international system and Britain’s place within it.59 Nowhere was this more apparent 
than in the discussion over the first major memorandum produced by the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department, the ‘Four Power Plan’ (which will be discussed in chapter two), 
and in discussions of a possible ‘Western Security Group’ (examined in chapters five, six and 
seven). 
In addition to their circulation to the political departments within the Foreign Office, 
the memoranda on post-war organisation which came from the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department were also reviewed by more senior officials, such as Assistant Under Secretary 
William Strang, Deputy Under-Secretary Orme Sargent and finally, the Permanent Under-
Secretary, Alexander Cadogan. The input from these senior officials varied at different stages 
of the war. For instance, Orme Sargent had been involved with the earliest attempts at 
developing post-war aims in the early stages of the war and also contributed to Jebb’s earliest 
drafts of the Four Power Plan, yet he remained somewhat removed from the later stages of 
planning for a post-war organisation due, in part, to other briefs, among them the post-war 
policy towards Germany.60  
Alexander Cadogan, in his position as Permanent Under-Secretary, served as one of the 
crucial links—the other being the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden—between the crafting of 
policy within the Foreign Office and its delivery within the Cabinet. As Keith Neilson and T.G. 
Otte have highlighted, after the defeat of France in May 1940, Cadogan came to be increasingly 
relied upon by Cabinet ministers to give direct advice on matters of foreign policy.61 His role 
at the Atlantic Conference of August 1941, where he joined Churchill as the only advisor 
	
59 Generally speaking, the Foreign Office had a pyramid structure of hierarchy. Departments were overseen by an 
Under-Secretary, and above them sat (in order of seniority) the Deputy Under-Secretary, the Permanent Under-
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dedicated specifically to foreign affairs, certainly attests to this fact.62 Moreover, as this thesis 
demonstrates, despite his increased responsibility, Cadogan became more involved in the 
details of post-war planning as they developed into 1943 and 1944.  Indeed, as planning 
progressed, Jebb and Webster came to see Cadogan as the senior official who could carry their 
plans through, both with timely interjections during Cabinet meetings and most importantly, 
as head of the British delegation at Dumbarton Oaks. Here, his contribution did not go 
unnoticed. Edward Stettinius, head of the American delegation at the conference and later the 
American Secretary of State, wrote to Cadogan in June 1945 that not only was his work 
‘invaluable’ but that his ability ‘to find the right answer to reconcile conflicting points of view’ 
had made the difference.63 Thus, Cadogan came to serve, along with Jebb and Webster, as one 
of the most important British officials in the development of the United Nations. The influence 
of these three men in particular was such that, in selecting a British representative to the United 
Nations Preparatory Conference in the autumn of 1945, Jebb wrote to Cadogan that there was 
no one on the British side who knew more about the organisation than he, Cadogan and the 
‘Prof’.64  
Another important aspect of this story—as unfolds in subsequent chapters—is the way 
in which this group of diplomats saw themselves as a breed apart from other groups: namely 
military officials, politicians and intellectuals. The historian Brian McKercher has noted that 
during the interwar years, there was a certain ‘homogeneity of the class and educational 
background of the “professional” diplomats, the unstated assumption that they were members 
of the most socially exclusive and prestigious department of state in Whitehall’.65 This air of 
	
62 Cadogan was hand-picked by Churchill to attend the conference, where he served as the only foreign policy 
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64 Letter from Jebb to Cadogan, undated, Papers of Gladwyn Jebb, Churchill College Archives Centre, University 
of Cambridge [hereafter GLAD] 2/1/1 
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superiority, as will be seen as various points in this history, coloured Foreign Office views of 
bodies like the Chiefs of Staff, many of whom were seen as capable warriors but unrefined 
statesmen. In the view of some officials, and especially Jebb, they simply did not grasp the 
complexities of diplomacy.66 
The same could be said of politicians, a number of whom, wishing to put their stamp 
on the post-war international order, inevitably clashed with the work of the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department. Chief among them was the Prime Minister, who regularly 
frustrated Foreign Office officials both with his refusal to take up their papers in Cabinet and 
his repeated efforts to influence the planning himself. Added to this were other leaders within 
the Commonwealth, such as South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts, as well as British 
ministers such as Sir Stafford Cripps and Leo Amery who submitted their own proposals.67 
The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was himself often supportive of the recommendations 
of his subordinates, and undoubtedly played an important part both in Cabinet debates and at 
the San Francisco Conference.68 Yet in terms of understanding the more detailed planning, 
Jebb and Webster often felt that the Foreign Secretary lacked a complete grasp of the various 
moving parts. As Jebb remarked in May 1944, ‘He has no mind, only a mass of antennae.’69  
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In addition to their frequent struggles with political superiors, Foreign Office officials 
also engaged in a kind of intellectual sparring with contemporary commentators and 
academics, many of whom espoused their own visions of international order. In his first major 
recommendation of post-war policy, Jebb warned that they must avoid the ‘facile idealisms of 
the [H.G.] Wellsian or Clarence Streit variety’, which he considered utopian visions detached 
from practical politics.70 Even the preeminent academics working for the Foreign Office in 
these years—men such as Arnold Toynbee and Alfred Zimmern—were not spared from such 
critiques, which often stemmed from a rather shallow reading of their academic and popular 
works. Jebb’s reflexive hostility to Toynbee, in particular, was on display in the early stages of 
planning, when he wrote of the latter that, ‘All the sentimentalists and idealists, both in this 
country and in the United States...will plunge like the Gadarene swine down this short-cut to 
salvation.’71  
Far from rejecting outright the views of intellectuals, however, Jebb and others in the 
Foreign Office were attentive to the work and suggestions of certain thinkers. Scholars such as 
Arnold Wolfers and William Fox of Yale’s Institute of International Studies, whose writing on 
the balance of power and collective security belied simplistic notions of realism versus 
idealism, were viewed by Jebb and his colleagues as in tune with reality of international 
politics.72 The most notable example of this interplay with intellectuals, however, was the 
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incorporation of Charles Webster himself, a Professor of International History prior to the war, 
into the Economic and Reconstruction Department. One of the foremost supporters of 
internationalism and the League of Nations in the interwar years, Webster won the attention 
and eventual respect of Jebb because, in the latter’s view, he was a ‘great power man’. Indeed, 
Webster’s expertise on international organisation—dating, as it did, back to the Congress of 
Vienna—made him a prized asset to the department most responsible for the planning of a 
post-war organisation.73 
That Webster was able to move from his career as a university professor to the centre 
of post-war planning within the Foreign Office was a product of the demands of wartime; but 
at the same time, it also reflected a more systemic reality of mid-century British diplomacy—
namely, that these individuals, whether diplomats or academics, were members of an elite 
social and intellectual milieu. Nowhere was this more apparent than at Chatham House, where 
from the 1920s onwards, prominent politicians, civil servants, military officers, diplomats and 
academics gathered to discuss issues in international affairs. Inderjeet Parmar has noted the 
‘numerous connections between Chatham House and sections of the British elite’, with many 
members having been educated at Oxford or Cambridge and belonging to exclusive social 
clubs.74 It is no coincidence that Arnold Toynbee, the Director of Studies at Chatham House 
and arguably the greatest British historian of his generation, was seconded to the Cabinet 
Committee on War Aims in the autumn 1940 as one of the few non-ministerial members.75   
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Lastly, it is important to note that this triumvirate of officials, while the most significant 
in planning and negotiating the post-war international organisation, were not operating within 
a vacuum in the British government. Other officials—both at the junior and senior level, and 
across government departments—provided crucial direction which influenced the plans of the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department. John Maynard Keynes, who played one of the most 
important roles in the Treasury during the war, provided an important spur to Foreign Office 
planning in the early years of the conflict.76 Later, during the deliberations at the Dumbarton 
Oaks and San Francisco conferences, one of the influential voices was that of Sir William 
Malkin, the Foreign Office legal advisor.77 Much of his work involved the codification of 
political agreements which had been reached between the delegations present—a thankless but 
invaluable task. Though his contribution, along with that of other officials such as Keynes, will 
be referenced, it will not be examined in critical detail. The thesis will focus primarily on the 
work of the officials who were most responsible for the planning and negotiation of a post-war 
political and security order.  
 
Key assumptions behind Foreign Office planning 
In examining the approaches of these officials and departments within the Foreign Office, it is 
crucial to highlight certain core assumptions on which they operated. First was the 
consideration of Britain’s future status as a world power. One historian of British foreign policy 
in the period has written that ‘the Foreign Office tried to hang on to great power status by 
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engaging in a kind of diplomacy devoid of real power.’78 That Britain was a power inexorably 
declining during the Second World War has been a popular theme in historical accounts, but 
one which has faced some pushback in the last decade. David Edgerton, in particular, has 
highlighted the fact that the United Kingdom, even in May 1940, retained the ‘world’s largest 
navy, greatest aircraft production of any country, and a small but uniquely mechanized army’.79 
Though it suffered a ‘stupendous relative decline’, due largely to American growth, the country 
still remained a ‘very powerful player’ at war’s end.80 Important, too, was the perceptions held 
by both the United States and Soviet Union that Britain and its empire would remain one of the 
most powerful international actors.81  
Of more relevance to this thesis, however, are the perceptions of British strength and 
influence which existed among Foreign Office officials throughout the war. Victor Rothwell 
has written that there was an ‘assumption of British Great Power status’ which was ‘shared…by 
all or almost all Foreign Office officials and by the leading British politicians of the time 
concerned with foreign policy’. While this is true—and is something evident throughout the 
thesis—there was also, Rothwell notes, a ‘nagging doubt’ present during the war about the 
United Kingdom’s material and financial power relative to the United States and Soviet 
Union.82 These doubts were intensified by warnings from certain quarters, such as the Treasury 
writing in 1940 that the government would struggle to fund a war unaided for multiple years.83 
The disparity in economic and military power was not lost on members of the Foreign Office, 
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and in particular the Economic and Reconstruction Department. As Jebb wrote in his first major 
planning document for the post-war world, ‘We must, on the one hand, either have some 
powerful ally or allies, or cease to be a World Power, and, on the other hand, we cannot expect 
to have powerful allies unless we are powerful ourselves.’84  
In the view of many Foreign Office officials, the source of British power was, to a large 
degree, dependent on the ability of the United Kingdom to draw on the support of the Empire 
and Commonwealth. Jebb made clear in that same planning document that, ‘We have to 
maintain our position as an Empire and a Commonwealth. If we fail to do so we cannot exist 
as a world Power.’85 Crucial pillars of the British Empire, however, were in question. The 
Indian Congress had, in July 1940, demanded complete independence from the United 
Kingdom after the war.86 Japanese advances into Malaya, Hong Kong, Singapore and Burma 
between 1941 and 1942—a situation worsened by the need to counter Germany in Europe and 
Italy in the Mediterranean—led to questions not only about Britain’s ability to defend its 
Empire, but about its global role more broadly.87 Nonetheless, many Foreign Office officials 
held onto a view which, as David Dilks has written, already existed in the interwar years. 
‘Britain’s position as a great Power, at least in the minds of her ministers and leading civil 
servants, rested to such a degree upon the possession of Empire that the notion of treating parts 
of it as disposable seemed too dire to contemplate.’88 Perhaps as important was a notion, as 
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John Kent has described, that Britain’s weaker position during the war was ‘a temporary rather 
than a permanent phenomenon’.89 
 Closely tied to the perception of imperial strength was an assumption held by a number 
of Foreign Office officials that the United Kingdom could boost their power relative to the 
United States and the Soviet Union by drawing on the support of acquiescent Dominion 
governments. Jebb wrote to a colleague that ‘Unless we can get some or all of the Dominions 
to agree with us on first principles, we are severely handicapped in putting forward any 
proposal of a general nature for world order after the war to the Americans and the Russians.’90 
His thinking, however, was clouded by what would prove to be an over-confident 
assumption—namely, that the United Kingdom would lead and the Dominion governments 
would follow. As he wrote in the early months of planning, ‘the Dominions may growl and 
grouse [but] they will eventually accept such a lead on our part.’91 As the negotiations over an 
international organisation developed throughout the war, however, Jebb and the Foreign Office 
found that the Dominion governments were, at times, some of the most outspoken critics of 
their proposals. 
In the course of planning for the post-war world, there was much debate on the question 
of whether the United Kingdom should give priority to the Empire and Commonwealth or the 
European continent. Some Cabinet members, such as the Secretary of State for India Leo 
Amery, sought salvation in the former and suggested that they leave Europe to its own devices. 
The majority of Foreign Office officials, however, viewed British leadership of Europe as 
essential to its own survival. Germany could not be allowed to start another war, and in line 
with a long tradition of British foreign policy, they could not allow the continent to be 
dominated by a state or group of states hostile to the United Kingdom. Some officials, such as 
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Jebb, went as far as to say that the continent was the ‘cradle and matrix’ of their civilization, 
and should Britain forego an influential role in the future, there was a risk that ‘our particular 
type of civilisation must inevitably crumble’.92 This is not to say that members of the Foreign 
Office ignored or ‘gave up’ on Britain’s overseas interests—indeed, it was the contrary—but 
their principal focus rested first and foremost on the relief, reconstruction and future ordering 
of the European continent.93  
Elsewhere, the assumptions concerning the post-war intentions of the United States and 
Soviet Union were arguably the two most important elements in Foreign Office planning 
during the war. Views toward each government varied from pessimism to cynicism, but the 
common understanding was that future cooperation with both was a necessity. Concerning the 
United States, many officials held views which were in varying degrees patronizing, suspicious 
and uncertain.94 Some felt that the Roosevelt administration was keen to advance anti-colonial 
policies which might undermine the British Empire, and at the same time, they were certain 
that in the Americans’ moral quest, they were naïve. 95  As the Head of the American 
Department Nevile Butler noted, ‘the United States will soon find they cannot run the show 
without us, and that we understand a lot more than they about the running.’96 Officials felt that 
Americans had a propensity for making grand moral statements, with little regard for the future 
implications of such pronouncements. An official who worked in the British Embassy in 
Washington throughout the war wrote in 1945 that: 
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Statements of general principles are so much in the blood of the Americans and so 
much part of their traditional methods of thought that they are not only a temptation 
they find hard to resist but almost an end in themselves which it is incumbent on 
an American government to secure.97  
 
The Atlantic Charter, in particular, was a document to which the British contribution was 
as important as the American; but in the months and years after its signing, some officials in 
the Foreign Office viewed it as a ‘rather conspicuous document’, the principles of which ‘could 
be applied to almost anything’.98 Regardless, American support for British interests in the post-
war world was viewed as a strategic necessity and would become tenet of British post-war 
policy.  
The key assumption, however, was that the United States was comprised of an isolationist 
public and Congress being dragged along by an internationalist President, a perception which 
led the Foreign Office to employ two tactics in particular. The first was that the British 
government would need to adopt the general lines of American plans, broadly speaking, and to 
influence these ideas where possible. Second was that American citizens should be made to 
feel that the organisation itself was largely an American creation, so as to ensure continued 
public support for the institution. Even at the end of the San Francisco Conference, where the 
United Nations Charter was signed, Jebb wrote that Britain’s policy remained ‘not to emphasise 
our achievements in public, but rather to allow the Americans to claim the principal credit for 
the production of the Charter as a whole’.99  
Foreign Office perceptions of Soviet Russia were just as important as their views of the 
United States, particularly in the first years of the conflict. As one Foreign Office memorandum 
from the period stated plainly, ‘We may find ourselves between a moral and distant America 
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and an amoral, but very present, Russia.’ 100  Given their concerns over the future of the 
European continent, many officials highlighted the fact that Soviet interest in post-war Europe 
was guaranteed while American involvement remained uncertain. Thus, it was essential to not 
alienate Moscow, and if possible, it would be a strategic boon to develop a cooperative 
relationship. Towards this end, in the weeks after the Atlantic Charter was signed, some in the 
Foreign Office recommended that a parallel ‘Volga Charter’ be presented to the Russians, so 
as to balance the agreement recently signed by Churchill and Roosevelt.  
Even if British officials remained suspicious and uncertain of American intentions, their 
views towards the Soviet Union were more pessimistic still.101 Stalin’s deal with Hitler in 1939 
loomed large, and Eden’s first wartime meeting with the Soviet leader in December 1941 led 
Foreign Office officials towards three basic assumptions: Soviet leaders had post-war designs 
of their own which were based primarily on security concerns, that their immense power might 
make such visions a foregone conclusion, and that Britain needed to exert diplomatic leverage 
before Soviet military advances rendered their influence obsolete.102 The Anglo-Soviet Treaty 
in May 1942, the Moscow Declaration in October 1943, and indeed, the future international 
organisation itself, were seen by Foreign Office officials as ways both to forge a cooperative 
spirit with Moscow and to bind them into post-war commitments which would, in turn, act as 
a kind of restraint on future ambitions.103 Thus, the creation of an international organisation 
came to be viewed by the Foreign Office as a way to maintain Anglo-Soviet relations through 
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the common objectives of holding Germany down and maintaining peace and security 
throughout the world.  
Historians across generations have been divided on the causes and outcomes of the 
Foreign Office assessment of Soviet intentions throughout the war. Julian Lewis and Lothar 
Kettenacker, among others, have criticised the Foreign Office attitude as naïve, while others, 
such as Martin Folly and Martin Kitchen have considered it a reasonable position based on the 
realities of the period.104 As this thesis will argue, the desire among many Foreign Office 
officials to establish a post-war organisation only added to the willingness to cooperate with 
the Soviet Union, though this did not stop these diplomats from attempting to create insurance 
measures, most notably in the form of a western security alliance. 
 
Substance of Foreign Office planning 
It was against this backdrop that Foreign Office officials fastened upon strategic planning for 
the post-war world. Their work left an indelible mark on the United Nations Organization, a 
point which will become clear in the course of subsequent chapters. Existing historical accounts 
note that the inclusion of France on the security council was the notable British influence. 
While important, this was hardly the singular or even the most important British proposal 
which was adopted. The Foreign Office contributed directly to the design of certain 
mechanisms which would ensure that the organisation respected the rights of smaller powers, 
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allowed for the peaceful resolution of disputes and dispensed overwhelming force to quell 
aggression when necessary. The concern for the rights of smaller powers, in particular, was 
one matter on which British planners brought a unique perspective into the negotiations over 
the future organisation. The ‘purposes and principles’ of the United Nations Organization 
which were adopted at the San Francisco Conference were first drafted by members of the 
British delegation and were intended to protect the rights of small states by serving as a check 
on great power authority. Elsewhere, the United Nations’ Military Staff Committee, the 
Declaration on Colonial Policy, and even the Preamble of the Charter were all products, in part, 
of British initiative.  
But more important than charting the British contributions to the organisation is 
examining the way in which the Foreign Office arrived at their proposals for a post-war 
international order. From a methodological standpoint, they first placed a premium on 
formulating a proactive strategy towards the post-war world, something that was referred to by 
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary Richard Law as a ‘grand strategy for the peace’.105 The 
historian John Saville has written that, ‘Forward planning was not favoured within the Foreign 
Office’, yet this argument, as this thesis will show, is undermined by an examination of the 
work done to plan for the post-war world.106 For officials such as Jebb and Cadogan, to forego 
such strategic planning would be to cede the initiative and thereby place British foreign policy 
at the mercy of the Americans and Russians. In the early years of the war, this was not as 
obvious a necessity to many in Whitehall. Churchill, Eden and others insisted that the war must 
first be won and that to plan for the post-war period was to put the cart before the horse. That 
Britain did devise a strategy in the end was the result, first and foremost, of the Foreign Office 
and Jebb, in particular. In his first major paper aimed at the post-war world, he wrote that what 
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they wanted to avoid was the image of Britain as a ‘ramshackle Empire…devoid of ideas, and 
overcome by the difficulties inherent in every proposal’. By developing their own strategies 
suited to the interests of Britain and its allies, they might set the terms of the debate on a future 
order. Only in this way, Jebb wrote, could they be ‘the master, and not the victim, of events’.107   
When it came to negotiating a future international order, especially at the Dumbarton 
Oaks Conference in September 1944, British officials took a firm stance when necessary, 
offered compromises when possible and allowed others to claim credit as a matter of tactics. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the question of veto power. When it first came up at 
Dumbarton Oaks, the British delegation, at the direction of Cadogan, stood firm on the idea 
that the great powers should not have the right to vote in disputes to which they were a party. 
Though the Americans eventually came over to the side of the British, the issue became the 
one on which the future of the organisation would depend. Here again, the Foreign Office 
played the key role, with Cadogan recommending a compromise which would see that all 
disputes would have to be heard, though the great powers might retain their right to veto in the 
end. By the end of the Yalta Conference, when the agreement on this issue had been reached, 
it became known as ‘the Roosevelt compromise’. Far from a hijacking, the Foreign Office had 
tactfully decided to allow their American counterparts to take credit, so as to boost that 
country’s enthusiasm for the organisation.  
A crucial component of the history of Britain’s post-war planning process, however, is 
explaining the way in which officials themselves—especially Jebb, Webster and Cadogan—
viewed the very nature of international politics. Whether through their own intellectual 
development or professional experience, these officials were consistently historically-minded, 
a characteristic defined by the way in which they approached the pressing questions of the 
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United Kingdom’s post-war foreign policy. As such, they were in many ways exemplars of 
what the historian Francis Gavin calls the ‘historical sensibility’ in national security decision-
making.108 The memory of the League of Nations—its successes but especially its failures—
loomed large in their minds, as did more distant history. The Congress of Vienna, and in 
particular the Concert of Europe it enshrined, was at times, even more so than the League, a 
model for the Economic and Reconstruction Department. Indeed, this nineteenth-century 
precedent was such that in his first memorandum dedicated to the post-war order, Jebb wrote 
of establishing a new ‘Concert of the World’.  
Seen in this way, the inadequacy of characterising the approach of these officials as 
‘realist’ or ‘liberal internationalist’ soon become apparent. It is an irony of this story that 
Gladwyn Jebb, who one newspaper considered ‘the brain behind the United Nations’, was far 
from an ardent internationalist himself. In the early years of the war, he wrote that the League 
of Nations was the ‘professors’ peace’ and its impotence in the 1930s was the result of grand 
schemes laid down by ‘starry-eyed idealists’.109 To avoid similar pitfalls, he stressed the need 
for British officials to understand the ‘interplay of living forces’, which, for him, consisted of 
more raw calculations of power. His aim was, in short, to ensure that the United Kingdom not 
only preserved a degree of its former influence by enmeshing itself in a great power concert, 
but also that it bound the United States into post-war commitments on the European continent. 
His views were such that, between the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences, he 
suggested on a number of occasions that the United Kingdom forego the world organisation, 
provided that Britain joined the United States and the Soviet Union in a tripartite alliance.110  
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Nor was there complete unanimity of worldview among the central figures in this story. 
If anything, there was a creative tension between different instincts. Somewhat of an antidote 
to Jebb’s brand of realpolitik was Charles Webster, who by 1943, was seconded to the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department, where he took on an increasingly important role in 
the planning operations overseen by Jebb. Webster was a long-time internationalist, having 
first cut his teeth as a historian of the Congress of Vienna and later, during the interwar years, 
as an outspoken supporter of the League of Nations. In what would have come as a surprise to 
his new boss, Webster had once argued as a doctoral student of the ‘inevitability’ of a world 
state.111 Far from the fleeting view of a graduate student, he took to the pages of The Times in 
1938 to argue that ‘the ultimate objective of those who wish to bring peace to the world should 
be a world state.’ Such a world authority would not come about by ‘a single act’, however, but 
would come ‘gradually into existence…through men using institutions and transforming them 
by action.112  
Though his commitment to internationalism was indisputable, at the same time, 
Webster suffered no illusions as to the failures of the League. While it was undermined by 
procedural constraints and an unwillingness among some governments to use force to counter 
aggression, it experienced a ‘catastrophic blow’ when the American Senate refused to ratify 
the Covenant in November 1919.113 For the future organisation to have any chance of enduring, 
there would have to be a great power grouping—which must include the United States and the 
Soviet Union—at the centre of the organisation. This grouping would need to remain 
unhindered by stifling bureaucratic procedure and would have to be flexible enough to dispense 
overwhelming force to counter aggression. In other words, as he wrote in 1943, ‘Power and 
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responsibility must be commensurate with each other.’114 As important for Webster, however, 
was that small states be included in the organisation, that there be mechanisms designed for 
the peaceful settlement of disputes, and that economic and social organisations—especially 
those of the League which were deemed successful—be incorporated into the wider 
organisation.  
While not as entrenched in the most detailed planning operations, Cadogan became 
increasingly attentive to the work of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. Long 
viewed as a stoic and competent leader, his interjections during the planning stages reflected 
both his previous professional experience as well as his changing view of Britain’s global 
position.115 On the latter consideration, Cadogan’s view was hardly defeatist. Instead, it was 
based on an honest assessment of Britain’s worldwide capabilities. As early as 1940, Cadogan 
wrote that British influence in the Far East was a ‘sham’ and that they had been ‘bluffing’ for 
decades.116 When it came to the post-war international organisation, Cadogan’s suggestions 
were rooted in his experience as the Head of the League of Nations Section in the 1920s. One 
of the lessons was that any future system needed to be ‘flexible’ and rely on guiding principles, 
as opposed to adhering to a more rigid ‘constitution and procedure’.117 Another was a basic 
conception and appreciation for power. As he wrote in 1943, ‘The history of the last 20 years 
has surely shown us that no “machinery” for keeping the peace will work unless there is the 
power to drive it, and the will to use the power.’118 
In examining certain elements of these diplomats’ intellectualism as well as their 
wartime work, a distinct method and approach to statecraft emerges. It defies simple 
	
114 Webster minute, 9 September 1943, FO 371/35397/U3814. Webster also reiterated this concept in a lecture in 
1943. Webster, ‘Some Problems of International Organisation’, Montague Burton Lecture at the University of 
Leeds, 15 October 1943, Webster papers, E(1)/946, LSE  
115 Reynolds and Hughes, Historian as Diplomat, p. 86 
116 Cadogan minute, 31 October 1940, FO 371/25208/W11399 
117 For example, see Telegram from Cadogan to Foreign Office, No. 4502, 22 August 1944, FO 371/40706/U6987 
118 Cadogan minute, 13 April 1943, FO 371/35366/U1535 
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categorisations of realist or idealist, nationalist and internationalist. The thesis does, however, 
attempt to advance a term—specifically, ‘realist-internationalism’—which describes the 
collective approach of Jebb, Webster and Cadogan. In using this term, the thesis proceeds 
cautiously, in that it does not seek to create a theory of international relations or to explain how 
international history might fit into an analytical system. 119  Instead, the term realist-
internationalism is used to describe what was a distinct approach by certain members of the 
Foreign Office to the pressing question of a post-war international order—one which rested on 
the interplay between, on the one hand, the necessity of national interest and considerations of 
power, and on the other, the need for a cooperative international system guided by certain 
principles and laws.120 
Similar to the approach made in this thesis, a number of scholars have sought to 
transcend the somewhat narrow descriptions of idealist and realist, nationalist and 
internationalist, when describing thinkers and statesmen in the 1930s and 1940s.121 Reynolds 
and Hughes, as will be discussed in the next chapter, have argued that Webster’s thought was 
a product of realist and idealist notions.122 Others, such as Raymond Douglas, have described 
the concept of a ‘muscular internationalism’, which he argues grew up within the Labour Party 
in the early years of the war and emphasised the ‘military predominance of the great powers’.123 
	
119 Ernest May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner have described the difficulties of explaining history through 
narrow theoretical constructions. Ernest May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner, ‘Theory and International 
History’, in Ernest May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner (ed.), History and Neorealism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 5 
120 The phrase ‘realist-internationalism’ has been used by the Turkish scholar Tarik Oğuzlu, though his conception 
differs from the one presented in this thesis. Tarik Oğuzlu, ‘Isolationism versus internationalism: Which course 
to take in foreign policy?’, Daily Sabah, 30 January 2020 
121 Glenda Sluga has gone so far as to describe twentieth-century internationalism as being defined by ‘the fine 
gradations of political realism inspired by the vogue for being internationally minded’. Sluga, Internationalism in 
the Age of Nationalism, pp. 79-80 
122 Reynolds and Hughes, Historian as Diplomat, p. 91 
123 Douglas contrasts this with a ‘Whig internationalism’ which he says was reliant on a belief that constitutionalist 
international system could—and should—be established. He argues that this was the ‘“bedrock” of Labour’s 
foreign policy for two decades’. Douglas, Labour Party, pp. 7-9, 60-69. It is worth noting that, according to 
Douglas, the first time the concept of ‘muscular’ internationalism appeared was in December 1942. It is around 
this time that Hugh Dalton, the Labour Party intellectual and politician credited by Douglas with this idea, saw 
Jebb’s Four Power Plan. Dalton diary, 6 December 1942, Pimlott (ed.), pp. 532-533 
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Inderjeet Parmar has noted how thinkers associated with Chatham House and the Council on 
Foreign Relations remained committed internationalists but also ‘recognised certain 
fundamentals of balance of power and of national-interest-driven world politics’.124 Elsewhere, 
Dan Plesch has written that ‘the evidence suggests that the leaders of the victorious powers 
were agreed that realism required a liberal internationalist approach with a strong social 
democratic theme.’125  
The term which bears the nearest resemblance to the concept of ‘realist-
internationalism’ as laid out in this thesis is ‘Hobbesian idealism’, which the historian David 
Long has used to articulate a version of internationalism which grew up in the interwar 
period.126  In explaining this concept, Long writes that it ‘marks a move away from old 
liberalism’s idea of international legal machinery as a surrogate for more violent resolution of 
conflict, towards a view that international law legitimized the use of force by the collective 
representatives of the international society’.127 Realist-internationalism as practiced by these 
British Foreign Office officials differs with Hobbesian idealism in one important way, 
however. The peaceful resolution of disputes, as well as an international court to resolve 
juridical disputes, was viewed as an essential part of the international organisation. Though 
	
124 Parmar labeled these thinkers ‘patriotic internationalists’, a phrase which was influenced, he notes, by Akira 
Iriye’s term ‘nationalistic internationalism’. Parmar, p. 72, 231 fn 55, 59. For Iriye, Wilsonian internationalism 
embodied this approach. Akira Iriye, From Nationalism to Internationalism: US Foreign Policy to 1914 (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. vii, 231-237 
125 Plesch, ‘How the United Nations Beat Hitler and Prepared the Peace’, p. 138; Mark Mazower has also noted 
the more realist nature of the United Nations Organization, writing that it was effectively ‘the League reborn only 
now modified and adjusted…to the frank realities of a new configuration of great power politics’. Mazower, No 
Enchanted Palace, p. 194 
126 He points to Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson’s The European Anarchy of 1916 as the foundation for this 
approach. Hobbesian idealism differed from ‘new liberal internationalism’ and ‘Cobdenism’, all of which, Long 
claims, constituted three ‘strands’ of the liberal internationalist tradition which grew up in the interwar period. 
David Long, ‘Inter-War Idealism, Liberal Internationalism, and Contemporary International Theory’, in David 
Long and Peter Wilson (ed.), Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 302-328, here p. 312 
127 Ibid, pp. 314-315. Ian Hall has briefly discussed what he calls a ‘Hobbesian internationalism’ present in Paul 
Kennedy’s The Parliament of Man. Similar to Long’s ‘Hobbesian idealism’, Hall writes that ‘Hobbesian 
internationalism’ was ‘a perspective that found its earliest exponent in…Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson’. Ian 
Hall, ‘World government and empire: the international historian as theorist’, International Affairs 82:6 (2006): 
1155-1165, here pp. 1160-61 
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many disputes were seen to been political in nature (and thereby incapable of being resolved 
by judicial procedure alone), many disputes were seen to be of a legal character, and therefore 
subject to the rulings of the international court. 
As this thesis will argue, the concept of realist-internationalism can best be understood 
by the way in which Jebb, Webster and Cadogan sought to design and negotiate the machinery 
of an international organisation. To take two of the key building blocks—one representing a 
structure and the other a mechanism—as examples, there was established a hierarchy of 
authority and the development of a kind of code of conduct. First, the great powers, through 
the structure of the security council, would remain primarily responsible for the maintenance 
of peace and security throughout the world. This was a view shared by British officials well 
before their earliest meetings with their American and Soviet counterparts, each of whom, to 
varying degrees, had also arrived at this basic premise. This idea of the great powers at the 
centre of a wider international system was a principle which, for Jebb and Webster especially, 
was based on the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century. Second, the behaviour of 
countries within the international system would be guided—and at times constrained—by the 
general stipulations laid down by an international organisation and enforced by the great 
powers. One example was the pacific settlement of disputes. For British officials in particular, 
a lingering lesson of the League of Nations had been the absence of mechanisms which would 
allow countries to resolve disputes without recourse to war. Webster, in particular, played a 
key role in introducing such functions into the British plans both for the General Assembly and 
Security Council, so that countries harbouring grievances—for example, over territorial 
boundaries—could, in theory, bring them before an international arbitrating body. There was, 
therefore, an element of truth in his reflection on the day of the signing of the United Nations 
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Charter, when he claimed to have helped design ‘the new methods of harmonising the Great 
Power Alliance theory and the League theory’.128 
The result was an international order which, as it stood in June 1945, worked for the 
national interests of Britain. As Jebb reflected on the process in the weeks after the San 
Francisco Conference, he noted how the new organisation helped the Foreign Office achieve 
its original aims. The United States was now ‘tied in’ to post-war commitments, a point which 
had remained the most important objective throughout. For the smaller powers making up the 
United Nations, their security was ‘secured’, and their economic and social interests protected. 
As for the Soviet Union, it would ‘shortly be bound by the most solemn obligations, which it 
must surely hesitate to repudiate’. In what was a confirmation of his original objective at the 
start of the Economic and Reconstruction Department’s planning effort, he wrote that with the 
creation of the organisation, Britain’s ‘major foreign political objectives have been secured’.129 
 
Structure 
The thesis is organised around the development of major memoranda and the deliberation at 
conferences, all of which serve as the essential inflection points in the process of British 
planning for a world organisation. The first chapter briefly discusses the respective 
backgrounds—intellectual and professional—of Gladwyn Jebb, Charles Webster and 
Alexander Cadogan; and then moves into an examination of the British view towards post-war 
planning through the end of 1941. The second chapter explores the creation and work of the 
Foreign Office’s Economic and Reconstruction Department which, beginning in 1942, 
assumed the key planning role for Britain’s approach to the post-war world. The head of that 
	
128 Webster diary, 26 June 1945, in Reynolds and Hughes, Historian as Diplomat, pp. 69-73. As Webster later put 
it, ‘All great institutions have been produced by reconciling high principles with vested interests… and the attempt 
to construct a Charter to meet the peculiar needs of our own age is rooted both in national interests and moral 
purposes.’ Webster, ‘The Making of the Charter of the United Nations’, p. 16 
129 Memorandum by Jebb, ‘Reflections on San Francisco’, 25 July 1945, FO 371/50732/U5998 
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department, Gladwyn Jebb, produced a paper titled the ‘Four Power Plan’, which, after 
weathering criticisms and counter-proposals from other government ministries, became the 
‘United Nations Plan’. While not yet official policy, it would become the conceptual 
framework for later planning stages, especially when it came to the post-war international 
organisation. The third chapter traces the development of the ‘United Nations Plan’ through 
the summer of 1943, when it became the ‘United Nations Plan for Organising Peace’.  
The second half of the thesis begins with an examination of Foreign Office planning in 
the autumn of 1943, a period in which the official approach shifted towards first, balancing the 
post-war aims of both the United States and the Soviet Union and second, reaching agreement 
between the three powers. A number of considerations—including the relationship between the 
great powers; the responsibilities of the great powers relative to the small powers; and whether 
alliances might buttress or underpin such organisation—helped frame Jebb and Webster’s 
distinct ‘realist-internationalist’ approach to the post-war world, and it led to what would 
become, by the spring of 1944, a British grand strategy for the post-war period. Chapter five 
traces the development of this grand strategy throughout the spring and summer of 1944. A set 
of five memoranda which constituted the British proposals for a post-war organisation were 
developed and eventually sent to the American and Soviet governments, while proposals for a 
‘Western Security Group’ which might underpin the wider organisation were put forward 
within the Foreign Office. The sixth chapter examines the work of Foreign Office officials 
before, during and after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where the three powers first agreed 
to detailed proposals for an international organisation. The final chapter begins with the Yalta 
Conference and ends with the signing of the United Nations Charter on 26 June 1945. The 
result was a United Nations Organization which, while the greatest internationalist creation the 
world had yet known, was also seen by Foreign Office officials to work in the interests of the 
United Kingdom. 
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The leap from speculating on a future international order and seeing that vision come 
to life was, among other things, a feat of diplomatic ingenuity. It is that journey—from abstract 
idealism about a world organisation to the creation of a durable structural entity in the form of 
the United Nations Organization—that this thesis examines in detail. A genuinely 
internationalist impulse animated the work of Jebb, Webster and Cadogan; but at the same 
time, they were anchored by an unsentimental and hard-headed desire to put the national 
interest of the United Kingdom first. This balance—between the constructive work of drafting 
plans for a world organisation and the desire to do so in one’s own image, and to one’s own 





Jebb, Webster, Cadogan and the Early Stages of Foreign Office Planning, 
1939 – 1941 
 
 
This chapter sets out to examine the early years of Foreign Office planning for the post-war 
period. It first offers a brief summary of Jebb’s, Webster’s and Cadogan’s careers through the 
1930s and importantly, some insight into the formation of their worldviews in the period 
preceding the war. Jebb was decidedly realist in his outlook and placed a priority on an active 
strategy which advanced British national interest in the post-war world. Though he showed 
openness to internationalist schemes which embraced legal, economic and social dimensions, 
Jebb rarely strayed from the precept that political order based on the organisation of military 
power was the fundamental pillar of regional and international order. Webster was the 
internationalist of the group, though his recommendations were far from ambitious schemes 
which sought to transcend power politics. His approach, broadly speaking, was one which 
attempted to balance national interests with universal principles. Cadogan, though more of the 
engineer of the British planning effort, also brought his past professional experience to bear on 
the questions facing the creation of an international organisation. The views of each man served 
as important intellectual tributaries to what might be considered a realist-internationalist 
approach to the post-war world. 
Though historians have previously addressed some of the intellectualism of both Jebb 
and Webster, this chapter adds to this body of scholarship by drawing on certain aspects of 
their worldview which have been somewhat understated.130 For Jebb, some of his university 
writings, especially those related to iconic statesmen of the seventeenth and nineteenth 
	
130 Greenwood, chapters 1-4 cover Jebb’s early years in the Foreign Office through to his work during the Second 
World War. Greenwood, Titan at the Foreign Office, pp. 1-201. See also Reynolds and Hughes, Historian as 
Diplomat, pp. 83-108; Ian Hall, ‘The Art and Practice of a Diplomatic Historian’, pp. 470-490 
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centuries, are brought to the fore, as is his proposition that a degree of ‘tension’ in international 
politics is necessary to a stable order.131 For Webster, emphasis is laid on a paper he prepared 
as a graduate student in the first decade of the twentieth century which has, heretofore, been 
overlooked by scholars examining his view of international relations.132 Here he argued that a 
world state was not only possible but inevitable, given the steady progression of peaceful inter-
state relations. It was a conception which, as this chapter argues, Webster had not yet 
abandoned by the time the Second World War began. As for Cadogan, few scholars have 
addressed his worldview, an unfortunate gap in the literature given Cadogan’s presence and 
influence in British foreign policy from the 1920s through the 1940s.133 This chapter will lay 
out certain aspects of his worldview prior to the Second World War, and thus provide 
somewhat of an intellectual foundation for his policy recommendations. 
After briefly examining Jebb, Webster and Cadogan, the chapter then describes some 
of the ideological and institutional context in which early notions of a future world organisation 
began to crystallise in the period. Though Cadogan was the only member of this triumvirate to 
contribute substantively to post-war matters in the earliest years of the war, the work of other 
Foreign Office officials and Cabinet members provided an essential framework in which future 
plans would develop. The pivotal moment in the early years of planning—and hence the event 
around which this chapter is organised—was the signing of the Atlantic Charter during a 
meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in Placentia Bay in August 1941. The chapter shines 
light on the role that Cadogan played in drafting and revising the Charter at this conference—
a contribution which has been undervalued in many of the histories of the meeting—before 
	
131 For example, Sean Greenwood, in his biography of Jebb, discusses his idea that ‘tension of some kind is a 
condition of all life’, but he does not take into account Jebb’s university writings, or his desire to be a so-called 
‘entwerfer’. Greenwood, Titan at the Foreign Office, pp. 54-57 
132 No mention of this work is made in Ian Hall’s ‘The Art and Practice of a Diplomatic Historian’ or Reynolds 
and Hughes’ The Historian as Diplomat. 
133 David Dilks’ discussion of Cadogan provides some essential background, as does Neilson and Otte’s chapter 
on Cadogan’s tenure as Permanent Under-Secretary. David Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan, pp. 
4-15; Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte, The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854-1946, pp. 234-257 
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addressing the way in which the Foreign Office viewed the joint declaration in the months that 
followed. 134  While a diplomatic landmark, the signing of the joint declaration was not 
necessarily viewed as a triumph within the Foreign Office, a fact which has also not been as 
rigorously examined in previous histories.135 Officials were suspicious of American intentions 
and willingness to follow through on what they considered ambitious, even vague, principles. 
Added to this was a concern with the ramifications that such a declaration would have on future 
Anglo-Soviet relations.136 The chapter is brought to a close with the signing of the United 
Nations Declaration in January 1942, a moment in which, for the first time, the conception of 
the great powers leading a group calling itself the ‘United Nations’ became clear.  
There are a number of themes which arise from this early phase before the planning 
process began in earnest. For one, the impetus for planning was initially reactive, and it was 
Hitler’s efforts in espousing a ‘New Order’ for Europe which drove both the Cabinet and 
Foreign Office to begin thinking about war aims. One of the key figures in this early stage of 
post-war planning was John Maynard Keynes who was then working in the Treasury. It was 
his vision for future financial and monetary mechanisms on the continent which proved to be 
one of the key catalysts for Foreign Office thinking about the post-war world.137 Elsewhere 
within Britain, the discussion over a future world order had begun in the public sphere and had 
	
134 Historical accounts of this meeting have often undervalued the role that Cadogan played in the drafting of the 
joint declaration. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, pp. 34-39. Several accounts of the Atlantic 
Charter meeting, for example, do not give credit to Cadogan for the first draft. See Theodore A. Wilson, The First 
Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941 (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1969), pp. 
187-188; Hoopes and Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the U.N., p. 36. This is due in large part to Churchill 
taking credit for the draft in his memoirs. See Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. III, pp. 385-386. 
Important exceptions include D.C. Watt who has written, albeit briefly, that the Atlantic Charter ‘was largely a 
British document, drafted at Roosevelt’s request by Sir Alexander Cadogan’. D.C. Watt, ‘Britain and the 
Historiography of the Yalta Conference and the Cold War’, Diplomatic History 13:1 (1989), p. 76. See also Louis, 
Imperialism at Bay, p. 123; David Reynolds, ‘The Atlantic “Flop”: British Foreign Policy and the Churchill-
Roosevelt Meeting of August 1941’, in Douglas Brinkley and David R. Facey-Crowther (ed.), The Atlantic 
Charter (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1994), pp. 129-150 
135 William Roger Louis has discussed the reaction of the Colonial Office to the Charter. Louis, Imperialism at 
Bay, pp. 126-133 
136 Ross, ‘Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941-45’, pp. 522-523; Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and 
the Soviet Union, pp. 35-38 
137 For a discussion of Keynes’s ‘new order’, see Skidelsky, pp. 194-199 
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captured the minds of some prominent intellectuals and campaigners. Lionel Curtis, Alfred 
Zimmern and Arnold Toynbee were among those who had been urging the government to take 
up the question of a future international order. While some historians have credited Toynbee 
with driving the thinking of the Cabinet in these years, this chapter argues that, in fact, Toynbee 
was a rather marginal figure, with many Foreign Office officials considering the great historian 
to be ignoring some of the hard realities and commitments of British foreign policy.138 Within 
the Cabinet itself, despite the creation of a War Aims Committee in the summer of 1940, there 
was little enthusiasm for these efforts. Instead, attention remained on the war effort.  
Throughout the period, however, the Foreign Office gradually began to become the 
most important centre of gravity for thinking about and then planning for the post-war world.139 
At first, officials scrambled to counter Hitler’s propaganda by attempting to consolidate their 
own views. They quickly realised, however, that such efforts quickly brought up the largest 
questions of British foreign policy, namely the shape and nature of the international system 
after the war, as well as Britain’s relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. It was 
the consideration of these questions which, in part, contributed to Cadogan’s draft at the 
Atlantic Conference in August 1941, as well as to the Foreign Office’s approach towards the 
Soviet Union in the months that followed. It is an understanding of this context which is 





138 Douglas, Labour Party, pp. 104-106. Similarly, Mark Mazower has highlighted the intellectual thought and 
influence of Alfred Zimmern, yet the records of the Foreign Office in this period show that, like Toynbee, 
Zimmern was a marginal figure. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p. 68 
139 Previous histories have largely undervalued the post-war thinking within the Foreign Office during these years. 
Rothwell notes that, in the early years of the war, ‘Churchill’s dislike of public debate of war aims had a 
counterpart in his dealings with the Foreign Office’, yet he does not attempt to examine Foreign Office thinking 
in depth. Rothwell, War Aims in the Second World War, p. 66; Christopher Hill, Cabinet Decisions on Foreign 
Policy, pp. 188-215 
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The Realist: Gladwyn Jebb 
The official most responsible for encouraging and coordinating planning for a post-war 
organisation throughout the war was Gladwyn Jebb. A brief look into his background at 
university and in his early decades at the Foreign Office reveals an individual who, armed with 
a sharp historical acumen, was willing to engage with emerging political ideas but at the same 
time, was stern in his understanding of what was both achievable and necessary in the realm 
of international affairs. Furthermore, as his career progressed, he became determined to be a 
mover and shaper of British foreign policy.  
Jebb entered the Foreign Office in 1924 by way of Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford. 
At the former, he came under the tutelage of a young Aldous Huxley, a man who Jebb later 
credited with the ‘real beginning’ of his education. ‘My eyes were opened, my zest for 
knowledge was quickened’, he wrote in later years. At Oxford, he worked with Lewis Namier, 
twelve years his senior, and a historian who sparked his interest in modern history.140 Jebb’s 
bookshelves in these years were lined with the memoirs of the great statesmen, figures such as 
Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, Otto von Bismarck, and even a recent work by his future 
subordinate in the Foreign Office, Charles Webster, entitled Castlereagh’s Foreign Policy and 
the Congress of Vienna.141 His essays in the period were littered with praise for the work of 
diplomatists. Jebb wrote of Cardinal Richelieu that the seventeenth-century French statesmen 
was ‘unquestionably the greatest that France ever produced’; while for the British Foreign 
Secretary Lord Castlereagh, he said that it was ‘to his credit as a diplomatist that he was 
impervious to any of the great, vague, ideas that were then troubling the Continent’.142  
	
140 Jebb, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn, p. 15 
141 Jebb’s notebook from 1920 contains a list of books he consulted for his essays. See GLAD 9/1/6 
142 Essay by Jebb, 'How far is it true that Richelieu was as great a failure as a home minister as he was successful 
as a politician?’, undated, GLAD 9/1/7; Essay by Jebb, ‘British Policy at the Congress of Vienna’, 12 October 
1920, GLAD 9/1/6 
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As Jebb began to engage more with contemporary politics during these years, his views 
on idealism and morality in international politics came to the fore. A popular topic in his 
writings was the League of Nations, an institution which was still in its infancy. The 
organisation, he wrote, brought up fundamental questions about the sovereignty of states. 
Though he acknowledged that organisations such as the League might wear down the 
traditional notion of sovereignty, it was important to understand that the principle would always 
remain a central aim of individuals and their communities. As such, he warned against focusing 
on ‘the vague prospects of the day after tomorrow’ and instead ‘the practical necessities of 
today’.143 This marked the beginning of what was a recurring battle for Jebb, namely what he 
perceived to be the naivete of so-called ‘idealists’. As he wrote to a friend during his first 
posting in Tehran:  
I've no use for the people who don’t see a continuity in politics as in everything 
else, and who attempt to found purely practical measures on some sort of moral 
notion. They’re bound to be disappointed, and a disappointed idealist is the worst 
kind of pessimist.144 
 
When Jebb entered the Foreign Office in 1924, it did not take long for him to catch his 
superiors’ attention. Harold Nicholson, then Minister in Tehran, wrote that Jebb ‘thinks in a 
straight line, none of that wobbly business’.145  On a personal level, however, the young 
diplomat was struggling with what he saw as the monotony of his job in these years. He 
complained to a friend that ‘the life of a diplomat is possibly a rather narrow, a rather 
unenterprising one’, and that there was not much room, at least at his level, for being a ‘creator’ 
or designer of important plans.146 Even Cadogan, under whom Jebb served as Private Secretary, 
wrote that Jebb was ‘always…talking about broad issues of foreign policy and giving his 
	
143 Essay by Jebb, untitled, GLAD 9/1/8 
144 Jebb to Richard Rees, 16 August 1926, GLAD 8/24 
145 Harold Nicholson to Lancelot, 22 October 1926, GLAD 8/23. Portions of this letter are quoted in Greenwood, 
Titan at the Foreign Office, p. 8 
146 Jebb wrote to his friend that, ‘There is not a great deal of scope for as the Germans would put it “entwerfer.”’ 
This roughly translates to ‘creator’ of ideas or concepts. Jebb to Richard Rees, 1 July 1926, GLAD 8/24 
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views’ when, in fact, all he wanted was someone to perform the essential administrative 
duties.147  
For all of Jebb’s curiosity and ambitions in his university years and during his early 
postings in the Foreign Office, the 1930s marked a period in which he would more forcefully 
advance his views on foreign policy. As his biographer Sean Greenwood has noted, Jebb 
expressed a pessimism about the League which would colour his later work. As he wrote to his 
wife, ‘The real trouble is that there are too many Great Powers outside the League (America, 
Japan and Germany) to make “collective security” anything else but a name.’148 In his official 
work, he began producing long memoranda—sometimes solicited, other times not—in which 
he took on the major questions of the decade, seeking to apply dynamic strategies in what 
Greenwood has noted was a ‘wide-ranging, world-shaping style’.149 In June 1936, he declared 
that ‘The “Grand Design” of the League of Nations is over…[and] it is time to build another 
on the interplay of living forces.’ This could be accomplished, he continued, by ‘an astute and 
lively pursuit of “Realpolitik”’, which, in Jebb’s view, amounted to setting Hitler and 
Mussolini against one another, pressuring France with a combination of inducements and 
threats, and eventually reaching an agreement with Germany. ‘Our policy now is dictated 
solely by our interests’, he wrote.150 Two years later, in a memorandum which echoed some of 
his earlier suggestions, Jebb spoke of a theme which would animate his later proposals during 
the Second World War. In his view, ‘tension’ in international affairs was not only an inevitable 
occurrence but a necessary factor in keeping the peace between great powers. The key was 
ensuring that the tension was not too great or too small. If the former, the system would collapse 
	
147 Quoted in Greenwood, Titan at the Foreign Office, p. 48 
148 Jebb to Cynthia Jebb, 1 September 1935, quoted in Greenwood, Titan at the Foreign Office, p. 24 
149 Greenwood has written that, ‘Though he wrote rather well, he also wrote too much. His complex, super-charged 
mind caused him to pour out memoranda in a wide-ranging, world-shaping style sometimes with quite convoluted 
conclusions.’ Greenwood, Titan at the Foreign Office, pp. xxv, 47-48 
150 Memorandum by Jebb, ‘Probable consequences of closing or failing to close the Suez Canal to Italy’, undated, 
1936, FCO 73/262/It/36/8 
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and if the latter, Britain would become a victim of the actions of others. ‘In short, and in terms 
of practical politics’, he wrote, ‘we should aim at…a strong Britain and a workable Balance of 
Power.’151 
As Jebb began to present his first major post-war policy recommendations in 1942, 
some of these earlier themes appear more clearly. First, the United Kingdom needed a 
coordinated foreign policy which was active rather than passive. Second, highly idealistic 
schemes—for example a world state or even those appealing to notions of ‘common 
humanity’—would need to be ignored, in favour of more realistic solutions based largely on 
the distribution of military and economic power. Third, securing the British national interest 
remained the primary objective of any future foreign policy. While this might involve a wider 
international system, such an arrangement would have to work in the interests of the United 
Kingdom. Finally, Jebb looked to the Concert of Europe as the preeminent example of great 
powers combining to maintain an inherently unruly international order. This interest in the 
European congress system of the nineteenth century was shared by his future colleague, 
Charles Webster, though each had extracted very different lessons from the period.  
 
The Internationalist: Charles Webster 
Charles Webster was arguably the most complex and historically expert mind within the 
Foreign Office’s post-war planning operation. While his expertise on past organisations 
instilled in him a respect for the influence and capability of great powers, he was also an 
internationalist who, at times, harboured radical, long-term visions of international 
organisation—ones which may have surprised some of his colleagues during the Second World 
War had they been fully known. His work for the Economic and Reconstruction Department, 
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however, was based on views refined over almost forty years as well as a life-long desire to 
influence politics. He remained an internationalist but one who sought to bridge the gap 
between the more utopian ideas of a future world order that he once entertained and Jebb’s 
more cynical or sceptical view of the realities of the international system. Both shared, 
crucially, a training in history and an appreciation for its modern relevance.  
When Webster entered the University of Cambridge in the autumn of 1904, the study 
of history was continuing an evolution that had begun nearly thirty years before. Historians 
such as Lord Acton and John Robert Seeley had not only been treating the study of modern 
history as a distinct discipline but had also been encouraging their students to apply their 
historical study to contemporary politics, to assist what Webster later referred to as ‘men of 
action’.152 Even when it came to choosing the topic of his doctoral dissertation—‘Studies in 
Foreign Policy, 1814-1818’—Webster acknowledged that he chose this subject because of the 
information that it might provide contemporary statesmen.153 Not only did it offer a heretofore 
neglected piece of nineteenth-century history, he wrote in the introduction, but it also showed 
that ‘many of the same problems which arose then are being forced upon statesmen at the 
present day.’154 
Webster had only recently become the Chair of Modern History at the University of 
Liverpool when the First World War broke out. Angered form the start by Germany’s violation 
of Belgium neutrality, he joined the Army Service Corps as a junior officer.155 More so than 
anything, the job was a stepping-stone for Webster, who, early on in the war, had become 
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determined to be involved in the peace conference that would conclude the conflict.156 Webster 
was eventually brought into the Military Intelligence Division at the War Office and then 
Historical Section of the Foreign Office, where in December 1918, he was asked to write about 
the lessons of the Congress of Vienna. The Congress which came on the heels of the 
Napoleonic Wars, he wrote, was the ‘only assembly which can furnish even a shadowy 
precedent for the great task that lies before the statesmen and peoples of the world’.157 The 
paper was eventually printed and circulated at the Paris Peace Conference, where it received a 
mixed reception. Some in the British delegation, including Harold Nicholson, considered it 
essential reading, while others, such as President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that there 
would be ‘no odour of Vienna…brought into the proceedings’.158 Despite Wilson’s criticism, 
Webster, like Jebb, continued to look to the Concert of Europe as an important precedent for a 
future international order. But where Jebb saw the Congress system as an example of great 
power dominance, Webster saw the conference diplomacy of the period as the modern origins 
of internationalism.  
In addition to his historical scholarship and his desire to influence politics, Webster also 
harboured a distinct worldview which was the product of his own intellectual journey. The 
historian T.G. Otte has called Webster a liberal internationalist; while other scholars, such as 
Ian Hall, have examined his international thought more closely, arguing that his thinking did 
not fit into the basic categories of realist or idealist.159 Reynolds and Hughes, in their attempt 
to describe the complexity of Webster’s thinking by the 1940s, posit that he was ‘idealist in his 
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realism’.160 While this thesis largely agrees with the analyses of Hall, Reynolds and Hughes, it 
is worth noting some of Webster’s earliest writings as well as the fact that he held onto many 
of these views decades later. 
As a postgraduate at Cambridge, he exhibited a rather radical idealism, arguing that a 
world state was not only a possibility but an inevitability. Citing the Geneva Convention of 
1864, the Brussels Conference of 1874 and the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Webster 
argued that these landmark meetings had developed laws governing the use of force which 
could restrict a nation’s ability to wage war. Furthermore, the establishment of the International 
Court of Arbitration in 1899 had created international machinery for arbitration, which, he 
wrote, ‘has come to be regarded as a practical alternative to war just as a trial was…regarded 
as an alternative to the family feud’.161 The remaining stage in this evolution of a world state, 
Webster believed, would be reached once states abolished war in favour of compulsory 
arbitration, a transition which had been undertaken in the domestic context but remained 
elusive in the international system. Far from a fleeting dream of a young idealist, Webster wrote 
in the pages of The Times in 1938 that, ‘The ultimate objective of those who wish to bring 
peace to the world should be a world state.’ Moreover, such a world state would not ‘be made 
by a single act but will come gradually into existence’, largely through global institutions such 
as the League of Nations and the International Court.162 This conception of a progressive, 
evolving internationalism is one which has not previously been highlighted in studies of 
Webster’s thought, but it is one which is central to understanding his approach to what would 
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become the United Nations.163  
Another important component of Webster’s outlook was his admiration for Lord 
Castlereagh and President Woodrow Wilson, two figures who many placed at opposite ends of 
a political spectrum. Though the latter looked to the European politics of the nineteenth century 
as crude and destabilising, Webster saw this period as one in which the great powers developed 
a workable and largely peaceful international order. Lord Castlereagh, in particular—on whom 
Webster had completed a two-volume study in 1925—he credited as the ‘founder’ of the 
Concert of Europe. He praised Castlereagh’s ability to secure the ‘special rights and privileges’ 
for the great powers as well as certain protections for the smaller powers. This achievement, 
Webster noted, was due to the Foreign Secretary having ‘as deep an interest in the 
reconstruction of Europe as he had in purely British interests’.164 
Webster’s praise for Castlereagh sat alongside his affection for Woodrow Wilson, 
despite the President’s criticism of his paper at the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson, Webster 
declared in a speech in 1930, had been ‘one of the main intellectual and moral influences’ of 
his life.165 The post-war international organisation which Wilson had done so much to design 
had not only ‘provided the greatest experiment in political machinery that the world has 
known’, but it had also served to become the ‘organized moral force of men throughout the 
world’.166 Still for all his praise of it being a moral force, Webster understood that the League, 
if it was to survive, could not rest on this aspect alone. It would need sufficient force and more 
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importantly, the willingness to employ it. Indeed, theories aimed at ending war through 
increasing economic ties or altruistic calls for ‘brotherhood’ were, Webster warned, ‘just about 
as powerful as cobwebs across the mouth of a cannon’.167  
As the League of Nations became increasingly fragile throughout the 1930s, a frustrated 
Webster implored his countrymen to defend it. In a line which echoed his point that Castlereagh 
had seen British interests as intimately bound up with the European continent, Webster wrote 
that ‘[Britain’s] salvation lies in making effective the ‘League system’.168 Still, despite his 
pessimism with the League of Nations, he believed that an international organisation of nation-
states was the only option going forward. ‘The world’, he insisted, ‘is gradually discovering 
that it must provide itself with machinery for international co-operation if civilization is to 
survive’.169  
By the Second World War, Webster’s long association with Chatham House, his 
reputation as one of the most prominent British historians of the period and his prolific 
commentary on League of Nations affairs in the interwar years meant that he was a well-
respected voice when it came to discussions of British foreign policy. Far from a hermetic 
historian, Webster had cultivated relationships with influential figures on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Within Britain, Webster could call on government ministers such as Leo Amery and 
Stafford Cripps; while in the United States, he visited with senior State Department officials at 
the behest of the Minister of Information Duff Cooper. 170  As the war progressed, these 
contacts, coupled with his own expertise, brought Webster ever-closer to the levers of 
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policymaking, a reality which meant that he might finally become a ‘man of action’ himself.  
 
The Engineer: Alexander Cadogan 
If Jebb and Webster were the chief architects, Cadogan, in his position as Permanent Under-
Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1938 to 1946, was the engineer responsible for seeing the 
plans through the negotiating stages. He played a central role during the drafting of the Atlantic 
Charter, and as the Economic and Reconstruction Department progressed on their plans 
throughout the war, Cadogan provided crucial direction when necessary.171 His experience 
leading the League of Nations section in the Foreign Office for a decade between 1924 and 
1934 provided him with invaluable knowledge—and subsequent opinions—on the structure 
and functioning of international organisation. Not only was this essential to the British planning 
for an international organisation, but his earlier work also provided him with a knack for 
navigating the trenches of conference diplomacy, a trait which would serve he and future 
British delegations well during the war.172  
Similar to Jebb, Cadogan attended Eton and later Oxford, where he studied history at 
Balliol College from 1903 to 1906. Two years later, he was accepted into the Diplomatic 
Service, serving first in Constantinople and then Vienna in 1913. In his latter posting, Cadogan 
found an Austro-Hungarian Empire that had ‘survived into senility’, he later wrote.173 In little 
over a year, war would grip the continent and Cadogan would return to London and the Foreign 
Office, where he quickly distinguished himself. Eyre Crowe, the Permanent Under-Secretary 
in the Foreign Office from 1920 to 1925, considered him ‘the best man in the office’, and 
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subsequently decided to make him the Head of the League of Nations Section within the 
Western Department in 1923.174 
In his capacity as a lead advisor on League of Nations affairs, Cadogan won the respect 
of colleagues, with some describing him as a ‘magnificently capable and imperturbable’.175 
But his composed facade masked a man frustrated, at times, by the cumbersome nature of 
League processes. He wrote of crucial discussions ‘floundering’ as they wore on, and as a 
result, the entire atmosphere could be ‘depressing’.176 Reflecting in later years, he wrote that 
‘there was no lack…of starry-eyed enthusiasts’ in Geneva. While the more cynically-minded 
often brought them ‘down to earth’ every now and then, such cynics were also guilty of lacking 
imagination and avoiding ‘bold initiative’. ‘Cynicism is easier’, he said, but this did not make 
it the preferred approach.177  
Much of his frustration stemmed from the action—or inaction—of his own government. 
After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Cadogan warned that a weak League 
response would undermine the influence of the organisation in future, a position which was at 
odds with members of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.178  ‘The League is in 
rather a bad way’, he complained to his wife in 1932, ‘owing to the way our Government treat 
it’. The problem, in his view, was that the Foreign Secretary at the time, John Simon, often 
arrived at the Disarmament Conference without clear direction from the Cabinet. This left the 
British delegation on the back foot and at the mercy of the proposals of other powers. ‘The 
fault is that we’ve got a government of old women who can’t even make up their minds’, he 
wrote.179 It was an experience in conference diplomacy which would shape his approaches both 
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as Permanent Under Secretary—especially in the way he worked with Churchill—and as the 
head of the British delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944. 
After a decade travelling between London and Geneva, Cadogan was sent to China, 
where he served as British minister for two years. It was there that Cadogan saw first-hand the 
increasingly aggressive nature of the Japanese regime, the weakness of the Chinese 
government and the precarious nature of Britain’s position in the Far East. Upon returning to 
London and the Foreign Office in 1936, he found himself in a battle with the Permanent Under-
Secretary, Sir Robert Vansittart, and in the midst of an unstable European continent. Anthony 
Eden, by then in his first stint as Foreign Secretary, had brought Cadogan back with the 
intention of taking over the top job at the Foreign Office.180  In the meantime, however, 
Cadogan set about on an ambitious initiative to reform the League of Nations.  
It is a proposal which offers insight into the way in which Cadogan viewed the notion 
of international order—or, to put it another way, the way in which he thought British officials 
could re-order an international system before it fractured beyond repair.181 Despite his support 
for the League and his optimism that it might survive, the Abyssinian and Rhineland crises had 
been its collective deathblow. The Covenant, he insisted, ‘doesn’t work’. This was due, in part, 
to its being built on the ‘rotten foundation’ of the Versailles settlement, a treaty which the 
League seemed to ‘perpetuate’. In the first place, the terms dictated to Germany were too harsh 
and it was unreasonable to expect that the country could be tied down for so long. ‘Germany 
could be held to the Treaty’, Cadogan wrote, ‘only for so long as the necessary force was there, 
and available, to compel her, and that time is long since past [sic].’ An added problem had been 
the fact that the Covenant had been buttressed by ‘superfluous’ international agreements in the 
years since 1919, many of which, in Cadogan’s view, served to weaken the force of the League 
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itself. Among these were the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the various non-aggression pacts, such 
as that signed between Germany and Poland in January 1934. ‘Multiplication of pacts is like 
the inflation of a currency by the printing press’, he wrote.182 
What he suggested, however, was to first review the settlement negotiated at Versailles 
and then to revise the Covenant. In doing so, they might create a ‘more durable basis for the 
decent regulation of international affairs’. What it came down to, he said, was a ‘question of 
machinery’. First and foremost, the provision allowing for mandatory sanctions would need to 
be scrapped, given that the experience of the League had shown that countries were not willing 
to commit to such action pre-emptively. He next suggestion was to look into the possibility of 
‘regionalising’ of the League, so as to make it more functional in various parts of the world. 
While neither a detailed nor a comprehensive list of suggested revisions, Cadogan wrote that 
these changes would likely reduce the League to a ‘consultative pact’ when it came to the 
maintenance of peace, but this was not to be written off necessarily.183  
The importance of an ordered international system and the way in which international 
machinery could bring this about remained a theme in Cadogan’s proposals during the Second 
World War. A point which he continued to stress was that Foreign Office planners should avoid 
too rigid a design, which he thought might constrain governments from taking action when it 
was most necessary. Importantly, however, he did not exhibit an over-reliance on international 
organisation. Even towards the end of the war, when the prospect of a United Nations 
Organization was drawing ever closer, he entertained the idea of a more basic great power 
alliance, assuming this would ensure future cooperation between the United Kingdom, the 
United States and the Soviet Union.  
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The search for British war aims, September 1939 – November 1940 
From the earliest days of the conflict, much of the thinking about post-war policy on the British 
side was shaped by the need to counter German propaganda. Just three weeks into the war, the 
head of the Foreign Office’s Political Intelligence Department, Rex Leeper, wrote to Cadogan 
that the task of developing British propaganda against Germany immediately brought up 
questions of ‘high policy’.184 It was not enough to simply state what they were fighting against. 
To convince the populations of Europe that their safety and prosperity laid outside the German 
Reich, the British government would need to articulate what they were fighting for.185 Cadogan 
understood that war aims served an important purpose in the struggle, but he admitted that he 
saw ‘awful difficulties’ ahead.186 War aims and peace aims, he wrote elsewhere, were ‘loose 
terms’, and they should take one step at a time. ‘Get rid of Hitler: that is my war aim—not 
peace aim. Do that first: then you will win the war.’187 
Though the Foreign Office were just coming around to the consideration of post-war 
aims in the first months of the war, there were other individuals and groups who had been 
thinking along these lines for some time. In September, Lord Robert Cecil and the League of 
Nations Union submitted to the Foreign Office a list of twelve points outlining in broad terms 
the future organisation of the world.188 One prominent member of that grouping was Lord 
Davies, an outspoken and committed internationalist, who was pressuring the Foreign 
Secretary Lord Halifax to make a statement in the House of Lords.189 His vision—and one 
shared by a number of politicians and intellectuals in the period—was for a confederation on 
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the continent, under the heading ‘The United States of Europe’.190 One supporter of this idea 
was Anthony Eden, the man who was to replace Halifax as Foreign Secretary only months 
later.191 In September, Eden had written to Halifax that the ‘only possible solution is on the 
lines of some form of European federation’ which would include a common defence policy, a 
customs union and shared currency.192   
Elsewhere, a grouping of preeminent British academics associated with the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) were engaging in a collective effort to study 
the future of international order.193 In February 1939, Lionel Curtis, one of the founders of the 
organisation, spoke about the need for a future world order, which in his view should consist 
of a ‘world commonwealth embracing all nations and kindreds and tongues’. He had been 
inspired by a number of contemporary writers on the subject, including Clarence Streit and his 
book Union Now.194  In July 1939, Chatham House created the ‘World Order Preparatory 
Group’ which was soon to be renamed the ‘World Order Study Group’. Armed with a generous 
donation from the Rockefeller Foundation, the grouping of academics led by historians Arnold 
Toynbee, Alfred Zimmern and Charles Webster set about on a programme in which they would 
solicit papers from contributors, all with a focus on the future organisation of peace.195 Though 
their work would be disrupted by the start of hostilities, as the war progressed, many of these 
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historians were brought closer to the policymaking realm, first under the Foreign Research and 
Press Service (FRPS) and later the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD).196  
By the summer of 1940, the war situation had changed somewhat drastically. France 
had fallen and there was now a new government, led by Winston Churchill. Government 
ministers and Foreign Office officials were still not prioritizing the idea of stating detailed war 
aims, but the topic continued to be forced on them because of manoeuvres by Hitler who 
continued to hold the military and diplomatic momentum. The need to counter Hitler’s schemes 
for Europe, in particular, forced Foreign Office officials to think about the fundamental 
economic and political principles on which a future British and European—and perhaps 
world—order would rest.  
Some, such as Nigel Ronald, argued that because Britain was dependent on export 
trade, the government would need to commit to a ‘better ordering of international economic 
relations’.197 Others, such as Frank Roberts of the Northern Department, continued to assert 
that it was necessary to show British military mettle by making some headway against the 
Germans. If they failed to do this, elaborate schemes for the future regional and international 
order would be seen by the rest of the world to be ‘impractical or typical British cant and 
hypocrisy’.198 For the time being, the Foreign Office felt that the promotion of basic principles 
should come before more detailed proposals. As the Deputy Under-Secretary, Orme Sargent, 
noted, ‘We shall do best to stick to simple, short-term ideas, based on certain fundamental, 
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permanent principles…and to eschew, however alluring and plausible they may be, far-
reaching and all-embracing Utopias.’199  
Just as the Foreign Office was wrestling with fundamental questions of future European 
and world order, the Cabinet began their own efforts to articulate ‘war aims’. Spurred on by 
Duff Cooper, then the Minister of Information, as well as Cadogan and Halifax, the Cabinet 
decided on 23 August to create the War Aims Committee.200  At this meeting, the Prime 
Minister used the opportunity to introduce his vision for Europe. He ruled out a ‘vindictive 
settlement’ and outlined a plan which would see the five great powers of Europe joined by 
three groups of smaller confederated states: Northern Europe, Middle Europe, and the Balkans. 
He thought the five great powers and the three confederations might be joined together by a 
‘Council of Europe’. Furthermore, there would be a court to handle all disputes between 
countries, as well as an international air force which might help maintain peace.201 Though 
Churchill’s views were not taken up in any formal way at the time, his conception of a ‘Council 
of Europe’, as well as a world court and international air force, would be issues with which the 
Foreign Office would subsequently take into account. 
During these months, Churchill put forward a recommendation which would have 
important—if often undervalued—influence on the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations 
Declaration, both of which would be signed the following year. During a Cabinet meeting on 
24 October, Churchill suggested the revival of the Supreme War Council, which had been 
created during the previous war in 1917. The new grouping—made up of the Free French, 
Holland, Belgium, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Dominion governments—would 
pledge themselves to fighting against Germany and Italy and to establishing a ‘new order in 
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Europe’ which might involve ‘the cooperation of free peoples in a system of military, 
economic, and social security’.202 Though this initiative was stalled due to the refusal of the 
Greek government to join, it would be taken up once again the following summer. 
The War Aims Committee went on to meet five times in the autumn of 1940, and while 
its suggestions never became the stated policy of the government, it was the most significant 
attempt thus far to formulate the basic tenets of a British post-war policy.203 Outside of the 
selected government ministers, there were a few individuals invited to participate in the work 
of the committee. One was Arnold Toynbee, who, in coordination with Duff Cooper, helped to 
outline some early suggestions for war aims. Although vague in its early stages, Toynbee’s 
vision was in line with the internationalism he had long espoused. While not quite approaching 
the schemes for world government which had marked some of his writing and speaking in the 
interwar period, he nonetheless spoke of the need for a ‘community of nations’.204  
This type of visionary idealism proved unattractive to Foreign Office officials, and it 
was a distaste of this brand of intellectualism which would become a mark of Foreign Office 
planning throughout the war. Even at this early stage, officials criticized Toynbee for being 
both vague and unrealistic. Some considered it a ‘typically Toynbee production’ while others 
wrote that they were filled with ‘despondency’ after reading it.205 While the Foreign Office still 
lacked a dedicated planning body of its own, senior officials from various departments offered 
their views on what a post-war policy might look like. The Southern Department felt that they 
should not put their trust in elaborate security schemes but to focus on the distribution of power 
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within the international system. ‘Responsibility devolves on states in accordance with the 
power they exercise’, one official wrote.206  
Others argued for a new order to be constructed, but they were wary of attempting, at 
this stage, to give it an international scope. Nearly all of their considerations were shaped by 
the perception of American post-war intentions. Nigel Ronald took a view that while the United 
States might be involved in the ‘police work’ on the continent immediately after the war, they 
could not be relied upon to continue such responsibility indefinitely. Moreover, any peace 
settlement, he warned, must ‘not take the form of any ambitious all-foreseeing written 
constitution’. He continued, ‘let immediate aims be modest and let us at once abandon all 
League-of-Nations-Union ideas about uniformity, world-wide scope, theoretical equality and 
so forth.’ His suggestion was for the creation of ‘regional groupings of small Leagues’ which 
states would be able to join, depending on ‘the geographical situation of its interests’.207  
Similarly, the Head of the American Department, John Balfour, insisted that they focus 
on building a European order rather than a world system. Here he thought Ronald’s idea for 
regional groupings would be a good start, especially for Europe. He added that any arrangement 
on these lines would have to avoid one of the weaknesses of the League’s design, namely the 
requirement that there be an unanimity of states in order to take collective action. Furthermore, 
any attempt to recreate the League, he added, would lead to American disinterest in future 
questions of European order.208  
The following month, Orme Sargent took up this question in his own memorandum 
titled ‘Some Observations on Peace Plans’. He wrote that the countries of Europe had suffered 
a ‘moral collapse’ in which many had lost the ‘will to self-preservation’. Moreover, they looked 
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to the United Kingdom and found a power consistently reluctant to stand up for them.209 As to 
a future European order along British lines, Sargent believed that it was based on Britain being 
willing to back up its principles with force of arms. If there was one thing they should have 
learned from the Germans by now, he said, it was ‘the rule of guns instead of butter’. 
Like Ronald and Balfour, Sargent acknowledged the significance of American 
involvement in the post-war world. Not only was Britain’s influence in Europe dependent on 
the ‘support and encouragement’ they would receive from the United States, but support from 
Washington, he warned, would only come if Britain was willing to be involved on the 
continent. 
They will wish Great Britain to play Sparta to their Athens, and if we show any 
tendency to imitate Sybaris instead, we must not be surprised if they quickly wash 
their hands of us and make other plans for their own defence which might well 
prove fatal to this country.210 
 
In reviewing the paper, Halifax felt that Sargent offered an important counter argument 
to some of the ‘intellectual optimism’ which characterized the plans of Toynbee and others.211 
Likewise, Cadogan agreed with Sargent to a large extent; and in his comments, he offered his 
most significant views to date on the post-war world. Echoing an argument of E.H. Carr, who 
had, the year before, published his book The Twenty Years Crisis, Cadogan said that the events 
of the last seven years ‘have put Force securely on its throne’.212 What mattered was not that 
states—large and small—could organise themselves along idealistic principles and common 
interests. These ideas, Cadogan argued, had been ‘blown to bits’ by the brute force of highly 
industrialized revisionist powers such as Germany, Italy and Japan. Moreover, Britain could 
not afford to ignore its own military strength. ‘All bluffs have been called’, he said. Since the 
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last war, they had lived on bluffs in Europe, and in other regions such as the Far East, they had 
lived on bluffs ‘for nearly half a century’. In the future, the United Kingdom would need to 
cultivate and maintain a great degree of military power in order to play a role, first in Europe 
and then in other regions of the world. In closing, Cadogan was clear that Britain would need 
outside help. ‘Everything, it seems to me, will be dependent on the willingness and the ability 
of the US to share our burden.’213  
 
John Maynard Keynes and the advance of post-war thinking 
Throughout the autumn, the War Aims Committee continued with their work, though there was 
little in the way of substantive progress. Ministers were paralysed by concerns that they would 
either make empty, ‘platitudinous’ statements or commit to guarantees which they could not 
meet. All the while, the need to counter German designs for a ‘New Order’—an economic  plan 
announced in July 1940 by Walther Funk, the German Economic Minister—became more 
pressing.214 Reports from the British Ambassador in Switzerland, David Kelly, indicated that 
Swiss and European business leaders, doubting that Britain could offer an alternative system, 
had begun planning for German leadership across economic and financial sectors. 
Additionally, there was a concern towards the end of the year within the Cabinet and the 
Foreign Office that if the government could not produce a constructive plan for the future, the 
opportunity might be seized by the Roosevelt administration, perhaps as soon as the President’s 
inauguration speech in January. With this in mind, Lord Halifax recommended that the Cabinet 
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enlist the help of John Maynard Keynes, the renowned economist who was now working in the 
Treasury.215   
In response, Keynes wrote that what European countries desired, more so than even 
political independence, was social security. This, he said, must be the policy at home and on 
the continent. The avoidance of post-war starvation, currency crises, and ‘the wild fluctuations 
of employment, markets and prices’ would have to be the focus of the British post-war 
planners, and for this, they would need to secure the cooperation of the United States. To help 
stem the inevitable humanitarian crisis at the end of the war, Keynes proposed the 
establishment of a ‘European Reconstruction Fund’ which would provide credit to central 
banks on the continent, which would then, in turn, be able to purchase stocks of food and raw 
materials from Britain. The preservation of ‘economic health in every country’, Keynes wrote, 
was the key to future peace.216 
Keynes’s paper received much praise from the Foreign Office, where many officials 
saw his work as representative of innovative yet practical ideas which would ensure that Britain 
could influence the discussion of the post-war order. Cadogan thought it offered ‘the most 
practical and hopeful contribution’ to the wider discussion over a future economic order for 
Europe.217 The new Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, found it to be ‘most useful’ and asked 
that the Foreign Office ‘hasten its most effective employment’. He was soon to give his first 
speech as Foreign Secretary, and he hoped that Keynes’s argument might be incorporated.218  
On 29 May, Eden delivered the first substantive statement on war aims from the British 
government. It relied heavily on Keynes’s paper from November 1940, specifically the points 
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about post-war relief, currency stabilisation and a system of international exchange.219 The 
speech drew interest in the United States, where Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the 
Secretary of State, wanted to find out more about the development of Eden’s views.220  Keynes, 
who was in the United States for an extended period during these months, wrote to the Foreign 
Office that the speech was well-received, although Roosevelt remained ‘extremely averse’ to 
publicly declaring post-war aims.221 Instead, in these months, it was the American Under-
Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, who took the lead on the American side in speaking publicly 
about the post-war world. 
In July, Sumner Welles spoke of the need for international machinery to help maintain 
the peace—‘instrumentality’, he argued, which must also allow for peaceful change. 222 
Welles’s remarks were well received in London, where one Foreign Office official commented 
that ‘the chief apostle of…the dependency of American welfare on the state of the rest of the 
world is very noteworthy—and encouraging.’223 Cadogan expressed some satisfaction with the 
remarks, although he reserved full praise for Welles until he could work out what exactly he 
envisioned as the future ‘instrumentality’ in regards to post-war territorial adjustments. 
Cadogan added that he had his own idea on this subject but that it ‘might shock Mr Welles’. It 
involved, in his view, ‘the crude form of an Anglo-American policing of the world for some 
years’.224 
One of the more significant developments relating to the post-war world which took 
place in the summer of 1941 was one which, though the United States was not involved, had 
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important implications for the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration which 
would be signed in August and December, respectively. 225 Building on an earlier 
recommendation by Churchill in October 1940 to revive the Supreme War Council, the Foreign 
Office had been working to organise a meeting of allied governments in London.226 On 12 
June, 14 representatives, including the leaders of the governments in exile in the British capital, 
signed what became known as the St James’s Agreement.227 It contained much of the phrasing 
originally recommended during the previous winter, and pledged the signatories to continue 
the fight against Germany and Italy and to build up a post-war order.228 Though this agreement 
has often been overlooked, it provided an important precedent for the more famous declaration 
which would be signed two months later.  
 
Cadogan and the Atlantic Charter 
By August 1941, Britain had been at war with Germany for nearly two years. The country had 
staved off a German air assault, deterred an amphibious invasion and weathered incessant, 
indiscriminate bombing throughout the preceding year. In the seven weeks prior to the Atlantic 
meeting, Hitler had launched Operation Barbarossa and the British and Soviets had signed an 
agreement on 12 July pledging assistance and promising not to negotiate a separate peace with 
Hitler. Despite an eastward lurch, the war was exhausting the British military and crippling its 
society. Lend-Lease had been enacted in March 1941, but the goods were only trickling in. 
Decisions by the United States to freeze Japanese assets and extend an oil embargo on 26 July 
and 1 August, respectively, meant provoking a hungry regime infamous for its predations. 
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British interests in the Far East now sat in the crosshairs. It was against this backdrop that 
Churchill and Roosevelt came together for their first wartime meeting off the coast of 
Newfoundland.  
At dinner on the first night of the conference, Cadogan found himself seated between 
Roosevelt and General George Marshall. The conversation was lighthearted at the start, but as 
the focus turned towards more pressing matters, two ideas came to the fore: first, that parallel 
statements by the American, British and Dutch governments addressing Japanese action in the 
Far East might be drafted and circulated; and second, the possibility of drafting a joint 
declaration of principles which might be signed by the President and Prime Minister. Cadogan 
recalled years later that, on the morning after the dinner, he was eating eggs and bacon on a 
writing table when Churchill stormed into the cabin demanding drafts of the parallel and joint 
declarations. After listing broad ideas of the shape that each should take, Churchill left and 
Cadogan set about on his drafts. By the time he finished, five handwritten clauses were 
presented to the typist.229 Of his original draft, the text of the preamble and the first three 
clauses, with the exception of a few words and phrases, remained the same through to the final 
copy. His fourth and fifth clauses were changed from their original text, but far from being 
ignored, their general concepts were split across the five new clauses.  
When the Americans returned the draft to Churchill and Cadogan during a meeting on 
the morning of 11 August, there were several points of contention, though only the subject of 
a post-war organisation will be addressed here.230 While Cadogan had spoken of an ‘effective 
international organization’ in his fifth clause, the Americans had scrapped the mention of an 
international organisation altogether.231  This was due primarily to the political tight rope 
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Roosevelt was walking back home. To speak openly of a post-war international organisation 
was to draw America—a country still outside the war—into post-war commitments around the 
world. Such a statement, the President believed, would be easy fodder for the explosive 
isolationist factions within Congress and the public.232 
Churchill himself was surprised by the veracity and tone of the American amendments 
dealing with the maintenance of peace. It was, he said, ‘most remarkable for its realism’. The 
Prime Minister, while sensitive to Roosevelt’s domestic reality, also had his own national 
interests which included a public desirous of a system for promoting and guaranteeing peace 
after the war. Thus, he sought the addition, after the word ‘essential’, of the line ‘pending the 
establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security’. In his telegram to 
London, Churchill admitted that the President, while disapproving of the amendment, was sure 
to accept it. ‘He will not like this very much, but he attaches so much importance to the joint 
declaration, which he believes will affect [the] whole movement of U.S. opinion that I think he 
will agree.’233 
In fact, Roosevelt accepted the change without much hesitation. For one, it did not 
infringe on his primary post-war aim in August 1941, which was the establishment of a 
transition period in which the United States and Great Britain would commence a policing of 
the world. According to Welles’s notes of the meeting, Roosevelt saw no objection to the 
amendment because it made clear that ‘the permanent international organisation would only be 
set up after that experimental period had passed.’ Furthermore, Roosevelt had no intention of 
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allowing the mention of international organisation become the focus of the clause. The 
disarmament of ‘aggressor nations’ was to be the priority.234 
Through this back and forth, it becomes clear Cadogan and Churchill were the ones 
pushing for the inclusion of language relating to a post-war international organisation. Even at 
this early stage, it was viewed as a way to bind the United States to the future maintenance of 
peace in Europe, an idea which had, by then, become something of a central aim for Cadogan 
and others in the Foreign Office. For the Americans, and Roosevelt in particular, the topic of 
international organisation, at least at this point in the war, was simply a beehive in domestic 
politics. Espousing such aims was sure to awaken the masses of isolationists, which at the time 
was perceived as a menacing prospect. Instead, it was Churchill and Cadogan who ensured that 
there was some explicit mention to the aim of a post-war international organisation.  
 
The Atlantic Charter and Anglo-American relations 
As the British delegation made their way back to London—on a trip that would take nearly a 
week—it was left to the Deputy Prime Minister to announce the signing of the joint declaration. 
While a remarkable statement, it largely feel on deaf ears within Britain, a country now 
suspicious of Prime Ministers returning to the country waving pieces of paper.235 There were 
no formal commitments and no declaration of war.236 Upon their return to London, Churchill 
and Cadogan were met by Eden who seemed a ‘little puzzled’ that the meeting did not produce 
more concrete commitments.237 Within the Foreign Office, the reception to the Charter was 
mixed. Eden’s Private Secretary, Oliver Harvey, saw little utility in the declaration, 
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commenting in his diaries that it was ‘a terribly woolly document full of all the old clichés of 
the League of Nations’, but that there was ‘no alternative but to accept it’.238  
On 19 August, just a week after the final text of the charter was agreed, Thomas North 
Whitehead, a professor on leave from Harvard University and working as an advisor on 
American affairs, wrote a memorandum which was to serve as the first official assessment of 
the eight points.239 He took a cynical view of America’s post-war commitments both to the 
European continent as well as to post-war agreements binding the country to responsibilities 
outside the Western Hemisphere. Regarding the reference alluding to a new international 
system in point eight, he wrote, ‘In practice, Americans will be loth [sic] to consider a system 
of world organisation which would involve handling wide and unaccustomed powers to their 
own Government; nor is their Constitution well designed for the assumption of such powers.’240 
When the Foreign Office departments were asked for their opinions on the subject, 
many relayed their hesitancy in attempting to formulate a post-war policy based on the eight 
points of the declaration.241 The main reason was that it was still too early to tell what the 
position of the United States and the Soviet Union might be at the time of the settlement. That 
Russia experienced its revolution in the last years of the previous war and that the United States 
entered the conflict late—only to back out of the Versailles settlement that ended the war—led 
many in the Foreign Office to be wary of assuming what the world would look like at the 
conclusion of hostilities.  
Despite these reservations, there was some alignment as to the basic requirements of a 
British post-war strategy. It was understood that the United States, given its military and 
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economic prowess, would have to remain involved in the world, most importantly in Europe. 
It was thought that Germany needed to be permanently disarmed, and that the Soviet Union 
should be deterred from moving westward given the vacuum created by Germany’s military 
defeat. Given the need for American assistance, focus began to concentrate how they might 
lead the United States to accept some post-war responsibility for European security. The clause 
relating to a future international organisation, in particular, was viewed by some as a way to 
ensure American involvement. As one official put it,  
Unless the Americans give continued support to an international organisation it 
will be quite impossible to prevent one or the other of the great Continental powers 
from making, after a suitable interval, exactly the same attempt to dominate the 
continent as Germany is making now.242  
 
This Anglo-American partnership is what many British diplomats viewed as the most 
important piece of an uncertain post-war puzzle. At the same time as Churchill and Roosevelt 
were meeting off the coast of Newfoundland, officials in the British Embassy in Washington 
were drafting a document outlining the importance of Anglo-American cooperation after the 
war. The memorandum would be produced as a Cabinet paper under Lord Halifax’s name by 
November.  It followed a similar line to that of the officials in London who had been analysing 
the impact of the Atlantic Charter, in that it spoke of the need for a close working relationship 
with the Americans after the war and the need to convince the American public and Congress 
of this involvement. As Ronald Campbell had laid out in the original draft on 15 August, a 
‘close association’ between Britain and the United States ‘is essential for the establishment and 
maintenance of a tolerable international order and for the safeguarding of peace’.243 
Just as important, though, was that Britain should work out an arrangement in which it 
would be an equal to the United States, as opposed to a subordinate power at the mercy of 
Washington. It was essential, the memorandum read, that ‘British views may retain an 
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appropriate degree of influence’ in world affairs. To achieve this position in conjunction with 
an Anglo-American relationship would require tactful diplomacy on the part of British 
statesmen. Therefore, Campbell argued, ‘We must eschew any appearance of trying to impose 
a solution of any question by insistence on a superior British wisdom.’244 Whitehall needed to 
understand American needs and to remove suspicion of British intentions. If this could be 
accomplished, they might be able to overcome expected confrontations with the American 
Congress, a body which had delivered the veto on a global role for the United States during the 
last war. 
 
A ‘Volga Charter’ 
Between the Atlantic Charter and additional memos espousing the necessity of trans-Atlantic 
cooperation, the autumn of 1941 seemed to be one in which the focus was very much on the 
United States. Nevertheless, the reality remained that America was not a formal belligerent, 
whereas the Soviet Union now was.245 While declarations like the Atlantic Charter set out 
admirable principles, there was little in the way of immediate tangible support. Conscious of 
the need to not alienate the Soviet Union by the appearance of an exclusive Anglo-American 
partnership, some in the Foreign Office, such as Orme Sargent, advocated the need for a 
diplomatic agreement with Russia, something he referred to informally as a ‘Volga Charter’.246 
Such an understanding with Russia might, on the one hand, help to allay fears in Moscow of 
an Anglo-American alliance working to undermine Soviet interests, but more importantly, it 
might offer Britain the opportunity for increased leverage vis-a-vis their negotiations with the 
Americans.  
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Despite the fact that they now shared a common enemy, suspicion of the British within 
Moscow had been intensifying. While Churchill had pledged aid to Russia in a speech on the 
night of Hitler’s invasion, and that Moscow and London had signed the Anglo-Soviet 
agreement on 12 July, Stalin remained wary of Britain’s commitment. Almost immediately 
after Germany’s advance into Russia, Stalin had begun to press Churchill about opening a 
second front in France.247 Moreover, the Soviets were conscious that the Anglo-American joint 
declaration in August had been made without prior consultation with Moscow. Their 
Ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, brought this up with Eden in a meeting on 26 August in 
which he explained that Anglo-American ‘declarations…in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean’ 
did not engender trust in Moscow. ‘The impression has been created that Britain and the USA 
imagine themselves lords and masters, judging the rest of the sinful world, including the 
USSR.’ Maisky warned the Foreign Secretary that, ‘You can't forge friendship on such a 
basis.’248  
With the German army on the outskirts of Moscow, an exasperated Stalin wrote to 
Churchill complaining of the lag in Anglo-Soviet relations. He felt that no ‘clarity’ existed at 
present between Moscow and London, a situation which he warned might make it ‘difficult to 
secure mutual confidence’. Not only was there no agreement on military matters concerning 
the fight against Germany, but there was no understanding ‘on war aims and on plans of the 
post war organisation of peace’.249 When Maisky visited Churchill to discuss Stalin’s message, 
the Prime Minister pointed out that for all of their demands to open a second front, it should be 
remembered that only four months ago they were allied with Hitler. As to the question of war 
aims, Maisky recorded Churchill as saying, ‘So, Stalin wants to know our post-war plans? We 
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do have such plans—the Atlantic Charter! What else can be said at the present moment?’250  
Stalin’s message forced an important reaction within the Foreign Office, where officials 
now felt that there needed to be a more concerted effort to reassure Moscow. As the Head of 
the Northern Department, Christopher Warner, noted, the Russians undoubtedly felt that the 
post-war aims of the United States were ‘diametrically opposed’ to their own and that Britain 
would likely side with Washington. It was time, he felt, to ‘allay their suspicions, even if we 
cannot meet their wishes’.251 One approach offered was for Eden and Churchill to make it clear 
that there was room for a collaborative effort on post-war aims. Britain could indicate to 
Moscow that their own war aims remained primarily focused on Hitler and did not go beyond 
the Atlantic Charter, a document for which Maisky had expressed his support in September.252 
Moreover, several points from a recent speech by Stalin, on 6 November, could be squared 
with their own, namely those concerning Stalin’s pledge not to seize foreign territory and to 
liberate populations under Nazi control.253 
The Foreign Office view took shape after a meeting between Cadogan, Law, Sargent, 
Strang, Harvey and Ronald on 18 November. There had been a frank discussion, first about 
what were the likely war aims of the Russians and second, how far Britain was prepared to go 
in meeting these aims. The difficulty, they agreed, was that Britain had yet to develop its own 
policy about the political economic aspects of a post-war settlement; and furthermore, they had 
promised the Americans that they would not make such arrangements prior to the end of the 
war. While the Atlantic Charter may have brought them closer to the United States, at the same 
time, it had limited their diplomatic manoeuvrability and left them ‘at a serious disadvantage’ 
when it came to discussing matters with the Russians. Improving relations with the Russians 
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thus came to be seen as a way to strengthen Britain’s strategic autonomy. As one official noted, 
‘bringing in Russia in this way might in fact serve to help us in our dealings with the Americans 
on these matters.’ One way of doing this was to indicate to Stalin, in clear terms, that they 
intended to treat Russia ‘on a basis of equality’ and that the post-war settlement—far from 
being an Anglo-American project—‘would be largely dictated by these three powers’.254  
In Churchill’s response to Stalin—a message which had been drafted by Cadogan—he 
said that he would be willing to send Eden to Moscow to discuss a number of matters. On the 
post-war organisation of peace, the Prime Minister was clear that Britain was to remain in the 
fight with Russia against Nazi Germany. He added that he expected ‘Soviet Russia, Great 
Britain and the United States will meet at the Council table of the victors as the three principal 
partners.’255 Meanwhile, within the Foreign Office, Orme Sargent took to drafting a kind of 
‘Volga Charter’ which Eden could take with him to Moscow in the hope of getting some kind 
of agreement with Stalin. Despite Churchill ‘violently’ opposing the draft, an eventual 
consensus was reached, though Cadogan thought it ‘as thin as restaurant coffee’.256    
Eden, Cadogan and Harvey set off for Moscow on 7 December.257 At their first meeting 
nine days later, Stalin told Eden that a declaration amounted to ‘algebra’ while an agreement 
was ‘practical arithmetic’.258 Stalin instead presented the British with two draft treaties, one of 
which concerned mutual military assistance and the other which related to political 
collaboration now and after the war. Stalin also proposed a secret protocol which would settle 
post-war frontiers, most notably a return to Russia’s western boundaries as they stood in June 
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1941.259 Eden explained that they were not looking to sign formal treaties at this stage, and that 
the question of a secret protocol was ‘asking the impossible’ of him, as it would mean violating 
the earlier agreement with the Americans to not settle such matters before the end of the war.260 
He instead sought to convince Stalin that an agreement along more general lines—one which 
would correspond to the Atlantic Charter—might be more useful at this stage.261  
The War Cabinet agreed with Eden’s line to Stalin and by 20 December, it was clear to 
the Russians that the British would not budge on this question. It was agreed that the two 
governments would issue a joint communiqué which spoke of the need for a full defeat of 
Germany and the need to ensure that Germany could not wage war in the future. Perhaps more 
importantly, the communiqué also committed the British and the Russians to future discussions 
‘relating to post-war organisation of peace and security’. When Eden described the visit to the 
Cabinet upon his return to London, he said that he had been ‘struck by the absence of 
constraint’ by Stalin and his advisors, as compared with his last trip in 1935. He felt that Stalin’s 
push for recognition of frontiers was rooted in Russian suspicion of Britain and the desire for 
Britain and the United States to ‘treat Russia on equal terms’. It helped, he thought, that they 
had been able to reassure Stalin, but there remained an ‘underlying suspicion’ of Britain within 
Russia which could be ‘re-aroused’ at any time.262  
 
A United Nations Declaration 
Just as Eden and Cadogan were meeting with Stalin in Moscow, Churchill was in Washington, 
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where discussions with Roosevelt would lead to the next great development towards a post-
war order. Here, the initiative came solely from the Roosevelt administration, but at a critical 
juncture, the War Cabinet in London added in language which gave important mention to the 
place of small powers. From the start, the discussions were intended to lay a foundation for a 
joint Anglo-American military strategy to defeat the Axis powers. Although conversations 
were primarily of a military nature, the State Department proposed a draft declaration on 14 
December which would pledge collective action against the Axis powers along the lines of the 
Atlantic Charter.263 It was a draft declaration which built on the earlier St James’s Agreement 
in June. This early draft included as principal signatories the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and ‘other signatory powers’, but it was soon redrafted by State 
Department officials between 14 and 19 December to include as the principal signatories, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China.264  
The War Cabinet in London largely approved of the declaration with some minor 
changes. They strongly favoured the inclusion of a number of smaller powers, to ‘give the 
necessary emphasis to the fact that this war is being waged for the freedom of small nations as 
well as great’.265 They also requested, in line with the Atlantic Charter, that there be included 
some mention of ‘social security’ into the text. Although the latter request was ignored in 
Washington, the Cabinet gave their approval to the declaration at a meeting on 29 December.266 
After Churchill and Roosevelt had decided on the name ‘United Nations’, all that was 
left was to sign the document.267 While a seemingly trivial detail, the signing ceremony was 
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symbolic in that the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China signed a 
full day before the 22 other signatories.268  It was clear that these powers were to be leaders of 
the rest, both in war and in peace; and it was a development which would have important 
implications as the Foreign Office began their work on more detailed plans for a post-war 
international organisation.   
By the New Year 1942, the United Kingdom had contributed to three joint 
declarations—the St James’s Agreement, the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations 
Declaration—which revealed the government’s intention to work with allies both during and 
after the war. More importantly, the work of the Foreign Office—including the debates taking 
place within and across departments—began to focus on the need to establish a workable 
international system at the end of the war, and crucially, the ways in which the relationships 
with the United States and the Soviet Union would need to be managed.  
 This chapter has set the stage for a more detailed examination of the post-war planning 
which took place within the Foreign Office from 1942 onwards. The discussion of the 
individual backgrounds of Jebb, Webster and Cadogan has revealed approaches to foreign 
policy which, shaped by historical study and experience, valued ordering mechanisms within 
the international system. For Jebb, this was to be found in a ‘workable balance of power’; for 
Webster, the future lay in a more robust international organisation; while for Cadogan, the goal 
was an ordered system but the difficulty remained the ‘question of machinery’. The more realist 
views of Jebb contrasted with the internationalism of Webster, and the way in which these 
approaches balanced against one another would influence what would, in later years, define 
the ‘realist-internationalism’ which coloured British plans for the United Nations Organization.  
Next, the chapter has shown how Foreign Office planning began progressing between 
1940 and 1941. Thinking about the post-war world in these early years of the war did not come 
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naturally. The weight of the military conflict, especially after the defeat of France and the Battle 
of Britain, tipped the government’s focus away from post-war questions. But as German 
propaganda relating to the post-war world continued to echo across the European continent, 
officials within the Foreign Office, in particular, began to advocate for a definitive 
announcement of war aims. The work of John Maynard Keynes in this period was crucial, and 
in many ways, his proposals for a new economic order in Europe helped to catalyse post-war 
thinking within the Foreign Office. Not only was this kind of innovative and proactive planning 
a way to galvanise European populations falling under the shadow of Nazi rule, but it provided 
a powerful tool in negotiations with the United States, a country which Foreign Office officials, 
even in the early years of the war and prior to American entry in the conflict, understood would 
exercise a disproportionate influence on the construction of a post-war political and economic 
order.  
This reality was not lost on senior officials such as Cadogan, who, during the Atlantic 
Conference in August 1941, delivered the first draft of a joint declaration on the post-war 
world. The majority of historical scholarship addressing the Atlantic Charter has heretofore 
undervalued the role of Cadogan and it is a narrative which this chapter has sought to revise. 
Finally, the Foreign Office views of the Charter reveal two important insights which run 
through this thesis. First, officials were, at various points, sceptical about the joint declaration 
and American post-war policy more broadly. There was a feeling that American statesmen had 
a tendency to proclaim ambitious, moralistic statements with little regard for the way in which 
this might be achieved in practical terms. Second, officials in the Foreign Office remained 
cognisant of the sensitivities of the Soviet Union. Though some officials, Cadogan included, 
sought an Anglo-American partnership at the core of a post-war order, the majority of officials 
believed that they could ill-afford to package it this way, lest the Soviet Union—by then an 
ally in the military conflict—grow suspicious. This balancing act between, as one official was 
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soon to frame it, a ‘moral and distant America and an amoral but very present Russia’, would 




A ‘Concert of the World’: Foreign Office post-war planning begins, 1942 
 
By the spring of 1942, there was a newfound urgency for post-war planning. If the early 
years of the war had been about the gradual acceptance of the need to plan for the post-war 
world, the year 1942 marked the beginning of a concerted effort by the Foreign Office to 
commence detailed planning. It was a period when debates within the Foreign Office and then 
the War Cabinet led to the first coherent policy recommendations aimed at British strategy for 
the post-war period. The Foreign Office drove the process throughout, first in setting up a 
department to examine post-war questions, and then in drafting the first substantive plans for 
both a future international order and a British post-war strategy. What had originally been 
called a ‘Concert of the World’ and later, a ‘Four Power Plan’, had, by December 1942, evolved 
into the ‘United Nations Plan’. The underlying conception was for a nucleus of the three great 
powers—along with China and possibly France—to act as the central authority responsible for 
the maintenance of peace and security. It was this basic framework which would become the 
cornerstone for Foreign Office planning for a post-war international organisation. 
To varying degrees, previous scholarship has examined the construction of the Four 
Power Plan and the Cabinet debate which it forced in November 1942.269 Less attention has 
been paid to the institutional and conceptual origins of this planning, however, and this chapter 
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will address both points in turn. The creation of the Economic and Reconstruction Department 
within the Foreign Office in June was the most significant step in this direction, and it was this 
body which was primarily responsible for Foreign Office planning for the remainder of the 
war.270 The new department owed its existence, in part, to the intervention of Nigel Ronald as 
well as two ministers, Stafford Cripps and Richard Law, both of who feared that the 
government might enter a future peace settlement as unprepared as they had been in 1919.271 
It was of the utmost importance for this new body to begin developing, in Law’s words, a 
‘grand strategy of peace’.  
On a conceptual level, Gladwyn Jebb, who had been nominated as the head of the 
nascent department, made clear from the start that his grouping was to focus on crafting ‘long 
distance schemes’. Previous historical scholarship has examined in some detail the contents of 
the Four Power Plan, but less attention has been paid to its precursor, a paper entitled ‘Relief 
Machinery—the Political Background’. 272  Moreover, scholars have often overlooked the 
debate which grew up within the Foreign Office on this paper and the ways in which this 
influenced the Four Power Plan. In addition to examining this crucial exchange of views, the 
chapter will also describe some of the more immediate reasons that Jebb and his colleagues 
took on this question of post-war international order at this stage. 
If fears over Hitler’s New Order had driven post-war thinking in 1940 and 1941, the 
feeling that the United States was well ahead of the United Kingdom in planning served as the 
new impetus within the Economic and Reconstruction Department. Perceptions of American 
post-war intentions shaped the earliest Foreign Office conceptions of a post-war international 
order. Officials in the early months of 1942 continued to stress the importance of bringing the 
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United States into European commitments, thus it was necessary to understand and incorporate 
the basic parameters of American thinking on post-war questions. What they could discern 
from American pronouncements was a conception of the four great powers operating at the 
centre of a wider grouping of United Nations. Far from simply adopting the American idea 
wholesale, however, British officials were determined to shape this basic conception ‘on the 
anvil of [their] experience’.273 
Jebb was responsible for the first draft strategy for the post-war international order, and 
in it, he took on the idea of four powers working together at the centre of a larger grouping of 
nations. Significantly, he couched this conception in a nineteenth-century precedent, 
specifically the Concert of Europe. In the same way that Britain, France, Russia and Austria-
Hungary cooperated in the decades after the Napoleonic Wars, so too might Britain, the United 
States, the Soviet Union, China and eventually France cooperate at the end of the present war. 
Added to this basic conception was Jebb’s idea for regional structures to be created, which, 
operating under the authority of the great powers, might help facilitate relief and reconstruction 
in Europe and Asia. These ideas were eventually redrafted into the Four Power Plan, which 
became the recommended policy of the Foreign Office.  
Towards the end of the year, the Four Power Plan would face a number of counter 
proposals from Cabinet ministers. The Prime Minister himself was the greatest hindrance to 
post-war planning in these months, as he urged Eden and the officials under him to focus on 
the task at hand, namely the defeat of Nazi Germany. Other ministers such as Stafford Cripps, 
however, put forward what Foreign Office officials considered more realistic schemes, certain 
aspects of which were adopted. By December 1942, the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department worked to redraft the Four Power Plan in such a way that Cabinet ministers were 
appeased and more importantly, planning remained in their hands.  
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‘Between a moral and distant America and an amoral, but very present, Russia’ 
Early efforts to infuse British foreign policy with more forward planning were bedevilled by 
depressing news from the frontline. In the final weeks of 1941, Japanese forces had begun their 
advance into the Philippines, a territory which would soon fall under their control. By February 
1942, the 80,000 troops defending Singapore—‘the Gibraltar of the East’ and the ‘Impregnable 
Fortress’—had surrendered and were imprisoned.274 In Eastern Europe, the German army had 
conquered swaths of western Russia throughout the autumn of 1941. Despite the failure to seize 
control of Moscow during this winter campaign, German troops continued to press the Red 
Army along multiple fronts as Hitler began preparing for a large-scale summer offensive. 
Elsewhere, Nazi U-Boats continued their relentless assault on Allied shipping convoys in the 
North Atlantic, while in North Africa, the Panzer Army Afrika under Erwin Rommel’s 
command recaptured the port city of Tobruk, Libya, on 21 June.  
The defeat at Tobruk struck the Prime Minister particularly hard. Eden recalled that 
Churchill, who was in Washington meeting with Roosevelt, ‘felt the humiliation bitterly’.275 
To make matters worse, the Prime Minister returned to London to face his second vote of 
confidence that year alone.276 ‘The ship of State’, as Jebb later recalled, ‘was almost on its 
beam ends’.277 It was hardly a time to think about what the world might look like after the war, 
yet it was against this backdrop that the United Kingdom began to develop a strategy for the 
post-war period.   
When it came to planning, the two most important considerations in the early months 
of 1942 were the post-war intentions of the United States and Soviet Union. Concerning the 
United States, a desire by officials in the Roosevelt administration and the State Department to 
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make future Lend-Lease aid conditional on Britain ending its system of imperial preference 
caused some alarm in the Foreign Office.278 Officials feared that the Roosevelt administration 
was using its leverage to weaken—and perhaps eventually dissolve— the British Empire. 
‘United States policy is exaggeratedly moral, at least where non-American interests are 
concerned’, one official complained, while others pointed to a feeling in the United States that 
the British were nothing more than ‘Machiavellian European schemers’.279 Regardless, it was 
accepted that the United States would be central to British post-war objectives. ‘Our constant 
aim must be to do everything calculated to keep America permanently interested in the 
preservation of world order’, one major memorandum read.280  
Meanwhile, however, Foreign Office officials were wary of moving too close to 
Washington at the expense of relations with Moscow. As one major review put it, ‘we may 
find ourselves between a moral and distant America and an amoral, but very present, Russia.’281 
Indeed, the position of Russia constituted one of the great question marks for the post-war 
European order. Given the defeat of Germany and the collapse of France, officials warned that 
there would be ‘no counterweight’ to Russia on the continent. It was essential, therefore, for 
the British both to establish—with the Americans—some kind of military presence on the 
continent and for the Foreign Office to reach an agreement with Russia which would ensure 
some measure of Anglo-Soviet cooperation in the post-war period.282 Though some senior 
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officials such as Cadogan and William Strang noted that the Russians were difficult to work 
with given their ‘almost insane suspicion’, the view which held was the need to establish a 
measure of trust within their diplomatic relationship.283 Orme Sargent had earlier suggested a 
‘treaty of alliance’ with Moscow, a policy which was eventually adopted and culminated in the 
‘Twenty-Year Mutual Assistance Agreement’ signed in May 1942.284 This agreement, along 
with the Atlantic Charter, now marked the so-called ‘fixed points’ of Britain’s approach to the 
post-war world.285  
 
Towards a ‘Grand Strategy for Peace’: The Spur to Planning 
Although the attempts to settle British policy towards the United States and the Soviet Union 
marked an important first step, the Foreign Office was still lacking an overarching long-term 
policy. A number of ministers and officials had begun raising concerns about this lack of 
planning in the early months of 1942. As Julian Lewis has shown, Nigel Ronald, in talks with 
the Chiefs of Staff, was pushing for the Foreign Office to have more input on strategic 
planning.286 Others, such as the Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office, Richard 
Law, warned that strategic missteps in preparing for the peace during the First World War had 
led to the current conflict. ‘It was in our strategical thinking, in the strategy of peace, that we 
made our mistakes. It was because our strategy was wrong that our tactics, whatever they 
were—and they were various—never worked out.’ Warning that the same outcome was 
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possible should Britain repeat these mistakes, he said, ‘If now we do not develop a grand 
strategy of peace, we shall be wrong again—and we shall have another war.’287 
These views were shared by the Lord Privy Seal, Sir Stafford Cripps, who just months 
later wrote to the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden calling for the creation of a joint committee 
which would focus on developing political and economic policy for the post-war period. On 
the economic side, the British had gone some way to create the Official Committee on Post-
War External Economic Problems, yet there continued to be a lack of coordinated political 
planning within the British government. ‘Until we have undertaken some forward planning in 
both the political and the economic sphere’, Cripps warned, ‘it will not be possible for us to 
meet the Russians or the Americans on equal terms.’288   
Senior officials within the Foreign Office agreed, and on 4 June, they established the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department, which, under the leadership of Jebb, would serve 
as the locus of Foreign Office post-war planning for the remainder of the war.289  Initially 
housed in the ‘attics’ of the Foreign Office, Jebb and his team were given a brief which ranged 
from refugees and armistices to wheat supplies, currency issues, and colonial questions.290 In 
Jebb’s view, however, the essential aim of the department was to direct British policy towards 
the settlement that would conclude the war. The new body, he said, should not be bogged down 
by short-term, day-to-day work, but it must continue to focus on ‘long distance schemes’.291 
There were three reasons that this body, despite its original charter, went on to become 
the generator of British post-war grand strategy. One was the personal initiative of Gladwyn 
Jebb, whose desire to grapple with the grand topics of British policy were no secret, and who 
	
287 Richard Law, ‘Speech to Cambridge Society for International Affairs, 18 March 1942’, Time and Tide, 21 
March 1942, copy in FO 371/35363/U830 
288  Memorandum by Cripps, ‘A Note on the Planning of International Reconstruction’, 18 May 1942, FO 
371/31538/U1903 
289 Cadogan diary, 4 June 1942, Dilks (ed.), p. 456 
290 Serving under him were Professor T. North Whitehead, Sir Evelyn Baring, Viscount Samuel Hood, and later, 
Paul S. Falla, John E. Coulson and Jim Lambert. 
291 Jebb to Sargent, 20 June 1942, FCO 73/263/Misc/42/1. See also, Sargent minute, 4 June 1942, FO 371/31538 
 96 
wasted no time in carving out a central role for the new department. Jebb had long sought 
positions within the Foreign Office which would give him the opportunity to shape key 
decisions. As his career progressed, he developed an attitude—shared by many officials of his 
generation—which held that British foreign policy needed to be active and robust as opposed 
to reactive and stale. In one of his first major recommendations, written eleven years earlier, 
he advocated a forward approach for British statecraft. ‘There is no doubt that we are in the 
dog fight along with everybody else, and that if we don't sharpen our teeth and claws and emit 
terrifyingly diabolical snarls we are in danger—well, not perhaps of being eaten up, but at least 
of not getting the bone.’292 This attitude would continue to colour his management of the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department throughout the war.   
The next reason for the department’s contribution to matters of so-called ‘high policy’ 
was the nature of the work. Relief and reconstruction efforts, in order to be successful, would 
require an overarching security and political structure based on the cooperation of the three 
great powers. This idea of political structures coming before those dealing with economics and 
finance was one of Jebb’s operating principles, and one which was best captured in his line, 
‘freedom from fear must precede freedom from want’.293 Questions of relief and reconstruction 
were thus bound with those of a future regional and international order.  
Thirdly, and most importantly, there was a perception amongst British officials that the 
Foreign Office needed to ‘catch up’ with the planning progress of the State Department. In 
June, Lord Halifax wrote in his weekly report from the American capital that there was a group 
within the State Department, called the Advisory Committee on Post-war Foreign Policy, 
which was responsible for examining post-war political questions.294 In a follow up later that 
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department in the Foreign Office’, 10 December 1931, FCO 73/263/Mis/31/1 
293 Jebb minute, 13 October 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/36 
294 Halifax to Foreign Office, 11 June 1942, quoted in John Saville, The Politics of Continuity, p. 181. See also 
Lawrence Weiler and Anne Patricia Simons, The United States and the United Nations: The Search for 
International Peace and Security (New York: Manhattan Publishing, 1967), pp. 17-37 
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month, Halifax described a meeting with Sumner Welles in which the Under-Secretary of State 
mentioned the need for the British and Americans to come for agreement on all matters ‘of 
common concern’ before the conclusion of the war.295 Welles explained that American plans 
were in no way finalized, but recommended that in two-to-three months’ time, the governments 
might be able to exchange papers on the subject. These suggestions served as arguably the most 
important catalyst for planning within the Economic and Reconstruction Department in the 
summer of 1942.  
 
‘Our diplomacy should be equal to this task’ 
Although it was clear that State Department officials were thinking seriously about post-war 
questions, their objectives remained a mystery. Roosevelt himself had long been thinking about 
grand schemes for the post-war world, but many of these comments had been kept private. As 
far back as September 1941, the President had spoken of a ‘trusteeship’ of great powers, while 
in a May 1942 conversation with the Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, he 
described what would be known as his ‘four policemen’ idea. 296 Meanwhile, in the State 
Department, Cordell Hull was overseeing an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, 
which by April 1942 had gone as far as to produce a draft outline for an ‘interim UN’.297 
Nevertheless, officials in the Foreign Office knew little of these ideas, much less the extent to 
which the administration was organising specific planning bodies. Instead, they began to 
construct, through other sources, a conception of the administration’s vision for the post-war 
world.  
	
295 Telegram from Lord Halifax to Foreign Office, No. 304, 30 June 1942, FO 371/31515/U48 
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297 Stephen Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 2003), pp. 37-40. Schlesinger also mentions an interview Roosevelt gave to the Saturday Evening Post in 
April 1942, in which he mentioned the four policemen idea. See also Hoopes and Brinkley, FDR and the Creation 
of the U.N., pp. 45-51. 
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The signing of the United Nations Declaration in January had itself been revealing. The 
fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China had signed the 
document a full day in advance of the other signatories offered a hint that the Roosevelt 
administration might be considering these powers to be in a different category altogether.298 
Months later, on 30 May, Welles had spoken of ‘an international police power’ in the future, 
along with the United Nations becoming ‘the nucleus of a world organisation of the future’.299 
This chimed with the details Molotov shared with British Officials, after his recent meeting 
with the President. Speaking to Churchill, Attlee, Eden and Cadogan on 9 June, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister said that Roosevelt envisioned a post-war world in which all powers would 
subscribe to a disarmament regimen, but that the four great powers themselves, acting as a kind 
of international police force, would retain a disproportionate level of arms in order to keep the 
peace.300  
An additional source of insight for Jebb and others in the department came from the 
reports of Sir Fredrick Leith-Ross, then the British representative to the Inter-Allied Postwar 
Requirements Bureau which was meeting in Washington.301 For months, he had been engaging 
with State Department officials over the design of post-war relief bodies, and from these 
conversations, a picture began to emerge in London. In essence, the Americans were seeking 
to initiate a relief effort that was under the auspices of the United Nations but directed by a 
‘policy committee’ of four powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union 
and China.302  
	
298 According to Hoopes and Brinkley, after the signing of the United Nations Declaration, Roosevelt began to 
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302 Telegram from Ronald Campbell to Foreign Office, No. 3578, 4 July 1942, FO 371/31501/U49. The talks 
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The view in the Foreign Office was one of wary approval. Relief and reconstruction 
were reliant on finance and material, and no one was confused as to the country that would be 
supplying the majority of both. Nevile Butler warned, however, that the relief plans put forward 
by the Roosevelt administration contained ‘political dynamite’ in the United States, and it 
remained to be seen whether a balance could be struck in that country between the desire to 
help rebuild Europe and the harsh reality of having the American public foot the bill.303 By 
early July, however, officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department had moved 
closer to the idea of four powers at the centre of both a relief organisation as well as a future 
international organisation. When officials in the State Department considered expanding the 
membership of the ‘executive committee’ beyond the four great powers, Evelyn Baring of the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department wrote that, ‘we are still emphatically of the opinion 
that the membership should not exceed four; and that if the relief scheme is to be the pattern of 
[the] future world organisation we are confirmed in this opinion.’304  
While Foreign Office thinking in these months was shaped to a large degree by what 
they perceived to be the American position on a post-war order, officials and ministers 
understood that future British planning could not simply adopt wholesale the State Department 
view. To do so would be an abdication of British diplomatic influence. It was a view held by 
Jebb and others in the Foreign Office, including the Foreign Secretary who insisted that Britain 
take a lead on post-war questions, especially when it came to Europe. ‘They [the Americans] 
know very little of Europe and it would be unfortunate for the future of the world if US 
uninstructed views were to decide the future of the European continent. Our diplomacy should 
be equal to this task.’305 
 
	
303 Butler minute, 15 July 1942, FO 371/31501/U161 
304 Jebb wrote that he agreed with this line. Baring minute, 6 July 1942, FO 371/31501/U49 
305 Eden minute, 25 July 1942, cited in Eden, The Reckoning, p. 341 
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‘A Concert of the World’ 
It was with the perception of American progress and British delay that the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department set about developing a grand strategy for the post-war world. The 
first paper dealing directly with this subject was produced by Jebb at the beginning of August. 
It was titled ‘Relief Machinery: the Political Background’ and sought to address the over-
arching political framework between the Americans, British and Russians that would help 
facilitate post-war relief efforts. 306  If the relief discussions had first opened the door to 
questions of post-war cooperation among the great powers, Jebb’s memorandum on the issue 
in early August elevated the discussion to one of future regional and international order.  
He left no doubt that the topic they were grappling with concerned, in his words, the 
‘re-organisation of the world’. For Britain to have a stake in the order, he wrote, it was 
necessary that ‘we…make up our own minds on what we want as a Nation. For only so shall 
we succeed in being the master, and not the victim, of events.’307 In devising a policy, they 
would need to take heed of certain considerations. First, the ‘facile idealisms of the [H.G.] 
Wellsian or Clarence Streit variety’ would need to be ignored altogether.308 These schemes, 
Jebb believed, were utopian visions devoid of reality. It was an old battle for Jebb, but as he 
had written numerous times in the previous decade, it was necessary to construct practical 
policies based on the ‘interplay of living forces’.309 The failure of the peace settlement in 
1919—a creation Jebb derided as the ‘Professors’ Peace’—was that it was rooted in theory 
rather than practice.310 
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Next, there was a delicate political balance to be struck between on the one hand, 
pleasing the Roosevelt administration and keeping them involved and on the other hand 
ensuring that Britain was influencing the post-war order. The latter half of this balance 
depended on not igniting the isolationist tendencies of an American public still suspicious of 
British intentions and European politics more broadly. Jebb wrote that if the Americans once 
again opted out of a post-war international order, as they had in 1919, it would be ‘a tragedy 
for the rest of the world’.311 A Europe devoid of American power, he warned, might lead to a 
German revival or a Russian expansion westward. Equally, however, it was crucial not to 
alienate other states—first and foremost the Soviet Union—in designing a new political 
arrangement. Here, Jebb was conscious also that such a system might appear to be an ‘Anglo-
Saxon tyranny, machine made and revolutionary’. Not only would this dissuade the American 
public, but it might also alienate the populations of smaller powers. 
The pivotal question, however, was whether the Foreign Office would choose to go 
along with what they perceived to be American aims, or whether they would introduce their 
own plans. Building upon the information gathered over the previous months, Jebb wrote that 
all signs were pointing to the Roosevelt administration thinking about a post-war world 
organisation which would be based on the countries calling themselves the United Nations and 
directed by a ‘policy committee’ of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union 
and China. This ‘supreme council’ would oversee an ‘Assembly’ of the United Nations. The 
‘loose system’, as Jebb referred to it, was to rely on Anglo-American air and sea power as well 
as Russian land power in order to keep the peace. Jebb labelled it a ‘Concert of the World’ 
which might ‘keep the peace for the next hundred years in the same way as the Concert of 
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Europe…more or less kept the peace in Europe between the Battle of Waterloo and the 
beginning of World War No. 1’.312  
Though Jebb recommended that they adopt the basic conception of the Americans, he 
suggested that they ‘render them more practicable by an admixture of our own political sense’. 
In other words, they might take the more ‘revolutionary’ approach of the Roosevelt 
administration and meld it with the more ‘conservative’ approach of the Foreign Office. 
Specifically, he recommended that they infuse the four power conception with their own 
‘regional idea’ which might give the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union 
their own ‘spheres’. Not only would this help to create a balance of power between the three 
great powers, but it would also allow Britain to shape the European continent to its interests. 
The foremost danger to Britain, Jebb wrote, was a European continent united against it, a 
scenario which would be made all the worse without the support of the United States.  
Consequently our aim should presumably be, if possible with the co-operation of 
America, to organise some measure of unity in Western Europe, leaving the East 
to be guided either by some association of the West Slavs with Russia in the 
background or possibly (if we could not prevent it) by Russia herself. In this way 
we should avoid the menace of Continental unification, and present ourselves as a 
real support to Western Europe, rather than appearing to them to be ourselves a 
menace.313 
 
These twin pillars of great power authority along with a regionalist system would make up 
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‘The Americans are going to make our world or mar it’ 
Jebb’s memorandum led to, as yet, the most important Foreign Office debate on post-war 
matters; and while there was broad support for his insistence that Britain develop its own 
strategy, there were differences over whether the United Kingdom could rely on the United 
States going forward. Richard Law, having recently returned from an extended visit to the 
United States, wrote a lengthy report in which he stated that, ‘the Americans are going to make 
our world or mar it’, and that this would all depend on whether the British could engender their 
trust and exert some degree of influence over their policies.314 The memories of November 
1919—when the American Senate voted against the ratification of the Versailles Treaty—
loomed large, as did fears that isolationist reactions could swell at any moment. Some officials, 
such as Butler, felt that even in light of the attitude of the Roosevelt administration, Britain 
could not count on sustained American involvement in the post-war period. For one, there was 
no telling how long the United States might remain committed to Europe, and there was 
pessimism as to whether the American government or public would agree to shoulder the 
burden of post-war security. ‘The principal danger seems to me that…in the course of five or 
six years [the American public] have found that the world is a collection of ungrateful and 
small-minded countries there may be a violent revulsion towards isolationism.’ 315  Other 
officials were even more cynical, feeling that the entire premise  
underestimates or misinterprets America’s sense of mission. [The Americans] want 
the palm without the dust, and their sense of mission is not…accompanied by 
anything akin to the idea of the ‘White Man’s Burden’, with the emphasis on the 
burden.316 
 
The question of American intentions for British, French and Dutch colonies in the Far 
East alarmed some. Roosevelt’s comments to Molotov, which were eventually relayed to the 
British in June, as well as Richard Law’s recent conversation with Welles in Washington, 
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seemed to point to an administration intent on forcing international trusteeship onto European 
colonial territories in the Far East.317 Jebb acknowledged that he feared the ‘Weltanschauung’ 
of Roosevelt and State Department officials involved the dissolution of the British Empire and 
the United States assuming oversight of the Far East, Africa and the Western Hemisphere.318 
Some officials, such as the Head of the Central Department, Frank Roberts, were resigned to 
the fact that Britain would need to sacrifice certain interests to preserve others, though he was 
vague on what exactly they might concede. The need for American support, he said, ‘implies 
giving way to a great many American pretensions, which may not in themselves be justified, 
in the hope that we may thereby involve America in a policy of undertaking international 
responsibilities extending to Europe’.319 
The one opinion which seems to have resonated with Jebb was from the British Minister 
in Washington, Ronald Campbell, who wrote on 26 July, prior to Jebb’s first draft, that while 
the United Kingdom could expect American assistance in the immediate aftermath and for 
some years after, the support would eventually dry up. Thus, Britain could not base its plan 
solely on the assumption that the United States would remain committed to Europe. What is 
more, the Foreign Office needed to display some tact in getting the most out of the Americans 
while they could. ‘We must lead and teach without appearing to do so, while taking their good 
ideas and forging them into practical tools on the anvil of our experience.’320 
There was another question in these months which held particular importance for the way 
in which American and British officials perceived of a future world order. It touched on a point 
raised by Richard Law, who had described the United States as a country which, led by a 
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visionary President, was viewing ‘world problems through a telescope where [Britain] look[s] 
at them through a microscope’. Americans, he said, were ‘thinking in centuries and continents’ 
as they pursued their ideal version of world order.321  
There is the evident conviction, disturbed by no inner questionings whatever, that 
the United States stands for something in the world—something of which the world 
has need, something which the world is going to like, something, in the final 
analysis, which the world is going to take whether it likes it or not.322 
 
This struck a chord in the Foreign Office, where officials understood how notions of national 
spirit or purpose could influence foreign policy. T. North Whitehead wrote that, ‘We are 
accused…of exhibiting ourselves as a nation somewhat devoid of vision, or of courage for 
the future of our civilization.’323 On this point, Jebb agreed, though he admitted that Britain 
could not simply develop some kind of ‘morale aim’ which could compete with the same 
‘intensity’ as the New Deal. 
What we can legitimately hope for in this country, I think, is that the nation at large 
should be inspired with a sense of its own importance in any world order—in other 
words, that we shall be a realistic and temperate force capable of toning down the 
conflicting world ideologies possessed by other nations.324 
 
Jebb’s view in these months was conservative in that he remained wary of grand schemes 
for the future. Even the supposed vision of the Roosevelt administration struck him as 
too idealistic in many ways. But his solution was far from a resignation to anarchic power 
politics. His relief machinery proposal, even relying as it did on the preeminent position 
of the great powers, was a form of internationalism, albeit one that would have seemed 
undemocratic to an Arnold Toynbee or Clarence Streit. It was based, first and foremost 
on concentrating authority in the hands of the great powers and then binding these 
countries together in the maintenance of international peace and security. In this way, 
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Britain could achieve its dual aims of maintaining its position as world power and 
bringing the United States into European commitments.   
 
Towards a ‘Four Power Plan’  
In addition to the debates over what could be expected from American post-war commitments, 
there remained crucial differences on two of Jebb’s most important tenets in the Relief 
Machinery paper: the concept of regional spheres of influence and whether to encourage the 
division of Germany after the war. The former issue was arguably the most important debate 
within the Foreign Office in the early drafting stages, and it would go on to be the key issue in 
the larger Cabinet debate months later. It was this subject that forced the question of British 
strategic identity going forward. Would the United Kingdom be an imperial power, maintaining 
her global reach through connections to its Dominions and Colonies? Was it to turn more 
towards Europe and take responsibility for organising the continent along political and 
economic lines that might keep the peace? Did its great power salvation rest in a system of 
Anglo-American hegemony or, as the Americans were suggesting, a four-power system in 
which the great powers cooperated amongst themselves to maintain a secure international 
order?  
Replying to Jebb’s paper, Frank Roberts, Head of the Central Department, came out in 
strong opposition to the idea of regionalism. While an international order along these lines 
would undoubtedly strengthen the United States, the Soviet Union and China, it would weaken 
the United Kingdom. The country would be forced to focus on the European continent at the 
expense of its overseas connections, leading inevitably to the loss of its ‘power and greatness’. 
Britain’s overseas connections, which had for so long allowed it to play a powerful role in 
‘counterbalancing’ the stronger nations of Europe, would have to be sacrificed in order to focus 
on the continent. ‘If we are to regard ourselves purely as a European nation, we cannot possibly 
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hope to maintain ourselves even as the first among equals.’325 British power, he believed, 
would be better served by maintaining the overseas Empire and acting as ‘a bridge’ between 
the United States and Europe.  
Elsewhere, Roberts voiced his opposition to the regional council which he thought 
would draw the ire of smaller states. He recommended that Jebb ‘disguise the hegemony of the 
leading powers more carefully’, perhaps by bringing in more states under a system that would 
resemble a reconstituted League of Nations. This would avoid a scenario in which the 
victorious powers were seen to be dictating terms to nations across the world. The current 
Foreign Office policy towards the League, he reminded Jebb, was to ‘maintain the skeleton’ of 
that defunct organisation in order to prevent such a post-war council of righteous, victorious 
powers.326 
Roberts was joined in his opposition to regionalism by Christopher Warner, Head of 
the Northern Department, but their views as to the role and power of the Supreme Council 
differed. Like Roberts, Warner viewed regionalism as a ‘fatal’ proposition, but not for the 
aforementioned likelihood of having to give up the Empire. Instead, a regional approach in 
which a great power was solely responsible for one region would lead inevitably to the great 
powers being at ‘loggerheads’ with one another. This would lead to a fundamental breakdown 
in relations, undermining the very reason for a four-power concert. His recommendation was 
for the concert—or supreme council—not to act in their self-interest in their assigned regions, 
but to emphasise ‘the conception that the world is an indivisible whole and that all three powers 
of the Concert, as trustees for the other United Nations, have an equal interest in every area’.327 
In his view, this would represent a system more akin to that which was instituted at the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815.  
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The next major debate involved the application of the four power idea to the European 
continent after the war. Here the fulcrum of continental policy was the attitude towards 
Germany. While all agreed on the necessity of preventing future German aggression, the 
solutions diverged. Where Jebb wanted to ‘encourage separatist tendencies and to get the 
western Germans associated with an Atlantic civilisation and the Eastern Germans with some 
kind of ‘Mitteleuropa’ block’’, others such as Sargent warned against dividing Germany in 
two.328 The latter’s proposal was to balance Germany, first with some kind of western Anglo-
French alliance in the west, coupled with two confederations of smaller states to Germany’s 
east and southeast. 329  Additional opposition came from the Northern Department, where 
Warner wrote that dividing Europe into ‘two halves’ would lead to future chaos. He reiterated 
his earlier recommendation that the great powers work together in a kind of ‘three power 
hegemony’ which, assuming it could be accepted by smaller states, would address such 
questions on a collaborative basis.330 It was this latter conception of great power cooperation 
which would become an essential pillar of Britain’s approach to the post-war world.  
After considering the comments of his colleagues, Jebb submitted a redraft of the Relief 
Machinery paper—now titled the ‘Four-Power Plan’—which was to become the first major 
Foreign Office proposal for the post-war international order. Jebb wrote that his intention was 
to develop an approach which would allow the government to establish a ‘guiding principle’ 
for subsequent policies. He was clear that, for Britain to remain an influential great power, they 
would need to join into a larger world system and to show themselves ready to make the 
necessary sacrifices therein. ‘We can only hope to play our part either as a European Power or 
as a world Power if we ourselves form part of a wider organisation.’ This did not necessarily 
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mean an organisation resembling the League, but it did imply building up ‘the machinery of 
international co-operation’ from the existing members of United Nations. ‘We should regard 
the conception of the Four Powers, working within the framework of the United Nations, as 
the present basis of our foreign policy’, he wrote.331 In commenting on the revised version, 
Cadogan thought that it provided ‘the foundation of an ordered world’ though he was quick to 
warn that ‘what we can ultimately build on that foundation remains to be seen, and will depend 
on the material to hand.’332  
The conceptual framework of the Four Power Plan remained largely similar to Jebb’s 
earlier draft on relief machinery, though he diluted his original support for spheres of influence 
by working in the suggestions of Sargent and Warner. Adopting the recommendations of the 
latter, in particular, Jebb said that the great powers might take joint responsibility for various 
regions of the world, even if this was ‘in token form’. ‘What we want to avoid’, Jebb wrote, ‘is 
any system whereby one Great Power has, so to speak, “to hold the baby” alone in any given 
area. For apart from anything else, this would mean that our European “baby” might prove to 
be too heavy for us unaided to hold.’333 Nevertheless, Jebb held to the notion that Britain had 
an essential role to play in Western Europe—an area he considered to be the ‘cradle and matrix 
of the civilisation which has now spread to almost every corner of the globe’. Without British 
leadership in this region after the war, he warned, there was a risk that ‘our particular type of 
civilisation must inevitably crumble, or merge into something very new and strange.’334  
It was clear to the officials involved that post-war Europe—and British power more 
broadly—would depend on American support in the months and years after the war, but this 
did not mean accepting the American proposals without reservation. Going forward, it would 
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be necessary to put a British stamp on it where possible. As Jebb wrote, ‘Only by taking up the 
vague ideas now floating about the world and expressing them boldly and even recklessly in 
our own terms can we hope to play the role which is proper to us.’335 At the tactical level, the 
paper recommended a balanced approach to Washington and Moscow. Much of this new line 
had been recommended by Cadogan and Sargent, both of whom were conscious of not 
alarming or isolating the Soviet Union. Doing so would make it nearly impossible for Britain 
to develop a working relationship with Stalin should the Roosevelt administration not be able 
to guarantee a post-war commitment to the continent. As Sargent wrote, ‘The Soviet connexion 
[sic] must always remain a second string to our bow, and we must be careful therefore not to 
mislay this string while practising our archery with the Americans’336 
In the final draft of the Four Power Plan, Jebb took on these suggestions and made it 
clear that the future policy of Britain was neither to follow the Americans blindly nor to accede 
to outlandish Russian demands. In a section titled ‘Suggested Grand Strategy’, he 
recommended approaching the Americans and Russians regarding the Four Power Plan, but 
doing so strategically. If the Americans made their terms ‘too stiff’ they should not hesitate to 
forge a ‘close and exclusive working alliance with Soviet Russia’, he wrote. At the same time, 
if the Kremlin were ‘too grasping’, then Britain should make it known that they would attempt 
to move closer to the United States while effectively isolating the Soviet Union. ‘Here indeed’, 






335 His emphasis here. This was a part of what Jebb referred to as the ‘grand diplomatic strategy’. Memorandum 
by Jebb, ‘The “Four-Power” Plan’, 20 October 1942, p. 17, copy in FO 371/31525/U783 
336 Sargent minute, 23 August 1942, FO 371/31525/U742  
337 Memorandum by Jebb, ‘The “Four-Power” Plan’, 20 October 1942, pp. 16-17, copy in FO 371/31525/U783 
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A Recipe for Jugged Hare: Churchill’s Initial Resistance 
By the end of September, the Foreign Office had agreed on the four power idea as a basis of 
post-war policy, and attention now turned to securing the approval of the War Cabinet. One of 
the great hindrances to Foreign Office planning in these months was the Prime Minister 
himself. Not only was he not concerned with long-term planning at this stage in the war, but 
when he did elaborate on his ideas for the post-war world, they were largely at odds with the 
recommendations of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. The first that Churchill 
heard of the Four Power Plan was on 16 October 1942, when Eden had left him with a copy of 
it at Chequers.338 Commenting on the draft, Churchill wrote that,  
Any conclusions drawn now are sure to have little relation to what will happen…I 
hope that these speculative studies will be entrusted mainly to those on whose 
hands time hangs heavy, and that we shall not overlook Mrs. Glass's Cookery Book 
recipe for Jugged Hare—‘First catch your hare’.339 
 
In a fiery response to Churchill, the Foreign Secretary expressed his frustration at the lack of 
approval for even a general direction in foreign policy. ‘I am most disappointed at your reply’, 
he wrote, adding that he had hoped the Four Power Plan would not be viewed as ‘a vague 
project for an indefinite future’ but instead as a ‘basis of a foreign policy… [which] should 
carry us over into the peace’. Echoing Jebb’s insistence on Britain acting with a concerted 
strategy so as not to be left behind, he said,  
It is from every point of view bad business to have to live from hand to mouth 
where we can avoid it, and the only consequence of so doing is that the United 
States makes a policy and we follow, which I do not regard as a satisfactory role 
for the British Empire.340  
 
Churchill approved, but in a longer response, he also took the opportunity to, for the 
first time, describe his vision for the post-war order. These were proposals which would 
continue to frustrate officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department for the next two 
	
338 Harvey diary, 19 October 1942, Harvey (ed.), p. 170.  
339 Churchill to Eden, 18 October 1942, M461/42, PREM 4/100/7 
340 Eden to Churchill, 19 October 1942, PM/42/229, PREM 4/100/7 
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years. Regarding Russia, Churchill was uncertain about Stalin’s intentions in Europe, but he 
was quick to note that ‘it would be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarians overlaid the 
culture and independence of the ancient States of Europe.’ On China, Churchill questioned 
whether one could even consider the Chungking Government as a world power. The presence 
of China on a world council, he believed, was a move by Washington to ensure that it had a 
‘faggot vote’ in their efforts to dissolve the British Empire.341 His foremost concerns, he 
admitted, ‘rest primarily in Europe’, and he was open about his desire to see the continent 
modelled on the federalism of the United States. This would be accomplished through first 
establishing a ‘Council of Europe’ which might eventually become a ‘United States of 
Europe’.342 Churchill ended his note by reiterating the priorities at hand, of which post-war 
issues were unquestionably secondary. ‘Unhappily the war has prior claims on your attention 
and on mine...I am sure we should be wise to wait longer before trying to formulate 
conclusions.’343  
The Prime Minister’s prioritisation of military affairs in this period can hardly be 
criticised, given that, during these weeks, British and American forces were undertaking one 
of the most important military operations to date. The British 8th Army launched a second 
offensive at El Alamein on 23 October, followed by a surprise invasion of Vichy-controlled 
French North Africa as a part of Operation ‘Torch’.344  The latter had been an approach 
Churchill had been championing, even in the face of steady opposition from American military 
leaders, most notably General George Marshall. On the eastern front, the Red Army was 
weathering a German advance towards the Caucasus, with the focal point being the city of 
	
341 As Greenwood has noted, the term ‘faggot vote’ essentially meant ‘puppet’. See Greenwood, Titan at the 
Foreign Office, p. 158 
342 The Council of Europe which Churchill envisioned would be made up of ‘ten units’ comprising the great 
powers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, along with new Scandinavian, Danubian and Balkan 
confederations. These units would contribute to a regional police force which might keep ‘Prussia’ permanently 
disarmed. 
343 Churchill to Eden, 21 October 1942, M474/2, PREM 4/100/7 
344 For a discussion of this campaign, see Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War 
II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 431-447 
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Stalingrad. Stalin wrote to Churchill in September that the situation in the city had 
‘deteriorated’, though the worst of the fighting was still to come.345 
The military situation led to a degree of tension within the War Cabinet, and the 
differences between the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary over post-war planning 
eventually came to a head during a meeting on 3 November. Churchill, in a view that would 
mimic Leo Amery’s proposal weeks later, argued that Britain, Russia and America needed to 
stay out of European affairs at the end of the war, so that a council of great powers including 
Prussia, Italy, Spain and a Scandinavian Confederacy might establish a working political and 
economic order. Eden responded with the Foreign Office view that, unless Britain, the United 
States and the Soviet Union took an interest in post-war Europe, there would most likely be 
another war in the coming decades. Growing increasingly perturbed, the Foreign Secretary then 
complained that the Four Power Plan had yet to be discussed in Cabinet and that he felt this 
was due to Churchill’s personal opposition to the idea. Eden warned that if the Prime Minister 
continued to block the plan from Cabinet discussion, he would have to find a new Foreign 
Secretary.346 
  
Counter-proposals from Cabinet Ministers 
Though the tension between Eden and Churchill eased for the time being, it was nearly three 
weeks before the latter finally agreed to circulate the Four Power Plan.347 Jebb’s paper was 
well-received by officials and ministers outside the Foreign Office. 348  Sir Wilfred Eady, 
representing the Treasury, agreed with Jebb that the government should take the decisive lead 
	
345 Stalin to Churchill, 3 October 1942, in Reynolds, Kremlin Letters, pp. 155-156. On 19 October, the War 
Cabinet had been informed that the northern portion of the city was captured by the Germans. War Cabinet 
conclusions, WM (42) 142, 19 October 1942, CAB 65/28 
346 Harvey diary, 3 November 1942, Harvey (ed.), pp. 175-76 
347 News coming out of the United States once again led to action in Whitehall. On 17 November, Sumner Welles 
had delivered a speech addressing post-war reconstruction. Cited in Foreign Office memorandum, ‘Recent 
American Speeches about the Post-war World’, 10 December 1942, FO 371/31515/U1682 
348 Lionel Robbins wrote months later that, ‘as a piece of draftsmanship it reminded me of the great State papers 
of pre-1914’. Lionel Robbins to Nigel Ronald, 25 February 1943, FCO 73/258/Eu/43/1 
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in Europe and work towards reversing the distrust that many on the continent felt towards the 
United Kingdom during the interwar period. More importantly, Jebb’s plan, he felt, might 
provide the British people with the self-confidence required for the nation to be a leading 
power.349 The President of the Board of Trade Hugh Dalton and Minister for Labour Ernest 
Bevin, both Labour Party stalwarts, agreed with the basic premise of Jebb’s plan, but urged 
that the Foreign Office develop economic plans in tandem with the political designs being put 
forward. Bevin, who had played an influential role in getting economic considerations 
incorporated into the Atlantic Charter, commented that ‘while man as a political animal tends 
to look backwards, as an economic animal he is forced, whether he likes it or not, to look 
forward.’350  
Sir Stafford Cripps, then the Lord Privy Seal, agreed with the broad parameters of the 
Four Power Plan, namely that the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union 
should work together at the end of the war to facilitate world reconstruction. But he also argued 
that the plan did not go into enough detail as to the direction the British should take. Of the 
twenty-four points in Cripps’s proposal, a few central arguments emerged. First, both the 
reconstruction and future management of Europe would be the most important post-war issues. 
Here, the size, geographic position and economic prowess of Germany remained potential 
threats; and the United Kingdom should, through elaborate political and economic designs, 
work to restrain Germany. One way to do this, he suggested, was to create federal unions of 
smaller European states which might be able to compete from an economic standpoint with 
German production. A second major point was that the four powers needed to act as a policing 
force ‘to maintain order and to prevent the building up of aggressive states’. Cripps envisioned 
	
349 Eady to Ronald, 26 November 1942, FO 371/31525/U1507 
350  Bevin to Eden, 8 December 1942, FO 371/31525/U1798; Dalton to Eden, 19 November 1942, FO 
371/31525/U1796. For a detailed study of the post-war views of Labour Party intellectuals and politicians in the 
1930s and 1940s, see Douglas, Labour Party. 
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this arrangement eventually growing into an international police force which might rely on the 
air and naval strength of the great powers to deter aggression. Third, and perhaps the most 
important ministerial recommendation which would influence Foreign Office planning 
debates, was the creation of a Council of Europe to deal with social, economic and political 
matters. The Council would be led by Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, 
and be joined by a Pan-American Union led by the United States, a Council of Asia led by 
China, the British Commonwealth of Nations led by Great Britain, and a region led by the 
Soviet Union. These would become the ‘five world councils’ which would make up a body 
Cripps referred to as the ‘Supreme World Council’.351 
A second counter-proposal to the Four Power Plan came from the Secretary of State for 
India Leo Amery, though his paper did not receive a warm welcome within the Foreign Office. 
In a memorandum entitled ‘Europe and the Post-war Settlement’, Amery agreed that the great 
powers would need to cooperate in the immediate post-war period, but he doubted whether this 
great power alignment could serve as the foundation of a world organisation or whether it could 
maintain peace in Europe. The United States, he predicted, would ‘once again wash its hands’ 
of European problems; while the Soviet Union, under the leadership of Stalin, would practice 
a form of ‘elementary realism’ in which they would focus more on their own domestic issues 
and regional interests in Asia. As for Britain, its concerns should rest with its Empire and 
Commonwealth, as opposed to continental questions. The nations of Europe, he suggested, 
would need to organise themselves in some kind of ‘European Commonwealth’ which might 
‘offer to a chastened and weakened Germany an outlet for her economic life and for the 
exercise of a peaceful influence in a freely-shared “living-space” which alone can console her 
for defeat’.352  
	
351 Memorandum by Cripps, 13 November 1942, pp. 3-4, WP (42) 516, FO 371/31525/U1505 
352 Memorandum by Amery, 12 November 1942, p. 3, WP (42) 524, ibid 
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Jebb replied to both Cripps’s and Amery’s papers on the same day, 15 November, but 
his critiques could not have been more different. He, along with the Foreign Secretary, 
expressed his surprise at the Lord Privy Seal’s seemingly congruent outlook, noting that ‘Sir 
Stafford is clearly on the side of the angels.’353 His  points reflected virtually the same as those 
made in Jebb’s original draft, namely that the great powers would need to not only take the 
lead in international affairs but also cooperate in the post-war period. While Jebb would go on 
to disagree with Cripps on more specific points, he, Cadogan and Eden now viewed Cripps as 
a possible ally once the Four Power Plan came up for discussion in the Cabinet. Amery’s paper, 
on the other hand, sparked disbelief. Amery, Jebb wrote, was being ‘more woolly minded than 
even the most visionary idealist’, and if the Cabinet agreed to accept his thesis, he warned that 
‘we shall be in grave danger of losing the peace.’354 The paper was resoundingly criticised 
within the Foreign Office ranks, with the Foreign Secretary remarking that it was ‘sad 
fustian’.355  
 
Towards a United Nations Plan 
Though the Prime Minister remained uninterested in post-war planning at this stage, it was 
clear that his colleagues were growing interested in such questions. The discussion that had 
grown up around Jebb’s paper put the Foreign Office—and importantly, the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department—firmly at the centre of post-war planning. Into December, the 
Foreign Office continued to advocate for a decided policy, and when the Cabinet finally met 
to consider these post-war questions, it was suggested by Eden that the Four Power Plan and 
Cripps’s proposal be combined into one workable document. 356  There was now serious 
	
353 Jebb minute, 15 November 1942, FO 371/31525/U1505 
354 Jebb minute, 15 November 1942, FO 371/31525/U1506; also quoted in Greenwood, Titan at the Foreign 
Office, p. 156 
355 Eden minute, 20 November 1942, FO 371/31525/U1506 
356 War Cabinet Conclusions, WM (42) 161, 27 November 1942, CAB 65/28 
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momentum building towards a British policy for the post-war world, a development which 
seemed nearly out of reach just months before.   
Addressing the House of Commons just days after the Cabinet decision, the Foreign 
Secretary recommended three points related to the post-war world, each of which was in line 
with the basic idea of the Four Power Plan. First, the great powers must be involved in the post-
war international order; second, there must be a degree of unity among them; and third, they 
must be willing to use force to counter aggression. Furthermore, the central nucleus of powers, 
he urged, should be set against the backdrop of a larger body comprising the United Nations.357 
In what was welcome news to officials in the Foreign Office, Lord Halifax cabled from 
Washington that State Department officials, including Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles, 
admired the statements from the Foreign Secretary.358 Just as promising—but perhaps more 
surprising—was the approval of the Russian Ambassador back in London.359   
A day after Eden had delivered his speech in the House of Commons, Jebb set about 
redrafting the Four Power Plan, to include the Cripps proposal as well as the comments of Eady 
and Bevin. In one of his major changes, Jebb wrote of the necessity of a world council 
consisting of Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, ‘(pro forma) China’, and possibly 
France. Though the Foreign Office had long viewed the revival of France as a crucial post-war 
objective, Jebb’s redraft was one of the first explicit mentions on the British side of the five-
power council which would go on to form the nucleus of the United Nations Organization. The 
primary responsibility of this council, Jebb wrote, was to resolve disputes between states and 
to protect against future aggression from Japan and Germany.  
	
357 Hansard, House of Commons Debate, Vol 385, cols. 1181-260, 02 December 1942 
358 See Telegram from Halifax to Foreign Office, 4 December 1942 and Telegram from Foreign Office to Halifax, 
8 December 1942, FO 371/31515/U1644. For Hull's views of Eden's speech, see Telegram from Halifax to 
Foreign Office, 15 December 1942, FO 371/31515/U1830 
359 Harvey diary, 4 December 1942, Harvey (ed.), pp. 530-31. Jebb was also pleased with Eden’s speech. See 
Dalton diary, 4 December 1942, Pimlott (ed.), pp. 530-1 
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The new draft also included the possibility of forming either an ‘assembly’ of nations 
or following a more ‘regional’ approach. Jebb admitted his support for the regional 
arrangement, but he also cautioned, as he had in the original draft, that one power theoretically 
responsible for keeping the peace in a given region could lead to numerous issues, among them 
a lurch towards domination of that region by one power or an inability to police the region 
sufficiently. 360  One of the more important recommendations here was for an ‘Armistice 
Commission’, which would be made up of the great powers as well as the smaller European 
allies and ‘represent a large-scale experiment in European international administration’.361 Not 
only did this suggestion embody Jebb’s regionalist aims, but it also contained the seeds of what 
would become, by the winter of 1943, the European Advisory Commission.362 
In an effort to reassure Hugh Dalton and Ernest Bevin—both of whom had emphasised 
the importance of economic considerations—Jebb expressed the view that addressing 
economic issues should be a key responsibility of the great powers. To Bevin’s point, in 
particular, he stressed that it was of the ‘highest importance’ to continue the International 
Labour Organisation and other institutions which might help to ‘smooth out such discrepancies 
before they become acute’. Furthermore, it would be beneficial for the great powers to adopt 
the Clearing Union and Commodity Control plans—ideas recently suggested by John Maynard 
Keynes—so that a stable and prosperous system of world trade and finance might envelop the 
countries of the world. Despite his assurances that economic considerations would remain in 
any accepted Four Power Plan, Jebb was clear on his longstanding precept that political aspects 
must come before economic ones. ‘Politics comes first, and…no world system will work unless 
	
360 Jebb, redraft of the Four Power Plan, 17 December 1942, p. 4, FO 371/31525/U1805 
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the political foundation is secure…But that does not mean that I ignore the economic or social 
aspects. Far from it.’363  
Regarding Cripps’s proposal, which the Foreign Secretary had explicitly requested be 
combined with the Four Power Plan, Jebb included a number of points though he resisted 
others. He and other members of the Foreign office viewed Cripps’s idea to create five regional 
councils as ‘egregious’, arguing that the Council of Europe was unfeasible and the overlapping 
interests and responsibilities of the five councils would sow the seeds for disagreement and 
ultimate breakdown.364 The immediate concern, however, was obtaining Cabinet approval for 
the general line of foreign policy; and Jebb’s recommendation was thus to finalise the draft in 
such a way that the Cabinet would agree to broad principles of the plan and leave the more 
detailed designs to officials in the Foreign Office. ‘I hope’, he wrote on New Year’s Eve, ‘that 
the Cabinet will be asked only to bless in principle, leaving details to be worked out between 
the [departments] principally concerned. I do not see how otherwise we are likely to make 
much progress.’365 If this meant accepting Cripps’s ideas on regional councils—including the 
proposal for a Council of Europe—then this would be the necessary price to pay.  
In an effort to reclaim some ground, Jebb wrote that if these regional councils were to 
be included in the combined plan, the ultimate authority within any international organisation 
would rest within the world council made up of the United States, the United Kingdom, the 
Soviet Union, along with China and eventually France. Jebb added in the text of the revised 
document that the regional councils 
would ultimately be subordinate, so far as political issues are concerned, to some 
Council of the World which, in the early stages after the war at any rate, can for all 
practical purposes only consist of the representatives of the Four Powers and 
possibly also of France, who would represent in their turn all the United Nations.366  
	
363 Jebb, redraft of the Four Power Plan, 17 December 1942, pp. 6-7, FO 371/31525/U1805 
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365 His emphasis. Jebb minute, 31 December 1942, FO 371/31525/U1805 
366 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘The United Nations Plan’, 16 January 1943, WP 
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This stipulation, in effect, placed the largest responsibility in the hands of the great powers, a 
theme which was the essence of Jebb’s original paper outlining the Four Power Plan.  
The combination of Jebb’s and Cripps’s plans became a new document, entitled the 
‘United Nations Plan’, which was submitted to the Cabinet on 16 January 1943. The text of the 
memorandum made clear that this was to be a ‘less ambitious and more practical’ scheme than 
the League of Nations, but that its aim was still to build up the ‘machinery of international 
cooperation’. A ‘World Council’—which was to consist of the four powers (and eventually 
France)—would sit atop subordinate regional councils and would be ultimately responsible for 
the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world. Added to this wider system would 
be a ‘World Economic Council’, which would include the great powers as well as the smaller 
powers. This economic council would oversee bodies such as the Clearing Union, Commodity 
Control, the International Labour Organisation, the League of Nations Humanitarian and 
Economic Services, and the Relief Organisation. The plan contained, in theory, all the 
measures necessary to ensure Britain’s dual aim of maintaining its status as a world power and 
creating international mechanisms to help keep peace in Europe. Both of these objectives, the 
paper made clear, could only be achieved if Britain was to ‘form part of a wider 
organisation’.367  
This chapter has examined post-war political planning within the British Foreign Office 
and Cabinet between the summer of 1942 and January 1943. It has argued that the Foreign 
Office, and in particular Gladwyn Jebb—as head of the nascent Economic and Reconstruction 
Department—drove the process in these months. Their efforts were spurred, in part, by the 
perception that British planning was well behind that of the United States. In setting out their 
own plans for the post-war world, the Economic and Reconstruction Department understood 
	
367 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘The United Nations Plan’, 16 January 1943, WP 
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that their ideas would need to appeal to the Roosevelt administration in some way. Thus, the 
approach was to take the rather nebulous conception of ‘four policemen’, which Roosevelt had 
spoken of privately, and to mould more detailed British ideas on this foundation. The Four 
Power Plan represented this main conception of four powers operating ‘in concert’ at the centre 
of a wider international order, but importantly, there was a distinct regionalist structure within 
Jebb’s plan, a conception which would underpin his recommendations for at least another year.  
There were significant hurdles to overcome both within the Foreign Office and within 
the Cabinet—bureaucratic realities which would continue to exert influence on the shape and 
pace of planning with the Economic and Reconstruction Department. This chapter has offered 
one of the first sustained treatments of the way in which the Four Power Plan was developed 
and discussed within the Foreign Office and Cabinet, and the way in which these critiques 
altered the document. Jebb’s original ‘spheres of influence’ conception, present in the Relief 
Machinery paper, was tempered by officials from various departments; while the larger Four 
Power conception was challenged by several counter-proposals within the Cabinet. Indeed, the 
debate which took place within the Cabinet in November 1942 marked the most consequential 
discussion on post-war planning up until that point. Surprisingly, the discussion was almost 
prevented entirely, given Churchill’s reluctance to commit to such issues at this stage. Here, 
the Foreign Secretary, until then somewhat removed from post-war planning, played a key role 
in forcing the issue to come before the Cabinet, even going so far as to threaten resignation 
should the matter fail to be taken up.  
The Cabinet debate was essentially a clash between visions of a future international 
order, with the future position of the United Kingdom and the British Empire at stake. 
Understanding the profundity of the subject and desiring a central role for the Foreign Office, 
Jebb pushed for the Cabinet to agree to the Four Power Plan ‘in principle’ and to leave the 
details to be worked out amongst officials within the Foreign Office. He considered the views 
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of Cabinet members, especially the Prime Minister and Leo Amery, to be woefully short-
sighted—a product of either ignorance or whimsical musings. Ministers such as Stafford 
Cripps, however, were closer to the thinking of the Economic and Reconstruction Department 
and hence, were viewed as allies for the time being. Yet Jebb and officials understood that once 
planning returned to the Foreign Office, they would exert more of a free reign over the more 
detailed planning process. Over the next six months, a wider circle of stakeholders, including 
Commonwealth officials, would debate the United Nations Plan, and as a result, the document 








By late 1942, the Foreign Office planning process had become more organised and 
advanced, largely in response to inter-allied competition. Partly through the efforts of Jebb—
and reflected in the increasing importance of the Economic and Reconstruction Department— 
the imperative of developing a ‘grand strategy for peace’ had won more converts. As much as 
anything, this had been triggered by a growing concern on the British side that the Americans 
were setting the post-war agenda within the wartime coalition. Crucially, the advocates of 
planning had convinced the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, of the necessity of thinking 
along these lines; and with varying degrees of success, he had made his case to The Prime 
Minister. The Economic and Reconstruction Department had also established itself as the 
engine of planning within the British government, seizing control of the pen when it came to 
early blueprints for a putative post-war international order. As the previous chapter noted, Jebb 
had done this by carving out a niche role as the bridgehead between the more idealistic and 
utopian thinking about world order as well as the inertia of the Cabinet when it came to lending 
their attention to these questions. This was a staging point in the development of the realist-
internationalism approach—predicated on an understanding of great power relations as the 
determining factor in international relations but also forward-looking in seeking to build 
international structures around this reality.368 Although the plans had yet to be developed into 
a mature tableau, Jebb’s team had nonetheless put down the early sketches for what a future 
world organisation might look like by the turn of the year. These plans were to provide the 
starting point for British negotiators thereafter. 
	
368 The concept of realist-internationalism, as it pertained to the approach of the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department towards a post-war organisation, will receive a more sustained treatment in chapter 4.  
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This chapter covers the evolution of planning between January and July 1943, a period 
which, in previous descriptions of British post-war planning for a world organisation, has often 
been covered too briefly or overlooked altogether.369 In addition to shining light on this crucial 
period of Foreign Office planning, this chapter puts forward three central arguments, in 
particular. First, the views of Churchill became more pronounced and more known to 
individuals outside of the British policymaking apparatus, and this influenced Foreign Office 
planning in critical ways.370 Churchill’s comments—first to the President of Turkey and later 
to Roosevelt himself—were seen by members of the Economic and Reconstruction Department 
as a threat to their own planning. While officials disagreed with the Prime Minister on a number 
of details—especially regarding his idea for a ‘Council of Europe’—they understood that his 
views could not be ignored. Their work between May and June thus involved developing 
structures for post-war Europe which might appeal to the Prime Minister, all while ensuring 
that this kind of regional structure might feed into their version of a future international 
organisation. Ironically, for all of the Foreign Office criticism of the Prime Minister’s views in 
this period, Churchill’s statements concerning the post-war world helped to instil a feeling 
among members of the Roosevelt administration that the United Kingdom, at this stage at least, 
was progressing ahead of their own planning. 
The second major argument in this chapter is that the spring of 1943 was the moment 
when British plans entered into a more deliberative process—namely with members of the US 
State Department. During a trip to the American capital in March, British planners learned just 
how advanced the American planning efforts were; and while there were welcome similarities, 
	
369 Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire, pp. 226-229; Reynolds and Hughes, Historian as Diplomat, 
pp. 18-22; Greenwood, Titan at the Foreign Office, pp. 159-170 
370 The comments made by Churchill here concerning the post-war world—known as his ‘Morning Thoughts’—
have been mentioned in numerous studies of the period, but less attention has been given to the response of the 
Foreign Office and the way in which this affected planning within the Economic and Reconstruction Department. 
Hughes, ‘Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organization’, p. 184, 186; Martin Gilbert, 
Winston S. Churchill, Volume VII: 1941-1945, Road to Victory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), pp. 
321-325; Douglas, Labour Party, pp. 124-125; Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, p. 104; Simpson, 
Human Rights and the End of Empire, pp. 227-228; Barker, Churchill and Eden at War, p. 207 
 125 
tensions were also apparent. The Roosevelt administration viewed the future international order 
as one based around the influence of the great powers and especially around their ability to 
design and facilitate an international organisation. The Foreign Office, on the other hand, were 
viewing questions of future international order through the lens of the great powers first 
establishing regional structures to deal with armistice questions, and then building up 
worldwide machinery based on this cooperation. The two approaches represented, in effect, 
top-down and bottom-up approaches to the establishment of an international order. This 
fundamental difference in American and British conceptions—as well as the meeting between 
the groups of officials more generally—has been given less attention in previous scholarship.371 
Moreover, the Foreign Office views of certain members of the Roosevelt administration in this 
period, including the President himself, has also been undervalued. Though British officials 
were doubtful of certain aspects of American thinking, they understood that British plans would 
need to go some way towards the American position, in order to guarantee their support in the 
post-war period. In the months after the visit, Jebb sought to square Britain’s post-war priorities 
in Europe with the wider ambitions of the Roosevelt administration. In other words, the desire 
of the Americans to assume a global role should, in his view, be made to work for British 
interests in Europe. Jebb continued to hold firm to earlier ideas of regionalism, though he 
sought a ‘middle ground’—between regionalism and a universal organisation—which might 
appeal to the United States going forward. Jebb’s attention thus turned to developing more 
detailed plans for a post-war organisation which could reconcile these two approaches. 
A third key argument here is that, within the Economic and Reconstruction Department, 
the very conception of a post-war international order altered in fundamental ways, due largely 
to the gradual incorporation of Charles Webster into the Economic and Reconstruction 
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Department.372 As a professor of international history at the London School of Economics prior 
to the war, Webster was considered the foremost British historian of international organisations 
dating back to the Congress of Vienna. Though an avid proponent of the League of Nations in 
the interwar years, Webster escaped Jebb’s aversion to academics largely because, in the 
latter’s words, he was a ‘great power man’ and had an ‘encyclopaedic knowledge of the 
League’.373 Over the next two years, Webster brought to the department a unique perspective 
on internationalism and British foreign policy which, like Jebb, was often grounded in 
historical precedent. His expertise, especially surrounding past peace settlements as well as 
previous international organisations, was one reason that the department was able to maintain 
its position as the brain trust behind the planning for a post-war organisation. Webster’s earliest 
suggestions—ones which fed directly into a revised version of the United Nations Plan—were 
for a future world organisation to make sufficient room for the position of smaller powers; for 
there to be economic and social organs which might provide crucial linkages in a future 
international system; and for the entire conception of a post-war international order to be based 
on ‘principles’ to which all members would agree. The result was a new plan which, although 
based on the Four Power Plan and the United Nation Plan before it, went much further in 
outlining the structure and function of a future world organisation.   
 
‘Morning Thoughts’: Churchill’s challenge to the Foreign Office 
By the New Year 1943, the United Nations Plan had become the bedrock of Foreign Office 
thinking about the post-war world. Officials were intent on controlling the publicity of such 
plans, however, as they engaged in a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, they needed to 
draw the Americans into post-war agreements; while on the other, they needed to avoid stirring 
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up the suspicion of both the Russians as well as the Republican factions within the United 
States, the latter of whom were determined to avoid European commitments. The tactful 
approach received an unwelcome jolt, however, when the Prime Minister, in a bold stroke, put 
forward his own vision of a post-war world.  
Fresh off a conference with Roosevelt at Casablanca, Churchill flew to Cairo and then 
Adana, Turkey, where he met with the Turkish President İsmet İnönü.374 On 1 February, 
Churchill passed a document to İnönü—and later to the Americans—which outlined his view 
of the post-war world. The paper was titled ‘Morning Thoughts’ and through it, he hoped to 
secure Turkish military commitments by encouraging them to ‘play a part and win her place in 
the council of the victors’.375 The portion of the document that would draw the scorn of the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department, however, was the Prime Minister’s scheme for an 
international order after the war, a conception which echoed his designs from the previous 
autumn. He spoke of the ‘Chiefs of the United Nations’ creating a world organisation which 
might include a European Government that would ‘embody the spirit but not be subject to the 
weakness’ of the League of Nations. Furthermore, Scandinavian, Danubian and Balkan 
confederations should be organised in Europe, while similar structures might be developed in 
the Far East. The wider organisation, he said, would be held together by the superior air forces 
of the great powers, combined with the continued disarmament of the Axis nations. He warned 
of dire consequences should the great powers—and to a lesser extent smaller powers such as 
Turkey—not join in this system. Another world war, he believed, ‘will destroy all that is left 
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of the culture, wealth and civilization of mankind and reduce us to the level almost of wild 
beasts’.376 
Upon hearing of the Prime Minister’s comments to the Turkish and American 
governments, the Foreign Office scrambled to contain what they believed might become a 
‘major disaster’. 377  Jebb was angered by Churchill’s propensity to ignore Foreign Office 
opinion and to elaborate on his own personal ideas. In a draft minute, he wrote that the paper 
‘seems to betray not only ignorance of the facts but also the absence of any prolonged process 
of thought’. Jebb would dilute his criticism before forwarding his thoughts on to other 
departments, but his earlier drafting reveals both frustration at the Prime Minister’s maverick 
contributions and a conviction that the leader of the British government should keep a distance 
from post-war planning. In an added jibe, Jebb recommended that Churchill heed the warning 
in the latter’s earlier autobiography, in which he wrote that ‘those who can win a war well can 
rarely make a good peace’.378  
While these comments were removed from his official minute, Jebb was no less stinging 
in his critique. He thought Churchill’s paper represented an ‘astonishing scheme’, in which 
‘horror quickly follows horror’. The Prime Minister’s plans for confederations, he believed, 
were ill-conceived. For one, the Norwegians would likely refuse a Scandinavian bloc, while 
the Czechs were unlikely to be willingly involved with the Hungarians, Austrians and 
Romanians, all of whom remained enemies of Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, that the plans for 
confederations could be reapplied to the Far East were as vague as they were impractical. 
Furthermore, the Prime Minister had spoken of a ‘coalition of resistance’ which Jebb felt 
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smacked of notions of collective security. This mention, he felt, ‘increases my impression that 
the Prime Minister’s real intention is to set up something like the old League’.379  
Like other officials in the Foreign Office, Jebb felt that the Prime Minister should 
immediately contact Stalin—either directly or through the British Ambassador in Moscow, 
Archibald Clark Kerr—to explain that his views were not the official policy of His Majesty’s 
Government but only the result of an ambitious attempt to bring Turkey into the war.380 
Cadogan, however, tempered these plans, noting that he had been in attendance during the 
meeting with President İnönü and that the Prime Minister had made it clear that his views did 
not reflect the official policy at present. As Cadogan sought to calm some of the growing 
hysteria within the Economic and Reconstruction Department, he opined that ‘Mr Jebb has 
seen a lot of ghosts’, but that outreach to the Russians should remain coordinated and 
measured.381 In fact, Cadogan noted in his diaries that he ‘didn’t see anything much wrong 
with it’ and that it did not contradict the Four Power Plan. Both he and Eden supported the 
idea, Cadogan claimed. As to Jebb and the other officials in his department, Cadogan noted 
privately that, ‘It always happens when one goes abroad, that the little quill-drivers in their 
cells pass a fine tooth comb through everything and wail that we have “sold the pass.” Do them 
a lot of good to go abroad—and stay there.’382  
Despite his role in the drafting of the Atlantic Charter, Cadogan remained less interested 
in sorting out the details of the post-war world in 1942 and in the early months of 1943. It was 
not that he believed these plans less important in the long run. Instead, he, like Churchill, 
simply viewed them as less pressing at that point in the war. Importantly, however, Cadogan 
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served as the crucial link between the planning operations and the political point of delivery, 
an influence which was only to become more important as the war progressed.  
 Eden, too, despite attaching his name to the Four Power Plan and the United Nations 
Plan, remained somewhat aloof from the more detailed schemes being developed within the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department. One could hardly blame the Foreign Secretary for 
this lack of attention to such issues, however. Since November, Eden, in addition to leading 
the Foreign Office, had been doubling as leader of the House of Commons, where he was in 
regular attendance to field questions on behalf of the government.383 His Private Secretary, 
Oliver Harvey, noted towards the end of 1942 and throughout the first months of 1943 that the 
dual responsibility was taking its toll on the Foreign Secretary. Foreign affairs, Harvey 
complained, ‘are left to the fag end of the day or to hasty moments snatched between 
parliamentary business’.384  He admitted that the arrangement would be more manageable 
should Eden be more willing to delegate work to senior officials. The Foreign Secretary, 
however, was hesitant to do so, largely out of fear that his own authority over foreign affairs 
would be curtailed from above.  
Churchill, as evidenced by the Turkish excursion, was convinced of his diplomatic 
capabilities and wasted few opportunities to exert his control over foreign policy. This was not 
lost on his Foreign Secretary, who Harvey recorded as growing increasingly frustrated—even 
resentful—by what he viewed as the Prime Minister’s ‘intrusion into foreign affairs’.385 It was 
under this awkward arrangement that Eden began his push for a meeting between himself and 
members of the Roosevelt administration.386 In late December, he had spoken with Churchill 
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about travelling to Washington to engage in discussions on ‘postwar and other foreign 
matters’.387 For Eden, this would offer a chance to exert his authority over foreign affairs by 
meeting with Britain’s chief ally in the war and its essential partner in the peace. Furthermore, 
it would offer him a chance to circumvent stalled Cabinet discussions concerning post-war 
issues. As Harvey noted weeks before the trip, ‘The chief value of the visit would be to enable 
[Eden] to put the screw on the Cabinet here by showing how far ahead the Americans were 
thinking.’388  
 
‘A Mad House’: Foreign Office officials visit Washington  
The military situation by the spring of 1943 had improved somewhat from the previous year, 
when German and Japanese advances in eastern Europe and the Pacific, respectively, had led 
to pessimism within certain quarters of Whitehall. By the beginning of February, signs pointed 
to the Red Army having successfully repelled the German invasion of Stalingrad, though the 
casualties suffered were enormous.389 In North Africa, the Anglo-American push towards 
Tunisia was a mounting success; and by May, Churchill and Roosevelt would finalise plans to 
invade Sicily followed by the Italian mainland.390 In the Pacific theatre, the Japanese army had, 
by March, switched to a more defensive posture, seeking to maintain their hold on occupied 
territories.391  
It was in this context that a Foreign Office delegation including Eden, Harvey and Jebb 
arrived in Washington on 11 March. By the time they touched down, they were relieved to find 
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that post-war matters had become a popular topic in the political discourse.392 In the months 
preceding the trip, British officials had been receiving information on the trends in American 
thinking when it came to the country’s global responsibility after the war. As one journalist 
wrote for Time magazine: 
There is [now] a movement of the mind of men. The plans for the postwar world 
are beginning to take shape…The news of the postwar world was one news of 
planners, politicians, theoreticians. It is becoming news of the hopes of plain people 
all over the globe.393  
 
A recent Gallup Poll had found that 64% of Americans believed that the United States 
should ‘set up with our Allies a world organisation to maintain the future peace of the world’.394 
Even in the Senate—the body that had prevented American involvement in the League of 
Nations—there had recently been resolutions introduced which called for the Roosevelt 
administration to take the lead in forming a United Nations organisation, an idea they 
considered as ‘the best hope for maintaining world peace and stability after this war’.395  
The British delegation remained in Washington for the next two weeks, and during 
conversations with their American counterparts, they began to better understand the range of 
views within the Roosevelt administration.396 There was Harry Hopkins, described by Harvey 
as the ‘eminence grise’ of the President, who revealed that Roosevelt thought highly of 
Churchill as a leader during wartime, but at the same time, was ‘horrified at his reactionary 
attitude for after the war’.397 As to the dynamics of policymaking within Washington, the 
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British delegation was, at times, left wondering who had the deciding vote. The divisive 
relationship between the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and the Under-Secretary of State, 
Sumner Welles, was known to diplomats within the Foreign Office; but other instances—such 
as Welles not informing John Winant, the US Ambassador to London, of Eden’s arrival time 
on 11 March—revealed additional jealousies and internecine struggles for influence. These 
snubs were not lost on Eden, who remarked to Harvey that it was ‘all rather like a mad house’ 
and that he felt ‘more at home in the Kremlin’.398 
Despite these initial impressions, British and American officials engaged in the most 
substantial Anglo-American conversations on post-war matters since the conference between 
Roosevelt and Churchill in Placentia Bay in August 1941. As the talks progressed over the next 
two weeks, there were developments which calmed and encouraged officials in the Foreign 
Office. There was an understanding that cooperation between the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the Soviet Union—and to a lesser extent the countries making up the United 
Nations—was a necessity; and second, that some substantial agreement among the great 
powers—including China, at the behest of Roosevelt—would need to be settled before the 
conclusion of hostilities.399 
In all of these discussions, an inescapable question was the attitude of Russia and what 
the Americans and British should expect of Moscow in the post-war period. In conversation 
with Roosevelt and Hopkins over dinner on 14 March, Eden expressed his view that relations 
with the Soviet Union was, for the moment, the most difficult problem facing the Atlantic 
allies. He thought that Russia preferred cooperation with the Americans and British over post-
war Europe for the simple fact that Stalin was not prepared to deal with European problems on 
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his own.400 As to what the Russians would demand at the conclusion of hostilities, Eden noted 
that Stalin would likely lay claim to the Balkans and cite the 1939 plebiscites as evidence of 
domestic support.401 In his report to the Cabinet, Eden said that the attitude toward Russia in 
the United States was noticeably ‘less friendly’ than in Britain, but that the general feeling 
during these talks was that Russia and China were undoubtedly central players without which 
the post-war order would falter. Importantly, however, was a mutual understanding between 
the British and Americans that their coordinated efforts would be the essential driver of post-
war planning.402   
On the issue of a future international organisation, arguably the most complex and 
consequential on the agenda, the British delegation was content to listen to the American plans 
rather than elaborate on their own. This reserved approach represented a tactic of the Foreign 
Office—the Americans could not be led to think that the United Kingdom harboured grand 
designs which would bind them into far-reaching commitments. The British delegation heard 
first from Sumner Welles, the President’s most trusted mind on post-war matters, and later, 
from the President himself. Both expressed similar views, though Roosevelt, in a meeting on 
27 March, discussed more in depth certain details of his vision for a three-tiered United Nations 
organisation. There would be a ‘general assembly’ made up of the United Nations which, by 
meeting once a year, would give the smaller countries the opportunity ‘to blow off steam’. In 
reality, their influence would be more of an illusion—the true power would rest with an 
‘executive committee’ made up of the four powers. This grouping would be responsible for the 
most important decisions and would be tasked with wielding the ‘police powers of the United 
Nations’. The third major body would sit between the executive committee and the general 
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assembly and would be known as the ‘advisory council’. It was to be made up of representatives 
of the four main powers as well as six-to-eight representatives of smaller powers, the latter 
grouping being elected depending on region and the size of population. The advisory council, 
Roosevelt posited, would meet from ‘time to time’ to settle various disputes that might be 
raised. Added to this three-tiered structure would be one individual who would serve as the 
leader or ‘moderator’ of the organisation.403  
Importantly, Roosevelt and State Department officials seemed to be adamant that the 
four great powers retain the main responsibility in the wider organisation, a view which was in 
line with Jebb’s Four Power Plan. There remained significant differences between the 
American and British ideas, however. When Eden relayed his reservations about the inclusion 
of China in this four-power arrangement, Roosevelt explained that China’s position on the 
executive committee was due more to domestic political concerns than anything else. In order 
for the American public to accept international responsibilities after the war, they must be 
convinced that the organisation was worldwide in scope, as opposed to another scheme aimed 
at keeping peace among the Europeans.404 Eden later explained this position to the Cabinet and 
added that the American position on China stemmed, in part, from the fact that they ‘hated 
Japan far more than they hated the Germans’, and furthermore, that they viewed the stability 
of China as a balance not only against Japan but against Russia as well.405 A second difference 
was that American designs, as described by both Welles and Roosevelt, would need to be 
squared with the Prime Minister’s idea of a Council of Europe, a concept which Churchill had 
recently outlined in a speech four days earlier.406 Welles understood that the British were 
determined to bring the United States into the maintenance of the European order at the end of 
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the war, but he was quick to point out to British officials that it could not be presented in this 
manner. The American public would instead have to be convinced of the country’s global 
responsibility, as opposed to the idea of the United States being used to sort out the problems 
of Europe.407  
While the meetings of the principal statesmen were significant, the discussions between 
the heads of the respective planning bodies were important in their own right. It was here that 
the minutiae of international machinery began to be deliberated. The conversations initially 
focused on the recovery of Europe at the conclusion of the war, a topic on which Jebb soon 
realised his American counterparts were not as advanced. He took the opportunity to describe 
his idea for a ‘United Nations Commission for Europe’, which had become the latest iteration 
of his earlier suggestion for an Inter-Allied Armistice Commission. This body, comprised of 
the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, would be responsible for 
coordinating the multiple armistice commissions on the continent at the end of the war. As 
Jebb reported in his minutes of the meeting, ‘It seemed to us that three-Power action in the war 
would lead…to three-Power collaboration in the re-establishment of order after the cessation 
of hostilities.’ He and Strang noted that the Americans were receptive to this idea, with some 
State Department officials agreeing that a body which could establish order in Europe after the 
war would be proof to the American public that the country’s involvement in Europe was 
worthwhile.408 More importantly for Jebb, however, was his thinking that upon this foundation 
of great power cooperation in Europe might be constructed a wider international order. It was 
a view he thought Leo Pasvolsky, one of the lead planners within the State Department, also 
shared to a certain extent. Jebb wrote to his colleagues in the Foreign Office that Pasvolsky’s 
views were ‘more in accordance with British interests than the more daring and “cosmic” 
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schemes of many of the New Deal members of the Administration’. The important 
consideration for the Foreign Office was how influential Pasvolsky would remain as post-war 
planning progressed. ‘The only question is how far this slow-moving little man can really put 
anything across…Mr Pasvolsky is certainly the tortoise of the State Dept.’409 
There were no public communiques or declarations to come out of the nearly three 
weeks of meetings; but nonetheless significant progress was made. The British found that 
American thinking on the post-war world—especially the most basic idea of the four powers 
being responsible for the maintenance of peace and security—was roughly in line with their 
own, though there remained important differences when it came to the future of Europe and 
the concept of a wider organisation growing out of regional structures.410  
On the American side, it was clear that the visit by British officials was a welcome 
development, and one which had stimulated the need for further planning on their side. Sumner 
Welles wrote that the visit by Eden and Foreign Office officials was ‘extraordinarily helpful to 
all of us’, and expressed optimism about the two countries working together in the future.411 
Reports coming from certain quarters of the State Department even indicated that leading 
American officials felt that the British were more advanced in their own post-war planning.412   
Roosevelt, in his press conference which took place just hours after Eden had departed for 
Canada, explained that the talks were only ‘exploratory’ in nature but for those wishing to be 
‘didactic’, that the Americans and British were in agreement on roughly 95 percent of the 
issues. Highlighting this emerging Atlantic consensus, he said, ‘That’s an amazing 
statement…I wish some people would put that in their pipes and smoke it.’413 
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‘The President’s mind is usually in the stratosphere’: Foreign Office views of the 
Washington talks 
While encouraging, Roosevelt’s statements masked important differences between the ways in 
which American and British officials were conceiving of the post-war international order. 
While the United Nations Plan had spoken of an eventual organisation with structures similar 
to those described by Roosevelt, the Foreign Office felt that, in order to create a stable 
international order after the war, they must first construct regional structures which might 
stabilise war-torn countries and facilitate relief efforts. These efforts were to be conducted 
primarily by the great powers, and their cooperation might provide the foundation upon which 
a wider organisation might be built up. This was especially true for Europe, which remained 
the most important region for British officials. For the Americans, on the other hand, the 
priority was to first establish a world organisation led by the great powers. As Jebb noted, 
instead of ‘building from the bottom upwards’ through regional institutions, the United States 
‘would prefer to concentrate on world machinery and then work out the way in which this could 
be applied to regions later’.414 
Added to this was a concern among senior Foreign Office officials about the way in 
which Roosevelt and his administration were planning to address Europe. Though many 
continued to emphasise the necessity of American involvement, others felt that the President’s 
mind was in the ‘stratosphere’. 415  Nigel Ronald wrote that Roosevelt’s views on the 
dismemberment of Germany and the ‘relegation of France to the rank of a third rate power’ 
would have dangerous ramifications. Unlike Roosevelt, the British were ‘nearer the firing line’ 
and thus would suffer from this ‘lack of political judgment’ on the part of the President. Should 
the British fail to bring the he and his administration around to their way of thinking, Ronald 
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warned, then the ‘outlook is indeed black’.416  
Orme Sargent, who had earlier considered a suggestion by the President to disarm all 
nations except the great powers to be ‘crack-brained’, raised the fact that Roosevelt’s proposal 
clearly went against the Prime Minister’s idea of a Council of Europe, which Churchill had 
described once again during a speech in March.417 He posited that this was likely not the result 
of Roosevelt’s aversion to the idea as much as his fear that the issue might be seized upon by 
American isolationists and used, in Sargent’s words, as ‘a stick with which to beat himself’. 
Such a consideration, he believed, would need to be taken into account on the British side if 
the idea for a Council of Europe was to be advanced. It remained, in Sargent’s view, the best 
proposal for dealing with the inevitable chaos on the European continent after the war.418 
Although Jebb considered Churchill’s views to be ‘rash’ at this point, he understood 
that they could not be ignored. The question was how to square Churchill’s wish for a Council 
of Europe with Roosevelt and Welles’s vision of a world organisation. The Americans 
themselves, Jebb thought, were likely opposed to a Council of Europe because of their concern 
over the power this might afford Britain and the Soviet Union going forward.  
In terms of Realpolitik it may be that [the Americans] imagine that both the United 
Kingdom and Soviet Russia might increase their power and their ability to play a 
world role comparable to that of the United States if they were regarded as the 
natural leaders of certain groups of European states.419 
 
Despite this risk, Jebb understood the necessity of American inclusion in post-war 
institutions. A plan skewed to the interests of the United States would be better than no plan at 
all. Therefore, he advocated British acquiescence to the broad parameters of American 
planning, but at the same time, he suggested a concrete agreement among the great powers to 
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establish a working order within Europe. If the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the 
United States could agree to focus on ‘cleaning up the frightful mess’ that was expected in 
Europe at the conclusion of hostilities, they could hopefully create an organic structure—in the 
form of a United Nations Commission for Europe—which could be applied on a larger scale.420 
Moreover, such a structure would go some way towards appeasing Churchill’s concern with 
the future of Europe, though Jebb would address his Council of Europe idea head-on in the 
coming weeks. 
In the background of these discussions was a view emerging within the Foreign Office 
that not only was it necessary to first build up regional structures, but that it was also wise to 
not rush into detailed designs of a post-war organisation. In his review of the discussions in 
Washington, Jebb had warned against constructing too much ‘rigid machinery’—in this case 
Roosevelt and Welles’s idea for regional groupings to elect members onto an Advisory 
Council—which might make it difficult for the great powers to maintain control of a chaotic 
post-war environment. Although inclusive to smaller powers, certain schemes recommended 
by Roosevelt and the State Department, at least at this stage, could complicate the process. For 
the sake of efficacy and expedience, the key decisions in the immediate aftermath of the war 
should be in the hands of the great powers, a principle which had first been articulated in the 
Four Power Plan. Regionalism, Jebb felt, should instead be allowed to develop out of ‘the 
machinery which will have to be established for grappling with Armistice problems’. The 
United Nations, he continued, must come to understand that the major questions of security 
must remain in the hands of ‘the Powers who possess the requisite force, namely...the Big 
Four’.421  
Throughout these discussions on the future regional and international order, the legacy 
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of failures within the League of Nations continued to cast a shadow over Foreign Office 
thinking. Like Jebb, Cadogan believed that planners could aim to construct a flawless 
international organisation, and yet the entire structure might still be undermined by impotence 
or inaction.  
The history of the last 20 years has surely shown us that no “machinery” for 
keeping the peace will work unless there is the power to drive it, and the will to use 
the power. For 20 years the League polished the machine which one by one the 
sources of power were cut off. 
 
 Cooperation amongst the great powers, along with those powers maintaining their military 
capabilities, would be required, Cadogan wrote, lest the designs of post-war planners become 
‘card castles’.422  
At this stage, the most important issue for Cadogan was to obtain agreement among the 
Americans, British and Russians as to the broad parameters of post-war cooperation. The 
essential issues were not yet the machinery of a future world organisation, but the more 
immediate challenges that would face Europe at the end of the war. Among these, Cadogan 
noted the need for an agreement on the shape of an armistice, the way in which enemy countries 
would be occupied, how to coordinate disarmament among enemy powers, and how to 
administer relief and reconstruction schemes.423 Similar to Jebb’s thinking on organic regional 
structures of post-war cooperation, Cadogan felt that should the three great powers be able to 
cooperate on the European continent, they might be able to apply this system to other regions 
of the world. Only when agreement among the great powers was secured and this arrangement 
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Moving towards an international organisation: A revised plan for the post-war world 
Though British officials were more intent on creating regional structures—especially in 
Europe—prior to any wider international organisation, this did not mean that they ignored the 
latter altogether. Indeed, one of the great insights from the meetings in Washington was an 
understanding of just how far the Americans had been thinking in terms of post-war 
organisation. Towards the end of his trip in the American capital, Jebb had been putting the 
final touches on a document which was intended to give more detail on the British approach 
towards a future international organisation, as opposed to broader concepts of a future 
international order. Titled ‘Suggestions for a Peace Settlement’, the paper adapted some of the 
views originally outlined in the Four Power Plan and the United Nations Plan. The necessity 
of four power cooperation after the war remained preeminent, but there was more attention 
given to the role that smaller powers might play in a future organisation. The great powers, he 
believed, would be responsible for world security, whereas the smaller powers might exert 
considerable influence over economic issues, a move which would give them a feeling of 
responsibility within the organisation. Borrowing well-known phrases from the Roosevelt 
administration, he said that ‘freedom from fear’ must be the responsibility of the great powers, 
while ‘freedom from want’ might be ‘handled by wider assemblies, whether on a world basis 
or on regional lines’.425  
Much of the concern for the role of smaller powers stemmed from the reaction of the 
Dominions—as well as of governments such as the Netherlands and Belgium—to British post-
war planning.426 Canada had already come out in strong opposition to the Four Power Plan, 
writing to the Dominions Office in January that the government ‘will not be able to co-operate 
cordially in any post-war system in which authority is concentrated exclusively in the four big 
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powers’. Officials in Ottawa also opposed any suggestion that the United Kingdom might 
represent Canadian interests on the key councils of the international organisation. Such an 
arrangement would mean that each nation in the Commonwealth ‘enjoys something less that 
[sic] the status of full nationhood’.427 In a subsequent note, the Secretary of State for the 
Dominions, Clement Attlee, wrote that the continuance of the Commonwealth could only be 
maintained if the Dominions were ‘satisfied that the general order which is to be set up after 
the war takes sufficient account of their interests and responsibilities’.428 It became clear to 
officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department that while agreement among the 
three powers—and to a lesser extent China—would be the most crucial aspect, the system 
would falter without the consent of the smaller powers. 
 Elsewhere in Jebb’s redrafted paper, the focus on Europe as the hinge of the post-war 
order remained; and it was this concern, more so than any other at this stage, which influenced 
his preference for regionalism. Europe, Jebb believed, was more significant than the Far East, 
for the simple fact that it had been the cradle of conflict for the last thirty years. If adequate 
measures were not taken, Germany, with its industrial capacity, population and geographic 
position at the centre of Europe, might return to wreak havoc once again. To stem this 
possibility, Jebb elaborated on his idea for a United Nations Commission for Europe, an idea 
which had crystallised since his meetings in Washington. This body, with its great power 
leadership and its plans for the incremental inclusion of other European countries, might lead 
one day to a Council of Europe—an obvious reference to the Prime Minister’s plan—and 
potentially serve as a blueprint for a wider international organisation.  
 Importantly, Jebb also considered the construction of regional structures as a way to 
increase the influence of smaller powers within the organisation.429 As he later wrote, one of 
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the lessons of the League—made most evident by the Manchurian crisis—was that only 
countries whose interests were directly threatened by aggression could be expected to take up 
action.430 Thus the formation of regional councils, he believed, might allow for states to come 
together to make decisions on pressing political and economic issues. In what would become 
an important provision in the years ahead, Jebb insisted that regional councils remain 
subordinate to the World Council should it be established. Added to this, was his 
recommendation that regional bodies might help to address certain issues surrounding colonial 
trusteeship, a subject which Roosevelt had raised in the Washington discussions, and one to 
which the United Kingdom, given its overseas dependencies, was particularly sensitive.431 
Regional commissions, he suggested, might help in assisting with the security and economic 
needs of ‘backward areas with the status of colonial dependencies’.432 
Related to these regional bodies was the question of a general assembly, a body which 
Roosevelt had mentioned but Jebb felt ‘might only exist in theory’. Instead of Roosevelt’s idea 
of an assembly meeting regularly, Jebb thought that disputes might be raised, deliberated and 
resolved in the regional councils, which might meet in a permanent location. The Executive 
Committee—or eventually the Council of the World—would meet when necessary, but this 
body would, like the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century, only be ‘consultative and 
peripatetic’.433 This reflected Jebb’s fear that attempting to fix a permanent location for such 
meetings would lead to unwelcome animosity between the four powers. 
Overall, the draft took on a different tone and aim from Jebb’s earlier papers. Where 
the Four Power Plan had been a suggested British grand strategy, the ‘Suggestions for a Peace 
Settlement’ was intended to be a blueprint which might be adopted by other powers, namely 
the United States and Russia. As such, points that had been a part of Jebb’s original plan in the 
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summer of 1942—such as the necessity of Britain joining a wider organisation in order to 
maintain her status as a European power and world power—were removed. Furthermore, there 
was more of a direct appeal to American interests, including an explicit reference to the Atlantic 
Charter. His idea was to square the recent statements by Churchill—namely the calls for a 
Council of Europe and a Council of Asia—with those of the President, whose views on the 
post-war world had recently been publicised under the title ‘Roosevelt’s World Blueprint’.434  
While Jebb’s paper represented a concerted effort to chart an independent British policy 
with regard to constructing an international organisation, his approach was not shared by all 
officials in the Foreign Office. William Strang, for one, who had been present at the meeting 
with Roosevelt on 27 March, said that in light of the President’s recent public statements, the 
Foreign Office should look to adopt his views more generally.  
Since what we all want is that the United States should share in international 
responsibilities after the war, and since the Administration at Washington may 
have some difficulty in persuading the legislature and public opinion, we ought, so 
far as we can with due regard to our own interests, to fall in with the President’s 
proposals and let him play his own hand as a matter of tactics.435 
 
For his part, Jebb felt that the new plan was entirely ‘in harmony’ with American ideas, except 
on the issue of France, the establishment of a Council of Europe and the question concerning 
the disarmament of smaller powers. The pressing concern, he felt, was the view of the 
Dominions, which along with India, would need to be consulted before the plan could be 
presented to the United States and the Soviet Union. 436  Indeed, the issue of the Dominions’ 
reception raised essential considerations within the Foreign Office. Their support was vital, but 
whether they would be represented under the British Commonwealth or as independent nations 
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was still undecided. The eventual answer would have major consequences for Britain’s power 
and standing relative to the United States and the Soviet Union.437 
In considering these minutes and the future development of policy, Eden convened a 
meeting on 13 May which marked the most important Foreign Office discussion to date 
concerning the plan for a post-war international organisation.438 The Foreign Secretary opened 
the discussion by offering views which appeared to support a return to the League of Nations. 
The more he thought about it, he said, ‘the new international machinery, if it were ever 
established, would be something like the League of Nations.’ The Provisional Executive 
Committee made up of the four powers which Jebb had proposed would likely be necessary in 
the immediate aftermath of the war, but this could not last indefinitely. Such an ‘inner council’ 
of the four powers might help to alleviate controversial disputes between other nations, but 
Eden felt that this would, in time, need to be replaced by a larger assembly of nations. 
In a telling response, Cadogan argued a point that was more in line with Jebb’s view 
than that of the Foreign Secretary. While he noted that they may end up returning to an 
arrangement like the League, they must emphasise that the great powers—and most 
importantly, their cooperation—should remain the centrepiece of the organisation. ‘After this 
war’, he said, ‘our principal energies should be devoted to facilitating co-operation between 
the Great Powers’, which, if achieved, would allow everything else to ‘fit into its place’. He 
echoed his earlier points that there should not be a rush to create complex machinery before 
the end of the war. Instead, the primary focus must remain on the practical problems, namely 
those concerning relief and reconstruction in Europe. If Britain could get the Americans and 
Russians to agree to a type of United Nations Commission of Europe as proposed by Jebb, then 
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they might succeed in bringing them into a design of their making. ‘Our major Allies’, he said, 
‘might be insensibly drawn into some kind of world organisation which, if put to them in the 
form of a logical scheme, might be rejected’.439 On the back of his comments, it was decided 
that a new Cabinet papers should be drafted—one laying out the major issues likely to face 
Europe at the end of the war and another detailing Jebb’s proposal for a United Nations 
Commission for Europe. This would hopefully serve as the policy which might be presented 
first to the Dominions and then to the Americans and Russians.440 
 
The ‘Great Power Man’ enters the Economic and Reconstruction Department 
The gradual incorporation of Charles Webster into the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department beginning in the spring of 1943 fundamentally altered British planning 
thereafter.441  Since January 1943, Webster had been producing a series of papers on the 
armistices and peace settlements from the period 1918-19.442 This historical knowledge, both 
of the detailed aspects of peacemaking and the intricacies of international organisation, came 
to be seen by Jebb and others within the Economic and Reconstruction Department as 
invaluable.443  Though in later years Jebb wrote that Webster was a ‘great power man’, his 
comment undervalues, to a large extent, Webster’s insistence that the four powers would need 
to operate within the framework of an inclusive international organisation. Crucially, Webster 
consistently stressed that the concerns of smaller states be respected, in a way that also made 
him a ‘small power man’, so to speak. This was a characteristic of his internationalist leanings, 
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but he also considered the United Kingdom’s role as a leader in larger organisations—as well 
as its concern for the interests of smaller powers—to be a tradition of British foreign policy 
dating back to Castlereagh.444  
In one of his first direct contributions to the Economic and Reconstruction Department, 
Webster offered some reflections on the direction of Foreign Office thinking about post-war 
matters. The Atlantic Charter, he felt, was to make up ‘the basis of the whole system’, a point 
which reflected his earlier view that while an ‘Anglo-American partnership’ might raise a 
number of difficulties, it could also benefit ‘the interests of the world as a whole’.445 These 
principles in the Charter, however, would need to be ‘amplified’ and defined in more specific 
terms. Importantly, the idea of members of an organisation ascribing to a set of ‘principles’ 
was one which Webster would suggest throughout the planning stages and one which reflected 
a rules-based approach to the international system. On the one hand, it would serve to guide 
the behaviour of states, while at the same time serving, in theory, as a check on the authority 
of the great powers. This was one of the only ways, Webster believed, that the smaller powers 
might support a system in which the great powers were predominant for a period of time after 
the war. 
Webster’s concern for smaller powers was one of his central contributions to the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department at this stage. The current shape of British plans, he 
warned, placed too much emphasis on the position of the great powers. While the smaller states 
might accept their outsized role in the immediate post-war period, their support for such an 
arrangement would likely fade thereafter. In order to get the smaller powers to agree to a long-
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term organisation, they would need to be assured that they were included on discussions which 
involved their interests. This effort to more effectively involve the smaller powers, he noted, 
was a principle which dated back to the Conference of Aix la Chapelle in 1818.446 Furthermore, 
if the new organisation could establish functional bodies relating to economic and social issues, 
smaller powers would be able to participate in matters which ‘transcend continents’, and 
thereby give these countries an important stake in the wider organisation. 
Another of Webster’s contributions to the British planning effort at this stage was his 
emphasis on the need to construct adequate machinery to deal with political and legal disputes. 
The peaceful settlement of disputes was, in theory, what the majority of states desired; but its 
practical application had been one of the most difficult issues for the League of Nations. 
Furthermore, the ability to devise such mechanisms was essential to the maintenance of an 
international order. The ideas currently floating between the American and British schemes 
envisioned regional councils attempting to settle disputes between nations, and when this was 
not possible, the matter would be taken up by the great power executive committee. This was 
inherently flawed, he noted, for the fact that, ‘No small power will accept a distasteful regional 
decision if it has the right of appeal to the Great Power Committee.’447 His recommendation 
was first to recommend the development of ‘technical bodies’, namely a World Court which 
might be responsible for handling legal or ‘justiciable’ disputes. This was based in large part 
on his view, expressed elsewhere, that the Permanent Court of International Justice had been a 
‘great achievement’ of the League of Nations.448  
At the same time, however, a World Court could not handle all disputes, especially 
those of a political nature and those dealing with the interests of the great powers. While 
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arbitration and conference diplomacy had come a long way over the last century, Webster felt 
that a better system was needed going forward. On this point, he remained somewhat vague on 
the more detailed mechanisms for resolving disputes within a World Council, though his 
response to Jebb's recommendation of peripatetic council meetings reveals an important 
insight. He noted that such ‘spasmodic’ meetings, lacking a set time and place and devoid of a 
central secretariat, would mean ‘a return to the “Concert” system which, in fact, often means 
“crisis” meetings and the reluctance or even refusal to be present on the part of one of the 
powers.’ Although he personally disagreed with this approach, Webster disguised his 
opposition in the paper. Instead, he invoked Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary 
from 1924 to 1929, who Webster said had considered ‘the regularity of the meetings of the 
principal statesmen as one of the greatest contributions of the League to international 
affairs’.449 
 
‘The PM will take matters entirely out of the hands of the experts’: Churchill visits the 
United States 
As the Economic and Reconstruction Department were working to consolidate their views into 
a Cabinet paper, Churchill travelled to Washington where he would once again deliver views 
contrary to those of the Foreign Office. Although not a planned subject of conversation, post-
war matters were thrust into several discussions, most notably during a luncheon at the British 
Embassy on 22 May. During the course of the meal, Churchill took the opportunity to explain 
his personal views of the post-war settlement, which were largely a restatement of his ‘Morning 
Thoughts’ of early February and a more recent radio address in March.450 He placed the chief 
responsibility for peace on the United States, Great Britain and Russia, a three-power grouping 
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which might make up a Supreme World Council. He would not object to China joining this 
group, so long as it was understood that its influence was not comparable to the three main 
powers. Under this ‘Supreme World Council’, there would be three regional councils: one 
European, one for the Americas, and one for the Far East. As he explained to Vice President 
Henry Wallace, his idea was for a type of ‘three-legged stool’, with the World Council atop 
three Regional Councils.451 Added to this basic structure would be an enforcement mechanism 
in the form of national and international armed forces. The latter would be under the direction 
of the respective regional council and then the world council. 
Though Churchill’s views found a receptive American audience, the Foreign Office 
was once again upset with the Prime Minister ignoring the department and expounding on his 
personal views.452 Though the United Nations Plan had yet to be taken up by the Cabinet—and 
thus there was no official policy on either the post-war settlement or a future international 
organisation—there had been a bevy of work completed by members of the Foreign Office, a 
fact which Churchill knew. While the Prime Minister was clear that his views were his own 
and not the official view of the government, it was a cunning attempt to get his views across 
and thus, to exert more of his influence over the conduct of British foreign policy.453 As Oliver 
Harvey complained in his diaries, ‘It is high time the old man came home. The American 
atmosphere, the dictatorial powers of the President and the adulation which surrounds him 
there, have gone to his head.’454  
Within the Economic and Reconstruction Department, Jebb and Webster were 
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frustrated by the Prime Minister’s personal initiative. Jebb considered Churchill’s proposal to 
develop confederations in Central and Southeastern Europe to be ‘positively dangerous’ while 
his concept of an International Police Force—especially based on national and international 
‘contingents’—was ‘of doubtful soundness’.455 Jebb’s new consultant on the planning process 
was even more acerbic in his remarks. Writing in his diaries on 15 June, Webster said that the 
Prime Minister’s comments: 
shews [sic] the danger which I have foreseen all along that these preparations & 
studies will be made and then precipitate and unconsidered action by the PM will 
take matters entirely out of the hands of the experts…Here he is trying to shape the 
whole of the future without saying a word to his Cab[ine]t, For[eign] Sec[retary] 
or their officials. The scheme is crude in the extreme and is more like that of a too 
donnish thinker than of a man of action. It is often so when men of action deal with 
something on which they have little experience.456 
 
It was not that Jebb and Webster disagreed entirely with the Prime Minister’s scheme. 
Indeed, Jebb had earlier advocated for such a council of the four great powers and certain 
regional bodies, and Churchill had gone some way towards bringing the Americans around to 
the necessity of four power cooperation in the post-war period.457 Instead, Jebb and Webster 
believed that other points—such as the concern for small powers and the responsibility of great 
powers within regional councils—were either butchered or ignored altogether and would thus 
‘wreck the whole scheme’.458  
Although Churchill’s comments on post-war matters contrasted in important ways with 
those of the Economic and Reconstruction Department, they had run—at least through the 
spring—largely parallel to the plans of the Foreign Office. This was not lost on Eden, who 
wrote to the Prime Minister that he agreed ‘generally’ with the views put forward in 
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Washington.459 As much as the Prime Minister had been ignoring certain details favoured by  
the Economic and Reconstruction Department, officials understood that in order for the 
Cabinet to approve their proposals, they would need to appeal, at least in part, to a number of 
Churchill’s proposals. 
 
Foreign Office blueprints for a post-war international order 
By June, the Economic and Reconstruction Department had produced two papers for the War 
Cabinet—one concerning the creation of regional machinery in Europe and another outlining 
a wider international order—which marked the crystallization of views that had been evolving 
since January. The first was titled ‘Armistices and Related Problems’ and it proposed the 
establishment of Jebb’s idea of a ‘United Nations Commission for Europe’ which would be 
made up of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and their European Allies, 
with a ‘steering committee’ of the three great powers and in some cases France. Cooperation 
on a number of issues surrounding the European armistice, the memorandum read, ‘would go 
a long way towards preserving the unity of the United Nations and laying the foundations for 
any future World Order that may be established’.460 The plan represented the Foreign Office 
preference for regional structures to serve as the building blocks of a wider international order. 
It was a conception of regionalism, Jebb later noted, which reflected ‘an evolutionary approach 
to international organisation’.461  
Crucially, the plan also reflected a desire to bind the Soviet Union into a post-war 
agreement in Europe. It was a view based on a warning from the British Ambassador in 
Moscow, Archibald Clark Kerr, which said that,  
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The Soviet Government, as hard-headed realists, are not going to be carried away, 
or levitated off the ground, by any long-term reconstruction plan which does not 
bear tangible relation to the condition existing in Europe at the end of the war.462  
 
An additional consideration was that such an agreement might prevent Stalin from negotiating 
a separate armistice with Germany, an outcome that would likely allow the Kremlin to erect a 
separate and independent system in Eastern Europe.463 When it was presented to the Cabinet, 
ministers agreed that Eden should approach both the Americans and Russians on these points, 
with the intention of reaching an agreement before the end of the war.464 An aide memoire was 
eventually sent to John Winant and Ivan Maisky for circulation to their respective governments.  
The British initiative sent waves through the State Department, where American 
officials, sensing that their counterparts in London were advancing on this aspect of post-war 
planning, began addressing more urgently certain outstanding questions on their end. As Ruth 
Russell has noted, the aide-memoire ‘forced the Department of State to consider together the 
various lines of thought and action that had been developing more or less independently in the 
politico-security field and in the economic-social field’.465  The idea for a United Nations 
Commission for Europe, in particular, led to a reckoning on the issue of regionalism, which 
Sumner Welles had favoured and Cordell Hull had vigorously opposed. By the end of the 
Moscow Conference three months later, the idea for a European commission would be realized 
in the form of the European Advisory Commission. 
 The second paper submitted to the War Cabinet was titled the ‘United Nations Plan for 
Organising Peace and Welfare’ and it focused more on the construction of international 
machinery which might give rise to a durable international order after the war. Based on the 
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464 War Cabinet Conclusions, WM (43) 86, 16 June 1943, CAB 65/34. Cadogan asked Jebb to draft the aide-
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recent work by Jebb and Webster, the paper was not simply a plan for a future United Nations 
organisation, but a plan for a post-war order, from which the international organisation would 
eventually develop.466 The essential framework remained the great powers operating within a 
wider grouping of United Nations; but the revised plan, Jebb noted, was based on reconciling 
the leadership of the great powers with the concerns of smaller states. 
On the whole, the United Nations Plan for Organising Peace was a more internationalist 
conception in spirit than either the Four Power Plan or the United Nations Plan. Due in large 
part to the earlier suggestions of Webster, the revised version gave more attention to the role 
of the smaller powers in a future order, as well as the creation of economic and social 
organisations. In fact, one of the principal ways that smaller states were to contribute to the 
post-war order was through economic and social bodes. These powers, the plan argued, ‘should 
have a real voice in the direction of [economic] affairs’, while the great powers—because they 
harboured overwhelming military force—might take the lead on political questions. Added to 
this was mention of the need for ‘judicial and arbitral machinery’ which might facilitate the 
peaceful resolution of disputes. While they remained vague on the exact form of such 
mechanisms, both Jebb and Webster felt that such designs had been one of the successes of the 
League and should be carried over.  
While more internationalist in nature, the recent draft remained rooted in realist 
calculations of power. Jebb’s earliest conception of a ‘Concert of the World’ was still evident; 
but now, in a nod to the Prime Minister, he changed the name to Churchill’s preferred ‘World 
Council’. The great powers—a group which included China and possibly France—would need 
to develop a ‘common world policy’ in order to prevent each country from going its own way 
after the war, with their smaller allies in tow. Within the World Council, the great powers 
	
466 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘The United Nations Plan for Organising Peace’, 
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would agree to settle differences between themselves and take primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace and security throughout the world—a decision which would be the great 
powers ‘acting unanimously’. An important addition to this revised plan was the suggestion 
that smaller powers would be represented on the World Council—especially when their own 
interests were involved—and they would be able to contribute armaments or military bases as 
a way of ensuring their place in the international system. 
Operating outside of, but subordinate to, the World Council were to be regional 
bodies—for example the United Nations Commission for Europe or the United Nations Far 
Eastern Commission—which might serve as a check on Germany and Japan, respectively, 
while also administering armistice terms and facilitating relief and reconstruction.467 Despite 
the views of the Roosevelt administration, Jebb and Webster continued to advocate that 
regionalism remain an integral part of a future international system.468 Regional bodies, they 
argued, would sow the seeds of great power cooperation, especially along security lines, and it 
would allow smaller countries belonging to these regions to play their part.  
The conception of a World Council overseeing regional structures—both of which 
would involve smaller powers—was one which, Jebb and Webster wrote, might give rise to a 
more cohesive international organisation in the future. In their view, regional bodies could elect 
representatives to sit on the world council, which, numbering around 11-12 members could 
serve as the ‘final Court of Appeal for all political or economic issues capable of threatening 
the peace’.469 On Webster’s recommendation, there was also mention of a possible General 
Assembly of Nations meeting every two years to discuss various political and economic 
matters. Moreover, the Assembly might be given the responsibility of electing seven or eight 
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469 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘The United Nations Plan for Organising Peace’, 
WP (43) 300, 7 July 1943, CAB 66/38/50, p. 8 
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representatives to sit on the world council with the great powers, should the regional 
representation scheme prove ineffective. The paper closed with a recommendation for the 
establishment of a permanent secretariat which might incorporate current staff from the League 
of Nations. It was thought that the economic and social organisations (as well as the permanent 
secretariat) might be located in a fixed location, while the meetings of the World Council and 
Assembly could take place there or elsewhere.470  
In what was something of an anti-climax for the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department, the paper came before Cabinet on 29 July only to be referred to a new Cabinet 
committee which was to focus on such questions going forward.471 Although Jebb, Webster 
and other officials were left frustrated that the Cabinet had yet to take a definitive position on 
post-war matters, the momentum was moving—albeit slowly—in the direction of Foreign 
Office plans becoming official government policy.  
This chapter has traced the evolution of planning within the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department between January and July 1943. The progression from the United 
Nations Plan to the United Nations Plan for Organising Peace was due to three factors in 
particular. First was the influence of the Prime Minister, who, without prior consultation with 
the Foreign Office, described his vision of the post-war world during discussions with heads 
of state, most notably the President of Turkey and later Roosevelt himself. Though they 
disagreed with the timing of these statements—as well as more specific details within 
Churchill’s proposals—officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department could not 
simply ignore his views. There was thus an effort made, albeit reluctantly, to incorporate the 
Prime Minister’s idea for a Council of Europe into the Foreign Office plans. It is important to 
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note that, although members of the department did not recognise it at the time, Churchill’s 
statements, coupled with their own planning efforts, led State Department officials to believe 
that the work taking place in London was more advanced than that which was ongoing in 
Washington.  
The second contributing factor was the gradual incorporation of Webster into the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department, a move which ended up altering certain elements 
of Foreign Office planning during the period. For one, more attention was given to building up 
a durable and more inclusive structure based on agreed principles, as opposed to an 
international order simply dictated by the three great powers. Added to this was a general 
understanding that for any post-war order to be effective and enduring, planners would need to 
be sensitive to the concerns of smaller powers going forward. By May, Webster had become, 
along with Jebb, one of the most important intellectual forces within the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department.  
Thirdly, the exchange of views with the United States beginning in March shaped 
Foreign Office planning in important ways, a development which has been relatively 
undervalued in previous historical literature. During these meetings, it was clear that the 
Roosevelt administration was thinking differently about key aspects of the post-war 
international order. While American and British officials agreed on the fundamental point of a 
future order being dependent on great power cooperation, the British were more intent to 
establish regional structures which might then serve as the building blocks of international 
structures, namely an international organisation. The view shared by senior members of the 
Roosevelt administration, on the other hand, was more concerned with establishing worldwide 
machinery and then addressing regional questions. 
Understanding the need to go some way towards meeting American aims, the decision 
was made within the Economic and Reconstruction Department to work towards a middle 
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ground, in which the American objective of setting up a worldwide organisation at the end of 
the war would be joined with the British desire to see the great powers facilitating the 
stabilisation and reconstruction of Europe. This recalibration on the part of the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department was most evident in Jebb and Webster’s planning documents 
towards the beginning of summer 1943. What had begun as a kind of British strategy for the 
post-war world—in the form of the Four Power Plan and the United Nations Plan—now 
became more of a blueprint both for the European post-war settlement as well as a wider 
international organisation. Importantly, the latter would be more than just a security apparatus 
and would involve judicial, economic, and social components which would foster international 
cooperation. At its heart, however, would be the nucleus of great powers, a concept which 
remained the cornerstone of the Foreign Office approach to the post-war world. In the months 
ahead, the focus of officials within the Economic and Reconstruction Department would turn 





The Balancing Act of a Great Power Peace: the Moscow Conference, Anglo-
Soviet relations, and the Balance of Power, August 1943 – December 1943 
 
 
Whereas the previous chapter addressed the initial Anglo-American discussions and the 
advance in British planning by the summer of 1943, this chapter examines how these plans 
collided with a new set of diplomatic realities in the period, and how British planners, in turn, 
sought to balance a number of competing interests. By focusing in on the work of the Foreign 
Office during this period, the chapter adds to a body of historical scholarship which has largely 
viewed these months as a quiet period of post-war planning for an international organisation.472 
The pivotal moment in these months was the Moscow Conference, where, for the first time, 
the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in principle to establish a 
post-war international organisation.473 The proceedings of the conference have been covered 
in detail by a number of historians, though fewer scholars have focused on the post-war 
planning of the Foreign Office both before and after the meeting of Foreign Ministers in 
Moscow.474 The period preceding the conference led the Foreign Office to order its thinking 
on the post-war organisation, and in the months after the conference, the Economic and 
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Reconstruction Department began to focus more on the relationship between the great powers, 
as opposed to their relationship with the medium and small powers of the world.  
Several factors caused this shift in focus. First and foremost was the view of the Soviet 
Union, which officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department had, to a certain extent, 
taken for granted. Although British planners viewed Anglo-American relations as the 
fundamental basis of a future international order, as these months progressed, the need to bring 
the Soviet Union into these discussions became an immediate priority. 475  Second, the 
Roosevelt administration remained in favour of creating international machinery as opposed to 
the regional structures recommended by the Foreign Office. Jebb, in turn, continued to look for 
a ‘middle way’ between these American and British approaches. Third, as they began to take 
into account the intentions of the Soviet Union and the United States in the aftermath of the 
war, officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department began to grapple with ways that 
a balance of power might help to underpin their plans for a post-war order.  
Throughout the period, the Foreign Office officials continued to advocate for improved 
relations with the Soviet Union, a move which would lead to significant progress in bringing 
the three powers together on the question of a future international order. Soviet leaders made 
it clear by September that they felt dangerously marginalised by Anglo-American diplomatic 
cooperation. Furthermore, major Soviet military victories—most notably at the Battle of Kursk 
in August 1943—coupled with the lack of a formidable Anglo-American military presence on 
the European continent, led Foreign Office officials to approach post-war questions with 
increased urgency.476  Believing that Anglo-Soviet cooperation was essential to the future 
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stability of Europe, a number of officials, especially from the Northern Department, pushed for 
Churchill and Eden to improve relations with Moscow.477 The Moscow Conference in October 
went a long way towards alleviating certain Russian suspicions. As the British Ambassador in 
Moscow, Archibald Clark Kerr, reported, ‘For the first time the Russians felt they had been 
admitted freely and on terms of complete equality to the most intimate councils of ourselves 
and the Americans.’478 More importantly, however, was that at the conference, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to set up two structures for the post-
war order. First was the European Advisory Commission—an example of the ‘permanent 
machinery’ which might, on the one hand, facilitate the stabilisation and reconstruction of 
Europe, and at the same time, give rise to the great power coordination which might underpin 
a wider international order.479 Second, the powers agreed to a Four Power Declaration which 
included a provision that the three governments would work to establish an international 
organisation in the future.  
Getting the great powers to cooperate at the centre of a future international order 
remained a central objective of the Economic and Reconstruction Department throughout the 
summer of 1943. Frustrated by the pace at which Cabinet members were addressing post-war 
questions, Jebb travelled to the United States to meet with State Department officials for the 
second time in five months. There, he presented once again his plan for a United Nations 
Commission for Europe, which he hoped might be substituted for the Prime Minister’s plan for 
a Council of Europe and serve as a ‘bottom up’ approach for a future international order. 
Though American officials resisted such a commission at this stage, it was here that Jebb began 
to accept more fully the need to accommodate American aims which prioritised the 
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establishment of an international organisation as soon as possible. Importantly, this did not 
mean that Jebb and Webster moved away from regional considerations within an international 
organisation, but that the latter slowly began to be prioritised over the former. As Jebb helped 
to prepare Eden for the Moscow Conference, he continued to stress the need for the Foreign 
Office to offer a ‘middle way’ between the proposals of the Roosevelt administration and those 
of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. By the time he left for Moscow, Eden was 
convinced of this approach and made clear that, though Churchill had continued to put forward 
his own plans, he was intending to follow those of Jebb and Webster.  
Finally, in the months after the great powers agreed at the Moscow Conference to work 
together in the post-war period, Jebb and Webster began to think about what the relationship 
between these powers might look like, and how this would affect the wider international order. 
These considerations led to a more distinct system which they hoped to bring forward—one 
that was more than mere realpolitik but markedly different from the idealised versions of 
internationalism with which they, at times, came into contact. Specifically, notions of balance 
of power and collective security—long thought to be conceptions diametrically opposed to one 
another—instead provided a more distinct framework of ‘realist-internationalism’ through 
which they would order their subsequent planning.480 
 
An inefficient Cabinet Committee on Post-war Settlement 
After the Cabinet had decided in late July to establish the Committee on Post-war Settlement, 
this group of ministers met four times between 5 and 25 August 1943.481 Though it had been 
created in order to examine major post-war planning proposals, including the United Nations 
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Plan for Organising Peace, the ministers assembled never reached final agreement on this 
paper. There was a doubt whether the Foreign Secretary even took an interest, despite his 
conversations with Roosevelt in March and his efforts to bring forward the plans of the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department. According to his Private Secretary, Oliver Harvey, 
Eden ‘has yet only superficial ideas of what our future plans are and is not anxious to commit 
himself’.482 In fact, there were two reasons for the committee’s perceived inefficiency and 
ultimate dissolution. First, the gravity and complexity of the questions necessitated detailed 
study, and ministers were often preoccupied by other matters. Second, British planning was 
forced to respond to military developments. On 25 July, Mussolini and his Fascist regime in 
Italy had been ousted from government. The capitulation, while a great boon for the allies, soon 
gave way to apprehension about the future of Europe. For Britain, as well as other allied 
governments, the need to come to a working agreement with the Russians over the future of 
Europe became the foremost objective.483 It was understood that without such an agreement 
with the Kremlin, even an Anglo-American relationship—which was far from guaranteed—
could not ensure that territories within Central and Southeastern Europe would be respected 
after the war. 
Despite the short life of the committee, events in Italy convinced its members of Jebb’s 
opinion that the great powers would need to work together to establish an effective executive 
control over Europe. Although none of these powers were themselves a Continental European 
state—ministers within this committee, for instance, did not consider Britain to be a European 
power in this case, so much as a global Empire—they would be chiefly responsible for 
overseeing Europe’s stabilisation, relief and reconstruction.484  Here Jebb’s proposal for a 
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United Nations Commission for Europe—an evolved form of his earlier Inter-Allied Armistice 
Commission—would serve as the primary machinery for great power cooperation and function. 
The committee, echoing one of the Prime Minister’s earlier recommendations for post-war 
European order, suggested that this United Nations Commission for Europe might be a type of 
‘embryonic Council of Europe’.485  
Despite their acceptance of Jebb’s plan, the committee came to be seen by the Economic 
and Reconstruction Department as an inefficient body. Jebb complained that everything was 
happening in ‘rather slow motion’, noting that perhaps ‘there is not all that urgency over plans 
for the future of the world!’ 486   Webster, too, felt that the delay in the committee was 
‘ridiculous’ and that it was high time they come to a decision on the United Nations Plan so 
that it might be put before the wider Cabinet.487 The object now, Jebb urged, was to reach 
agreement on ‘principles’ of the post-war settlement so that they might be able to initiate 
discussions, first with the United States and later with the Soviet Union. As before, the impetus 
to action was a feeling that the State Department planners were edging ahead of officials in the 
Foreign Office. ‘The Americans…are thinking in terms not dissimilar to our own, and now is 
the moment to influence them, before their own proposals have actually crystallised and 
received approval from the highest authority.’488 
 
‘Go out and start things up’: Jebb returns to Washington 
In August, Jebb returned to Washington in what was the latest example of the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department—and the Foreign Office more broadly—attempting to drive the 
planning process forward. His primary objective was to push for an agreement between the 
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great powers on how they might develop a ‘common world policy’ in the post-war period. Only 
when this was agreed upon could the three powers begin to address the range of post-war 
problems. As he wrote to Ronald, ‘the only conceivable way of getting some kind of real 
planning going is for somebody at this end who has done the planning to go out and start things 
up.’ 489  Ronald was supportive of Jebb’s request, noting that such talks on ‘fundamental 
principles and ideas’ were an ‘essential prerequisite in the formation of all plans for a better 
world order’.490  
In the course of his meetings with State Department officials, Jebb was presented with 
two proposals which would have significant implications for his own planning. The first was a 
draft Four Power Declaration which outlined an agreement whereby the four powers—the 
United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China—would commit themselves 
to continuing their wartime cooperation.491 The draft declaration was welcomed by the Foreign 
Office, and in particular Jebb, who had first proposed such a four-power system in August 
1942. In a letter to Cadogan which addressed each of the eight points, Jebb wrote that a kind 
of ‘four power dictatorship’ was the only arrangement which might effect change in the post-
war period. The British, he felt, should take the American proposal and ‘swallow it practically 
whole and without suggesting additional articles’. It was likely that the Chinese would sign on, 
but there would need to be delicate outreach to the Russians, who must not think the 
arrangement to be an entirely Anglo-American conception.492 It was a line which Cadogan 
quickly approved.493  
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Closely related to the draft Four Power Declaration was a second document, titled ‘The 
United Nations Protocol’, which called for the members of the United Nations to sign a 
document pledging their commitment to setting up an international organisation at the end of 
the war. The protocol was along the same lines as that mentioned to Churchill during his most 
recent visit to Washington, but it contained more detailed outlines of the structure of the 
organisation, including how representatives might be elected to a world council.494 Despite it 
originating in the State Department, the document did not have the support of the President, 
who felt that it was, at this point in time, a step too far and one that might lead to backlash both 
within the Senate and amongst the American public. Jebb, too, felt that the time was not right 
for such a proposal, noting that, ‘All kinds of controversial points would at once be debated in 
the press and militate against a general acceptance of the first and more important document.’495 
The objective at the moment was to get Allied agreement on the most fundamental points and 
leave the more detailed planning questions to later meetings. 
During the conversations, Jebb also took the opportunity to share a revised version of 
his United Nations Commission for Europe, a scheme which he still envisioned becoming a 
type of foundational machinery on the European continent. There was considerable pushback 
from American officials, however, who explained to Jebb that the administration viewed this 
arrangement as Churchill’s ‘Council of Europe’ under a different name. It was a design the 
Roosevelt administration had long been opposed to, seeing it as a potential source of criticism 
from isolationists. Even after clarifying the differences between the Prime Minister’s Council 
of Europe and his own idea for a Commission for Europe, Jebb was unable to convince his 
American counterparts, who felt that if any system were to be established, it would need to 
follow the creation of a wider international security organisation led by a nucleus of the four 
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powers.496 It was not that they disagreed with such a European Commission, but the only way 
they envisioned being able to drag the American public into such a scheme was through a 
worldwide organisation, as opposed to a European system that gave off an image of an Anglo-
American alliance.497 It was once again the bottom-up versus top-down approach favoured by 
the British and Americans, respectively. Regarding the latter, Jebb wrote to the Foreign Office 
that the American approach was still guided, in part, by traditional fears of European 
entanglements.  
People who knew anything about foreign affairs in the United States admitted that 
something along the lines of an alliance was essential if peace was to be preserved 
but, owing to deep rooted feelings of distrust of entangling alliances in America, it 
could not be represented to the American Nation in that way.498  
 
Jebb’s proposal for a United Nations Commission for Europe would be placed in reserve 
for now, though it would soon become a symbol of allied cooperation during the Moscow 
Conference. As for the Four Power Declaration, the Foreign Office officials back in London 
were encouraged by the idea of the four powers agreeing to cooperate in the post-war period.499 
Among other things, such a declaration at this point in time, one official noted, would do well 
to counter Nazi propaganda. Two recent lines from Berlin had warned that there were serious 
rifts within the collective United Nations front and that British and American leaders were 
prepared to turn the continent over to communism.500 A declaration of the kind proposed by 
officials in Washington would—apart from advancing collaboration between the three 
powers—be a symbolic display of Allied unity. 
 
	
496 State Department officials wrote to Roosevelt that, there were ‘grave dangers’ in having the world organisation 
rest solely on regional foundations. Memorandum for the President, 11 August 1943, quoted in Rofe, ‘Prewar and 
wartime postwar planning’, p. 24 
497 Memorandum by Jebb, ‘Report on a Visit to the United States’, 29 August 1943, FO 371/35461/U4056 
498 Telegram from Ronald Campbell to Foreign Office, No. 3692, 14 August 1943, FO 371/35439/U3626 
499 See the minutes from Foreign Office officials in FO 371/35397/U3673 
500 Harrison minute, 19 August 1943, FO 371/35397/U3673. Geoffrey Harrison, Central Department, 1942-44; 
German Department, 1944-45 
 169 
Balancing relations with Washington and Moscow 
As Jebb’s meetings with State Department officials were wrapping up in Washington, 
Churchill and Roosevelt were settling in to their sixth wartime conference which would have 
important ramifications on the relationship between the United Kingdom, the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Similar to their previous meetings, Churchill and Roosevelt arrived more 
intent to focus on military matters but ended up addressing key post-war issues in the 
process.501  The Americans presented the draft Four Power Declaration to Churchill who—
along with Eden and Cadogan—expressed general approval, but also acknowledged that the 
Cabinet would have to be consulted before a final decision could be taken.502 Elsewhere, they 
agreed on the terms of the Italian surrender, plans for an invasion of France in May 1944, and 
the need for increased cooperation with the Soviet Union on post-war questions.503 The latter 
of these topics would have the most important implications both for the European settlement 
as well as the future international organisation.  
That Moscow needed to be brought more formally into these discussions was a line the 
Foreign Office had been advancing for months. In contrast to the seemingly unified vision 
developing in Anglo-American relations, the present state of Anglo-Soviet relations was one 
of tension and suspicion. Stalin was repeatedly perturbed by the lack of a second front in 
Europe, a point which was repeated in stern telegrams to Churchill.504 The Prime Minister, in 
turn, was increasingly frustrated with Stalin’s messages. He told Ivan Maisky before the latter’s 
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Victory, pp. 462-488; Kimball, Forged in War, pp. 218-221. Others have written about the discussions at Quebec 
which related to the post-war world. See Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, pp. 122-124; Divine, 
Second Chance, pp. 136-137; Hoopes and Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the U.N., pp. 83-85; Louis, 
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in our having let [Stalin] believe we were going to.’ Quoted in Kitchen, British Policy Towards the Soviet Union, 
p. 161.  
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recall to Moscow that he was ‘getting rather tired of being scolded, and did not see much use 
in keeping up a personal correspondence if it only became a vehicle for recrimination’.505 To 
worsen the situation, Churchill only notified Stalin of his upcoming meeting with Roosevelt at 
the last minute. The deterioration in relations concerned officials in the Foreign Office. William 
Strang warned in the first days of the conference that, ‘Moscow has not had its due share of 
United Nations business: and Soviet collaboration in the post-war security system is so vital to 
us that we must spare no effort to secure it.’506 Officials in the Northern Department noted that 
this behaviour—of negotiating with the United States and only notifying Moscow afterwards—
was going to ‘land us in one hell of a mess’.507 While the department accepted that Russian 
policies were often the root cause of Anglo-Soviet tension, they acknowledged that the British 
must be prepared to do what was necessary to foster workable relations. ‘This Office is the 
only place where it is realized that, in spite of all these things, we just have to get along with 
[the Soviets] or Europe will be a ghastly place for a long time.’508 
The concern within the Foreign Office made its mark on the Prime Minister as well. 
Conscious of the need for Soviet cooperation and sensitive to the idea of the Four Power 
Declaration looking like another Anglo-American creation, Churchill and Roosevelt eventually 
wrote to Stalin informing him of the content of discussions taking place in Quebec and 
reiterating their desire to have Anglo-Soviet-American talks in the near future. If they could 
not agree on a meeting of the three leaders, then it was suggested that ‘exploratory’ discussions 
between the Foreign Ministers might be arranged.509 Seven days later, a message arrived from 
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Stalin. Feeling as though the Kremlin was being purposely kept in the dark regarding the Italian 
armistice negotiations, he wrote: ‘I have to tell you that it is impossible any longer to tolerate 
such a situation.’510  
The tone of the message shocked Churchill and Roosevelt, who, in turn, had to be 
calmed by Cadogan and Eden.511 In a telegram to Attlee and the War Cabinet, the Prime 
Minister wrote that Stalin had an ‘ill temper and bad manners’ and that the only ‘black spot’ 
on the conference in Quebec was the ‘bearishness of Soviet Russia’.512 Despite their initial 
outrage, Churchill and Roosevelt were encouraged by another message from Stalin which 
arrived the following day, on 26 August. He had agreed both to a tripartite meeting between 
himself, Roosevelt and Churchill, as well as to a meeting of the Foreign Ministers beforehand. 
As to the latter, he pressed for these to not just be ‘exploratory discussions’ but ‘practicable 
and preparatory’ which might lead to concrete agreements between the three leaders.513 
 
A ‘Middle Way’: Foreign Office proposals prior to the Moscow meeting 
The imminent arrival of the Moscow Conference forced officials in the Foreign Office to order 
their thinking on future relations with the Soviet Union as well as on the shape of an 
international organisation. 514  On the question of Anglo-Soviet relations, military 
developments—namely the Red Army’s victory at Kursk and their advance westward—was 
welcome news; but at the same time, Soviet victories also caused concern amongst Foreign 
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Office officials about the future of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.515 The future boundaries 
of Russia’s western frontier, in particular, returned as a crucial priority. Given his earlier 
conversation with Stalin, Eden felt that the frontier issue remained the key to unlocking Soviet 
cooperation on other matters, and that Stalin was ‘likely to be suspicious and unco-operative’ 
until he could receive assurances on this point.516 As the Foreign Office wrestled with this 
question in the period preceding the conference, officials speculated to what extent Russia 
would increase its influence in Europe. Some members of the Northern Department argued that 
the Kremlin had ‘an inordinate opinion of their own power, are resolved to exercise it and are 
even more imperialist than in the days of the Czars’.517  
A meeting on 24 September sought to address a number of these questions, notably the 
creation of political ‘machinery’ within Europe to facilitate post-war cooperation. Jebb ensured 
that Webster was invited to the meeting, and the professor’s own paper on ‘The Problem of 
Eastern Europe’ from February 1943 was used as a basis of discussion.518 More importantly, 
however, was Webster’s recommendation that the Foreign Office might propose a list of 
‘principles’ which could guide the negotiations in Moscow.519 As Jebb explained after the 
meeting, such principles—if agreed to by the three powers—could prevent ‘chaos in Eastern 
Europe’ which was inevitable, especially if London, Moscow and Washington were not 
cooperating in the post-war period. If the great powers could not work ‘in concert’, he warned, 
they would fall back on the ‘time-honoured but regrettable principle of spheres of influence’.520 
On the recommendation of Jebb and Webster, the Foreign Office now prioritised the effort to 
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have the great powers arrive at an agreement based on a set of principles. Such an agreement 
might have the dual purpose of relieving Anglo-Soviet tension and laying the foundation for a 
European and international order.521  
It was understood that the question of a future world organisation would inevitably arise 
at the forthcoming conference, and it was here that the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department’s work became particularly useful. After Roosevelt had indicated his desire to see 
the subject discussed in Moscow, Eden asked for Jebb’s views on the matter.522 Jebb noted that 
the key difference between the President’s and Prime Minister’s plans remained how European 
problems would be dealt with after the war. The Americans, he said, might be open to 
Churchill’s idea for a Council of Europe in the future; but their priority now was the 
construction of a World Council which would deal with European disputes. Going forward, 
there might be a way to bring a Council of Europe under the authority of a World Council, but 
that was a detail which would have to be worked out in later stages. Again, the question of 
maintaining a European order from the top-down (World Council) or the bottom-up (Council 
of Europe) remained a key Anglo-American divergence.  
His next point concerned the question of authority and was more of a direct criticism 
of Roosevelt’s plan. Jebb highlighted the problem inherent in Roosevelt's scheme that the four 
powers would be bound to two different—potentially competing—groups: the World Council 
and the Executive Council. If, in this system, the former was to hold the ultimate authority, the 
latter council would become, Jebb warned, ‘a laughing stock’ because of its futility. Moreover, 
the disparity in power exercised by the four powers compared to the smaller powers would 
create bitter hostility. His next objection concerned the mechanisms to maintain peace. 
Roosevelt had mentioned his idea of ‘tripartite machinery’ keeping the peace after the war, but 
	
521 The following week Jebb and Webster prepared a draft for a ‘Joint Declaration on Joint Responsibility for 
Europe’ which was later taken to Moscow. For a copy of the draft principles, see FO 371/35399/U5368 
522 Eden minute on Telegram from Churchill to War Cabinet, Iz. 3297, 14 September 1943, FO 371/35440/U4349 
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Jebb thought that such a monopoly of force—the President’s earlier views on this held that 
only the four great powers would be allowed to possess significant armaments—would make 
it difficult to erect any regional security schemes, a point which remained in the Foreign Office 
plans. 
In addressing these questions, Jebb also laid out the basic view of the Foreign Office as 
it pertained to these questions, a position he referred to as a ‘middle way’ between the more 
worldwide desires of the Roosevelt administration and the regional needs of the United 
Kingdom.523 It was largely unchanged from the earlier United Nations Plan for Organising 
Peace and Welfare, and again described a World Council of the four powers along with France, 
a country which continued to be left out of Roosevelt’s plans. Included in this World Council 
might be a few smaller nations, elected based on their region of the world. It would serve as a 
vehicle for the great powers to ‘smooth out any frictions’ and its primary function would be to 
prevent aggression and oversee the peaceful settlement of disputes. Importantly, the smaller 
powers on the Council would be allowed a say in any discussion, but the ultimate decision 
would ‘rest with the World Powers, acting unanimously’. Elsewhere, there might eventually 
be a wider Assembly of nations, though the problems in the period immediately after the war 
would need to be addressed primarily by the World Council. To help with post-war security 
and reconstruction, Jebb recommended that regional organisations might be set up, though they 
would, from the start, be subordinate to the World Council.524  
In what was an important tactical decision, Foreign Office officials recommended to 
Eden that while such discussions on this subject might be encouraged at the Moscow 
Conference, he should move slowly and not commit to any big decisions. It was essential that 
these matters be taken up by the relevant experts in the three countries, as opposed to being 
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finalised before details could be worked out.525 Cadogan was one of the chief advocates of 
moving slowly on the question of world organisation, but at the same time he recommended a 
careful approach with American officials, whose enthusiasm he did not want to dampen. Given 
his earlier experience negotiating with members of the Roosevelt administration, he pointed 
out that the Americans ‘have a funny way of doing business—a feature of which is that the 
President occasionally talks at large’. While it was ‘untidy’ to some, he did not feel that it was 
worth it, at least at this stage, to single out single phrases uttered by the President to the Prime 
Minister and analyse them as official American policy. His recommendation was to support 
the American Four Power Declaration as a first step, and then to enter into negotiations in 
Moscow ‘with a fairly open mind’.526 Eden agreed that discussions at the conference should 
only be along the most general lines. He was also adamant, however, that the British allow the 
Americans to chase their policy, saying that, ‘I don’t want to discourage the Americans in any 
of this enterprise.’527 Moreover, a recent proposal by the Prime Minister to recommend ‘a 
system of a League of Nations which will include a Council of Europe’ was one which Eden 
intended to ignore, at least in the presence of his American and Soviet counterparts.528 
The primary item on the American agenda remained the draft of the Four Power 
Declaration; and on this all-important issue, the Foreign Office view was split at first. One 
official felt that ‘the declaration consists of high-sounding phrases which mean little’, and it 
would instead be better to have a meeting of the great powers prior to any agreement.529 Most 
officials, however, came around to the idea of the great powers issuing a statement about their 
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intention to work together in the post-war period.530 For Jebb, this represented the culmination 
of a four power plan he had envisaged a year before. Now was not the time for delay. Echoing 
what he had said to Cadogan weeks before, Jebb wrote that, ‘The mere fact that we are in the 
presence of an American initiative of this magnitude is of great importance…So far as we are 
concerned I should have thought we ought to foster the idea by all means in our power.’531 The 
declaration, he felt, should not be viewed as an end in itself, but as a big step in the right 
direction. As the progression of his Four Power Plan into the United Nations Plan for 
Organising Peace over the last year had shown, the potential of a future international 
organisation rested on a nucleus of great powers, and the American proposal certainly 
embodied this thinking.   
In a meeting on 6 September, the War Cabinet had expressed general approval for the 
declaration, although they suggested some minor alterations. One concerned the clause relating 
to the establishment of a world organisation, namely that smaller powers not only be allowed 
to join but that they would also be able to ‘play their part’.532 The Foreign Office had also 
expressed similar sentiments, noting that the original document produced by the State 
Department sounded like a ‘sort of four-power dictatorship’ which would be unpalatable to 
smaller states. Their amendments—namely the substitution of ‘with a view to joint action’ for 
‘act jointly’ in point 5—would serve as a kind of ‘middle way’.533 An important consideration 
here was the view of the Dominions, and in particular Australia. H.V. Evatt, the Australian 
Minister for External Affairs, wrote to Eden that, ‘step by step the Dominions are being 
excluded’ from influence in the post-war world. He felt that, if anything, the British 
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Commonwealth should be included as one of the powers instead of solely the United 
Kingdom. 534  Though the Foreign Office resisted Evatt’s last recommendation, the draft 
returned to the State Department had given considerable attention to the position of smaller 
states.535 It was this version of the Four Power Declaration which would be carried to Moscow. 
 
The Moscow Conference 
The Foreign Secretary approached the meetings in Moscow with a heightened sense of 
urgency, and wrote in his diaries upon arriving that, ‘I want to get on as fast as I can.’536 
Officials in the Foreign Office expected the proceedings to be ‘difficult’, while Roosevelt and 
Churchill had few expectations. If anything, the major decisions would be left to the upcoming 
conference between themselves and Stalin.537 Just two days into the conference, however, Eden 
reported to London that the conference was in ‘unexpectedly smooth waters’. 538  The 
relationship with these ‘incalculable people’, Eden later reported to Churchill, seemed to be 
‘on a footing of permanent friendship’. 539  He continued, ‘I do not think that any of us 
sufficiently understood hitherto...how much these people have suffered from a feeling of 
exclusion which the extent and scope of their victories has only served to intensify. However 
unjustified this feeling may be, it is real.’540 
The Four Power Declaration was the most important agreement concerning a future 
international organisation which was to come out the conference.541 It was first taken up on the 
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third day of meetings, when Cordell Hull, opening the discussion with an impassioned plea for 
post-war internationalism, said the Four Power Declaration was ‘an extension of the spirit and 
sense of the United Nations Declaration’. Eden echoed the American Secretary of State and 
emphasised that the declaration would go a long way towards securing a ‘basis of cooperation’ 
between the great powers from which the post-war order would emerge. The only hiccup in 
these discussions was the insistence of the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, that 
it be a declaration of three powers instead of four.542 That China should be a signatory even 
while absent from the conference did not sit well with the Kremlin. This was eventually 
dropped after convincing arguments from both Hull and Eden; and by the fifth day of the 
conference, the ministers assembled were in agreement on the text of the declaration, which 
was eventually signed on 30 October 1943.543  
Though the conference did not dwell on matters concerning a world organisation, on 
26 October Molotov proposed that the three powers might form a commission to examine 
questions surrounding its establishment in the future.544 Hull and Eden were initially in favour 
of Molotov’s proposal being included in the Four Power Declaration itself (under the fourth 
paragraph), but this was eventually dropped, largely at the urging of Hull who wanted to avoid 
sparking isolationist sentiment in the United States.545 The three powers instead agreed that it 
would be best for each government to work on its own plans and to discuss them informally in 
due course. 546  At last, the Economic and Reconstruction Department had a four power 
agreement as well as the prospect of future conversations on the creation of a world 
organisation.  
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The next achievement of the conference—the creation of the European Advisory 
Commission—was an outgrowth Jebb’s idea for an Inter-Allied Armistice Commission and its 
later variation, a United Nations Commission for Europe.547 Spurred on by the need for the 
great powers to consult on post-war questions such as the Italian armistice, Eden presented a 
proposal to establish ‘a permanent body which would act as a clearing house for European 
problems of common interest connected with the war’.548 While the Russians and Americans 
had offered proposals for collaboration on certain questions, namely the Italian armistice, the 
British position was—in line with Jebb’s primary aim in these months—to give any future 
commission wide powers of authority and more importantly, to establish ‘permanent 
machinery for consultation between the three powers’. Furthermore, Eden wanted authority 
solely in the hands of the great powers, an arrangement whereby the three powers would have 
a veto over decisions. When Molotov suggested that other allied nations might be invited, Eden 
said this would be a mistake because of the cumbersome nature of so many smaller countries 
being involved. 549  This view was the product of the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department’s desire to not only establish international machinery by way of regional 
structures, but to also place the primary responsibility for armistice questions in the hands of 
the great powers. It was this agreement which Eden considered to be the true success of the 
conference.550 
The draft declaration of principles which Jebb and Webster had developed prior to the 
conference was eventually dropped during the course of conversations. Hull thought that they 
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should stick to more general principles; while Molotov felt that in the immediate post-war 
period, smaller states must be allowed to ‘find their feet without outside pressure’. Though the 
irony in Molotov’s statement seemed stunningly clear, Eden, feeling that the mood was 
‘unpropitious’, eventually withdrew the draft declaration altogether.551 Jebb wrote that it was 
‘very sad’ that these principles were declined at the conference, while Sargent noted that ‘it 
would have been a great comfort to the lesser allies.’552 Importantly, the concept of principles 
guiding the behaviour of states was one which the Economic and Reconstruction Department 
would continue to advance, and one which would influence later discussions between the three 
powers.  
For all the success on the Four Power Declaration, British officials made little progress 
in coming to terms with the Soviets about the shape of post-war Eastern Europe. Given Eden’s 
openness—at least privately—to ‘yield’ to the frontier aims of the Soviets, there ended up 
being little discussion of these subjects. As Christopher Warner of the Northern Department 
noted towards the end of the conference, ‘We are no wiser as to the Russian attitude on 
questions concerning Eastern Europe.’553 It was this uncertainty over Russian intentions in 
post-war Europe which was to drive later Foreign Office efforts to develop additional regional 
machinery—in the form of alliances, most notably—in Europe. 
 
New Considerations for the Foreign Office: The Balance of Power and Notions of 
Internationalism 
While the agreements at the Moscow Conference marked a considerable advance in the 
direction of a future international organisation, the experience of this three-power negotiation 
also led Foreign Office officials to consider more seriously two issues: the relationship of the 
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great powers to the smaller powers and Britain’s future position vis-à-vis the United States and 
the Soviet Union. The momentum in the direction of a more internationalist order was thus met 
with more fundamental calculations concerning power politics. Indeed, as Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull returned to the United States boasting of an end to spheres of influence, balances 
of power, and alliances, officials in London considered such aspirations to be ‘wishful 
thinking’ and geared more towards winning over American public opinion.554  If there was to 
be a system capable of maintaining order after the war, it would need to be based on the realities 
of great power politics.   
Even as more detailed planning for a post-war organisation had slowed somewhat since 
the drafting of the United Nations Plan for Organising Peace, officials in the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department continued to grapple with larger conceptual debates about the 
future international order. One of the most important discussions stemmed from a paper sent 
to the Foreign Office by Professor Arnold Wolfers of Yale University. On the question of the 
relationship between the great powers to the rest of the world, Wolfers suggested that if it was 
agreed that such a ‘nucleus’ of powerful states should be responsible for the maintenance of 
peace at the end of the war, then there would need to be an elaboration on the position of the 
medium and small states. These countries, Wolfers argued, made up a vital element of the 
international order and thus could neither be coerced nor ignored. But at the same time, when 
it came to security in the post-war world, they must not be afforded positions which could stifle 
the action of the great powers. Indecision within the League of Nations—largely the result of 
too many powers having too much say—had paralysed that organisation’s ability to maintain 
the peace.  
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A second but equally important question was the relationship between the great powers 
themselves. In Wolfers’s view, the fundamental intellectual foundation of the future 
international order would rely on the seemingly ‘paradoxical’ conceptions of balance of power 
and collective security. 555  The latter would be carried out nearly entirely by a ‘nuclear 
coalition’ of the great powers, and it would, in essence, rely on a disequilibrium of power—the 
great powers would have far greater military capabilities than the rest of the world.556 Just as 
important for Wolfers, however, was that a balance of power exist between the great powers, 
which might ‘lead them to serve as a check on each other’.557 
Wolfers’s work was admired by members of the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department who thought his emphasis on respecting the rights of smaller powers and his idea 
of how the great powers might relate to one another was a valuable contribution. Jebb thought 
it an ‘excellent paper’ after reading it on the flight to the United States in August, and he even 
passed it to some members of the State Department during his visit.558 For Webster, the paper 
was an admirable work, but he warned that this view might not be shared in the United States. 
Wolfers, he said, has a ‘European background and it would be unwise to assume that American 
thinking will accept this realistic approach’.559 As to the relationship between the great and 
small powers, Webster argued,  
Power and responsibility must be commensurate with each other. If the Great 
Powers are to obtain the consent of the lesser Powers to their assumption of world 
leadership they must convince the latter of their intention and capacity to guard the 
worlds peace, while at the same time respecting the rights of their smaller 
neighbors.560 
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Importantly, however, was Webster’s more substantive proposal to create a rules-based 
system which might include a functional Assembly of Nations under the Security Council. In 
keeping with his earlier suggestions, he thought it would be necessary to lay out principles, 
along the lines of the Atlantic Charter, which might formally express such benevolent 
intentions on the part of the great powers. Furthermore, he thought it would be necessary to 
have an assembly ‘where the lesser powers can make themselves heard’, as well as a more 
codified or constitutional system whereby the great powers might be held to certain 
expectations and procedures.561 On this point, the majority of the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department were in agreement that there needed to be a type of constitutional basis which 
might formulate the position and function of the great powers. Indeed, this had been a central 
element in the United Nations Plan for Organising Peace in July 1943. But as the months passed 
and the plans became more detailed, the breadth and depth of great power responsibility was a 
topic which was to be constantly debated. It was paramount that the great powers have the 
freedom to confront aggression quickly and resolutely, but it was also essential that the rights 
of small states not be trampled upon in the process.  
Wolfers’s discussion of the balance of power and collective security also touched on a 
subject that members of the Economic and Reconstruction Department, in their own way, had 
been considering for some time. Though Webster did not exactly agree with Wolfers that there 
needed to be an emphasis on a balance of power between the three great powers, he himself 
had written a paper for the Foreign Office Research Department addressing this very subject. 
Like Wolfers, he argued that, in reality, the terms were not all that different—both involved 
the combination of states to deter aggressors—but over the course of history they had come to 
represent two intellectual camps in opposition to one another.562 Webster, himself a scholar of 
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both nineteenth-century European politics as well as the League of Nations, had wrestled with 
these conceptions for decades. While he had championed the internationalism of Woodrow 
Wilson, he also valued the balance of power, provided it ensured stability.563 
Just as with Webster, the concept of a post-war balance of power was never far from 
Jebb’s mind.564 While Webster did not exactly go as far as Wolfers to say that the future 
relationship between the great powers should be based on a balance of power, Jebb did just that 
in a lecture to the Canning Club at Oxford University in February 1944. The distribution of 
power between the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, was, for Jebb, the 
predominant factor in the construction of a future world order.   
We therefore arrive at a post-war picture in which the three Great Powers will 
perforce have to take the lead, and the burden of my argument is that it is on their 
relation between each other that the prospects of future peace will primarily 
depend. On what, then, will these relations themselves depend? Surely, they can 
only depend on comprehension of and respect for each others’ ‘vital interests’. This 
is what is meant by politics, and it is on the handling of the tension thus created 
that the balance of power will rest.565 
 
 
A Realist-Internationalism takes shape 
Though previous studies have described a relatively quiet period of post-war planning within 
the Foreign Office during the second half of 1943, as this chapter has demonstrated, the period 
was in fact a busy and consequential time within the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department. Frustrated by the slow pace in which the new cabinet committee under Attlee 
was examining proposals for the post-war world, Jebb advocated for discussions with 
members of the State Department and later, with the Soviet Union, as soon as possible. A 
motivating concern, though somewhat misplaced, was that Britain’s window of opportunity 
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with the United States was closing. If they failed to influence the broad parameters of State 
Department planning before their ideas ‘crystallised’, then the structure of the international 
system—to say nothing of Britain’s place within it—would be less favourable to British 
interests. In fact, when Jebb did meet with his American counterparts in August, he found 
them still resistant to his idea of a United Nations Commission for Europe, although they were 
offering a proposal which was strongly in line with the central principle underlying his four-
power conception from the previous year.  
This development, coupled with a Foreign Office push to improve relations with the 
Soviet Union, led to the British, American and Soviet foreign ministers coming together at the 
Moscow Conference in October 1943. Years later, William Strang, who had accompanied 
Eden to Moscow, wrote that this particular conference was ‘the most productive of all the war-
time tri-partite Ministerial meetings’.566 Eden’s dominant performance among Molotov and 
Hull has been noted by other historians, but less discussed is the preparation which took place 
within the Foreign Office prior to the conference.567 It was during this time that Jebb, as one 
of the principal advisors to Eden in the run-up to the meeting, began to advocate for a ‘middle 
way’ between the more universal proposals of the Roosevelt administration and the regional 
designs which he had earlier advocated. Importantly, his recommendation for a United 
Nations Commission for Europe was accepted and carried forward into the conference, where 
it would be agreed upon by the three governments.  
As important as the diplomatic negotiations and agreements in these months was the 
ongoing work of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. Indeed, during this period, 
one can see growing evidence of the existence of a distinct approach by Jebb and Webster 
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toward the problem of constructing a post-war international order. While not representing a 
standalone or neatly categorized theory of international politics, their views, taken 
collectively, might be best understood as realist-internationalism. Though Jebb placed more 
importance on power considerations and the ways in which the great powers might facilitate 
the maintenance of peace and security, by the end of 1943, he had accepted that modern 
conceptions of internationalism, while at times descending into more utopian schemes, 
represented a force of modern politics which could not be ignored. On the other hand, Webster 
leaned more towards internationalism than raw calculations of state power; yet, like Jebb, he 
understood that certain realities in international politics—namely the inequalities in military 
and economic power—could not be overlooked. Thus, the position and responsibility of the 
great powers remained, for him, an essential aspect of a post-war international order, as 
evidenced in his oft repeated line that ‘power and responsibility must be commensurate with 
each other’. 
Equally important was the way in which both men looked to the history of the nineteenth 
century, and how, in turn, this application of history accounted for their rather non-scientific 
and non-theoretical view of international order. For Jebb, the Concert of Europe represented 
a shining example of great powers cooperating to maintain an international system. Webster, 
on the other hand, saw the concert system not only as a model for great power cooperation but 
more importantly as the first modern example of an inclusive internationalist system. It was 
the inclusion of the smaller powers in this wider system of conference diplomacy, which, he 
thought, served as the most valuable lesson for the present day.  This was most clear in his 
recommendations throughout 1943, many of which stemmed from a desire for the United 
Kingdom to become a champion of smaller powers by protecting their interests in a wider 
international structure. One way of doing this, as his comments in September suggested, was 
to create an organisation which might ascribe to principles and be guided by a kind of 
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constitution which, while not as rigid as that of the Americans, might serve to reassure the 
smaller powers. As Webster was to argue in the coming months, the effort to construct such a 
system, far from being an idealist aim, was in the ‘great tradition’ of British foreign policy.568 
At the heart of their approach to the post-war world was also an inherent tension between 
the national interest and wider universal aspirations. Indeed, throughout 1943, Jebb came to 
an understanding that the ability of the United Kingdom to protect its interests in the post-war 
period increasingly depended on their willingness to adopt more universalist American 
approaches to international order. While Webster began from a different starting point than 
Jebb, in that he had long believed that the interests of the United Kingdom were tied up with 
the creation of a more internationalist system, he never thought of advocating for an 
international organisation at the expense of British interests. Indeed, for Webster, the potential 
of such an organisation relied to a great degree on maintaining the power of the United 
Kingdom and its Empire. 
The realist-internationalist view was thus the combination of preconceived notions as 
well as responses to concurrent politics. The phrase itself reflects an approach to the post-war 
world which, Jebb noted, was between ‘idealistic nonsense and stony mountains of half-baked 
‘Real- and Geo-politik”’.569 Its practical application is perhaps best reflected in the Economic 
and Reconstruction Department’s work in 1944, for it was here that officials, while 
undertaking the most detailed planning for an international organisation to date, also 
recommended the creation of a regional alliance. Though seen as a potential buttress of the 
future international organisation, it was, to a greater degree, viewed as a more realistic way to 
protect British interests on the continent. 
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Making the Machine: Planning for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 
January – July 1944 
 
 
By the late summer 1943, the primary focus of the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department was on achieving general agreement between the great powers to cooperate in a 
systematic way in the post-war period. Only after this basic foundation had been laid, they 
believed, could the Foreign Office policy of four powers operating at the centre of a wider 
international order develop. The Moscow Conference—and later the Tehran Conference— 
marked a great achievement on this front, as the United Kingdom, the United States and the 
Soviet Union agreed not only to cooperate after the war, but also to take steps to create an 
international organisation.570  This experience, coupled with increasing suspicion of Soviet 
intentions in Eastern Europe, led to crucial considerations by officials in the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department. In particular, Jebb and Webster had begun to think that, in order 
for the three powers to maintain their cooperative relationship in the post-war period, a balance 
of power between them was necessary.  
 This chapter covers the period from January to August 1944, when Foreign Office 
planning came to be defined by two overarching objectives. First was the need to design, in 
detail, the machinery of a future world organisation, so that the Foreign Office could enter into 
future discussions on the subject with American and Soviet officials. Beginning in January, the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department took the initiative and developed an ‘agenda’ which 
was sent to Moscow and Washington. This effort, as it turned out, helped to shape the basic 
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framework of the future organisation.571 Importantly, when officials turned to their own drafts, 
they looked to the precedent of the League of Nations more closely. Webster’s historical 
expertise on this subject was increasingly influential, as the department focused on the more 
detailed mechanics of the future organisation, including the machinery which might facilitate 
the ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’ and the ‘military aspect’ of the future organisation. 
Moreover, the British plans continued to emphasise the necessity of the smaller powers playing 
a substantial role in the World Council and the Assembly, a point which senior officials in the 
State Department acknowledged went beyond that laid out in their own plans as they stood in 
April 1944. By July, the Economic and Reconstruction Department had produced five 
memoranda which outlined in considerable detail the structure and functioning of a post-war 
organisation. While previous historical scholarship has given some attention to these five 
documents as they developed in the spring of 1944, this chapter offers one of the first dedicated 
analyses of these plans.572  
A second and related objective for the Economic and Reconstruction Department was 
that, in addition to articulating in detail the machinery of a future international order, they 
should develop a separate system to ensure the security of the post-war European order. Jebb 
continued to recommend the creation of a more effective United Nations Commission for 
Europe, especially as the European Advisory Commission which had come out of the Moscow 
Conference began to appear as a hollow version of his original conception. More importantly, 
building on their earlier discussion of how a balance of power between the three great powers 
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might aid an international organisation, Jebb and Webster worked to advance a suggestion that 
Britain should form a defensive alliance with the democracies of Western Europe, a 
development which would increase its power relative to the United States and Soviet Union.573 
They recommended that this grouping of states would buttress the world organisation—and 
importantly, fall under its authority—by protecting against a revanchist Germany in the first 
place, and to a lesser extent, by serving as an insurance policy against a potentially expansionist 
Russia. It was this conception, colouring as it did the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department’s plans throughout the spring of 1944, which offered the most concrete articulation 
of what has been described as a ‘realist-internationalism’.  
By the end of May, as the department was working to have its plans approved by the 
Cabinet, there was a consensus within the Foreign Office that Britain’s post-war policy would 
stand on three pillars, namely: a world organisation, a United Nations Commission for Europe, 
and a Western Security Group. Importantly, throughout this process, the plans of the Prime 
Minister—who was now recommending a ‘United States of Europe’—began to fade into the 
background, due, in part, to the fact that a number of Dominion governments began to side 
with the ideas of Jebb and Webster.574 It was these plans—set within the confines of a new 
British grand strategy—which gave shape and purpose to the British delegation which, in 
August, arrived in Washington to discuss the creation of an international organisation. 
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The Foreign Office sets the agenda for three power discussions 
In the first two weeks of the New Year 1944, there was increased urgency to begin three power 
talks on a possible international organisation; but at the same time, officials in the Foreign 
Office feared that they were still well away from developing concrete plans. A telegram from 
Washington in early January reported that officials in the State Department were progressing 
with their own plans and had indicated their willingness to begin three-power talks on a future 
organisation by the end of the month.575 Jebb was alarmed by the message. In no way were the 
British prepared for the task of meeting the Americans and Russians on these matters, 
especially if a meeting was to be held in late January. Such short notice, he wrote, is ‘really 
rather frightening, since we have…no considered basis for instructions to our 
representative…and with the best will in the world, it will be difficult to achieve one in the 
time available’.576 Still, it was important that the Foreign Office encourage rather than dampen 
American enthusiasm, and it was with this mindset that Jebb outlined a plan for how the 
department would tackle the preparation of such plans in the coming months. 
The proposed agenda was split into seven categories, A through G, and covered topics 
ranging from the origins of British planning to the concept of regionalism. Jebb was to oversee 
the process, while also taking on primary responsibility for the plans relating to the security 
dimension of a future organisation. As important as the written work was the need to lobby 
various stakeholders across government in order to secure their support. On this point, 
however, Jebb suggested that Eden not openly discuss the planning process of the Foreign 
Office with his Cabinet colleagues just yet. The fear was that they might be led to think that 
they could influence the process, and hence the department would be swarmed with proposals. 
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Ronald was in agreement here, noting that the ‘responsibility of the government should not be 
engaged too soon’.577  
The views of the State Department, however, would be invaluable to British planners. 
Jebb and Ronald wrote to the embassy in Washington asking whether they could supply more 
information on the specific details of American planning.578 The subjects included the design 
of the world council, the proposed relation of the world council to the regional councils, the 
structure and responsibilities of a future international police force, and the relation of economic 
bodies to the world council. As Ronald instructed British officials in Washington, ‘By pumping 
[James] Dunn, [Leo] Pasvolsky or Norman Davis you get hold of some straws to show the way 
the wind is blowing these would certainly be of great value in the preliminary discussion of 
such matters which are taking place here.’579 Details on the American schemes would come, 
most notably during the visit of the Under-Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, and several 
State Department officials in April; but in the meantime, the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department focused on developing their own plans as well as setting the parameters of the 
debate.   
Charles Webster became increasingly important to the planning process in these 
months, as the professor—having now moved into a formal role within the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department—was responsible for papers dealing with the structure and nature 
of the organisation to the way in which disputes between states might be settled. Though he 
speculated that his new job would ‘very likely lead to nothing at all’, Webster was conscious 
that he now at least had the opportunity to personally shape British planning.580 He wasted no 
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time in his new appointment. Towards the end of January, he wrote to Jebb listing seven points 
which he felt should be the ‘principles’ for the future discussions with the Americans and 
Soviets. Chief among these was an insistence that the inclusion of the United States and the 
Soviet Union into a world organisation was ‘more important than the exact form of the 
organisation itself’. Furthermore, the great powers were to make up a world council and this 
body was to be charged with ‘final responsibility for the preservation of peace in every part of 
the world’. Proposals for regional councils which had been submitted by the Prime Minister 
were nowhere near as important as the establishment of a world council with extensive 
responsibility. In what would become an increasingly important consideration for Foreign 
Office officials throughout the spring of 1944, Webster also indicated that regional 
arrangements such as a ‘Western European security organisation or a North and South Atlantic 
system’ would be beneficial to the United Kingdom, especially if, by some chance, a world 
organisation could not be agreed.581  
At the end of January, J.G. Ward of the Economic and Reconstruction Department met 
with Leo Pasvolsky and Harley Notter at the State Department, where it was agreed that the 
Americans and British should first consider exchanging ideas and plans amongst themselves, 
prior to opening discussions with the Russians.582  Though the Americans recognised the 
‘dangers and difficulties of such a proceeding’, it was understood that without solid Anglo-
American coordination on a future organisation, such a scheme would have little chance of 
coming into existence.583 Ward and his State Department counterparts then agreed to exchange 
papers on the general outline of an agenda for three power talks, which would read as a kind 
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of ‘table of contents’.584 Taking this up in London, the Foreign Office decided in early February 
to put forward an agenda to the Americans and Russians. Jebb explained that this might allow 
them to ‘start the discussions on lines favoured by us…rather than putting forward ours as 
amendments to the American list’.585 In this way, they might have some control over the scope 
of the talks, and to a greater extent, some influence on the shape of the organisation.  
A ‘summary of topics’ was subsequently sent by the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department to the State Department on 12 February, and five days later, the State Department 
sent over their own ‘topical outline’.586 Both the American and British draft agendas were 
strikingly similar, a product of discussions between State Department and Foreign Office 
officials over the previous year. Each outlined an organisation which would have an Assembly, 
a Council, a Court, and a Secretariat; and both mentioned the need for a system of general 
security as well as economic and functional organisations. The one major difference on the 
American side—a topic which was to cause tension in the months ahead—was the mention of 
future territorial trusteeship. 587  The Foreign Office and State Department then sent their 
outlines to Moscow for consideration. While seemingly a trivial detail, the exchange of draft 
agendas accounts for the similarity of the plans which the three powers would present six 
months later at Dumbarton Oaks. 
 
Learning from the League  
As the planning process began to delve into more functional details, officials naturally looked, 
once again, to the precedent of the League of Nations. Thus far, the organisation had loomed 
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in the background of the Foreign Office planning, though references to it had been more 
negative than positive. Officials noted that the organisation had been successful in dealing with 
economic and social matters; but from a security standpoint, it had failed miserably in the 
preceding decade, and thus references to it contained a certain toxicity. Now, however, as 
officials entered a critical moment of needing to plan for more detailed aspects of a future 
organisation, the League offered a useful blueprint.  
This encouraged a process of exploring the failures of internationalism in the recent 
past. Two weeks into the New Year, Webster had dinner with his friend Lord Robert Cecil, a 
man who he considered to be one of the key architects of the League.588 The ‘essential failure’, 
Cecil told Webster, was that they did not make it clear to citizens that they needed to put the 
requisite force behind the League in order to ensure its efficacy. Both men agreed that in 
addition to hard power, there needed to be put before the world an institution which could 
inspire the masses, lest they fall back on more selfish, dastardly actions to preserve their own 
security.589 On that same day, Webster had submitted a paper assessing which functions of the 
League might be carried into a future United Nations organisation.590   
Having suppressed talk of the League previously, Jebb felt that the question of which 
aspects of the League would be applied to the new organisation was now a matter of increasing 
urgency, especially as Eden began to think about how the United Nations Plan might be ‘recast’ 
in future discussions with the Americans. In Jebb’s opinion, some League institutions such as 
the Economic and Financial Sections, the Health Section and the International Labour 
Organisation might be carried over, but there could be ‘no question of a return to Geneva’.591 
He continued to hold a wariness of plans which might be ‘entirely intellectual’, noting that,  
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The League system...was about as perfect as the human mind could derive. The 
only trouble about it was that it wouldn't work. The reason why it wouldn't work 
was in the first place because the existing Great Powers could not agree as among 
themselves on certain essential things. And until we do get agreement between the 
World Powers on these essential things no international machine however perfect 
will ever work.592  
 
Cadogan, who had spent ten years as Head of the League of Nations Section in the 
Foreign Office, was clear that the old organisation, despite its well-known failures, had had 
some successful component parts; and it would be a waste to disregard the last twenty-plus 
years of experience gained in Geneva. Certain characteristics of the League would need to be 
discarded, but those that were effective, Cadogan suggested, might be brought back ‘under 
another guise’. These functional organisations would need to be directed by a central body—a 
type of Secretariat—which Cadogan referred to as the ‘machine’ of the international 
organisation. Like Jebb, Cadogan believed that certain aspects of the League were, in theory, 
perfectly designed, but in practice, they failed to deliver on their objectives. But this did not 
mean that at this stage they should not aim to design the best structure possible for the future 
United Nations organisation. ‘The “machine” of the League became the golden calf’, Cadogan 
wrote, ‘and we musn’t lapse into that idolatry again. But if we are to have an “international 
organisation”, we must have a machine to serve it, and it is important to get the best design.’ 
Similar to Jebb’s thinking that the machine would ultimately depend on the cooperation and 
willingness of the great powers, Cadogan wrote, ‘I don't think it’s difficult to construct a 
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Structure and machinery of an international organisation 
In February, Parliamentary Under-Secretary Richard Law brought together a group of officials 
from across government to coordinate the planning operation. This inter-departmental body 
was later made a Cabinet sub-committee under the title ‘Committee on Future World 
Organisation’. 594  The committee—which included members from the Treasury, the War 
Cabinet, the Dominions Office and the Ministry of Labour, among others—met over a number 
of weeks, with its primary task being to coordinate the drafting of various papers that were to 
be presented to the Americans and Soviets. The rough outline followed that which was laid out 
by Jebb in January, and as time went on, the focus of papers expanded or contracted based on 
what was deemed essential in the upcoming negotiations. 
Between March and April, a number of papers drafted by the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department were submitted to the committee. They were separated into five 
memoranda, A through E, and covered the ‘Scope and Nature of the Permanent Organisation’; 
‘The Pacific Settlement of Disputes, The Question of Guarantees and How and When the 
Guarantee Should Come Into Operation’; ‘The Military Aspect of Any Postwar Security 
Organisation’; ‘Co-ordination of Political and Economic International Machinery’; and 
‘Method and Procedure for Establishing a World Organisation’.595 The first three memoranda 
were the most important in terms of laying out the structure and aims of the organisation, as 
well as the special position of the great powers.  
Across the five memoranda, there were key points which emerged. First, while all states 
would be equal in theory, the four powers were to retain a special position and responsibility 
within the organisation. Their continued cooperation, Memorandum A read, was more 
important than ‘any other single factor’. The grouping of great powers—eventually including 
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France (once its ‘greatness was restored’) and possibly the addition of other states based on 
election by the Assembly—would make up the World Council. This body would be considered 
a ‘centre of action’ while the wider World Assembly was to be the ‘centre of discussion’. The 
primary purpose of the Assembly, moreover, would be to ‘focus public opinion on the objects 
of the organisation’, while the purpose of the World Council would be the ‘preservation of 
peace’.596  
To help ensure the latter, there would need to be in place a method to facilitate the 
peaceful settlement of disputes between states. This subject was a favourite of Webster’s who, 
in drafting Memorandum B, wrote that, ‘If war is to be abolished for a considerable period 
there must be in existence…a means to make those decisions which in the past have been made 
by violence.’ All ‘justiciable’ disputes, he suggested, should be handled by a Permanent Court 
of International Justice, the establishment of which had just been recommended by an Inter-
Allied Committee.597 Other disputes, Webster wrote, would be handled by the World Council, 
which would be free to decide amongst themselves—and without input or consent from the 
parties involved in the dispute—how the matter would be settled.598 
Closely related to the peaceful settlement of disputes was the question of when the 
international organisation would take action. Webster suggested that the entire procedure was 
to be guided by ‘certain essential principles’ more so than adherence to a strict constitution.599 
‘Flexibility’ was a favourite word of British planners, all of whom believed that the League 
had been hampered by rules governing when they should use force. As Cadogan wrote, ‘If we 
are to learn any lesson from the failure of the League, it is, I think, that procedure is rather a 
secondary matter. Everything depends on the unity of purpose of those powers who are able to 
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impose their will.’600 One of the major faults of the League, Webster argued, was Article X 
which guaranteed the ‘territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members’. 
Introduced by Woodrow Wilson, this article was questioned early on by British officials such 
as Lord Cecil who thought the promise to maintain the territorial ‘status quo’, while not 
allowing for reasonable adjustments, would present problems going forward. When the 
territorial boundaries agreed by the Treaty of Versailles were challenged by revisionist powers, 
particularly in the 1930s, it became clear that many League members—including the United 
Kingdom—were not willing to take action in line with Article X. 
The entire question, Webster said, could not in the future be dealt with by some 
constitutional clause. ‘Too rigid a definition of the occasion for action’, he wrote, ‘is likely to 
hinder as to facilitate the preservation of peace and security.’ Instead, such questions might be 
addressed by ‘a continual process’ of discussion and negotiation between the great powers, as 
well as the other states involved in the matter.601 This reliance on great power negotiation was, 
Webster argued, ‘in the great tradition of British policy’ dating back to Lord Castlereagh, Lord 
Palmerston, Lord Salisbury and more recently, Lord Balfour and Sir Austen Chamberlain.602 
As for the guarantees of territorial integrity or political independence to all states, this would 
need to be scrapped in the future organisation, in order to avoid a situation in which the great 
powers were bound into taking action. Despite the emphasis on the ‘flexibility’ of the 
organisation and the freedom of action for the great powers, the British plans were not devoid 
of values. Indeed, the memoranda A and B made clear that there were to be certain ‘principles 
and objects’ which would guide the procedure and decisions of the Council and Assembly.603  
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When force was to be used was another crucial question facing British planners. This 
subject was addressed by Jebb in Memorandum C, which concerned the ‘military aspect’ of a 
future world organisation. Work on this paper had been ongoing since the end of 1943 and 
involved the Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee, a body chaired by Jebb but comprised 
primarily of military officials. In their discussions, they ruled out the possibility of an 
‘international police force’, which the Chiefs of Staff considered to be both impractical and 
‘too radical’ an arrangement. Jebb, however, had put forward an idea for a ‘Military Staff 
Committee’—working under the World Council—to direct ‘earmarked national forces’. It was 
this machinery which Jebb and the Foreign Office believed might facilitate military 
cooperation among the four powers and serve as the enforcement mechanism of the world 
organisation.604 Though the Chiefs of Staff initially opposed this proposal thinking that the 
Russians could not be brought into such an arrangement, they eventually agreed that this 
Military Staff Committee might be included in the British plans.605 
   These papers were discussed and redrafted in March and April, and after considerable 
delay, they were presented to the Cabinet’s Armistice and Post-War (APW) Committee on 22 
April 1944.606 In laying out their case, Jebb and Webster emphasised the flexibility of the 
organisation, the reliance on principles as a basis for action and the central role of the great 
powers.607 The Committee approved the papers by Jebb and Webster but pushed back on 
Memorandum D, covering the relationship of economic institutions to the world organisation, 
which they considered ‘too theoretical and detailed’.608 Webster was tasked with a redraft of 
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the paper, but in the meantime, it was decided that the plans would now be submitted to the 
War Cabinet and then circulated to the Dominion governments, before being shared with the 
Americans and Russians.  
 
A Western Security Bloc and a Revised British Grand Strategy 
Even as they were attempting to craft far more detailed plans for a future international 
organisation, Jebb, Webster and other officials in the Foreign Office were addressing key 
policies towards the European continent. As important as the construction of a future world 
organisation was, this in itself was to be a constituent part of the international order. Not only 
was there a lingering fear that the United States or more likely, the Soviet Union, would back 
out of a world organisation, but there was also an acceptance that additional safeguards would 
need to be erected. Both Jebb and Webster had been considering such factors, especially in 
their earlier conversations on the balance of power and collective security, but as the planning 
for an international organisation became more serious, the discussion on the future of Europe 
became more pressing. In particular, the question of a future defensive alliance with the 
countries of Western Europe began to be viewed as a protection against a revanchist Germany, 
a buttress to the world organisation, and to a lesser extent, an insurance policy against a 
potentially hostile Soviet Union.  
Though officials had been considering such varied arrangements of European states, 
the need for some kind of Western European grouping was increasingly encouraged by key 
British allies. On 25 November 1943, the Prime Minister of South Africa, Jan Smuts, delivered 
a speech to the Empire Parliamentary Association in which he spoke of the need for the United 
Kingdom to forge closer relations with the democracies of Western Europe, in order to increase 
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its own power relative to the Soviet Union and the United States.609 On 20 March 1944, he 
followed up with Eden on the subject, claiming that his speech months before was intended to 
spark discussion—something he called ‘kite flying’. His message now, however, was more 
alarmist, and warned of the potential threat from Moscow coupled with what he believed to be 
London’s passive stance.610 
From a tactical standpoint, Foreign Office officials had been disappointed with the 
speech. Smuts had given the idea of the UK joining with the democracies of Western Europe 
in a defensive organisation ‘an unfortunate balance-of-power flavour’, a feeling which officials 
thought would always prove distasteful to the United States. The emerging Foreign Office view 
was that such a grouping would be an important mechanism in a wider world security system, 
but it was essential that it be framed in an appropriate manner. In other words, the primary 
purpose of a western security grouping would be to protect against an aggressive Germany. 
This point would have to be emphasised, as the Russians would likely approve of measures 
designed to resist future German aggression. The secondary purpose of such a grouping, 
however, would be to protect against the possibility of Russia extending its influence over the 
European continent. Unlike the first, this second purpose would need to be kept quiet so as not 
to provoke the Russians. At the very least, provocation would lead to Moscow seeking to build 
up an Eastern European bloc, and at the very worst, it would throw the entire construction of a 
world organisation into jeopardy. Though they didn’t view the arrangement as one of ‘selfish 
purposes’, they pointed out that the Russians likely would, and thus there would develop a 
‘dangerous’ system in which Europe was divided into two ‘spheres’. At the same time, it was 
noted that Stalin, in comments made to Eden as far back as December 1941, had entertained 
the idea of British playing a greater role militarily in Western Europe. This comment, combined 
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with the fact that the Soviet Union had recently concluded a treaty with Czechoslovakia, 
seemed to already justify any British moves towards the formation of a western bloc.611  
In Jebb’s view, Smuts’s idea of Russia as the ‘new colossus’ which would take 
advantage of the vacuum on the European continent was somewhat overblown. This 
underestimated the extent to which the Soviet Union would be weakened and exhausted by the 
war itself.612 He felt that the idea of Britain binding itself more closely to other Western 
European democracies was a good one, however. This move towards a union would ‘not only 
increase our political bargaining power but would also link our fortunes in an enduring way 
with the continent of Europe’.613 Still, the timing was not the best for such ‘heterodox ideas’, 
and other officials such as Frank Roberts, while agreeing with the United Kingdom moving 
closer to the countries of Western Europe, felt that Smuts had ‘retarded’ the process at this 
stage.614  
Given the connection to the larger subject of world organisation, the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department were asked to develop a response. In the weeks that followed, 
Webster and Jebb each submitted memoranda on ‘Britain and Western Europe’ and ‘The 
Western Bloc’, respectively. In his paper, Webster recommended the creation of an alliance 
between Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and possibly Norway which, although not 
involving political or economic unification, might ‘buttress a worldwide security system’. He 
cited the historical precedent of Austen Chamberlain negotiating the Locarno Treaties, 
agreements which were intended to support the League rather than undermine it. As Webster 
put it: 
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Our main interest in Post-War Security is to obtain such definite commitments and 
practicable arrangements that we can rely on the United States and the USSR 
joining with us in the maintenance of world peace. This object, however, by no 
means excludes special arrangements for particular areas in which we have a 
special strategic interest if they are made in support of and not as alternate to the 
general world system. On the contrary such special arrangements may be essential 
in order that the worldwide security system may be able to function effectively in 
our defence.615 
 
Jebb was in ‘broad agreement’ with Webster’s paper, noting that alliances of mutual 
defence would ‘reinforce’ the future world security system, as opposed to undermining it. The 
entire question, he felt, was to ‘decide how our whole European policy shall be fitted in to our 
policy towards the rest of the world’. He noted that British suggestions towards Europe had as 
yet been vague and remained without a decided policy, especially towards Germany.616 His 
recommendation was to ‘revive’ previous Foreign Office proposals for a central European body 
such as the United Nations Commission for Europe (the European Advisory Committee had, 
since its creation at the Moscow Conference, fallen flat) which would operate under the 
‘umbrella’ of the world organisation. 617  The additional element, however, would be the 
formation of ‘defensive systems’ in both the west and the east of Europe which might be 
directed against Germany. Here Britain and France would take the lead, and it was hoped that 
the United States might be involved in the ‘background’. The eastern system, on the other hand, 
would ‘depend primarily on the USSR’.618 
The system which Jebb proposed was based on his understanding that for a future world 
organisation to be functional, there needed to be a balance of power between the United States, 
the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. He wrote in another minute that 
Whatever ‘World Organization’ may be set up—and however ‘loose’ it may be—
peace is not going to be preserved unless the Big Three are in a position to 
cooperate. This entails a) that they must regard each other as equals b) that they 
	
615 Draft memorandum by Webster, ‘Britain and Western Europe’, 11 April 1944, FO 371/40692/U4102 
616 Draft memorandum by Jebb, ‘The “Western Bloc”’, 12 April 1944, FO 371/40692/U4102 
617 The EAC, Eden later wrote, had been a ‘flop’. Eden minute, 9 July 1944, FO 371/40699/U6441 
618 Draft memorandum by Jebb, ‘The “Western Bloc”’, 12 April 1944, FO 371/40692/U4102 
	 205 
pay due regard to each others ‘vital interests’. This is what is meant by the Balance 
of Power, and if its balance is unbalanced then trouble is bound to follow.619 
 
The minutes which followed Jebb’s comments revealed a number of officials who were in 
agreement with the line of policy but were concerned with the phrasing. ‘This doctrine’, one 
official wrote, ‘if it is ever acted on, must be most carefully concealed from the US.’ He 
continued, ‘“Power Politics”—“the balance of power”—“divide and rule”—are almost 
universally held to be both wicked and peculiarly British practices.’620  The Head of the 
American Department, Nevile Butler, agreed, noting that while the United States was 
‘beginning to think much more realistically about power’, they were still averse to certain 
stereotypes of European statecraft. Thus, the Foreign Office might pursue the policy as 
described by Jebb, but it was essential that they not get ‘caught in the act’.621 
Though both Jebb and Webster were basically in agreement on the essential points of a 
Western Security Group, it was Webster’s paper—written in conjunction with both Jebb and 
Nigel Ronald—which was adopted by the Foreign Office in early May. Eden thought the 
recommendation ‘useful’, though he admitted that, ‘I don’t quite know what to do with it.’622 
Orme Sargent noted that it served as an important insurance policy against the chance of a 
hostile Russia. ‘All the same, in practice this regional system might very well, in altered 
circumstances, develop into a bulwark against Russian penetration.’623  
There was now a growing consensus within the Foreign Office—one driven by the 
work of the Economic and Reconstruction Department—that Britain’s grand strategy for the 
post-war period rested on three pillars. First, there would be a world organisation ‘based on a 
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tripartite Great Power alliance’. Second, there would be a United Nations Commission for 
Europe on which the three great powers (with the possibility of France at a future date) would 
sit on a ‘steering committee’. Third, there would be the creation of a Western European defence 
system, the primary purpose of which was to protect against an aggressive Germany.624  
 
Jebb and Webster challenge Churchill 
In April, a delegation of State Department officials, led by the Under-Secretary of State Edward 
Stettinius, visited London to discuss post-war matters. Over a number of meetings, Stettinius 
and Isaiah Bowman relayed some of the progress that they and their colleagues had been 
making in planning for the world organisation. 625  On the design of the international 
organisation, officials in Washington were roughly in agreement with the basic components of 
an Assembly, a World Council, a Court and a Secretariat.626 As to the size of the World 
Council, the State Department was thinking along the lines of four to five powers joining—on 
a rotating basis—the core four great powers.627 The whole system, he said, should avoid ‘too 
rigid a definition of the constitution’, and instead allow for some flexibility in how the member 
states—especially the great powers—might respond to future crises. 
The Foreign Office was encouraged by the visit, and from what they could tell, the 
American plans as they stood were ‘remarkably close’ to their own.628 The primary differences 
involved the size of the council and the rights given to the great powers (the Americans seemed 
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to want increased rights for the great powers), along with an American view that British 
officials thought was less interested in the ‘susceptibility’ of the smaller powers and less 
attentive to the relations of the political and functional organisations. 629  These differing 
conceptions as to the place and responsibility of smaller powers was noted by the American 
delegation which reported to Washington that, ‘the composition of the Executive Council is 
more broadly conceived by the British than by our Government.’630 Added to this was the 
divisive issue of what to do with colonial territories—namely those recaptured from enemy 
powers—which Webster thought might be the ‘King Charles’s Head’ of future Anglo-
American discussions.631 Overall, the mood in the Foreign Office was optimistic given that the 
British and American plans were moving in the right direction. Webster, however, was still 
concerned about the views of Churchill, noting in his diaries that ‘the old man may still blow 
the whole thing up.’632  
For all the progress made in planning for the machinery of a future organisation, 
without clear political leadership, progress would inevitably be checked. With this in mind, 
Cadogan and Webster had been pressing Edward Bridges, the Cabinet Secretary, about ways 
to force the Prime Minister to examine and decide on the papers relating to world 
organisation.633 At a Cabinet meeting on 27 April, Churchill expounded on his most recent 
vision for a post-war world organisation. It was a view which was in line with certain key 
elements of the current Foreign Office plans—namely that the great powers would be chiefly 
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responsible for the maintenance of peace in the years after the war—but at the same time, it 
differed along old lines, especially with regards to the idea of regional councils.634  
Shortly after the Cabinet meeting, Churchill spoke privately with Richard Law and 
expressed a view which was, until then, unheard of from the Prime Minister. He stated that 
when it came to the post-war world order, he wanted no international organisation at all but 
instead a ‘continental League of Nations’ and a four-power alliance.635 In his mind, the priority 
was the maintenance of peace throughout the world, a task which he believed could be carried 
out by a close working alliance between the United States, the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom, and to a lesser extent China. The continental League of Nations would, in effect, be 
the Council of Europe which Churchill had long advocated, a solution he believed would right 
the ills of continent. 
After his conversation with the Prime Minister, Law approached Webster about drafting 
a memorandum which would make the case against such a proposal. Late into the evening on 
28 April, Webster set about making the case for a post-war international organisation. Across 
six pages, Webster argued that the only way to get a four-power alliance was through the 
creation of a wider international organisation. The Americans would simply have it no other 
way.636 Without the wider organisation, Webster pointed out, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 
who Webster considered more important than the President because of his influence within 
Congress, would withdraw his support. Without American support, Webster warned that the 
United Kingdom would be without its greatest ally ‘in a world of uneasy and unstable 
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alliances’. On regional organisations, which were a recurring theme of Churchill’s plans, 
Webster thought that they could be ‘made to buttress the general system of security’, but 
without an overarching organisation, such regional groupings might morph into rival alliances. 
On Europe, he believed there was no sign of ‘continental unity’, but felt that if there were 
moves to bring the continent into some regional grouping, Britain must be included, lest it 
come to be dominated by Russia or Germany in the future.637  
When the memorandum crossed Eden’s desk on 30 April, the Foreign Secretary said 
he agreed ‘emphatically’ with Webster’s thoughts, and even drew a diagram of the proposed 
world organisation in the margin of the document.638 Despite Eden’s agreement on the paper, 
both Webster and Jebb remained concerned that Eden did not fully grasp the complexities of 
the Foreign Office plans; and worse, they were uncertain whether the Foreign Secretary would 
stand up to the Prime Minister.639 An exasperated Webster wrote in his diaries that, ‘This is a 
really big issue on which the fate of the world may ultimately depend.’640 Both Jebb and 
Webster had instead, by the end of April, put their faith in Cadogan, who they felt not only 
understood the fundamental issues but was also tactful enough to get the plans through 
Cabinet.641  
A meeting of the Dominion prime ministers in May would serve as a crucial boon to 
the efforts of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. It was here that the plans of Jebb 
and Webster were approved over those of the Prime Minister. At this early stage, Eden found 
Prime Ministers Peter Fraser, John Curtin and Mackenzie King ‘whole-hearted in approval’ of 
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the direction of British foreign policy.642 Encouraged by the support from the Dominion prime 
ministers, Eden sent the papers on ‘Future World Organisation’ to Churchill on 4 May and 
urged him to circulate them among the Dominion delegations.643 Churchill agreed, but not 
before drafting his own memorandum on the subject, which was to be sent around to the 
delegations along with the five memoranda from the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department. In what was a surprise to Foreign Office officials, Churchill wrote that he was in 
‘general agreement’ with the department’s memoranda on world organisation, and his 
differences were ‘largely those of emphasis and degree’. A key divergence remained his vision 
for regional councils of Asia, Europe and the Americas, while he added in old and new ideas, 
such as a ‘fraternal association with the United States’ and a ‘United States of Europe’.644  
The papers were discussed among the Dominion prime ministers between 9 and 11 
May, and much to the delight of Webster, Richard Law relayed that the leaders had supported 
the professor’s papers on world organisation.645 They expressed certain reservations, however. 
One concerned the issue of regional bodies. Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, had 
a ‘violent reaction’ to these proposals, arguing that not only was a Pacific or Asiatic region an 
‘unreal conception’, but also, if the Dominions were incorporated into such regional councils, 
their influence would be limited geographically.646 Given their involvement in two world wars 
over the preceding thirty years—conflicts which, they pointed out, they were not responsible 
for initiating—they desired a greater responsibility in world affairs, beginning with their 
position in the British Commonwealth. Perhaps more important, was the suggestion put 
forward in the Foreign Office papers, that the United Kingdom, from its seat on the World 
	
642 Eden diary, 4 May 1944, reprinted in Eden, The Reckoning, p. 442 
643 Eden to Churchill, 4 May 1944, FO 371/40691/U3872 
644  ‘The Post-war World Settlement’, Note by the Prime Minister, 8 May 1944, PMM (44) 5, FO 
371/40692/U4194 
645 PMM (44) 12th meeting, 11 May 1944, CAB 99/28. Webster diary, 11 May 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, 
Historian as Diplomat, p. 34. Reynolds and Hughes have noted that the opinions of the Dominion prime ministers 
was the ‘coup de grâce’. See ibid, pp. 86, 99-100 
646 Cadogan diary, 19 May 1944, Dilks (ed.), p. 630; Peter Fraser to Eden, 18 May 1944, FO 371/40693/U4562 
	 211 
Council, might act on behalf of the entire Commonwealth. This was a proposal to which nearly 
all of the Dominions were opposed.647  
Despite some of their objections, Jebb and Webster both understood that the Dominion 
prime ministers represented a powerful check on Churchill’s post-war plans. Thus, they viewed 
Dominion acceptance of the papers on world organisation as another tool with which to 
circumvent the Prime Minister. Now clearly the odd man out, Churchill withdrew his 
memorandum, having grown increasingly frustrated by the widespread opposition to his 
suggestions among the Dominion governments. He made clear, however, that ‘his views 
remained unchanged in essentials.’ He asked that the Foreign Office papers be ‘reexamined 
from the point of view of emphasis’ and redrafted in order to show some alternative 
solutions.648 
As much as they wished, the Foreign Office could not afford to ignore the Prime 
Minister’s views altogether. He remained the most influential voice within the government, 
and his support would be indispensable when it came to the future negotiations between the 
British, Americans and Russians. This was not lost on Webster, who, despite his opposition to 
the Prime Minister’s views, understood that some concessions needed to be given in order to 
bring him more fully on board with the plans of the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department.649 The decision was made to incorporate some of Churchill’s views, but to do so 
superficially and on the terms laid out by the Foreign Office. The Prime Minister’s views on 
regions would be included in the introductory section of the ‘Future World Organisation’ 
papers but would then be swiftly argued against.   
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Jebb, on the other hand, was more outwardly frustrated, and had taken it upon himself 
to draft a note directly to the Prime Minister which would counter his views. As Jebb 
complained to Webster, no one had ever ‘challenged him properly’.650 To his friends, such as 
Hugh Dalton, Jebb confided that the Prime Minister’s influence on foreign affairs was 
damaging, as his views were ‘romantic and ill-judged’.651 With the approval of Law, Jebb set 
about drafting a paper he titled ‘British Policy Towards Europe’. Intended primarily for the 
Prime Minister, the memorandum would first explain why the idea of a ‘United States of 
Europe’ was both ‘dangerous and impracticable’, and then describe how the Prime Minister’s 
objectives might be met through the ‘mutually consistent’ plans for a World Organisation, a 
United Nations Commission for Europe and a Western European Defence System.652 
Given its collective industrial potential, a United States of Europe, Jebb argued, would 
upset the present balance of power between the Americans, British and Soviets. ‘The balance 
of power would accordingly rest on four legs instead of three and seeing that the United 
Kingdom would be next door to such a colossus it might be in a most invidious strategical 
position.’ This would be made all the worse by a continent dominated by Germany—a 
lingering fear of the Foreign Office—despite a weakening Nazi machine. Should such a 
European State exist, the Soviet Union would undoubtedly be fearful for its interests, leading 
to ‘the encouragement of Communism and subversive movements all over Europe’.  
A more likely outcome for the continent at the end of the war, Jebb believed, would be 
‘a loose association of European states’ which might include the United Kingdom and the 
Soviet Union. The goal then was to establish an order whereby the ‘potential storm centre’ of 
a divided European continent might be allayed and the ‘machtpolitik’ of the Soviet Union 
might be countered. Such an order could be established under an ‘umbrella’ of a world 
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organisation led by the three great powers. A United Nations Commission for Europe—
operating under a ‘steering committee’ of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet 
Union and possibly France—might be established in order to direct a policing of the continent. 
The second pillar under this umbrella would be the Western European Defence System, 
provided that it was clear that the arrangement was directed against Germany and not the Soviet 
Union.653 As with their earlier proposals for a western security grouping, Jebb, Webster and 
other officials in the Foreign Office understood that this scheme doubled as a future insurance 
policy against a hostile Russia.654  
The papers were eventually forwarded to the Prime Minister on 16 May, but he swiftly 
stated that he would not force a Cabinet decision before the following Wednesday, when he 
was scheduled to give a speech in the House of Commons. The decision further rattled the 
worn nerves of Jebb and Webster, both of who feared that the window of opportunity was 
closing.655  In the end, Churchill’s speech was more in line with the views of Jebb and Webster 
than with his earlier proposals; though he still held on to his vision for a European council. 656 
On 21 May, he wrote to Eden stating clearly that, ‘The only thing I am pressing for is a United 
States of Europe in some form or other, with a Council of its own of which I trust Russia, Great 
Britain and the United States will be members.’657 In the end, it was decided by Jebb, Webster 
and Cadogan to appease the Prime Minister by including a brief mention of a future European 
regional organisation in Memorandum A of the world organisation papers.658  
Indeed, just as the Foreign Office were finalising their own papers, telegrams from 
Washington reflected a renewed sense of urgency on the part of the State Department, and in 
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particular the Secretary of State.659 On 29 May, Hull relayed that discussions with members of 
Congress had advanced, and that the State Department was now ready to engage in negotiations 
with their British and Russian counterparts.660 As Cadogan wrote, ‘It seems pretty clear that 
the Americans…are in a hurry. We must not give the impression of drawing back.’661 The 
Allied invasion of France on 6 June 1944 consumed much of the War Cabinet’s attention 
throughout June. But by the end of the month, when British, American and Canadian troops 
had made gains in the north of France, there was a window in which other subjects could be 
taken up. On 7 July, the War Cabinet finally met to consider the papers on ‘Future World 
Organisation’, which comprised the memoranda A thru E. The Prime Minister, however, left 
the meeting early, before the topic of world organisation came up. As he left the room, Cadogan 
recorded Churchill as saying that he was leaving it up to the group to discuss ‘the Peace of the 
World about which, in present circumstances, I am rather lukewarm’.662 The Prime Minister’s 
absence was a fortunate turn for the Foreign Office. In his absence, the Cabinet quickly 
approved the memoranda on world organisation, and agreed that the plans should now be 
shared with the Americans and Russians.663 In the weeks ahead, the Foreign Office’s focus 
would turn to the final preparation for the conference, as well as the all-important issue of post-
war policy towards Europe. 
 
British policy towards Europe 
As the British plans for a future world organisation were nearing completion, there was also 
progress on the Foreign Office’s approach towards Europe, due in large part to the work of 
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Jebb and Webster. The former’s paper on ‘British Policy in Europe’, while originally intended 
to combat the views of the Prime Minister on a ‘United States of Europe’, ended up being 
considered as the Foreign Office’s future policy towards the continent. In a meeting of the 
APW Committee on 1 June, it was decided that Jebb’s paper should be combined with 
Webster’s ‘Western Europe’ paper, which had advocated Britain joining a defence system with 
France, the Netherlands, Belgium and possibly Norway.664 It was a suggestion which was 
gaining traction from some quarters of Britain’s diplomatic establishment. A telegram from 
Britain’s Minister in Algiers, Duff Cooper, arrived at the end of May which called for a 
Western European alliance in the face of what he considered to be a future Russian threat. 
Although Britain and Russia, under the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, were to be partners for the next 
18 years, ‘the alliance of the wolf and the lamb’, Cooper wrote, ‘is ever an uneasy 
partnership’.665 The Foreign Office was in broad agreement of Cooper’s call for an alliance. 
Jebb, in particular, went as far as to say that this alliance of western democracies might be more 
important than the world organisation itself. ‘It is primarily in the right development of our 
“alliance potential” that the future of this country lies and not so much in the “mystical” idea 
of a world state or even, on certain definitions, in the idea of a World Organisation.’666 A 
crucial difference between the Foreign Office view and that of Cooper, however, was that such 
an alliance could not be directed against Russia. Oliver Harvey, in a contribution which was 
supported by Eden, wrote that the western alliance should be directed against Germany, with 
Soviet Russia supporting the western allies in the endeavour. It was a scheme, Harvey insisted, 
which Stalin had already encouraged as far back as December 1941, when Eden had travelled 
to Moscow. 667 Orme Sargent, while agreeing with the need for a western security group, 
warned that when Britain and Russia no longer viewed Germany as the main threat—
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something he referred to as the ‘cement’ of their post-war relationship—their relations would 
deteriorate and the western bloc would then move from protecting against Germany to 
protecting against Russia. It would then be, he said, ‘a most dangerous experiment which might 
well precipitate the evils against which it was intended to guard’.668 
The view here was based on an earlier Foreign Office assessment, which warned about 
an over-assertiveness against Russia at this delicate moment. In other words, officials stressed 
that they must not stoke Russian suspicions by aligning too closely with the United States or 
developing policies which gave the impression of being directed against Russia.669As Cadogan 
wrote at the beginning of July, ‘There is no doubt that our own policy must be directed to 
cooperation: if it fails, it must not be through our fault.’ Eden agreed, adding that failure must 
also not come from ‘an undue display of weakness on our part towards Russia’.670 
On this point, the Foreign Office view ran contrary to other influential voices within 
government, most notably the Chiefs of Staff.671 Throughout the summer of 1944, there was a 
widening split between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff over post-war policy towards 
Russia. On 6 June, the Post Hostilities Planning Staff (PHPS), which was made up mostly of 
military representatives, recommended as a ‘precautionary measure’ the build-up of armaments 
‘together with France and our other natural associates in Western Europe’.672 But while this 
sounded similar to the plans being drawn up in the Foreign Office, the proposals of the PHPS 
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were, like Cooper’s suggestions just a week prior, directed primarily against Russia. A month 
later, the Chiefs of Staff decided that such plans needed to go further, and in particular, take 
into account the ways that parts of Germany—assuming it might be dismembered after the 
war—might be brought into a grouping led by Britain.673 Upon hearing these views, officials 
in the Foreign wrote that the service chiefs were, in addition to their resistance to a world 
organisation, suffering from an ‘anti-Bolshevik complex’, while the PHPS were ‘wild 
acolytes’.674 Similar to Sargent’s warnings of a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, Foreign Office 
officials warned that if Britain was to take certain steps in Europe—especially in regards to 
allying with parts of Germany against Russia—then the Kremlin would undoubtedly take 
measures to protect itself. The result would be a hostile Russia, the destruction of three power 
cooperation (and with it, the end of the world organisation), and Europe divided into blocs. 
At the beginning of July, Eden approved the broad parameters of Cooper’s paper, as 
well as the comments of Harvey and Sargent. In his mind, the Anglo-Soviet Treaty was to be 
a key pillar of British policy, along with a ‘close association of UK and powers of Western 
Europe as the western buttress’. 675  A reply to Cooper—drawn along the same lines as 
Webster’s and Jebb’s earlier papers on  European policy—was eventually drafted and 
circulated to the Cabinet. It was clear that the formation of a western security grouping was 
now a priority for the Foreign Office. It read, in part that,  
From the political point of view…our policy should be directed towards 
establishing some kind of defence system in Western Europe whether we are 
successful in creating a World Organisation or not. If we are unsuccessful the need 
for it will be immeasurably greater.676 
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The burning question now, however, was whether they should reach out to these 
western governments before or after the Washington talks on world organisation, and it was 
here that Cadogan offered a more tactical approach. During a meeting in the Foreign Office on 
7 July, Eden indicated that he favoured making contact on this issue soon.677 Cadogan was in 
agreement with the idea of mutual defence arrangements in western Europe, but he was also 
mindful of the historical precedent—namely,  how the Treaty of Locarno was an agreement 
which was, in theory, subordinate to the authority of the League of Nations. He differed, 
however, on the timing of the approach to other western governments.  
If I could order the world as I liked, I might even begin with the Western European 
System, and build on that. But we have to take things as we find them, and the fact 
is that we must try…to work out a World Organisation with the Americans.678 
 
He suggested that the Foreign Office would be wise to hold back on discussing this topic with 
these countries. His fear was that such outreach by the British—without the support of the 
United States—might be hijacked by isolationist factions among the American public and 
Congress. For Cadogan, getting the Americans involved in a post-war security organisation 
remained the ultimate goal. ‘We ought not to do anything to prejudice our chances of getting 
the United States committed to some kind of World Organisation, since if they were committed 
the whole peace structure would be greatly reinforced.’679 
At this stage, it was decided that Eden might make subtle approaches to his Western 
European counterparts, but in a manner that was secret and ‘in a general nature’. Eden agreed 
that the Foreign Office might wait to inform the Americans and Russians of the talks with the 
Western European allies, but in his view, such discussions on a potential security pact were a 
necessity. He admitted that he held an ‘obstinate’ view on this point. ‘It is really bad’, he wrote, 
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‘for [the] US government and Soviet to think that we cannot ever have so harmless a talk with 
our nearest neighbors without telling them in advance’.680 
 
Plans for world organisation approved 
After the ‘Future World Organisation’ papers had been approved by the War Cabinet on 7 July, 
attention turned to outlining the directives for the British delegation. Drafted by Jebb under the 
title ‘Future World Organisation: Points for Decision’, they contained some detailed points 
which had not been addressed in the original series of memoranda. These included the size of 
the World Council (to be no fewer than 9 or larger than 12, with France included as a permanent 
member); voting within the World Council (they recommended a unanimous vote of the 
Council in the settlement of non-justiciable disputes, but a two-thirds majority—including all 
of the great powers—of the Council for decisions to use force); the relationship of the Military 
Staff Committee to the Council; the advocacy of a United Nations Commission for Europe 
(which they hoped would play a more effective role than the EAC in the post-war period); and 
the permanent location of the Secretariat.681  
On 4 August, the Cabinet approved the directives as outlined by Jebb and instructed 
Cadogan, who was to be the head of the delegation, that if the Americans were to broach 
colonial questions, he was to refer to London for further instructions. Churchill, for his part, 
recommended that the upcoming talks be ‘for preliminary exploration’, as opposed to seeking 
a more comprehensive agreement. Overall, the Prime Minister appeared pleased with the 
developments, though Cadogan felt he was ‘cynically jocular’ and not taking it seriously. The 
Prime Minister went so far as to state that he regretted the fact that the War Cabinet had not 
had more time to discuss these matters.682 It was a comment to which Cadogan and Eden—not 
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to mention the Economic and Reconstruction Department—shook their heads. By the time the 
directives had been approved, roughly half an hour after the meeting had started, Churchill 
remarked that, ‘There now: in 25 min[ute]s, we’ve settled the future of the World. Who can 
say that we aren’t efficient?’683  
The next day, Cadogan made his way to Euston Station in central London. Weaving his 
way through crowds, he eventually boarded a train which took him to a waiting RMS Queen 
Mary. Over the next six nights, the former head of the League of Nations Section and now the 
Permanent Under-Secretary sailed with his delegation to what would be the first formal 
negotiations to consider a future international organisation. 
This chapter has examined the period during which the most detailed and 
comprehensive planning to date was undertaken within the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department. The chapter has highlighted, in particular, the role of Jebb and Webster, who 
continued to be responsible for the most substantive planning. The way in which they and their 
colleagues in the Foreign Office sought to directly challenge the plans of Churchill—and 
subsequently the role of the Dominion governments in defeating the Prime Minister’s plan in 
favour of Jebb and Webster’s—has been covered in detail. Moreover, the decisions taken in 
January and February to send to the United States and the Soviet Union a ‘summary of topics’ 
to be considered at an eventual conference, it has been argued, allowed the Foreign Office to, 
as Jebb had hoped, ‘start the discussions on lines favoured by us’. It was this initiative which 
led, in part, to the similarity between the British, American and Soviet plans—an alignment 
which will be described in the following chapter.  
Next, the chapter has focused attention on the way in which Jebb, Webster and their 
colleagues in the Foreign Office began to examine more closely the League of Nations 
precedent in these months, a point which is often taken for granted. Indeed, as the task of 
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developing concrete plans for a world organisation became more pressing, certain structures of 
the League—including the Secretariat, the financial and economic sections and the Health 
Organisation—were considered valuable institutions, portions of which might be carried over 
into the future.  
Perhaps most importantly, the chapter has discussed the central role that both Jebb and 
Webster played in the development of the ‘western security group’ idea, demonstrating that 
not only was this grouping conceived as a way of protecting against Germany and insuring 
against Russia, but it was also viewed as a way of increasing British power vis-a-vis the United 
States and Soviet Union. The latter point, in particular, was central to Jebb and Webster’s belief 
that for the world organisation to function, there needed to be a balance of power among the 
great powers sitting at the heart of the organisation. As such, the work of the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department in the spring of 1944 was the most substantive expression yet of 





Delivering on the plans: the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the Veto Question, 
and a Western Security Group, August 1944 - January 1945 
 
 
The planning which took place in the spring of 1944 had been the most detailed to date, 
and now the crucial three-power conference awaited. The Economic and Reconstruction 
Department, in preparation for upcoming these discussions, had developed five memoranda 
which addressed critical aspects, such as the structure of the organisation and the way in which 
it would settle disputes and enforce decisions. Just as important in these months was the 
development within the Foreign Office of a revised grand strategy. Their approach now rested 
on three main pillars: the creation of an international organisation, the formation of a United 
Nations Commission for Europe, and the development of a defensive alliance in Western 
Europe.  
This chapter covers the period between August 1944 and January 1945, when the 
Foreign Office worked to deliver on these plans, most notably at the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference, where Cadogan, Jebb and Webster played the most important roles on the British 
side. The proceedings of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference have received a sustained and 
comprehensive analysis by the historian Robert Hilderbrand, whose book Dumbarton Oaks: 
The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security examined the 
conference in detail.684 Other histories of the creation of the United Nations Organization have 
covered, more briefly, the history of the conference, as well as specific issues such as colonial 
trusteeship and domestic jurisdiction which delegates addressed to varying degrees in the 
course of their deliberations.685 This chapter, not to mention the thesis as a whole, focuses more 
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on the planning and negotiation of the main political and security dimensions of the 
organisation, as opposed to more specific issues such as human rights, colonial trusteeship and 
domestic jurisdiction.  
Though several scholars have focused on the work of the British delegation at the 
conference, few have examined in depth their preparation immediately prior to this meeting of 
the three powers. The work of the Foreign Office in this period, as this chapter will make clear, 
helped to define the delegation’s approach to the conference. While Reynolds and Hughes have 
discussed Webster’s analysis of the American and Soviet plans in these weeks, their writing 
relies more on Webster’s diaries than on the files of the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department.686  Hilderbrand has not given much attention to the British preparation in the 
weeks prior to the conference, though he has briefly discussed the Anglo-American 
conversations which took place in Washington the week before the conference. 687 
Greenwood’s work, on the other hand, does not examine the weeks prior to the conference in 
any detail. All of these scholars, however, have given significant attention to the British 
delegation’s work during the conference.688 This chapter builds on this research, and its main 
contribution to the history of the conference itself is to magnify the work of the British 
delegation, specifically on the question of great power voting rights as well as the crucial 
compromise proposal concerning the veto, which was put forward by Jebb during the 
conference. 
This chapter advances an argument that the British delegation, led by Cadogan and 
supported by, among others, Jebb and Webster, played an indispensable role in helping to 
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define the position of the great powers relative to the rest of the United Nations. On the question 
of whether great powers should have the right of veto in disputes to which they were involved, 
Cadogan remained firm in his opposition against, at first, the Russians and the Americans. 
Though the American delegation eventually came around to the British view, the initial stand 
taken up by Cadogan had great implications for the nature of the organisation, and it is this 
factor which has been less emphasised in the previous studies by Hilderbrand, Reynolds and 
Hughes and Greenwood.689 Where the Soviet Union may have seen it as more of a ‘great power 
dictatorship’, in which the permanent members of the World Council would always retain veto 
power, the British—and eventually the Americans—saw it as a slightly more democratic 
institution, in which the permanent members should, to a certain extent, be answerable to a 
majority of smaller states. Crucially, a recommendation made by Jebb during a meeting at 
Dumbarton Oaks—one which was intended to resolve the growing divide between the British 
and Soviet positions on the voting issue—was the compromise solution which would ultimately 
save the organisation. 
Moreover, little scholarship has examined the Foreign Office planning for a world 
organisation in the crucial period between the end of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the 
beginning of the Yalta Conference in February 1945.690 The historian Warren Kimball has even 
claimed that the disputes ‘preoccupied the Americans…more than the British’.691 However, as 
this chapter will demonstrate, the Economic and Reconstruction Department during these 
	
689 Hilderbrand has written that during these initial discussions between the Americans and British, ‘The most 
important difference…was over trusteeship and colonial policy.’ Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, p. 69. 
Greenwood notes that, ‘The Americans blew hot and cold moving shortly before the Conference opened from an 
undecided position to one which supported the Soviet line but then shifting to the British view during the first 
week of proceedings.’ Citing Reynolds and Hughes, Greenwood adds that Webster ‘claimed credit for enticing 
the Americans into the British camp.’ Greenwood, Titan at the Foreign Office, p. 181. See also Reynolds and 
Hughes, Historian as Diplomat, pp. 42-43. 
690 William Roger Louis has covered in detail the question of colonial trusteeship, especially the way in which 
officials in the Foreign Office and Colonial Office sought to address this issue during the autumn and winter of 
1944-45. See Louis, Imperialism at Bay, pp. 392-447. A.W. Brian Simpson has also examined the questions of 
human rights and domestic jurisdiction in the period between the Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta conferences. See 
Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire, pp. 250-256.   
691 Kimball, Forged in War, p. 316 
	 225 
months was focused on salvaging the organisation and, at the same time, developing 
contingency plans in case it failed to come into existence. The question of voting—and in 
particular, the question of veto power—was one of the issues that had yet to be decided by the 
end of the conference. In the months after, Foreign Office officials worked to offer up 
compromises on this and other outstanding matters, such as the Kremlin’s suggestion that the 
16 Soviet republics be admitted as founding members of the future organisation.692 The voting 
question, however, remained the most important; and while the British delegation’s view at the 
conference was that the great powers should not have the right to veto in disputes in which they 
were involved, this was not necessarily the view shared by officials in the Foreign Office or 
the Cabinet. Indeed, the subject was debated throughout Whitehall in these months, with some, 
including Churchill and Eden, advocating the Soviet position and others siding with the view 
taken by the British and American delegations at Dumbarton Oaks. It was a debate which 
concerned the nature of the organisation—namely, whether it should be a kind of five-power 
alliance or whether it might adopt more inclusive characteristics. Though Jebb and others 
flirted with the former, in the end, it was Webster who played one of the most important roles 
in corralling opinion and directing the British opposition to the Soviet thesis.  
The debate in this period reveals yet another indication of a view towards international 
organisation which can be described as realist-internationalism. On the one hand, the creation 
of an international body made up of great and small powers remained the overarching goal; yet 
equally, officials involved with the planning for such an institution, and most notably Cadogan 
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and Jebb, were favouring suggestions which would concentrate more power in the hands of the 
United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Despite the importance attached to the world organisation in this period, the Foreign 
Office did not view it as a panacea for its foreign policy objectives. There was a continuing 
search in these months for the machinery which would most effectively order the European 
continent. Even during the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations, the British delegation had been 
responsible for a provision stating that a future organisation should not ‘preclude the existence 
of regional arrangements’.693 Here the Foreign Office had in mind the creation of a Western 
Security Group, an idea which some officials continued to push in the months after the 
conference.694  The Prime Minister’s reluctance for such an alliance, coupled with French 
hesitance at the present time, would scuttle the Foreign Office scheme, however. On the other 
hand, a second alliance proposal caught the attention of some Foreign Office officials. Senator 
Arthur Vandenberg, an increasingly influential voice on post-war matters within the United 
States, recommended in January that the great powers, before establishing a world 
organisation, might form an alliance directed at Germany and Japan.695 It was a suggestion 
which appealed to Jebb, Cadogan and even Eden, all of whom had a creeping doubt as to 
whether the world organisation could, in fact, secure British interests. Their discussions on the 
eve of the Yalta Conference reveal their fundamental view of the purpose of the organisation—
namely to bring the United States into post-war commitments on the European continent. 
Lastly, the work of the Economic and Reconstruction Department was hindered in 
varying degrees, once again, by the opposition of Cabinet ministers. Sir Stafford Cripps, who 
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had played an important role in the earliest stages of Foreign Office planning in the winter of 
1942, now returned to the scene, this time effectively siding with the Soviet opinion that the 
great powers should wield veto power across all disputes within the World Council.696 More 
significant, however, was the view of Churchill, who, despite his views fluctuating at times, 
sided with Cripps in favouring the Russian view.697 Added to this was the Prime Minister’s 
steady opposition to the idea of a Western Security Group—at least at this stage—which he 
managed to stifle for the time being. Though officials respected the Prime Minister’s decisions, 
they also felt that, whether it concerned the voting issue or the western bloc, he was 
understanding neither the nature of the diplomatic challenge nor the policy recommended. This 
ignorance became abundantly clear between December 1944 and January 1945, when the 
Foreign Office was pushing to get Cabinet approval for their proposals prior to the next meeting 
between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. By the time of the Yalta Conference in February 
1945, there was great uncertainty amongst Foreign Office officials whether the government 
was prepared to enter into negotiations with the United States and the Soviet Union.   
 
A brief comparison of British, American and Soviet plans on the eve of Dumbarton Oaks 
Generally speaking, the three powers put forward plans which were very similar to one another, 
especially in regard to the structure of the organisation.698  Each recommended the creation of 
an Assembly, a Council, a Secretariat and a Court; and all three plans laid out basic principles 
on which the organisation would operate. While the primary focus of each government was on 
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future international security, the American and British plans made specific reference to the 
creation of economic and social bodies which might be under the authority of the 
organisation.699 Though the Soviets agreed with facilitating international cooperation along 
economic and social lines, they felt that these issues should be taken up by a world organisation 
separate from the international security organisation.700 The result was a plan which focused 
largely on security matters, and one which appeared to Cadogan to be ‘amateurish and…hastily 
constructed’. He doubted, as well, whether the Russian delegation would be given any leeway 
from Moscow.701 On the issue of an international court of justice, the Soviets remained vague, 
while the Americans proposed the reconstitution of the existing court and the British 
recommended the adoption of the proposals laid down by the informal Inter-Allied 
Committee. 702  Each government proposed the establishment of a Permanent Secretariat, 
though the British plan was the only one which gave the Secretary-General, as head of the 
Secretariat, the power to recommended matters directly to the Council.  
On the question of military aspects of the future organisation, the British plan 
recommended a Military Staff Committee which might coordinate the forces that member 
states put at its disposal; whereas the Soviet plan suggested the creation of an International Air 
Corps which might be made up of national contingents.703 The American plan, on the other 
hand, only gave mention to a possible ‘security and armaments commission’ which might 
advise the Council. Furthermore, in what was a long standing aspect of British plans for a future 
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world organisation, the British document gave far more attention to the creation of regional 
political structures which they thought would be ‘likely to encourage co-operation of smaller 
states in security measures’ and to increase the efficacy of military action.704  
The most important difference across the three proposals, however, was the power 
given to the Council. The United States and the Soviet Union had adopted the earlier British 
suggestion that France eventually join the Council as a permanent member; and both 
recommended that certain decisions of the Council—namely those concerning the prevention 
of aggression—could be arrived at by a majority vote, as opposed to the two-thirds majority 
the British had been contemplating.705 Furthermore, in what Jebb felt was ‘the greatest issue 
with which we shall have to deal’, both the Americans and Russians proposed that the great 
powers could vote—and thereby reserve veto power—in disputes to which they were a party. 
In a manner which frustrated Webster, Jebb appeared open to the Soviet and American position 
on this issue. 706  For Jebb, great power cooperation would be jeopardised if there was a 
recurring chance that the great powers could sanction one another based on the decisions of the 
council. Worse, if it was ever decided that military action should be taken against a great power, 
this would mean another world war and thus, the dissolution of both the international 
organisation and the world order which it was intended to uphold.707 Jebb’s view, however, 
was opposed by Cadogan and Webster, with the former pointing out that such a procedure ‘was 
equivalent to giving a litigant Great Power the right of voting in its own cause’, and the latter 
having been responsible for the original provision in the first place.708 The British position 
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throughout the conference thus remained one firmly opposed to the Soviet thesis.  
On the American plan in particular, Webster wrote that he was surprised that the State 
Department planners had made ‘such far reaching suggestions’.709 He pointed out that, even 
aside from the veto question, the Americans were intending to give authority to the Council 
which had never before been bestowed on such a body. ‘It will’, Webster wrote, ‘certainly be 
an immense advance towards the creation of a world state if such powers are given to the 
Council’.710 Despite its extensive powers, Webster supported the idea of the Council having 
such powers, which, in his mind, was a modification of the procedure created by the Concert 
of Europe in the nineteenth century. It would undoubtedly face strong criticism from smaller 
powers, he thought; so, in order to win the support of other states, he felt that a section laying 
out the ‘principles and objectives’ of the organisation might serve as a check on the freedom 
of the great powers within the Council.711  
In the days after the full British delegation arrived, Cadogan, Jebb and Webster began 
to meet with their American counterparts, in an attempt to settle the differences between their 
plans.712 A major concern of the British at this stage was that the United States intended to 
construct an inflexible constitution for the organisation. On this point, Cadogan explained to 
the Americans that the British government was thinking more of a ‘flexible’ organisation which 
would rely on guiding principles, as opposed to a rigid one defined by ‘constitution and 
procedure’.713 This was a product of his experience with the League of Nations, in which 
Cadogan believed planners had put so much effort into constituting an inelastic system that it 
was a constraining force on the great powers. The Americans agreed to a certain extent and 
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took on Webster’s suggestion that there might be ‘principles and objectives’ brought into the 
organisation, as a way of guiding state behaviour.714 On the controversial question of colonial 
trusteeship—which Webster had previously warned might be the ‘King Charles’ Head’ of the 
negotiations—Cadogan admitted that he remained ‘apprehensive’ about the American 
position, but he was, at least for now, relieved that the Americans had agreed to put it in ‘cold 
storage...for the time being’. If they were to bring it up, State Department officials assured, it 
would be ‘during walks in the garden’, as opposed to a more formal discussion within the 
conference. By 18 August, Cadogan was able to report to London that the ‘points of divergence 
have been so narrowed down that there is now something like provisional agreement as 
between Americans and ourselves.’715  
Even with the Americans and British agreeing on a number of points, there was still an 
issue which Cadogan felt ‘dominates the whole situation’, namely the question of whether the 
great powers would wield veto power over certain decisions taken within the council. The 
Americans had explained to the British that they supported an arrangement whereby great 
powers would have the right to veto any decision which concerned their own interests. The 
Americans explained that such a provision was likely a requirement in order for the Senate to 
approve of American participation in the world organisation. Cadogan wrote that such an 
arrangement was ‘highly unpalatable’ and would foster resentment among smaller powers, 
including members of the British Commonwealth. ‘It seems to me impossible to present this 
to the United Nations.’716  The British view, shaped by their experience in the League of 
Nations, was that countries which were parties to a dispute should not have the right to vote. 
Ironically, Cadogan saw a potential ally on this issue in the Republican presidential candidate, 
Thomas Dewey, who on 17 August, gave a speech warning the great powers to not fall into 
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‘the abyss of power politics’.717 Cadogan noted that Dewey’s statement had ‘set the cat among 
the pigeons’, as American officials now scrambled to reconsider their position.718 For his part, 
Webster lobbied hard on the issue in talks with American officials, some of whom admitted 
that, from their end, they had been thinking primarily about the possible objections of the 
American Senate as opposed to those of the smaller powers.719 
 
The Dumbarton Oaks Conference 720  
The British, American and Soviet delegations arrived at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference 
riding a wave of confidence in the military effort. As the historian Michael Howard has written, 
these were ‘halcyon days’.  
In the West, the German front in Normandy had broken, the Allies had landed in 
the south of France, Paris had been liberated, and Allied forces were pouring into 
Belgium and Holland. In the East, Soviet soil was being cleared of the invading 
forces, and Germany’s allies—Finland, Romania and Bulgaria—were suing for 
peace. A spirit of high euphoria reigned.721 
 
Under the heat of spotlights and camera flashes, the conference opened at 10:30am on 
21 August. After photographs and introductory remarks, the heads of each delegation gave 
their opening speeches. James Reston of the New York Times pointed out that while the 
Americans spoke of an organisation based on sovereign equality of all nations, the Russians 
focused more on the position and responsibility of the great powers within the organisation. 
Cadogan’s speech then seemed to take up the middle ground between the two.722 ‘No one 
wishes to impose some Great Power Dictatorship on the rest of the world’, Cadogan told the 
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delegations assembled, ‘but it is obvious that unless the Great Powers are united in aim and 
ready to assume and fulfill loyally their obligations, no machine for maintaining peace, 
however perfectly constructed, will in practice work.’723  
Given the magnitude of the conversations and the range of topics covered, the three 
delegations were able to reach agreement surprisingly quickly. Both Cadogan and Jebb 
represented the British on the Joint Steering Committee which was responsible for setting the 
parameters of the negotiations while also taking up the most important decisions of the 
conference.724 The grouping just under this was the Formulation Committee, which Jebb and 
Webster both contributed to and which became the engine of the negotiations.725 By the second 
day, Webster wrote that when it came to major questions of security, they had ‘practically 
already got agreement on all points’.726 By 4 September, there was an outline of a draft proposal 
and three days later, Stettinius was discussing with Cadogan the possibility of holding the 
conference on world organisation in a midwestern American town as early as October, on the 
eve of the Presidential election.727  
In what became the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the three powers agreed to establish 
an organisation made up of a General Assembly, Security Council, an International Court of 
Justice and a Secretariat, all of which would operate according to the ‘principles’ of the 
organisation. The assembly was to be responsible for budgetary questions, the acceptance of 
new members into the organisation, the election of non-permanent members of the Security 
Council, issues relating to disarmament and the regulation of armaments, as well as the work 
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of the Economic and Social Council. The Security Council would be comprised of eleven 
members, including five permanent members (including France) and six non-permanent 
members. The council was given expansive authority to deal with any matter it deemed to be 
a threat to international peace and security. In terms of the organisation’s enforcement 
mechanism, the Security Council was to work in conjunction with a Military Staff Committee 
made up of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members. This body would be in charge of 
coordinating any national forces that might be put at the disposal of the Security Council.728  
The great question remained the voting rights of the great powers, and while Cadogan 
and Webster had been successful in bringing American officials over to their position, the 
Soviets remained defiant that the permanent members would have the power both to prevent a 
dispute from coming before the Council and to prevent action from being taken against itself.729 
The Russians considered it a ‘cardinal point’, despite Cadogan’s warning that it would lead to 
an alienation of the middle and small powers, and a subsequent failure to erect an international 
organisation. 730  In a meeting of the Formulation Committee on 13 September, Jebb had 
proposed a compromise, in which a great power would not be able to prevent a discussion from 
coming before the Security Council, but it would be able, through its veto power, to prevent 
action from being taken by the Security Council.731 It turned out to be a crucial proposal—and 
one which would eventually save the organisation after it was agreed to at Yalta—but for the 
time being, the three delegations opted to address the issue at a later date.  
The experience of the conference had further convinced Jebb that the most important 
dimension of the future organisation—and indeed the wider international order—was the 
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relationship of the great powers. While he thought that the Soviets were ‘on morally 
indefensible grounds’ regarding the great powers and voting rights, it was clear from the 
behaviour of the Russian delegation that ‘whatever we do or say the set-up of the world after 
this war will in fact be based on a number of Great Powers plus their own “client” states, and 
that whatever scheme we construct we must take this fact into consideration.’732 It was not 
what the British wanted, per se, but it was what the interplay of power politics in this period 
necessitated. Nonetheless, he remained hopeful that the structures and principles worked out 
in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations could become the pillars of a future organisation, 
regardless of its exact shape. He warned Nigel Ronald, however, that should an organisation 
come into being, the three great powers would need to make it clear to the public that this was 
not to be some ‘wonderful machine’ which by its very existence extinguished war. On the 
contrary, Jebb wrote,  
In the present state of this wicked world, I am afraid that such an institution is 
impossible of achievement. The most we can hope for is that by meeting and 
cooperating together the Great Powers may be able to work out among themselves 
some system which will eliminate friction.733  
 
A renewed Foreign Office push for a Western Security Group  
That the great powers would remain cooperative was anything but certain, and the wider 
Foreign Office strategy towards the post-war world continued to take this into account. 
Throughout the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, one of the key objectives of the Foreign Office 
remained the construction of some kind of defensive alliance in Western Europe, which might 
serve as an ordering mechanism on the continent. This was designed chiefly to protect against 
a powerful Germany in the future, but it was also a way of increasing British power relative to 
the United States and the Soviet Union. This priority of the Foreign Office was such that, at 
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the conference in Washington, the British delegation worked to have incorporated in the final 
proposals the mention that the international organisation would allow for regional 
arrangements directed at the maintenance of peace and security, provided that these ultimately 
fell under the authority of the Security Council.734    
This provision was fuelled, in part, by British diplomats continuing to stress the need 
for a Western Security Group. Just days before the Dumbarton Oaks conversations began, Duff 
Cooper, then the British Ambassador to the French government based in Algiers, had reignited 
the debate by sending another paper to the Foreign Office urging the creation of a Western 
European bloc. ‘The leadership of Europe will await us, but we may miss the opportunity of 
acquiring it if we hesitate to adopt a positive policy through fear of incurring the suspicion of 
Russia on the one hand or the disapproval of America on the other’, he wrote.735 Other British 
officials warned against such a move, at least in this manner. In a delayed follow up to a Foreign 
Office memorandum on the future policy towards Russia—originally sent in April—Archibald 
Clark Kerr wrote from Moscow about the importance of a tactful approach by the Foreign 
Office. ‘The whole approach of the Soviet government to international problems’, he said, ‘is 
strongly influenced by a morbidly developed sense of inferiority.’ The correct approach for the 
Foreign Office was one in which Britain did not unnecessarily ostracise the Kremlin.736  
There was a meeting in the Foreign Office on 20 October which sought to square official 
thinking on a Western Security Group, in light of the recent Dumbarton Oaks negotiations. The 
officials in attendance agreed that the ultimate objective was to bring the countries of Western 
Europe, especially France and the Low Countries, into a multilateral agreement. First and 
foremost, it would be aimed at countering the power of Germany; and secondly, it might 
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succeed in bringing these countries together along security and economic lines.737 The Foreign 
Office forwarded their views onto the Post Hostilities Planning Staff who were in agreement 
and produced a report which was then approved by the Chiefs of Staff in early November.738 
Now that the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff were in agreement on the necessity of an 
alliance, Eden instructed the Foreign Office to ‘press on’ with plans for a Western Security 
Group.739 In the meantime, Eden raised the idea in conversation with Churchill who, in turn, 
dampened the mood. The Prime Minister considered the Western Allies to be ‘liabilities’ at the 
present time, writing that, ‘I do not know how these ideas of what is called a “Western bloc” 
got around in the Foreign Office and other influential circles.’ Though he recommended that 
they not oppose any outreach from these countries, he noted that any decision would require 
‘mature deliberation’ within Cabinet and Parliament.740   
The Foreign Office initiative was furthered hindered by a growing suspicion in Moscow 
that the United Kingdom was developing a grouping in Western Europe which might threaten 
its own interests on the continent. By mid-November, Soviet diplomats based in London began 
to question their Foreign Office counterparts on the subject, while recent press reports in Russia 
and France only fuelled the scepticism.741 As a result, a decision was taken in the Foreign 
Office to let the Russians know, on a general level, about the talks with Belgium, Holland and 
France.742  When Clark Kerr spoke with Vyacheslav Molotov on 28 November, the latter 
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indicated that the Kremlin had indeed grown suspicious, beginning with Smuts’s speech in 
November 1943 and worsening after conversations with Belgian and French diplomats. The 
conversation with Clark Kerr had helped to relieve fears, Molotov said, and he added that it 
was understood on their end that Britain would obviously ‘play first fiddle’ in any Western 
Security Group which might be formed at the end of the war.743 
Still, the Foreign Office’s initiative was soon put on hold, due to a move by the Prime 
Minister.744 Days before Clark Kerr’s conversation with Molotov, Churchill wrote to Stalin 
that he had been reading about a proposed Western Bloc in the news but had yet to give any 
go ahead for such plans. He was emphatic that the key relationship was between the great 
powers first and foremost.745 An incensed Churchill then took up the issue with Eden, writing 
that France was still years away from being able to form a formidable army, and until this took 
place, ‘There is nothing in these countries but hopeless weakness…That England should 
undertake to defend these countries…seems to me contrary to all wisdom and even common 
prudence.’746 Churchill then raised the subject in Cabinet, at which point Cadogan, who was in 
attendance, wrote that it seemed that the Prime Minister had gotten ‘the wrong end of the stick’ 
in terms of understanding the issue, but that with a little explanation, he might ‘be cured of his 
worst misapprehensions [on the subject of a Western Bloc]’.747  
Cadogan continued to serve as the crucial link between the planning of the Foreign 
Office and the approval of the Cabinet. After Churchill’s most recent outburst, he worked with 
Jebb to craft a reply—in Eden’s name—to the Prime Minister, explaining the origins and 
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rationale of the western security idea. They noted that, despite some of these smaller countries 
being ‘grossly unprepared’ for war in the years after the First World War, ‘the lessons of 1940 
were to build up ‘a common defence association in western Europe’ which would prevent 
future aggressors from picking off countries ‘one by one’. Such a grouping would allow Britain 
to share the burden of defence and hopefully ease the demands for the United Kingdom to 
maintain a full standing army. They also pointed out that the Chiefs of Staff had expressed their 
approval of such plans as far back as July, and even at the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations, room 
was made in the proposals for regional defence organisations to be constructed and put under 
the larger security umbrella of the world organisation. 748  Finally, Cadogan and Jebb 
highlighted that Stalin himself, as far back as December 1941, had expressed support for the 
idea of Britain assuming the leadership of Western Europe, which might add to the security of 
continent.749  
The signing of the Franco-Soviet Treaty on 10 December put the question of a Western 
Security Group into a slightly different light, though Churchill’s view would remain 
unchanged. Recent conversations with French officials had indicated that the Quai d’Orsay 
might be interested in creating a similar alliance with the British; but the state of Anglo-French 
relations, particularly in the Levant, led Churchill and Eden to the conclusion that any treaty 
initiative should come from Paris. 750  Furthermore, the Prime Minister still remained 
ambivalent, if not opposed, to the idea of a wider Western Security Group, believing it to be 
an asymmetric relationship. He warned that the British ‘must be careful not to involve 
ourselves in liabilities which we cannot discharge and in engagements to others for which there 
is no corresponding return’. Moreover, the primary diplomatic objective of the moment, 
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Churchill said, remained the creation of a world organisation, ‘on which it all depends’.751 The 
Foreign Office, in turn, decided against a reply to Churchill on this matter throughout January 
and into February. Their decision was to wait to see what would come of the discussions over 
the Anglo-French Treaty, a development which they believed might create the nucleus of any 
future military association between the western allies.752  
 
Foreign Office approaches to settling the question of voting in the council  
In the months after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the Foreign Office sought to deal with 
the issues that had arisen from the proposed structure of world organisation. The question of 
great power voting rights was the issue on which the future of the organisation hinged, and it 
appeared that neither the British nor the Soviets would budge. For the Kremlin, the primary 
concern was ensuring that there would be great power unanimity on major decisions. Despite 
the best efforts of British and American officials to avoid alienating Moscow, Soviet leaders 
harboured suspicions as to Anglo-American intentions for the international organisation and 
broader post-war order. Echoing a message from Stalin to Roosevelt, Molotov explained to 
Clark Kerr that what the Soviet Union wanted was to rid the great power council of suspicion, 
and the way to do this was to demand that a great power not take action unless it was approved 
by the Council. In a follow up message, Clark Kerr explained that until recently, the Soviet 
Union had felt that other great powers considered them ‘unfit for the structure of an 
international order’.753  Now, however, they were not only an integral piece of the future 
international system but a power which could shape the very structure.  
The opinion of Cabinet members on this issue fluctuated. During the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference, Churchill had written to Eden that he was in ‘very close agreement’ with the Soviet 
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proposals, but in September, he had reversed his position, at least for the time being.754 Others, 
including Clement Attlee and Viscount Cranborne, had expressed their opposition to the Soviet 
thesis, making clear that, ‘We would prefer a show-down with the Russians to any attempt to 
gloss over real differences.’755 Field Marshall Smuts, however, had sent in a memorandum 
supporting the view of the Soviets on this issue. He wrote that he was ‘deeply perturbed’ by 
the stalemate within the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, and argued that, because the 
establishment of a world organisation was paramount, that the United Kingdom and the United 
States should go some way towards accepting the Soviet thesis in order to ensure their support 
for the organisation.756 Churchill replied days later, and reversing his position once again, said 
that he was in general agreement with Smuts on the Soviet voting formula.757 He added that 
‘no further progress can be made on this dangerous path’ until he, Roosevelt and Stalin could 
meet again.758 It was a view shared by Roosevelt, who was confident that during the next 
meeting of the Big Three, they could get a compromise which might ‘tide things over for a few 
years until the child learns how to toddle’.759  
Despite Churchill’s request to put the issue on hold, officials strove in these months to 
come up with recommendations for the Cabinet. It led to a heated debate within the Foreign 
Office, with some officials, such as Cadogan and Jebb, fluctuating in their views, and others, 
such as Webster, steadily defending the original British approach. Even as the British 
delegation was still days away from wrapping up the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, J.G. Ward 
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wrote that the Foreign Office, including Eden, had largely moved toward the position of the 
Russians, with the idea of the Soviet thesis being a ‘lesser evil’ than no organisation at all.760 
Some, such as Nevile Butler, saw the possibility of British imperial interests being protected 
by the Soviet thesis, provided that they could convince the Dominions and other smaller states 
to sign up.761 Other officials, however, were opposed to siding with the Soviets.  Frank Roberts 
noted that the Russian proposal seemed ‘to smack too much of “Holy Alliance” methods’, and 
that it would undoubtedly breed distrust of the great powers.762  
Cadogan’s opinion on the matter was significant in that it revealed an important 
calculation taking place within the Foreign Office in the period—namely, whether the 
organisation would simply be an alliance of great powers, or whether it would represent a more 
democratic and internationalist scheme. The significance was most glaring in the 
considerations of Cadogan and Jebb, both of whom had been central to the planning and 
negotiating process thus far. Just days after Cadogan returned from Washington, he addressed 
this issue at length, and moved somewhat away from his line at Dumbarton Oaks. ‘The real 
choice’, he said, ‘lies between a Four or Five Power Alliance dominating a World Organisation, 
and a “democratic” universalised organisation to deal with all eventualities.’ He said that while 
they had, until this point, been aiming at the latter, he was not sure this was the correct 
approach. There was an ‘inherent vice’, reminiscent of the League, he said, in the idea of a 
Charter which might lead to the great powers taking action against one another. Thus, while 
the idea of a four power alliance might be ‘repugnant to many people’, there could be ways to 
design ‘variants’ of such an alliance, whereby the great powers might be able to exercise 
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unanimity among themselves.763  
Though a stark suggestion from the Permanent Under-Secretary, it was a view which 
Jebb had long been entertaining. At one point, he wrote that ‘it is arguable that we might, in 
the circumstances be better off without [a world organisation].’764 On the one hand, he felt that 
if Britain did not envisage the ability to sanction the Soviet Union or the United States in the 
event of them ‘misbehaving’, then they should not set up a world organisation at all. At the 
same time, however, sanctioning a great power would mean war. To say otherwise would be 
leading populations around the world ‘up the garden path’ in believing that a world 
organisation had been designed to maintain peace indefinitely. ‘This...is the greatest of all 
dangers, namely that we should build up our future world organisation on a sham.’ For Jebb, 
the central issue remained both the position of the great powers as well as the relationship 
between them. In what was his most revealing statement in these months, he made it clear that 
if they could get a great power alliance, then that would be the preferred arrangement.  
The real snag…was that the idea of a ‘naked’ alliance was one which simply could 
not be put across in America and that in practice the only way to get America to 
accept world-wide commitments was by constructing a World Organisation in 
which the ‘power politics’ aspect would be discreetly veiled.765  
 
In his view, not only was the World Organisation necessary for American involvement in the 
post-war world, but even within the organisation, it was necessary to oppose the Russian thesis 
in order to secure American participation. 
Even as Foreign Office opinion fluctuated in these weeks, it was Webster who remained 
firmly opposed to the Soviet thesis and would eventually convince others—including 
Cadogan—of his position. His catalyst was a paper by Sir Stafford Cripps, who had remained 
largely removed from the planning process since his response to Jebb’s Four Power Plan in the 
winter of 1942. In his paper, he called for the great powers to have the right to vote in disputes 
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in which they were involved. Given that all would retain veto power, it was a view which 
aligned with the Russian position. He noted that the Security Council was not a ‘judicial’ body 
but a ‘political’ body, therefore certain realities would need to be honoured. Consent of the 
great powers, he said, was ‘essential’ and therefore each member must reserve the right to 
vote.766 Jebb felt that Cripps’s comments carried much ‘force’, but that the idea of countries 
not voting in a dispute ‘is liable to land us in difficulties if it is pressed too hard’.767 Both 
Webster and William Malkin, the Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office, took exception to 
Cripps’s case, however, with Malkin noting that adopting Cripps’s approach would represent 
a ‘complete reversal of our attitude so far’. For Webster, this fundamental question of great 
power voting rights struck at the heart of the nature of the organisation. ‘The real question’, he 
wrote, ‘is whether a system is to be set up in which there is one law for the Great Powers and 
another for the lesser states’.768 He considered the idea of being able to sanction small powers 
but not great powers a ‘sham’ and advised that Britain not give up its ‘position of principle’ by 
yielding to the Soviet thesis. Moreover, he highlighted that the Dominions, especially Canada, 
were unlikely to sign up to such an organisation.769 
The argument convinced Cadogan, who decided that Webster should draft the Foreign 
Office reply to Cripps’s paper. In his draft, Webster stated clearly that if they were to accept 
the Soviet thesis,  
We should set up two entirely different systems, one for the Great Powers which 
would be subject to no control whatever except to the extent that they may be 
influenced by the other Powers, and another for the Smaller states which would be 
subjected to most drastic penalties if they refused to act as the Council decides. 
 
He noted that they were still discussing ways that the Council—and specifically the body of 
great powers within it—might be tied to a larger organisation, but that giving the great powers 
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such unconstrained power would wreck the organisation. At the same time, however, to subject 
the great powers to sanctions or decisions of the Council would destroy the cooperation needed 
after the war.770   
 It was not enough to simply oppose the Russian thesis, however, and throughout 
October and November, the Economic and Reconstruction Department worked to deliver a 
compromise which might be presented to the Americans and Soviets. It was an example of the 
way in which officials, at times, altered aspects of their own plans in order to get agreement on 
the more essential points, namely the creation of an international organisation. It fell to Jebb to 
collate the various proposals which had been circulating in the Foreign Office. The first option 
was ‘Compromise A’, which was the same as that which had been offered by the British 
delegation at Dumbarton Oaks. Under this compromise, a great power would not be able to 
prevent the discussion of a dispute, but would be able to block—by using its veto power—any 
imposition of a settlement. That a great power would not be able to prevent a case being heard 
in the Security Council, Jebb noted, could give the organisation ‘very considerable moral force’ 
and give them about 80% of the original Anglo-American thesis. ‘Compromise B’ followed a 
line, originally developed by Jebb in September, in which the great powers, when party to a 
dispute, would simply form a ‘consultative body’ amongst themselves and attempt to settle the 
matter. In this grouping made up of only the great powers, there would be no voting and no 
question of enforcing a decision. The great powers would simply attempt to work it out 
amongst themselves, in a kind of modern iteration of the Concert of Europe.771 ‘Compromise 
C’ would follow closely to ‘Compromise B’, but with one major difference: the Security 
Council would not be responsible for examining and discussing a dispute in which a great 
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power was involved. This would instead be immediately put to the great power consultative 
body. In effect, any dispute involving a great power would be outside the world organisation 
as designed during the Dumbarton Oaks talks.772   
Eden found Jebb’s paper useful, but the Foreign Secretary also expressed his support 
for the Russian proposal. ‘The more I think of the Russian proposal the less shocked I am by it 
as a practical method of dealing with a real problem.’773 Just days before, Eden had read 
Cripps’s memorandum in support of the Russian thesis and felt that there was ‘much sense in 
it’. 774  Despite Cadogan’s warning to Eden that the Cripps paper was ‘based on false 
assumptions’, in these weeks it appeared as though the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister 
were siding with Cripps—and thus, the Soviet thesis—over the Foreign Office officials 
heretofore responsible for the planning for a post-war organisation.775  On 21 November, 
Churchill agreed to circulate Cripps’s paper along with a response by Cadogan.776 The debate 
over the veto question would soon come to a crucial Cabinet decision. 
 
Wavering approaches of the Cabinet and Foreign Office prior to Yalta 
Between December and January, the Foreign Office was pushing for the Cabinet to make 
decisions on the issues of voting in the Security Council, as well as a related issue concerning 
whether the 16 Soviet republics would be admitted into the organisation as independent 
members.777 A three-power meeting had been set for early in the New Year and officials had 
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been adamant that there be a decided British policy.778 Both Eden and Churchill remained 
uncommitted on the voting issue, although both had expressed support for the Soviet position. 
But even as officials sought to bring the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister around to 
their view on these matters, they themselves began to doubt once again whether the world 
organisation would amount to the version they had imagined. As a result, they continued to 
weigh whether British interests could best be secured through a wider organisation or through 
some kind of alliance between one or more of the great powers. In the end, it was decided to 
press on with the formation of a United Nations organisation, but the discussions within the 
Foreign Office in this period—particularly over the possibility of developing an alliance with 
the great powers—reveal the importance they attached to securing American commitments in 
the post-war period. 
Just as Jebb’s paper on suggested voting compromises was brought before the Cabinet, 
a telegram arrived from Washington indicating that Roosevelt was hoping to discuss these 
matters. Importantly, when it came to ‘judicial or quasi-judicial procedures’ for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, the President wrote that the great powers should not exercise their right 
to vote—a move he believed would ‘immensely strengthen their own position as the principal 
guardians of the future peace’.779 It was in line with Foreign Office thinking, but apparently 
not with that of the Prime Minister who wrote to Eden that, ‘As far as I can see the Foreign 
Office view differs fundamentally from mine...I am in entire agreement with the Russians.’ 
Added to this was his frustration with the pressure placed on the Cabinet to decide such matters. 
‘All these attempts to settle the world while we are still struggling with the enemy seem to me 
most injurious.’780  
The Foreign Office responded to Churchill, pointing out that Roosevelt’s proposal 
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effectively amounted to ‘Compromise A’ in the Foreign Office memorandum. 781  This 
compromise, they noted, had originally been voiced by the British delegation during the 
Dumbarton Oaks discussions, and it was even discussed by Eden and Churchill at the second 
Quebec Conference in September 1944. This clarification did not seem to matter, however. 
When, on 20 December, the Cabinet convened to consider the voting question in light of 
Roosevelt’s proposal, little progress was made.782 Cadogan, who was in attendance, felt that it 
was ‘a complete madhouse’ and that Churchill was misunderstanding the basic facts. ‘The old 
P.M. is failing’, he wrote. Cadogan, like the rest of the Foreign Office, were adamant that the 
Cabinet must come to an agreed policy on the matter, so that they were not beholden to the 
decisions of Roosevelt and Stalin, not to mention the whims of Churchill. ‘We want to have a 
mind of our own and no one will give any attention to it’, Cadogan complained in his diary.783 
On 11 January, the Cabinet finally decided on the questions of great power voting rights 
and the admittance of the Soviet republics. Cadogan wrote that after delaying the subject for 
as long as possible, Churchill finally got to the topic of world organisation, and with the help 
of Cadogan’s explanation on the basic points, he was ‘lumped over the hurdle’.784 It was 
decided that the British would support Roosevelt’s compromise, and that they would let the 
Americans take the lead on the question of the 16 Soviet republics.785 But just as British policy 
had taken shape, a message from Washington threw the entire matter into the air once again. It 
stemmed from a message sent by Roosevelt which indicated that while he may be able to go 
some way towards accommodating the Soviet voting thesis, he would not be able to do the 
same for the issue of the Soviet republics. As Lord Halifax reported, Roosevelt ‘frankly hoped 
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to horse trade one for the other’.786 Jebb noted that if Roosevelt were to agree to the Soviet line 
on the voting question in return for the sixteen republics not joining the organisation as 
independent members, then this would change British calculations entirely.  
It is here that Jebb and Cadogan expressed a cynicism towards the future organisation 
which was surprising given their roles in the planning and negotiation phases until that point. 
Roosevelt’s comments played a part, but it was also a recent recommendation put forward by 
US Senator Arthur Vandenberg which fed into their reconsideration. Vandenberg had proposed 
that the five great powers develop a ‘hard and fast treaty’ against Germany and Japan. 
Importantly, Vandenberg aimed for the five-power alliance to be more of a backbone than a 
replacement to the world organisation.787 
Jebb saw ‘a great deal of advantage’ in such a scheme, and in offering his thoughts, he 
went so far as to say that this kind of alliance might serve a more useful purpose than the 
organisation itself.788 
My own personal view has always been that it would not be a disaster if the World 
Organisation came into being in a limited or in a truncated form provided we got a 
hard and fast treaty with the Americans for the purpose of preventing renewed 
aggression by Germany and Japan. The only danger, as I see it, is that if the World 
Organisation does not materialise or does not pass through the American Senate 
we may get the worst of both worlds, namely no treaty and no organisation.789  
 
Webster was alarmed by Jebb’s comment, noting that Vandenberg, who had been considered 
a ‘moderate isolationist’ in the past, was himself a ‘slippery customer’.790 These types of 
proposals, especially when the world organisation was at stake, were ‘bedevilling things’, he 
wrote. Added to this was his concern that Roosevelt might agree to the Soviet thesis in return 
for Stalin abandoning the idea of the 16 republics. ‘All this is expediency and trickery and there 
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is no principle amongst these men’, Webster wrote.791  Other officials, however, saw the 
benefits of Vandenberg’s proposal, provided that it could be tied to the world organisation 
going forward. Nevile Butler felt that this type of treaty represented a kind of ‘foundational 
security’, noting that during the Paris Peace Conference, there was an attempt to create an 
Anglo-American Guarantee Treaty with France, which, if it had materialised, would have 
served as an important structural support for the League of Nations.792  
Cadogan weighed in on the debate, and his comments reveal an important dimension to 
his thinking on the fundamental bases of international order. He carried a certain cynicism of 
‘lovely and logical’ plans for world organisation, which he felt crumbled under realities. There 
was, he said, ‘no magic formula for keeping the peace of the world’. The great powers were 
the only countries which could pose a ‘serious menace’ to the peace of the world; and if any 
were intent on aggression, then no world organisation—whether under the Soviet or Anglo-
American voting proposals—would be capable of preventing a war. The Vandenberg proposal, 
on the other hand, served a valuable purpose, because it represented ‘realistic and rough and 
ready methods’ to quell two potential danger spots, namely Germany and Japan. Importantly, 
Cadogan understood that to write off the world organisation—as Jebb had briefly suggested—
in favour of Vandenberg’s proposed five power alliance was not exactly a choice, given the 
momentum, especially since Dumbarton Oaks, which had been moving in the direction of 
establishing a world organisation. Furthermore, to accept the Soviet thesis would likely mean 
that the smaller powers, including the Dominions, would not join the organisation.793 
For all of the variance of opinion within the Foreign Office since the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference, officials had come to a decided line prior to the Yalta Conference. First and 
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foremost, they needed to continue their pursuit of a world organisation, which was seen as the 
best way of bringing the United States into European commitments. Second, the Foreign Office 
recommended that the United Kingdom adopt the Vandenberg proposal for a five-power 
alliance, not so much as a replacement for the world organisation, but rather as a structural 
support.794 Though the latter suggestion would not be taken up by the Cabinet in the end, the 
Foreign Office, now settled firmly on the need to create an international organisation and to 
have their compromise—now known as the ‘Roosevelt compromise’—adopted by the Soviets. 
The only remaining hurdle was again the Prime Minister, who seemed to suggest that he still 
might side with the Soviet Union on this issue.795 Churchill’s views were met with increasing 
alarm in the Foreign Office, where Jebb wrote that, ‘If the Prime Minister takes the view that 
he will side with the Russians if the Russians stick out on their thesis it will quite likely mean 
that the Americans will not be able to come into the World Organisation.’ He pointed out that 
at the recent APW Committee meeting, it was agreed that the President’s proposal—which 
Jebb noted was actually the British compromise offered at Dumbarton Oaks—was one which 
the British should support ‘irrespective of the Russian attitude’. In this way, they might ‘bring 
pressure to bear on the Russians to accept it’.796  
Foreign Office pressure finally convinced the Prime Minister, who wrote that now was 
not the time to ‘fight a stiff battle’ with the Americans. Similar to Jebb and Cadogan, his focus 
remained on continuing great power cooperation into the post-war period. ‘The only hope for 
the world’, he wrote, ‘is the agreement of the three Great Powers. If they quarrel, our children 
are undone’.797 Despite Churchill’s note, a concerned Eden wrote to Cadogan, ‘I fear P[rime] 
M[inister] still does not understand [these] issues and is under influence of Cripps 
	
794  Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 25 January 1945, APW (45) 12, FO 
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795 Churchill to Eden, M. 90/5, 19 January 1945, FO 371/50673/U626 
796 Jebb minute, 21 January 1945, ibid 
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memorandum. I did my best last night.’798 Eden’s lack of confidence in Churchill on these 
matters was not apparent at the time but certainly weighed on the Foreign Secretary. Weeks 
before, Eden had confided to his diary his concerns over what he saw as an ambiguous Anglo-
American position going into the upcoming three power talks.  
I am much worried that the whole business will be chaotic and nothing worthwhile 
settled, Stalin being the only one of the three who has a clear view of what he wants 
and is a tough negotiator. P.M. is all emotion in these matters, F.D.R. vague and 
jealous of others.799  
 
This chapter has examined the period between the start of the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference in August 1944 and the beginning of the Yalta Conference in February 1945. It has 
put forward a view that the United Kingdom, far from being a passive observer during the 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference and in the months that followed, played the most important role 
in defining the role of the great powers within the organisation. The first major contribution, 
from a deliberative standpoint, was the initial stand made by Cadogan and Webster against the 
American and Soviet positions on the veto rights of the great powers. The British delegation’s 
ability to bring their American counterparts over to their position—one which favoured parties 
to a dispute not being able to vote in that dispute—helped to align the Anglo-American position 
on this question, and set the stage for a contentious debate between the United States, the 
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union which would last until the Yalta Conference. Second, a 
suggestion made by Jebb in a meeting of the Steering Committee at Dumbarton Oaks—
specifically, one intended to resolve the impasse on the veto question—ended up forming the 
contents of what would become known as ‘the Roosevelt compromise’. This is a British 
contribution which has been consistently overlooked in the history of the United Nations but 
one which salvaged the very creation of the organisation itself.  
	
798 Eden minute on M.110/5 (PM/45/49), 25 January 1945, ibid 
799 Eden diary, 4 January 1945, Avon Papers, 20/1; also quoted in Dilks (ed.), pp. 692-93 
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In the months after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the sense of achievement in 
having reached agreement between the three powers had given way to critical debates within 
the Foreign Office and Cabinet over the question of great power voting rights. For officials 
such as Webster, this was nothing short of a battle over the nature of the organisation. Others, 
such as Jebb and Cadogan, however, wavered somewhat in their views. They both, to varying 
degrees, expressed support for a kind of great power alliance, even if this came at the expense 
of the organisation. Indeed, it is somewhat striking that there was, at a critical juncture, such a 
fundamental reconsideration. This was an example not only of the priority that officials 
continued to place on great power cooperation, but also of the way in which concern for the 
national interest, at times, overtook the objective of creating a wider international structure. 
While their ultimate recommendation was to move forward with the creation of a world 
organisation, the debate in these months revealed important aspects of their approach to 
statecraft, which this thesis argues can best be described by the phrase ‘realist-
internationalism’. 
Integral to understanding this approach is highlighting the extent to which these Foreign 
Office officials relied on alliances as ordering mechanisms in themselves. Whether it was a 
Western Security Group or a five-power alliance, officials viewed such arrangements, to 
paraphrase Cadogan, as tried and tested means of ordering an international system. On the one 
hand, they might buttress a world organisation; or in other scenarios, they might insure against 
that organisation’s breakdown. Finally, officials continued to return to an earlier realisation—
namely, the importance of bringing the United States into European commitments through an 
international organisation. It was the acceptance of this point which played the most important 










This chapter focuses on the period between the start of the Yalta Conference and the 
end of the San Francisco Conference, a time which proved to be the most pivotal for the Foreign 
Office thus far. Specifically, this section sets out to examine Foreign Office approaches to the 
conference in the context of emerging discord between the great powers. Previous historical 
scholarship has focused on this period, especially as it relates to the Yalta Conference, the 
origins of the Cold War and the San Francisco Conference itself.800 But less attention has been 
given to the Foreign Office preparation for the San Francisco Conference, in particular, and the 
ways in which officials balanced their increasing suspicions of the Soviet Union—and to a 
lesser extent the United States—against the necessity of delivering on the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals. Sean Greenwood’s Titan at the Foreign Office, though it discusses some of Jebb’s 
work before and during the Yalta Conference, does not examine Foreign Office preparation 
between February and April. 801  Similarly, P.A. Reynolds and E.J. Hughes’ Historian as 
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Diplomat, focuses more on the work of Charles Webster in these months, as opposed to a wider 
examination of Foreign Office preparation for San Francisco.802  
The opening section begins with a discussion of the Yalta Conference, where the 
outstanding questions of great power voting rights and the admission of the 16 Soviet republics 
were finally resolved. The writing here does not add, in any concrete way, to the extensive 
scholarship on this conference, but it does highlight the split which existed between the Prime 
Minister and the Foreign Office, as well as the work of Cadogan during the three-power 
discussions over the future world organisation. Overall, this section of the chapter helps to set 
the stage for its analysis of the work carried out by the Foreign Office in the months that 
followed the conference.  
Though the Yalta Conference marked a great achievement for these governments when 
it came to the post-war organisation, the optimism which characterised the end of the meetings 
soon soured, as Anglo-Soviet relations descended into mutual suspicion.803 Soviet moves in 
Romania and Poland, coupled with ostensibly minor disputes about invitations to the San 
Francisco Conference, led to Molotov’s initial refusal to attend the meeting. This move, 
coupled with a wrinkle in Anglo-American relations over the subject of colonial trusteeship, 
led the Foreign Office to consider a postponement of the conference in March.804 At one point, 
Cadogan warned that if the conference were held as current politics stood, it would lead to 
‘disaster’.805 Though a postponement was decided against, the San Francisco Conference saw 
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a renewed battle over the veto question, which again threatened to derail the establishment of 
the organisation. Throughout the period, officials in the Foreign Office were as perturbed as 
they were pessimistic about future relations, though their focus remained fixed on securing 
Russian participation in the organisation. 
Through a close reading of the Foreign Office files from this period, this chapter brings 
out certain essential aspects of the Foreign Office approach towards the post-war organisation 
between February and June 1945. The first notable finding is the way in which officials dealt 
with the fundamental question of regional versus international machinery. Though a future 
international organisation remained a central objective for the Foreign Office, it did not 
constitute the entirety of British strategy towards the post-war world. The question of a Western 
Security Group continued to be a central objective for some officials, especially given the 
increased Soviet influence—diplomatically and militarily—in Eastern Europe. Crucially, 
officials began to re-purpose the prospect of such a western grouping, now thinking that the 
formation of such a bloc might prevent France from exerting its control over the region.806 
Thus, the idea for a Western Security Group now took on the triple purpose of protecting 
against Germany, insuring against Russia and dampening French influence in Western Europe.  
Though the Foreign Office would eventually put the issue on hold in favour of 
concluding the world organisation discussions, the question of regional versus international 
machinery did not disappear. Indeed, during the San Francisco Conference, one of the most 
heated debates came over the question of whether regional blocs or alliances between states 
would be subordinate to the world organisation. The Foreign Office never objected to states 
being allowed to join such alliances, but officials did oppose these groupings undermining the 
	
806 Some studies which have examined the push for a Western Security Group into the spring of 1945 have often 
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French Relations Before the Coming of NATO, 1944-48 (London: Minerva, 1996) 
	 257 
authority of the Security Council. This concern became increasingly important given the recent 
Franco-Soviet Treaty and the prospects this held for the future European order. A position 
articulated by Jebb in the run up to the San Francisco Conference ended up laying the 
foundation for the British approach once negotiations began. There, the British delegation 
provided a robust defence of the position that regional alliances should not usurp the authority 
of the Security Council, leading to what Webster described as ‘a victory for the global as 
against the regional point of view’.807  
Finally, the Foreign Office in these months concentrated on ensuring that the key 
structures and functions of the organisation as laid out in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were 
not drastically altered or limited by the counterproposals of smaller powers. This was most 
evident in the debates over the veto question, which saw formidable opposition from a number 
of quarters. The official correspondence sent between San Francisco and London reveals that 
Cadogan and Webster played important roles in these debates throughout the conference, 
helping to smooth differences between the great powers and then ensuring that these 
delegations stood strong in the face of widespread opposition.808 The result was an acceptance 
by the smaller powers of the Yalta voting formula and with it, the realisation of a fundamental 
aim of the Foreign Office since the summer of 1942, namely that the great powers, operating 
at the centre of a worldwide organisation, would be primarily responsible for the maintenance 
of peace and security. 
 
The first great hurdle: The discussions on the world organisation at the Yalta Conference 
The decisions reached at Yalta concerning a world organisation came as a great relief to the 
Foreign Office, and in particular Jebb and Cadogan who were in attendance. Both men had left 
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London in a rather ‘defeatist’ mood.809 The difficulty in reaching a Cabinet decision on the 
voting issue had taken its toll and it seemed that the Prime Minister, despite him agreeing to 
the Foreign Office position, still did not grasp the issue. This was most apparent during 
preliminary meetings between the Americans and British in Malta. Edward Stettinius, now the 
American Secretary of State, noted that the Prime Minister ‘did not seem to understand the 
international organisation or the voting procedure in the council’.810 In another meeting, a 
pessimistic Eden told Harry Hopkins that they ‘were going into a decisive conference and had 
so far neither agreed what we would discuss nor how to handle matters with a Bear who would 
certainly know his mind’.811 Moreover, as Serhii Plokhy has highlighted in his history of the 
Yalta Conference, the Americans and British travelled to the conference ‘in a poor bargaining 
position’ given that the Red Army was now 70 miles east of Berlin just as the Western Allies, 
having recently incurred a German counterattack at the Battle of the Bulge, were regrouping.812 
At the Yalta Conference, Stalin first addressed the subject of the world organisation 
during the opening dinner, noting that the great powers must reserve their predominant 
position, and that the small powers—many of whom he thought had played minor roles in the 
outcome of the war—should not be able to wield undue influence.813 The Americans and 
British agreed in principle, but still emphasised that the great powers must not run roughshod 
over the interests of smaller states. After the meal, Churchill, in conversation with Stettinius 
and Eden, explained that he was still attracted to the Russian thesis, primarily because it would 
ensure great power unity after the war. Here the Foreign Secretary disagreed once again with 
the Prime Minister, but this time in front of the American Secretary of State, who subsequently 
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explained his position on the matter.814 Stettinius felt that he had made some headway in 
convincing Churchill, and Eden would later follow up that Stettinius’s appeal was the decisive 
moment in bringing the Prime Minister around on the voting question.815   
While the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were a central topic of the negotiations from the 
start, it was not until the third day of the conference that progress was made. Here, Stalin 
admitted his own ignorance of the subject, but made clear that erecting an organisation which 
might outlast those who had lived through the horrors of war was essential.816 By the next day, 
7 February, Churchill, who had only recently been steered away from the Russian thesis 
became the champion of the so-called ‘Roosevelt compromise’. In a rambling speech, which 
Cadogan described as ‘off the rails’, he warned that if the three powers were to move in the 
direction of the Russian position, the world organisation might be in jeopardy.817 Despite the 
Prime Minister’s ‘harangue’ and Stalin’s admitted ignorance of the details of the voting 
question, the American and British delegations were able to slowly allay the fears of the 
Russians on this issue. On the British side, Cadogan was one of the indispensable figures of 
the conference, guiding Churchill into line where possible and reassuring the Americans of the 
British position when necessary. 818  His influence was such that Jebb, upon returning to 
London, told Webster that Cadogan had effectively traded spots with Eden and become 
Churchill’s primary advisor on the voting question.819 By the close of meetings on 7 February, 
Stalin and Molotov had been persuaded by Roosevelt’s compromise, as well as the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals more broadly.820 
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The following day the Russians brought up the issue of the admission of the Soviet 
republics into the organisation.821 In what came as a pleasant surprise to the Americans and 
British, the Russians backed off of their original request that the 16 republics of the Soviet 
Union be admitted as founding members of the organisation. They instead asked that two-to-
three be admitted—namely the Ukraine, White Russia, and Lithuania—based on their 
contribution to the war effort.822 The British were quick to see the benefits of this proposal. For 
one, the admission of two or three Russian ‘puppets’ would ease the case against Britain and 
their supposed ‘bloc’ of Dominions. Churchill thought it could be a ‘friendly gesture’ to the 
Russians; and perhaps more importantly, it would mean that Britain was not the ‘only multiple-
voter in the field’.823  
The question of colonial trusteeship was also taken up at the conference, where Jebb 
admitted that there was a ‘wide gulf’ opening between the Americans and British on this 
matter.824 The Foreign Office had supported a proposal by the Colonial Office which advocated 
the dissolution of the mandate system in favour of a new international system, but these were 
strongly opposed by Churchill who wrote that, ‘“Hands off the British Empire” is our maxim 
and it must not be weakened or smirched to please sob-stuff merchants at home or foreigners 
of any hue.’825 During discussions at Yalta, Eden was adamant that the question not be brought 
up at the forthcoming conference on world organisation, a suggestion which had been made by 
the Americans. The Foreign Secretary spoke with Harry Hopkins, who explained that the 
President was not exactly of the same mind as some officials in the State Department, and he 
would most likely not force a completely unfavourable system on the British.826 Elsewhere, 
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Stettinius sought to reassure Churchill, and it was finally agreed that territorial trusteeship 
would only apply to three categories: existing mandates of the League of Nations; territory 
reclaimed from the enemy; and any other territory which might be voluntarily placed under 
trusteeship. 827  For the time being, British officials were comforted in knowing that the 
international organisation would not, in theory, threaten the Empire. 
With nearly all issues concerning the world organisation resolved, the three delegations 
began exploring possible dates for a United Nations Conference as well as the countries which 
would be invited. It was suggested that the conference begin on the 25th of April and that all 
countries who had joined the United Nations by 1 March 1945 would be invited.828 Now, 
roughly four months after the conclusion of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in October, the 
three powers had formally agreed to the basic framework of the world organisation. More 
importantly, the Foreign Office had achieved their aims more easily than expected. The 
compromise on the voting formula was their own—though they were resigned to let the 
Americans take credit for it, as a matter of tactics—and they had not had to concede too much 
on the question of the 16 Soviet republics. As Cadogan wrote to his wife at the end of the 
conference, ‘I hope the world will be impressed!’829  
 
Great power friction and the question of postponement 
For all of the optimism which came out of Yalta, just weeks after the conference, Soviet 
diplomatic manoeuvres in Eastern Europe caused great suspicion amongst officials in London. 
These developments led, in part, to the first crisis within the Foreign Office in these months. 
On 1 March, the Romanian Prime Minister, Nicolae Rădescu, was forced from office and 
replaced less than a week later by Petru Groza, the first communist Prime Minister of the 
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country. The British government were outraged, calling it a direct violation of the Declaration 
on Liberated Europe which had been agreed at Yalta.830 Looking east, Churchill was dour about 
the prospects of Anglo-Soviet cooperation, warning that Britain could not afford to be ‘cheated’ 
in the same way over Poland, even if it meant going to war with the Soviet Union.831 There, 
the Soviets had announced on state radio that the government under the Lublin Poles would 
represent the country at the San Francisco Conference, a move which ran directly against the 
wishes of the Americans and British. Churchill soon wrote to Roosevelt expressing a grim 
outlook. If there could not be a satisfactory agreement over Poland prior to the start of the 
conference, he said, ‘We are likely to give the world the impression that we shall be basing the 
new World Organisation on a foundation of sand.’832 To add to the animosity, Stalin and 
Molotov requested that the Ukraine and White Russia be invited to the San Francisco 
Conference.833 Though the Americans and British had agreed at Yalta to eventually allow the 
Ukraine and White Russia into the future organisation, they had not agreed to their attending 
the meetings in San Francisco. Both the British and Americans decided to ‘stick to their guns’ 
and not give way to the Soviet request that the two republics attend the conference.834 As a 
result, Molotov backed out of the San Francisco Conference on 22 March, giving as his reason 
a budget meeting of the Supreme Soviet.835  
Britain’s relationship with the United States in these months was on a much better 
footing, though the issue of colonial trusteeship remained unresolved, and officials were 
growing increasingly frustrated on this point. In an attempt to gain insight on American 
intentions, senior officials agreed that Jebb should visit the United States on a ‘scouting 
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expedition’. Cadogan felt that it would be helpful if Jebb could understand—and possibly 
influence— the lines on which State Department officials were thinking, especially in regards 
to the organisation and procedure of the conference.836 When he travelled to Washington in 
March, Jebb reached an agreement to set up an ‘informal organising group’ of representatives 
of the great powers which would meet in the weeks leading up to the conference. Next, they 
agreed that economic and social organs of the future organisation, while essential to the 
functioning of the institution, should be addressed in detail after the conference, so that the 
discussions in San Francisco might proceed more efficiently. Finally, they addressed the 
question of colonial trusteeship, with Pasvolsky telling Jebb that the British will be ‘agreeably 
surprised’ by the ‘modest’ nature of the American paper on colonial issues.837  
Foreign Office calculations in regards to colonial questions had changed in the 
aftermath of the Crimea Conference, leading Jebb to write that the earlier proposals put forward 
by the Colonial Secretary were ‘still-born’. 838  As the Foreign Office worked towards 
formulating a new policy, some officials speculated that a more ‘thorough-going form of 
international trusteeship’ would be pressed by the Americans, and might include ‘direct 
international administration’. Added to this was what officials believed to be the American 
intention to create a ‘moral umbrella’ under which they might set up military bases on captured 
Japanese islands.839 Though they had yet to receive a formal proposal from the Americans, 
officials’ worst fears were stoked when, in late March, the Foreign office received word that 
the United States was planning to introduce a ‘fully matured plan’ which would include 
‘international inspection’ of mandated territories as well as increased ‘international 
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supervision’ of colonies.840 The announcement stirred both Eden and Churchill, with the Prime 
Minister writing that, ‘I do not like it. It goes far beyond what I was assured at Yalta.’841 The 
Foreign Office tried to downplay the report, but at the same time, officials were frustrated by 
the uncertainty of the issue. As Cadogan wrote, ‘They’ve been hanging this over our head since 
last May, without doing us the compliment of explaining, in the least degree, what they 
mean.’842 Others complained of what they saw as an American tendency to issue ‘strong 
(though vague) idealistic sentiments’. As Ronald Campbell wrote,  
Statements of general principles are so much in the blood of the Americans and so 
much part of their traditional methods of thought that they are not only a temptation 
they find hard to resist but almost an end in themselves which it is incumbent on 
an American government to secure.843 
 
Between the uncertainty of the American position on colonial trusteeship and the 
lingering tension with Moscow, there was a serious consideration in early April whether the 
Foreign Office should recommend a postponement of the conference. Jebb weighed the 
consequences of such a decision, noting that ‘we are between the devil and the deep sea.’ In 
the end, he suggested that they not go in this direction. The State Department and Roosevelt 
administration had done a great deal of leg work in bringing around public opinion in their 
country, and to delay the conference at this stage, he believed, would have ‘dreadful 
psychological effects’.844 It proved to be a wise decision, as the colonial trusteeship issue was 
not nearly as big of a problem as officials had feared. In reality, the State Department was at 
odds with American military officials on the subject of trusteeship. While the former wanted 
to erect a Trusteeship Council and help certain dependent territories gain independence, the 
latter was conscious that such proposals might hinder their ability to maintain control of 
territories captured from the Japanese—ones which they hoped would help establish an 
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American military presence in the Pacific.845 These differences, combined with the death of 
Roosevelt on 12 April, meant that the United States would not provide the Foreign Office with 
their views until the San Francisco Conference. 
 
An adaptive grand strategy: Jebb’s ‘Political Forecast’ and the Western Security Group 
While the creation of the world organisation remained the focus for the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department throughout the spring of 1945, officials continued to weigh other 
options which might help to secure British interests. Regional ‘machinery’ in the form of an 
alliance of Western European democracies continued to be floated. But important to these 
strategic considerations were the assumptions of post-war Europe on which the Foreign Office 
was basing its outlook.  
The period after the war, Jebb wrote in a paper for the Post Hostilities Planning Staff, 
was sure to be ‘troublous and difficult in the extreme’. Disorder would be the norm throughout 
Europe, with domestic populations struggling between left-wing governments and right-wing 
dictators promising recovery and reform. Contrary to some of the thinking around the Chiefs 
of Staff, he did not think that the Soviets would expand westward, although he admitted that 
Soviet influence ‘will almost undoubtedly be paramount in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania 
[sic], Hungary, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia’. This did not mean absolute Soviet control over these 
countries, but their populations would likely look east, to Moscow, rather than west when it 
came to questions surrounding armaments and foreign policy. It was essential that Anglo-
Soviet relations remain on a cooperative footing, though the situation in the Middle East and 
Far East could present problems. On the future of Anglo-American relations, Jebb was clear 
that ‘our interests in general are completely interlocked’, and in his view, both countries were 
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dependent on one another. Britain would need the ‘whole-hearted moral and physical support’ 
of the United States in any future conflict, while Washington would depend on London as a 
‘bridgehead’ to Europe.846  
A vital pillar of the Foreign Office approach both to the European and international 
orders remained the creation of a Western Security Group which might protect against future 
German hostility. On the one hand, it would prove to Moscow that Britain was serious about 
resisting Germany. As Archibald Clark Kerr had reported, the Soviets viewed British policy 
towards Germany as ‘the touchstone of our faith as a good ally’.847 On the other hand, if Britain 
could assume a leadership role within Western Europe, this might also increase its power vis-
à-vis the United States and Soviet Union. Moreover, the grouping of Western European 
countries might serve as an insurance policy against either the United States or the Soviet Union 
leaving the world organisation in the future. The idea of regional machinery feeding into an 
international order—or serving as a backup should the international order break down—had 
remained a fundamental organising principle for Jebb since the earliest iteration of his Four 
Power Plan. 
The question of a Western Security Group had lingered into February, with little 
attention paid to it during the Crimea Conference.848 The Foreign Office had yet to respond to 
Churchill’s message of 31 December, though the Prime Minister had followed up in February 
with another message to Eden, writing that the idea of British security being dependent on it 
taking responsibility for ‘a cluster of feeble states’ was ridiculous. ‘We ought to think of 
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something better’, he said.849 Even if they were to entertain the idea of a Western Bloc, he felt 
that there would first need to be an Anglo-French treaty, and he was insistent that the French 
be the first to recommend such a bilateral alliance. A meeting with the French Foreign Minister, 
Georges Bidault, in February further stalled the initiative, however, with the Quai d’Orsay 
hinting that such an Anglo-French treaty was dependent on Paris and London coming to terms 
on the future treatment of Germany as well as the crisis in the Levant.850  
The Foreign Office, however, continued to consider the issue, due in part to reports 
from their ambassadors in Brussels and Paris. Significantly, these diplomats began to see the 
value of the treaty as not only a protection against Germany and possibly Russia, but also as a 
check on France. As the Ambassador to Belgium, Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, warned Eden 
on 20 February, ‘Belgium looks for British support as an offset to the French pressure which 
she fears.’851 A month later, he followed up with a similar message, noting that France was 
showing ‘definite signs’ of a policy which might be directly at odds with British interests. 
Belgium and Holland, he added, were relationships which Britain could not afford to overlook. 
‘The link between ourselves and the Low Countries is so ancient and so vital that it is really a 
law of nature in the politico-strategic sphere.’852 On 11 March, a telegram from Duff Cooper, 
then British Ambassador in Paris, echoed Knatchbull-Hugessen’s suspicions and called for a 
decisive line from London. His recommendation was for Britain to take up the initiative and 
attempt to create a political and military alliance with France. Should London refuse, the 
French would likely lead a Western Bloc of nations, which could, should the world organisation 
not come to have the influence originally envisioned, possibly lead to France—together with 
its ally Russia—exercising a dangerous influence in Europe. This outcome, he warned, would 
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‘leave us in a position of dangerous isolation’.853 
The view in the Foreign Office was one of concern. Officials were somewhat suspicious 
of French intentions in Western Europe, and they feared that if they did not take the lead in the 
region, then France would not hesitate to assume the mantle. In the internal discussions which 
took place, Jebb admitted that, should France occupy the Rhine area as far north as Cologne, 
Belgian independence would be in jeopardy. Because they could not yet guarantee French 
friendship in the future, Jebb said, ‘this might be a very dangerous situation for us.’ 854 
Likewise, John Troutbeck of the new German Department, wrote that the Belgians are ‘fully 
justified in their fear of French ambitions’.855 Jebb and others in the Foreign Office pushed for 
the government to continue to pursue an Anglo-French treaty which might make up the basis 
of a wider regional defence organisation including Belgium, Holland, and eventually Norway 
and Denmark. Such an arrangement would accomplish several objectives, including checking 
the power of Germany, preserving the independence of small states, and preventing France 
itself from dominating the region. Added to this was the idea that the all-important international 
order would be more firmly supported. As Knatchbull-Hugessen put it, the ‘triangle-frame’ of 
the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union would suffer ‘unless the smaller 
regional pieces fall into their place in the general structure’.856 
Though there was serious consideration in these months about the Foreign Office 
moving ahead with the construction of an alliance with Belgium and Holland—and later 
France, Norway and Denmark—this was eventually decided against. Eden, not to mention 
Churchill, believed that carrying France was the prerequisite; and even into April, Cadogan 
remained optimistic of the French seeking an Anglo-French pact. It was ultimately decided 
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within the Foreign Office that they would wait to take up such an alliance until after the 
conference on world organisation. As Harvey explained, ‘Whilst the need for the [Western 
European] Group as our long-term policy is very clear, it is less certain whether the moment is 
a good one, on the eve of the San Francisco.’857  
 
‘World Organisation or Alliances?’: A Foreign Office reassessment  
Although the Foreign Office would put the Western Security Group on hold, their intention to 
one day create such a pact meant that they would continue to be the foremost proponents of the 
world organisation making sufficient room for regional organisations. Importantly, however, 
officials understood the need to strike a balance. While the world organisation would need to 
allow for such alliances and pacts, these could not usurp the authority of the Security Council. 
To do so would not only weaken the organisation, but it would also drive the United States 
away and potentially allow the Franco-Soviet Treaty to become the most important ordering 
mechanism on the European continent.  
 In the run up to the San Francisco Conference, the French posed the biggest challenge 
to this Foreign Office approach. Concerned over how quickly the world organisation could 
respond to future aggression, French officials had proposed an amendment to the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals which would allow alliances to operate outside the control of the Security 
Council. The parties undertaking action would simply need to inform the Security Council of 
their actions. The recent Franco-Soviet Alliance, as Nevile Butler pointed out, was at present 
the only guarantee the French had against a hostile Germany in the future, and they wanted to 
ensure that it could be as effective as possible.858  It was a proposal which some in the Foreign 
Office thought could wreck the entire organisation. Worse, the Northern Department estimated 
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that Russia, given their recent treaty with France, would likely support such a measure.859 The 
situation left British officials scrambling for a response. On the recommendation of the Foreign 
Office, the APW Committee warned against accepting the French idea, making it clear that any 
enforcement action in the future should be taken as a result of Security Council decisions and 
not individual treaty obligations.860  
The question was one of grave importance, for it struck at the heart of how the 
organisation would undertake its primary purpose: the maintenance of peace and security. In 
searching for a way to reassure the French, Butler suggested Senator Vandenberg’s idea for a 
five-power treaty which would be designed to protect against Germany and Japan. Such a 
proposal, he felt, would provide for some measure of ‘unity’ prior to the conference and ‘would 
be justified by the weakening of confidence since Yalta’.861 Cadogan noted that the entire 
question raised a ‘difficult and delicate matter’, but the central divergence revolved around the 
possibility that the great powers might take action in opposition to the wishes of their 
counterparts in the Security Council. This was a fundamental problem, as it would, in practice, 
violate the principle of unanimity among the great powers. When the matter arrived on Eden’s 
desk, the Foreign Secretary largely agreed with Cadogan, but he felt that the idea of a five-
power alliance was worth examining in detail.862 
In a paper titled ‘World Organisation or Alliances?’, Jebb assessed whether British 
interests could, going forward, be secured by a world organisation or an ‘interlocking series of 
alliances’. The latter represented an ‘alternative’ international order, he felt, as opposed to 
arrangements which might reinforce a world organisation. While both had their merits, ‘The 
great danger’, he warned, ‘is that we may resolutely pursue neither one policy nor the other 
and consequently find ourselves in the worst position, namely without a World Organisation 
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and without adequate alliances.’ As a starting point, he reiterated that the ‘principal objective’ 
for the United Kingdom was to bind the United States into concrete commitments in Europe. 
One way to do this was to establish a treaty with the United States, though he doubted whether 
there was an American appetite for such an alliance. For one, many Americans were likely to 
associate treaty obligations with ‘power politics’. Instead, the fact remained that in order to 
secure commitments from the United States, a wider world organisation was a necessity.  
The French thesis, however, presented a serious obstacle. If adopted, Jebb was clear 
that it would ‘prejudice the whole future of the World Organisation’. Such an arrangement—
whereby great powers, operating through an alliance, might be able to take action regardless 
of the view of the Security Council—would, in effect, lessen the influence of the Security 
Council to something like that of the Council of the League of Nations. Far from negating the 
formation of alliances, however, Jebb saw the benefits that such arrangements could bring, 
provided they were in line with the purpose and principles of the organisation and they 
remained subordinate to the Security Council. Importantly, they would also serve as an 
important insurance policy against the possibility of the United States or the Soviet Union 
opting out of the world organisation in the future. His recommendation was that the Foreign 
Office should make a concerted effort to convince their French and Soviet counterparts of the 
inherent difficulties contained in the French proposal. ‘No suggestions that [the Security 
Council] would be ‘too slow in action’ should be allowed to militate against its being ultimately 
entrusted with full responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security all over the world.’ 
Jebb’s paper went on to make up the basis of the British position on the matter, and copies of 
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No ‘theoretical security organisation’: The Foreign Office prepares for San Francisco 
Although the most detailed planning had been completed and the most contentious differences 
between the great powers had been resolved, the possibility remained that the majority of the 
countries within the United Nations could still reject the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and in 
turn, prevent the creation of an international organisation. Thus, the great powers would need 
to ‘sell’ the merits of the organisation while not sacrificing the essential structure and function 
of the machinery outlined at Dumbarton Oaks.864 For the United States, this meant a domestic 
public relations campaign and an effort to bring their Latin American neighbours on board.865 
While the Foreign Office did not represent a traditionally isolationist public as in the United 
States, they did work to bring around key stakeholders, especially the Dominion governments, 
whose support at the conference was considered vital for British influence.  
On 13 March, leading figures within the League of Nations Union, including Lord 
Lytton, Professor Gilbert Murray and Lord Robert Cecil—the latter having been the key 
architect of the League of Nations on the British side—met with Eden, Jebb and Webster at the 
Foreign Office. The meeting was a snapshot of some of the continuities and change in British 
internationalism in the first half of the twentieth century. Cecil at first stressed the importance 
of bringing public opinion along, but his chief concern was the voting system in the Security 
Council, an arrangement which he felt ‘in effect made an alliance of the five powers’. He did 
not think that Eden could get the world ‘to accept a proposition so unjust’. Lord Lytton echoed 
this concern, noting that it would mark a ‘retreat from the position of the Covenant’. In reply, 
a defensive Eden made clear that it was not to be solely ‘a theoretical security organisation for 
the maintenance of peace’.866 The relationship and collaboration of the great powers, Eden 
stressed, was the lens through which the Foreign Office viewed the potential of the world 
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organisation, and it was essential to get these powers ‘round the table’ from the start. 867 
The approach of the Foreign Office was not entirely one of defence, however. In the 
months leading up to the conference, the Economic and Reconstruction Department, in 
particular, worked to offer amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals which, if accepted, 
would further increase the power of the Security Council. The first related to the Council’s 
ability to make recommendations in disputes which did not affect the maintenance of peace 
and security. Whereas the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had given the Council the power to 
investigate these kinds of disputes, it did not give them the authority to recommend potential 
solutions or settlements.868 The next proposed amendment concerned domestic jurisdiction, 
and it suggested that the Council have the right to intervene in the affairs of other states if they 
deemed a situation to be a threat to international peace and security. On the minds of such 
officials as Jebb, Webster and Cadogan was the Nazi policies towards the Jewish populations 
of Germany; but essential in their consideration was the fact that the Security Council not be 
allowed to interfere in matters which was not deemed a ‘threat to the peace’.869  
In addition to their own suggested amendments, the Foreign Office worked to 
incorporate the views of the Dominion governments where possible and also to oppose their 
suggestions when needed. Some examples included Canada’s longtime desire for certain 
states—namely those who had contributed to the war effort in significant ways—to receive 
weighted consideration when it came to the election of non-permanent members of the Security 
Council. Due to a compromise offered by Cadogan, the United Kingdom adopted the line that, 
in selecting non-permanent members to the Security Council, ‘due regard’ should be given to 
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their contribution to the maintenance of peace and security.870 Another Canadian suggestion—
that non-members of the council not be bound by decisions taken in that body, except in 
agreement with them or through a two-thirds vote of the Assembly—was resisted by the 
Foreign Office who felt that such a proposal would ‘deprive the organisation of teeth and of 
the power of rapid action’.871  While there was a serious interest in trying to incorporate 
Dominion suggestions into the structure and functioning of the organisation, there was the 
recognition that first, the British had already gone some way to ensure these recommendations 
were included in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and second, that as much as they sought to 
help the Dominion governments, the British—especially after Yalta—had certain ‘moral 
obligations’ to stay true to the essential pillars of the three power cooperation.872  
By the beginning of April, the majority of Foreign Office amendments had been 
approved—first by the APW Committee and then by the War Cabinet—and they now faced 
their final pre-conference obstacle: gaining the support of the Dominions.873 On 4 April, the 
leaders of the Dominion governments gathered in London for the annual Commonwealth 
Conference, which ended up dealing almost entirely with the forthcoming discussions on world 
organisation. There was agreement on certain key points which would go directly into the 
future United Nations Charter. One of the more notable was a draft of the preamble submitted 
by Field Marshall Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa. 874  When it was tabled, Lord 
Cranborne noted that the Foreign Office, and in particular Webster, had produced such a draft 
months earlier. In the penultimate meeting of the conference, a revised draft incorporating 
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Webster’s and Smuts’s original versions was submitted and approved.875 The revised version 
would make up the basis of the future preamble of the United Nations Charter, though Webster 
was to downplay his contribution on this issue.876  
The Commonwealth Conference also offered the Foreign Office a sample of more 
difficulties to come over the voting question. The New Zealand representatives, in particular, 
found it ‘wrong in principle’ that a permanent member of the Security Council might be able 
to veto enforcement action against itself. Others, such as Hume Wrong, then the Canadian 
Associate Under-Secretary for External Affairs, understood that great powers would need to 
reserve the right to veto action against itself, but he objected to the idea that a great power 
might have the ability to veto what constituted a threat to international security. Eden addressed 
some of these concerns during the meeting, noting that while the principle of unanimity was a 
key characteristic of the League of Nations, the intention of the great powers was to limit that 
principle to a smaller group of states going forward, thereby ensuring that the organisation’s 
ability to maintain peace would be more effective.877 The Commonwealth Conference ended 
without agreement between the United Kingdom and the Dominions on this point, a schism 
which was to become somewhat of an embarrassment to the Foreign Office in the forthcoming 
negotiations. Weeks later, as the San Francisco Conference was in full swing, the British 
delegation found that some of their toughest opponents on this question were their own 




875 BCM (45) 11th meeting, 12 April 1945, copy in Webster 13/8, LSE. For Webster’s earlier drafts, see FO 
371/40725/U8785. Christof Heyns, ‘The Preamble of the United Nations Charter: The Contribution of Jan Smuts’, 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law 7:2 (1995), p. 335 
876 Webster diary, 26 June 1945, Reynolds and Hughes, Historian as Diplomat, pp. 69-73 
877 BCM (45) 6th Meeting, 9 April 1945, Webster 13/8, LSE 
	 276 
‘How can we work with these animals?’ Anglo-Soviet tension at the San Francisco 
Conference  
Hours before the San Francisco Conference opened on the afternoon of 25 April, the forces of 
the Western Allies had established contact with the Red Army near the German town of Strehla. 
This long-awaited military triumph, however, did not seem to lighten the mood between the 
Russian delegation and their American and British counterparts.878 Early Soviet objections to 
the American chairmanship of the conference, combined with differences over whether the 
Ukraine, White Russia, the Lublin Polish government and Argentina should be invited to the 
conference, left many in doubt as to whether the great powers could come together for this final 
stretch. The tension was such that Eden wrote to the Foreign Office that the Americans were 
‘becoming increasingly apprehensive of Molotov’s technique of obstruction and seem to be 
inclining in favour of a showdown’.879   
For the sake of the conference and the future international organisation, the British were 
determined to work with the Russians; but in these months, few in the Foreign Office were 
sanguine about the threat Moscow posed to western influence across Europe. Poland continued 
to be the source of suspicion, with the British growing increasingly certain that Moscow did 
not intend to honour the terms agreed at Yalta, namely those which stipulated that the three 
powers were to be involved in any discussions on the future of the Polish government. British 
fears were confirmed to some extent when, on 3 May, they received word that 15 Polish 
representatives affiliated with the exiled Polish government in London were captured. It had 
been a blatant contradiction of Molotov’s earlier promise to not interfere. 880  Cadogan 
considered the chances of such cooperation to be ‘hopeless’. ‘How can one work with these 
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animals?’, Cadogan wrote, ‘And if one can’t, what can one hope for in Europe?’881 The military 
situation in Europe also shaped these crucial diplomatic considerations. While many were in a 
celebratory mood at the imminent defeat of Nazi Germany, others warned that the position of 
Russia could not be ignored. Early into the conference, Eden and Cadogan handed a message 
to Edward Stettinius which urged American forces to continue their advance into 
Czechoslovakia, and in particular Prague, in order to create some Anglo-American leverage 
when it came to orchestrating the post-war settlement in that country.882 
Though the State Department would decline this suggestion, Anglo-American 
cooperation appeared formidable in the early days of the conference. The collaborative 
approach between the two powers—throughout the war and more recently during discussions 
in Washington prior to the conference—continued at San Francisco, where the Atlantic allies 
remained in close contact, often meeting behind the scenes on both the ministerial and official 
level. Later in the conference, Cadogan remarked that the Americans and British had fared well 
in shooting down amendments which sought to significantly alter the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals. Senator Connally of the American delegation, in particular, had ‘the gift of the gab’ 
and his oratory, coupled with Cadogan’s knowledge of the complex questions, led the 
Permanent Under-Secretary to remark that ‘he’s our heavy artillery and I am the sniper.’883 The 
British delegation was far from the American sidekick that some previous histories of the San 
Francisco Conference have portrayed.884 Nevile Butler reported that Stettinius leaned ‘a good 
deal’ on Eden, while some reporters suggested that, ‘it seems to be the American policy at San 
Francisco to play along with Britain vis-a-vis the Russians.’ 885  Still, for Foreign Office 
officials, it was agreed that the Americans could take all the credit they desired if it meant their 
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country committing to the organisation. As Butler noted, ‘We want people to love us, and not 
make odious comparisons.’886 
 
Crises of the conference: The regional organisation and veto questions  
The debates over the power of regional alliances relative to the international organisation and 
the veto question were the two most significant of the conference.887 Both raised fundamental 
questions about the nature of the organisation, and in each case, the Foreign Office defended 
views which they had held over the preceding years. At its root, the regional question dealt 
with a simple concept: whether, from a security perspective, the future international order 
would be determined by the machinery of regional alliances or the world organisation. 
Although the Foreign Office had earlier given their support for a French amendment which 
would allow a regional alliance freedom of action should the Security Council not reach a 
decision on that particular dispute, another amendment introduced by the Soviet Union on this 
question forced a larger debate.888 Soviet representatives had suggested an amendment which 
would have made all of their existing treaties exempt from approval by the Security Council, a 
proposal which caused Latin American states to demand that a similar provision be made for 
the recently signed Act of Chapultepec, a non-binding agreement in which Latin American 
republics—as well as the United States—promised to defend one another in case of attack. 
Importantly, the United States supported them in this effort, hoping to add to the Charter a 
provision which would allow for states to undertake regional action in ‘collective self-
defence’.889 The Foreign Office felt that such a suggestion gave too much freedom of action to 
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regional groupings, and Eden warned Stettinius that it would lead to ‘regionalism of the worst 
kind’.890 
There remained a strong desire among Foreign Office officials to limit the ability of 
regional groupings to operate entirely outside of the Security Council’s authority. Members of 
the British delegation felt that the Latin American states—and even the American delegation, 
to a certain extent, were risking the authority of the Council. ‘The single tree of 
Chapultepec…seems to loom infinitely larger in their horizon than the entire forest of 
Dumbarton Oaks’, one official wrote.891 Back in London, members of the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department who had remained in London expressed their concern with the 
recent proposals of other delegations, warning that, ‘There will not be much left of the Security 
Council’s authority by the time the conference ends.’892 In the minds of some British officials 
was Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which stated that the organisation 
would not override international agreements or understandings such as the Monroe Doctrine. 
Such a situation, Eden believed, would leave the Security Council on a ‘very thin covering’. 
He made it clear to Stettinius that he could not sign a charter which contained such 
amendments. On this point, however, the Americans remained firm, and Eden eventually 
agreed to their proposal for ‘collective self-defence’, so long as there was no reference to the 
Act of Chapultepec.893 While other histories have sought to portray a serious divergence of 
views between the Americans and British on this point, in reality, the views of each delegation 
did not diverge on the essential point of maintaining the Security Council’s authority over 
regional pacts.894 Webster himself considered it a great achievement, noting that with Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter, the British delegation had secured a ‘victory for the global 
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as against the regional point of view’, in that they were able to keep the ‘dominance of the 
central organisation’.895  
While the regional organisation debate forced uncomfortable discussions—especially 
between the British and the Americans—the question of great power voting rights once again 
threatened to destroy the organisation. At a committee meeting on 17 May, Peter Fraser, the 
New Zealand Prime Minister, asked that the great powers explain the ‘scope, extent and effect 
of the voting and veto proposals’ so that they might have a better idea of what was at stake.896 
It fell to Cadogan, as the British representative on the council that day, to describe what had 
been decided at Yalta just three months prior. While the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
he explained, had allowed for all members to exercise veto power, in the new organisation, the 
secondary powers would be deprived of the veto. It was an arrangement, he told the delegations 
gathered, that might seem ‘unequal’ but it was not ‘unreasonable’. The five powers, he pointed 
out, had and would continue to have the responsibility for maintaining peace and security, not 
to mention that, taken together, they represented more than half the population of the world. In 
international politics, he said, ‘you have got to accept the inequalities you find.’ At the same 
time, Cadogan assured those gathered, the five great powers would not be able to simply dictate 
terms to the rest of the world. Seven votes of the members of the Security Council—including 
all the permanent members—would be required in order for that body to enforce action, while 
no member could prevent a matter from being discussed by the council.897 ‘Although there may 
be theoretical criticisms of these proposals, they do represent something that we can do within 
the limits of reality, and that they will constitute a contribution to the maintenance of peace.’898 
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At the end of Cadogan’s speech, Fraser, clearly impressed by the performance, asked that 
Cadogan’s speech be printed and circulated to all delegations.  
Despite Cadogan’s explanation, many of the smaller powers were not convinced. 
Though they accepted that the great powers—given the military capabilities of the United 
Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, in particular—should have the right to veto 
any enforcement action within the Security Council, their objection to the veto came in the 
realm of the peaceful settlement of disputes. In other words, when a dispute did not involve a 
threat to the maintenance of peace and security. In these cases, they did not think that the great 
powers should be able to prevent the discussion of disputes or the recommendation of 
settlements. The British delegation relayed to the Foreign Office that the basic idea of a great 
power veto clearly revealed ‘the uneasiness’ of the smaller powers, and privately, Cadogan 
told the British delegation that the small powers might make the veto issue ‘the occasion of a 
demonstration against the Great Powers’.899 Worse, the British delegation considered Australia 
and New Zealand to be the ‘protagonists’ of the smaller powers working against such interests 
of the Security Council. Though their opposition had earlier been voiced at the Commonwealth 
Conference in April, it was their intention at San Francisco, stated H.V. Evatt, the head of the 
Australian delegation, ‘to remove from the charter a dangerous blot’.900  
The smaller powers decided to issue a 23-point questionnaire to the great powers about 
the interpretation of veto, to which the great powers decided that their responses should be 
made collectively, to ensure solidarity against the challenges from the smaller powers. It was 
during this process, however, that the Soviet delegation began to protest a technicality—
namely, whether or not a procedural issue within the Security Council was itself subject to a 
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veto.901 Taken to its logical end, this would lead to a set up whereby a permanent member could 
effectively veto the discussion of a dispute, based ostensibly on procedural grounds. This 
scenario was what the smaller powers referred to as the ‘hidden veto’ and the debate it stoked 
led Webster to consider it the ‘crisis of the conference’.902 ‘It hardly seems possible’, he 
lamented, ‘that [the conference] can survive and bring the Charter into existence’.903 
As the conference threatened to collapse, Cadogan took the lead on the issue within the 
British delegation. Though some British and American officials—Jebb and Leo Pasvolsky 
included—were sympathetic to the Soviet line, others, such as Webster, were alarmed at what 
this would mean for the functioning of the Security Council. Webster cautioned Cadogan on 
this point, and the Permanent Under-Secretary, in turn, agreed with the professor. At a cocktail 
party on the evening of the 26th—hosted by Halifax to celebrate the anniversary of the Anglo-
Soviet Alliance—Cadogan spent nearly the entirety of the night in discussion with Soviet 
delegate Andrei Gromyko, who he thought was ‘too frightened of Moscow to depart by a single 
hair’s breadth from his instructions’.904 More importantly, despite their earlier agreement that 
the permanent members could not veto discussion or consideration of a dispute, the Soviets 
now showed signs of ‘wobbling’ on this point.905 As the British delegation waited for Gromyko 
to receive direction on the issue, Cadogan wrote to the Foreign Office asking for approval of 
his recommended line. Here he suggested that the British delegation ‘stand fast on this crucial 
point provided we carry the Americans and Chinese or at least the former with us’. He 
continued,  
It should in other words be established beyond a shadow of doubt, and so provided 
in the Charter, that the discussion and consideration in the Security Council of any 
question brought before it by any state by the assembly or by the Secretary General 
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shall…not be blocked by any one permanent member.906  
 
When the question was put to the Economic and Reconstruction Department, Paul Falla 
and J.G. Ward were divided in their views, with the former open to accepting the Russian 
proposal if need be, and the latter seeing the ability of a great power to decide what was 
procedural to be a retrograde step. It was pointed out that Churchill, in discussions with Stalin, 
had said that it was important that the three great powers not assume ‘the position of rulers 
over the rest of the world without even allowing other nations to state their case’.907 Eden 
settled the matter by agreeing that Cadogan's approach should be followed.908 
This negotiating line was to take on increasing importance, when, on 1 June, Gromyko 
returned to his counterparts with the decision from Moscow. In effect, the Russians had 
returned to the basic question of whether the permanent members could veto discussion of 
disputes, regardless of whether it was a procedural matter or not. To do otherwise, he said, 
would be a ‘retreat from Yalta’.909 In a message to the Foreign Office, Cadogan wrote that, 
‘There is no disguising the fact that a head-on clash with the Russian has now developed.’910 
In a message to his wife, however, he was more adamant that the Russian position was not 
simply about the functional dynamics of the Security Council. 
It’s simply arguing about words, on the surface, but it is of course a symptom of 
something much deeper—Russian suspicions and unwillingness to cooperate. How 
to cure those I really don’t know. And I don’t know whether it’s better to have a 
good rough show-down with the Russians, or to attempt to go on coaxing them. I 
am inclined to think the former.911  
 
At this point, Cadogan and others were considering what was to come of the conference. 
To prevent an entire dissolution, some recommended that they adjourn the conference and 
return at a later date; while others suggested continuing to draft the charter but to leave out this 
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particular question surrounding the veto until a later date.912 Frustration was directed at the 
Russians, but at the same time, others pointed to the disruptive role played by the smaller 
powers. Webster felt that some, especially Evatt, had succeeded in ‘driving a wedge’ between 
the Soviet Union and the other great powers. Thinking that the behaviour of the smaller powers 
might very well wreck the international organisation at this late stage, he wrote angrily that, 
‘The prospect of a completely lawless world must make them pause—or must it?—as so many 
of them seem to have no sense of responsibility at all.’913  
Meetings between the great powers continued, however, with the British holding fast to 
the line recommended by Cadogan. They succeeded in bringing onside the Americans, 
Chinese, and French, all of whom were clear that, given past agreement on this very point about 
the veto powers of the permanent members, they could not now renege. The British and 
American delegations stayed close on this point and continued to hold private meetings in 
Stettinius’s private penthouse. The goal, first and foremost, was to keep the Russians in the 
organisation. On this point, the British delegation and the Foreign Office notified Churchill, 
who they thought might, in conjunction with US President Harry Truman, send an appeal to 
Stalin to resolve the outstanding issue.914 On receiving this recommendation, Churchill pointed 
out that he had repeatedly reassured the Russians that the great powers, under the Yalta 
formula, were safe from sanctions being applied against them. ‘All [the Russians] would have 
to suffer would be to be forced to hear any case of complaint from a small power and defend 
themselves or not, as they chose.’915 The Prime Minister sided with the Foreign Office and 
counselled that, ‘To give way on this point would destroy the whole purpose and prestige of 
the Organisation.’916 
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Despite the scramble by Foreign Office officials and the Prime Minister to give detailed 
instructions to the delegation in San Francisco, a telegram eventually arrived from Moscow in 
which Stalin said that what had been the subject of such intense debate amounted to an 
‘insignificant matter’ and that the Soviet Union supported the position of the British and the 
Americans.917 Much of this was down to Harry Hopkins, who, operating as a special envoy of 
the US President, had spoken with Stalin in Moscow and gone some way to explain the 
outstanding issues.918 Now that the great powers had resolved their dispute over the ‘hidden 
veto’ question, they returned the questionnaire to the smaller powers and sought to extinguish, 
once and for all, their protests against the veto.  
Even as the great powers resolved their differences on this crucial point, there remained 
some steady resistance to the veto question, however, with Australia and New Zealand 
providing some of the strongest criticism.919 On 9 June, the Australian delegation, supported 
by the New Zealand delegation, voiced opposition to the idea that a great power could prevent 
recommendations for the pacific settlement of disputes. In a rebuttal to a speech by Evatt, 
Webster delivered an impassioned defence of the great power position. He noted that the rule 
of unanimity had been present in the League of Nations for the last 25 years, and that the 
smaller powers had never questioned it. To think that the world organisation could, through 
established mechanisms, take action against one of the great powers would prove to be 
catastrophic, as it would mean another world war. He added that the great powers retained a 
special position due, in part, to the ‘blood, sweat and tears’ they had sacrificed during the 
war.920 When Evatt repeated his opposition days later, the great powers again united in their 
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defence of the basic structure of the organisation. To drive the point home, Senator Tom 
Connally of the American delegation tore up a sheet of paper in front of Evatt—an indication, 
he said, of what would happen to the charter should the voting formula be rejected.921 In a more 
measured speech, Lord Halifax stressed the traditional role of the United Kingdom as the great 
power who had long defended the rights of small states in the organisation, but he also made 
clear that great power cooperation was the essential nucleus of world peace. Without it, there 
would be rival power blocs and a return to war.922 In what was a victory for the permanent 
members of the Security Council, the Yalta voting formula eventually passed by a vote of 30 
to 2 on 13 June.923 The majority of smaller nations, while they did not agree with the voting 
formula in theory, accepted that it was necessary to have a ‘defective’ organisation rather than 
no organisation at all.924 
Though the voting issue was the most important of the conference, there were a number 
of other questions which were settled and enshrined in the United Nations Charter. 
Unfortunately for Cadogan, Jebb and Webster, their efforts to give the Security Council 
increased authority to intervene in domestic affairs were defeated, a decision they thought 
withdrew from the organisation ‘the power to intervene against outbreaks of intolerance of the 
kind which led to the present war’.925 Elsewhere, both the World Court and the Military Staff 
Committee were brought into the Charter, the latter having been a key enforcement mechanism 
in Jebb and Webster’s earlier plans. On the issue of trusteeship, the American and British 
delegations at the conference worked together to produce a draft which made up the basis of 
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discussions.926 In the end, it was decided to create a Trusteeship Council which would oversee 
a wider trusteeship system, the latter of which was intended ‘to promote the political, 
economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories and 
their progressive development towards self-government or independence’. Important for 
British officials, however, was that the United States stuck with what had been agreed to 
between Churchill and Stettinius at Yalta. Though the United Kingdom would not have to hand 
over its overseas possessions, in reality, the Charter’s new provisions related to trusteeship 
were to play an essential role in building momentum for later de-colonisation.927  
If ‘solemn deliberation’ had marked the opening of the conference on 25 April, a mood 
which can only be described as exuberance marked its conclusion. On 26 June, the delegations 
gathered in the Herbst Theatre, just across from the War Memorial Opera House where the 
majority of negotiations had taken place. Lord Halifax, who had been the Foreign Secretary 
when questions of post-war aims were first raised within the Cabinet, signed for the United 
Kingdom. For Jebb and Webster, it marked a moment of triumph, and both men took to 
celebrating with the British delegation in San Francisco. Elsewhere, Cadogan, who had 
returned to London weeks before, turned his attention to Anglo-French relations in the Levant.  
The signing of the United Nations Charter marked the end of the most pivotal period in 
the entirety of Foreign Office planning for a post-war organisation. Ironically, it was in the 
final stages of negotiating the United Nations Organization—namely at Yalta and San 
Francisco—that its creation seemed to be most in doubt. The changing relationship with the 
Soviet Union—sparked, in part, by the Kremlin’s actions in Romania and Poland—played a 
role, as did the protestations of the smaller powers. As this chapter has shown, the Foreign 
Office, even in the months leading up to the conference, still questioned whether, and to what 
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extent, the creation of a world organisation would deliver on their post-war foreign policy 
objectives. These British officials remained a steadying force in these months, however, first 
in preparing for the conference and then helping to deliver the Charter in a form that did not 
alter or detract in any serious way from the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Jebb served an 
important role in articulating how regional alliances might relate to the organisation, a position 
which led the British delegation at San Francisco to ensure—even in the face of American, 
Soviet and French opposition—that the Security Council retained its authority. At the 
conference itself, both Webster and Cadogan were crucial figures in the defence of the Yalta 
voting formula, whether in opposition to renewed Soviet objections or in response to 
formidable protests by the smaller powers. The result was a diplomatic achievement of the first 
order—namely, the creation of a new world organisation which was seen to work in the 




The establishment of the United Nations Organization was undoubtedly a great 
achievement for the Foreign Office and in particular, for Cadogan, Jebb and Webster. But as 
the three men took in the proceedings at the first United Nations General Assembly in January 
1946, described in the opening to this thesis, a pessimism was already growing. Cadogan, who 
privately referred to the Soviets as ‘animals’ during the San Francisco Conference, began to 
view relations between the great powers as irreparable. After a frustrating day at the 
Preparatory Commission in November 1945, he wrote that the new organisation was becoming 
‘a parody of the League, with all the failings and no advantages, that I can see’.928 When he 
became Britain’s first Permanent Representative to the United Nations in February 1946, 
Cadogan would witness first-hand the breakdown of great power cooperation which Foreign 
Office planners had originally viewed as the central foundation of the international system. It 
was no better for Jebb, who succeeded Cadogan to that post in 1950 and wrote two years later 
that, ‘Let us frankly recognize the comparative weakness of the United Nations as an 
instrument for providing the physical force to resist aggression.’929 
From the late 1940s through the fall of the Berlin Wall, the rules-based international 
order which the organisation embodied had been overshadowed by a larger competition 
between the Soviet Union and the Western allies. This did not mark an end to the United 
Nations nor to the international system is sought to orchestrate, however. By the time the Soviet 
Union collapsed in 1989, American and British statesmen would speak of a ‘Liberal 
International Order’—which had as one of its pillars the organisation created in 1945—as 
having triumphed.  
In the present day, the debate over the future of this rules-based order has led some to 
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examine its foundations once again.930 Too often in this pursuit, however, there is less attention 
paid to the motivations, the ideas, the individuals and the circumstances that ushered it into 
existence. The aim of this thesis has been to explore one aspect of this history—namely, the 
role of Foreign Office officials in helping to create the United Nations Organization—and in 
turn, shed light on what was a unique approach to constructing an international order.  
From its inception, the Economic and Reconstruction Department proved itself willing 
and capable of addressing the fundamental questions of a future order. It replaced what had 
been a reactive and largely futile effort by Cabinet members to develop war aims with what 
became an operating ethos, laid down by Gladwyn Jebb, to be the ‘master and not the victim 
of events’.931 The emphasis on charting a ‘grand strategy of peace’, in Richard Law’s words, 
is what allowed the department to become the engine room of post-war political planning, not 
only within the Foreign Office, but across government ministries. 932  By the time of the 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference, its focus on big-picture, long-term strategy had lived up to 
Stafford Cripps’s desire to see a planning body which would allow the United Kingdom to 
meet the Americans and Soviets ‘on equal terms’.933  
Perceptions of American planning, in particular, helped drive and even shape that of 
Britain, but did not determine it. An early calculation made within the Foreign Office was that 
British interests in the post-war period would be dependent on whether they could bring the 
United States into the defence of the European order. This understanding—best represented by 
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the comment of one Foreign Office official that the Americans ‘are going to make our world 
or mar it’—meant that it would be necessary to go some way towards accepting the plans of 
the Roosevelt administration. But crucially, the Foreign Office did not have very far to go. For 
one, the idea of an international order—and an international organisation at the heart of that 
order—was as present in British minds as it was within those of the Roosevelt administration, 
a point which became clear in the drafting of the Atlantic Charter. Second, British officials, 
like their counterparts in Washington, understood from their experience of the League of 
Nations that a less cumbersome and more effective system needed to be developed whereby 
the organisation would be able to mobilise adequate military power to resist aggression. Thus, 
when it became clear that Roosevelt was envisioning a four power nucleus at the centre of a 
wider organisation, the Foreign Office was attracted to the proposal, seeing it as a way to 
prevent the rise of Germany and Japan in the future and at the same time, allowing the United 
Kingdom to maintain its position as a world power.  
Importantly, however, Jebb hoped to craft British ideas onto this basic conception, most 
notably in the form of regional structures, economic and social organisations and a possible 
international organisation. The regional approach, in particular, was one that British planners 
originally hoped might possibly give rise to an international organisation. Not only were British 
concerns on stabilising the European continent, but the Manchurian crisis in the early 1930s 
had laid bare the fact that countries would not be willing to commit men and material to prevent 
aggression unless they felt their interests directly threatened. Though the regionalist approach 
would eventually fade by the end of 1943— due, in part, to American opposition—the decision 
to begin planning for an international organisation meant that the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department, by the spring of 1944, was able to deliver on ideas which had been progressing in 
parallel over the previous year.  
The department was not the only grouping within Britain thinking about the structure 
	 292 
of a post-war international order—or more particularly, a world organisation—but they quickly 
distinguished themselves as the individuals who could balance big ideas for international order 
with a furtherance of national and imperial interests. Early on, Jebb criticised intellectuals such 
as HG Wells and Clarence Streit who he considered ‘starry-eyed idealists’, as well as others, 
such as Arnold Toynbee and his World Order Study Group, who he thought were ‘long-haired 
theoreticians’ promoting grand schemes for world government. His criticism of the latter 
grouping was, at times, shockingly arrogant, as was his view that the League of Nations had 
been the ‘Professors’ Peace’. The one intellectual who he did value, however, was Charles 
Webster, who he considered to be a ‘great power man’ with an ‘encyclopaedic knowledge’ of 
past international organisations, and therefore, more in touch with the realities of international 
politics. While this characterisation was true to a certain extent, Webster could also display a 
somewhat radical version of internationalism, as evidenced by his articles supporting the 
‘gradual evolution’ towards a world state, which appeared in The Times in the late 1930s. 
In their wartime planning, however, Jebb, Webster and other officials including 
Cadogan, developed plans for the post-war world which combined both realist and 
internationalist notions. At the beginning of the planning process, there was far more emphasis 
on power and national interest. Cadogan, in the early years of the war, had spoken of the 
experience of Munich as one which had returned ‘force securely to its throne’.934 On the other 
hand, Jebb’s earliest drafts—Relief Machinery: The Political Background and the Four Power 
Plan—were remarkable, both for their scope as well as their realist calculations. As one official 
wrote, it was not ‘some misty dream for the distant future’, but rather, ‘the stuff of current 
politics’.935 While the basic conception of a nucleus of great powers operating at the centre of 
a wider international order would last through to the creation of the United Nations 
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Organization, it would be masked to a great degree by more internationalist aspects.  
Much of this was due to the gradual incorporation of Charles Webster into the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department. From the moment he was asked to comment on 
Jebb’s plans in May 1943, he began to recommend traditional tenets of internationalism, most 
notably that the medium and small powers should be made to feel more influential within the 
international order, whether through their involvement (on a non-permanent basis) in a World 
Council or their making up a World Assembly.936 Elsewhere, his emphasis on the need for both 
economic and social organisations as well as mechanisms to be developed to facilitate the 
peaceful resolution of disputes were products of his belief that international affairs, since the 
early nineteenth century, had been moving in a progressively internationalist direction. Even 
Cadogan and Jebb, who tended to be more realist in their thinking, did not overlook the benefits 
of an international system ordered along political, legal and economic lines. They insisted, 
however, that should an international organisation come into existence, it would need to be 
‘less rigid’ than that of the League of Nations. The powers most capable and willing to use 
force would need to be free from the cumbersome procedure and restriction which had hindered 
the previous organisation during the interwar years. 
This approach, described in this thesis as ‘realist-internationalism’, was most evident 
in two areas of British planning as it developed between 1944 and 1945. First, even as the 
Foreign Office was progressing closer to the formation of a world organisation, officials 
continued to search for additional security guarantees as well as ways to increase their power 
relative to the Soviet Union and the United States. The formation of an alliance between the 
western democracies came to be seen as a way to achieve these objectives. Not only would it 
serve as a ‘hard and fast’ protection on the European continent (whether against Germany, 
	
936 Jebb later noted that, ‘The gradual modification of the various Foreign Office papers…so as to get them more 
in harmony with the idea of world organisation…was to a large extent [Webster’s] work.’ Jebb, ‘Review of 
Reynolds and Hughes’ Historian as Diplomat’, p. 480 
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Russia, and even France), but it would also help Britain to balance the power of the United 
States and the Soviet Union. This remained the case even a month after the United Nations 
Charter was signed, when Jebb wrote that the United Kingdom ‘is obviously less important 
than its two great Allies until and unless it can either develop a workable Commonwealth 
system…or establish some entity in Western Europe, or both’.937 Importantly, such an alliance 
was also seen by officials as a way to buttress rather than undermine a world organisation.  
Second, the great power concert dimension of the international organisation was ever 
present in the minds of British planners. It was this notion which defined Jebb and the Foreign 
Office’s earliest plans, and it remained the principle objective throughout. Nowhere was this 
more apparent than in January 1945, when, just as the three allies were preparing to meet in 
Yalta, Jebb and Cadogan briefly considered the formation of a five-power alliance in place of 
a world organisation. While this shocked Webster at the time, he, too, understood the necessity 
of the great powers working together to underpin a wider order. His belief that ‘power must be 
commensurate with responsibility’ effectively became an axiom within the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department in these years. At the San Francisco Conference, during an 
onslaught of challenges by smaller states against the proposed authority of the Security 
Council, Webster wrote to Halifax that ‘the heart of the organisation is still that concert of the 
Great Powers…inside an ordered system comprising states great and small.’938  
The idea of a ‘concert of great powers’ was one of the most notable differences in the 
way in which British and American planners conceptualised the nucleus of a future 
international order. Both Jebb and Webster were fond of the Concert system which had grown 
up in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars, but each man drew different insights from the history. 
For Jebb, the system was a model of great power cooperation, as evident, in his early plans, 
	
937 Memorandum by Jebb, ‘Reflections on San Francisco’, 25 July 1945, FO 371/50732/U5998 
938 Webster to Halifax, 18 May 1945, Webster 14/5, LSE 
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that the four powers might operate as a kind of ‘Concert of the World’. For Webster—an 
historian of the Congress of Vienna and the Concert system—it was the beginning of a modern 
internationalist order, in which the great powers brought in the smaller nations. Importantly, 
Webster felt it was Lord Castlereagh’s deftness in balancing the interests of the great and small 
powers which created a distinct tradition in British foreign policy.939 It was one which guided 
his thinking—and coloured his memoranda—throughout the period. 
In preparing a ‘grand strategy for peace’, Foreign Office officials also looked to 
another, more recent precedent in which an international order had been erected on the ruins 
of a world war. In a new way that has not been fully understood, despite its failure, the League 
of Nations became increasingly important as the planning for a future international organisation 
progressed. On this subject, the British made the most of their expertise. Indeed, after it had 
been decided at the Moscow Conference that an international organisation would be created, 
the Foreign Office planning was as influential, if not more, than that of the Americans or 
Soviets. Much of this was down to the work of Charles Webster, as well as other officials such 
as Cadogan, who had an intimate understanding of the League, including its weaknesses and 
strengths. Here, the focus on the mechanics of the organisation—how they would settle 
disputes, how they might allow for peaceful change, how they might enforce decisions with 
military power—were essential considerations. It was this more mechanical and technical 
usage of historical knowledge which helped strengthen their negotiating position at the 
Dumbarton Oaks discussions. Added to this was a deeper understanding of previous 
precedents, such as the Concert system. Seen this way, the work of Jebb and Webster proves 
to be one of the great twentieth-century examples of what scholars today refer to as ‘Applied 
	
939 Webster wrote in July 1945 that Castlereagh ‘did more than any other man of his period to try and work out a 
feasible scheme for the co-operation of the Great Powers. He was also the greatest defender of the small powers, 
seeing quite clearly that the two objects were not incompatible but complementary.’ Memorandum by Webster, 
‘Castlereagh or Canning’, Webster 15/2, LSE 
	 296 
History’.940  
In examining the work of the Economic and Reconstruction Department, the thesis also 
sheds light on important realities in diplomatic planning—namely, the way in which strategies 
evolve through a deliberative process, as opposed to ready-made blueprints. Foreign Office 
plans were not only the product of internal discussions among officials with different regional 
foci and responsibilities, but also the outcome of debates across government ministries. At 
times, there was an incorporation of plans, such as those of Cripps; and at other times, there 
was a steady resistance, as in the case of Jebb and Webster’s opposition to Churchill. Their 
repeated criticisms of the Prime Minister, however, were sometimes misplaced, especially 
given that, as it turned out in the spring of 1943, Churchill’s basic ideas on a future organisation 
did not differ from their own as fundamentally as they had earlier claimed.  
It is important to note that officials in the Foreign Office and especially those in the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department erred in their assumptions concerning the 
Dominions. In particular, officials were all too confident that the Dominion governments—to 
say nothing of the smaller powers making up the United Nations—would simply follow their 
lead in the creation of a post-war organisation. This lazy estimation faced an uncomfortable 
reckoning in the spring of 1945, most notably at the San Francisco Conference, where the New 
Zealand and Australian delegations, among others, showed themselves willing to stall 
proceedings at a crucial moment. 
More consequentially, Foreign Office planning throughout the war came up against the 
national interests of the United States and the Soviet Union, both of whom had their own 
extensive planning operations. Jebb’s meetings with American officials in the spring and 
	
940 Robert Crowcroft, ‘A Tiger in the Grass: The Case for Applied History’, History Today 68, 9 September 2018; 
Francis Gavin, ‘Thinking Historically: A Guide for Strategy and Statecraft’, War on the Rocks, 19 November 
2019; Margaret MacMillan, The Uses and Abuses of History (Canada: Penguin, 2009); Hal Brands and Jeremi 
Suri (eds), The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2016) 
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summer of 1943—and especially the way in which he sought to create a ‘middle way’ between 
earlier versions of the Foreign Office plans and those of the State Department—are indicative 
of the way in which the Economic and Reconstruction Department adapted strategies to 
changing circumstances. Most importantly, Cadogan’s contribution during the negotiations at 
the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences represented the way in which British 
diplomats conceded, resisted and compromised, all while keeping their main foreign policy 
objectives in sight. 
As important as the way in which British officials adapted to political stimuli is the way 
in which developments in the military sphere influenced considerations within the diplomatic 
sphere. Until the summer of 1943, planning within the Foreign Office had been along Anglo-
American lines, with little attention paid to the views of the Soviet Union. After significant 
gains by the Red Army—coupled with a series of terse messages from Moscow—British 
officials addressed Anglo-Soviet relations with increasing urgency, most notably in their push 
for a three-power agreement at the Moscow Conference. For the remainder of the war, Soviet 
military advances across Europe and the Kremlin’s expanding political influence in Eastern 
Europe caused added concern within the Foreign Office. These developments, coupled with a 
quiet acceptance that the United Kingdom’s influence was declining, led officials to begin 
considering other ordering mechanisms on the European continent. 
Closely related to how diplomats adapt strategies to changing political and military 
dynamics is another important insight into the statecraft of officials in this period—namely the 
way in which they sought to develop the mechanics of international order from abstract 
concepts. The comparison between the American and British cases is important here. Firstly, 
the Foreign Office and State Department had different conceptions of the way in which an 
international organisation would develop. For British planners, it was, in Jebb’s words, an 
‘evolutionary approach to international organisation’ whereby the great powers might 
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cooperate within regional structures and then work to develop a wider organisation. In 
Washington, there was more a preference for creating worldwide structures and then 
addressing regional issues in turn. Secondly, both the Americans and British differed in their 
views of alliances and their ability to order an international system. Throughout the war, 
members of the Roosevelt administration often spoke of an international organisation replacing 
‘alliances’ and ‘balances of power’ and ‘power politics’, whereas for the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department, these were the very structures which might underpin such an 
organisation. The British appreciation for alliances as ordering mechanisms was a factor which 
would have increasingly significant influence on the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation at the end of the decade.    
In their attempts to order an international system, Foreign Office officials were 
presented with trade-offs which shaped their tactical approach. The most important of these 
was an acceptance that the American preference for creating a worldwide organisation would 
need to come before the British preference of first developing regional structures. British 
officials accepted by the end of 1943, that if they continued to press their point on this matter, 
the Americans might opt out of a global role—a possibility which the Foreign Office had long 
sought to avoid. Indeed, in their earliest assessments of British interests in the post-war world, 
there was an understanding that the United States entering into commitments to preserve a 
world order was a necessity. The question was how officials might take the Roosevelt 
administration’s desire for a global role and shape it on the ‘anvil of [British] experience’.941 
Jebb’s Four Power Plan and the department’s subsequent United Nations plans all sought to 
craft regional designs onto a great power nucleus; but after Jebb’s meetings in the United States 
in March and August of 1943, there was a gradual acceptance that the American preference 
would need to be adopted. Eden came to embody this new approach, writing that ‘I don’t want 
	
941 Extract from letter by Ronald Campbell, 26 July 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/17 
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to discourage the Americans in any of this enterprise.’942 It was this understanding which 
ultimately led the Foreign Office to focus on the immediate creation of an international 
organisation.  
Ultimately, the British role in the creation of the United Nations Organization was 
hugely significant and British officials could be forgiven for seeing it as an achievement of 
their statecraft. The ideas and expertise that Foreign Office officials brought to bear on the 
negotiations at the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences were such that Jebb, in 
July 1945, suggested that the United Kingdom ‘played…a preponderating part’ in the creation 
of the organisation.943 Where the British role was perhaps most significant, however, was on 
the question of voting in the Security Council. The United Kingdom held from the start that 
great powers should not vote in disputes to which they were a party. Though this would change 
in the final charter, the British delegation’s original stand on this point—in opposition to the 
United States and the Soviet Union—prevented the organisation from becoming, in Cadogan’s 
words, a ‘four power dictatorship’ which the smaller powers would likely never have accepted. 
More important was that the British planners developed the compromise—later known as the 
‘Roosevelt compromise’—which posited that great powers might have the ability to veto 
decisions but not discussions within the Security Council. It was this solution which saved the 
organisation at a crucial moment when talks looked like they might collapse.  
Reflecting on the process years later, Webster commented that, ‘The responsibility of 
world-wide peacemaking is the most serious that any statesman can undertake except that of 
world-wide war.’944 During the Second World War, Jebb and Cadogan would doubtless have 
agreed. Their appreciation of the need to develop a ‘grand strategy for peace’ helped make the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department the engine of British post-war political planning 
	
942 Eden minute, 26 September 1943, FO 371/35440/U4349 
943 Memorandum by Jebb, ‘Reflections on San Francisco’, 25 July 1945, FO 371/50732/U5998 
944 Charles Webster, ‘Patterns of Peacemaking’, Foreign Affairs 25:4 (1947): 596-611, here p. 602 
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early on; while the addition of Webster brought in invaluable expertise which moved their 
proposals for the post-war international organisation in a more internationalist direction. 
Importantly, the combination of their worldviews—all of them deeply rooted in historical 
knowledge and experience—helped define a distinct realist-internationalist approach to 
statecraft which had the most important implications for the rules-based international order 






Manuscript and Archival Sources 
 
Bodleian Library, University of Oxford 
 Papers of Lionel Curtis 
Papers of Arnold Toynbee 
 
Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham 
 Papers of Anthony Eden (Avon Papers, AP) 
 
Churchill Archives Centre, University of Cambridge 
 Papers of Alexander Cadogan (ACAD) 
 Papers of Gladwyn Jebb (GLAD) 
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum, Hyde Park, New York 
 Sumner Welles Papers 
 
King’s College Archives Centre, University of Cambridge  
 Papers of Charles Webster [Webster, KCAC] 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science Library 
 Papers of Charles Webster [Webster, LSE] 
 
The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew Gardens 
 Avon Papers (FO 954) 
Cabinet Papers (CAB) 
 Foreign Office (FO 371) 
 Papers of the Prime Minister (PREM) 
Private Papers, Lord Halifax (FO800) 
 
The National Archives of the United States, College Park, Maryland 
Papers of Harley A. Notter  
 
 
Published Primary Material 
 
Barnes, John and David Nicholson (ed.), The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929-45 
(London: Hutchinson, 1988) 
 
Campbell, Thomas M. and George C. Herring (ed.), The Diaries of Edward Stettinius Jr, 1943-
46 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975) 
 
Dilks, David (ed.), The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945 (London: Faber and Faber, 
2010) 
 
Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organisation (UNCIO) 
1945, Volume VI 
1945, Volume XI 
	 302 
 
‘Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organization’, Department of State 
Publication 2297, Conference Series 66 (Washington: US State Department, 1945) 
 
Eade, Charles (ed.), The War Speeches of Winston Churchill, Volume 2 (London: Cassel and 
Company, 1965) 
 
Eden, Anthony, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell 1962) 
 
------------------, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965) 
 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 
1941, Volume I 
1942, Volume I 
1943, Volume I 
1943, Volume III 
1943, Conferences at Washington and Quebec 
1944, Volume I 
 
Gorodetsky, Gabriel (ed.), The Maisky Diaries: The Wartime Revelations of Stalin’s 
Ambassador in London (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015) 
 
Harvey, John (ed.), The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1941-1945 (London: Collins, 1978) 
 
Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Volume II (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948) 
 
Jebb, Gladwyn, ‘Interview with Lord Hubert Miles Gladwyn Jebb’, Interview by George 
Movshon and William Powell, United Nations Oral History Project, 21-24 June 1983 and 24 
October 1985. Accessed online: http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/89624 
 
------------------, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1972) 
 
Notter, Harley, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1975) 
 
Parliamentary Papers, Hansard 
 HC, 1942, Volume 381 
HC, 1942, Volume 385 
HC, 1943, Volume 393 
 
Pimlott, Ben (ed.), The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1940-1945 (London: 
Johnathan Cape, 1986) 
 
Ross, Graham (ed.), The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet 
Relations 1941-45 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 
 
Sherwood, Robert E. (ed.), The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, Volume II (London: 
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1949) 
 
	 303 
Stettinius, Edward, Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference (New York: Doubleday 
and Company, 1949) 
 







Acton, John Emerich Edward Dalberg, ‘Inaugural Lecture on the Study of History’ (Delivered 
at Cambridge, June 1895) in John Emerich Edward Dalberg, Lord Acton, Lectures on Modern 
History [edited by John Neville Figgis and Reginald Vere Laurence] (London: Macmillan, 
1906) 
 
Ambrose, Stephen and Douglas Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 
1938 [9th edition] (New York: Penguin Books, 2011) 
 
Anderson, Terry, The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944-47 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1981) 
 
Anstruther, Ian, Oscar Browning: A Biography (London: John Murray, 1983) 
 
Armitage, David, Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 
 
Bailey, Sydney D., Voting in The Security Council (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1969) 
 
Barker, Elisabeth, Churchill and Eden at War (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1978) 
 
---------------------, The British Between the Superpowers, 1945-50 (London: Macmillan Press, 
1983) 
 
Bell, Duncan, Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2016) 
 
----------------, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007) 
 
Bell, Duncan (ed.), Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in 
Nineteenth Century British Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
 
Bennett, Edward, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Security: American-Soviet 
Relations, 1939-45 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997) 
 
Birn, Donald S., The League of Nations Union, 1918-45 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) 
 
	 304 
Bosco, Andrea, June 1940, Great Britain and the First Attempt to Build a European Union 
(Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016) 
 
Bosco, Andrea and Cornelia Navari (ed.), Chatham House and British Foreign Policy, 1919–
1945 (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1994) 
 
Bosco, David L., Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the 
Modern World (London: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
 
Borgwardt, Elizabeth, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005) 
 
Brands, Hal and Jeremi Suri (ed.), The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016) 
 
Brinkley, Douglas and David R. Facey-Crowther (ed.), The Atlantic Charter (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 1994) 
 
Caedel, Martin, Semi-detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International 
Relations, 1854-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
 
Cairncross, Alec, Economic Ideas and Government Policy: Contributions to Contemporary 
Economic History (London: Routledge, 1996) 
 
Campbell, Thomas M., Masquerade Peace: America’s UN Policy, 1944-45 (Tallahassee: 
Florida State University Press, 1973) 
 
Chadwick, Owen, Acton and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
 
Charmley, John, Churchill’s Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940- 
1957 (London: Faber and Faber, 2009) 
 
-------------------, Duff Cooper: The Authorized Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1986) 
 
Chapnick, Adam, The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005) 
 
Churchill, Winston, The Grand Alliance [The Second World War, Volume III] (London: 
Cassell, 1950) 
 
-----------------------, The Hinge of Fate [The Second World War, Volume IV] (London: Cassell, 
1951) 
 
-----------------------, Closing the Ring [The Second World War, Volume V] (London: Cassell, 
1952) 
 
Conway, Ed, The Summit: The Biggest Battle of the Second World War—Fought Behind 
Closed Doors (London: Little, Brown, 2014) 
 
	 305 
Costigliola, Frank, Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold 
War (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013) 
 
Dallek, Robert, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1979) 
 
Dallin, Alexander, The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and 
Objectives (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1962) 
 
Deporte, A.W., De Gaulle’s Foreign Policy, 1944-1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1968) 
 
Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes, After the War (London: A.C. Fifield, 1915) 
 
--------------------------------------, The European Anarchy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1916) 
 
Divine, Robert, Roosevelt and World War II (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969) 
 
------------------, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World 
War II (New York: Atheneum, 1967) 
 
Donovan, Frank, Mr. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms: The Story Behind the United Nations 
Charter (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1966) 
 
Dormael, Armand Van, Bretton Woods: Birth of a Monetary System (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1978) 
 
Douglas, R.M., The Labour Party, Nationalism and Internationalism, 1931-1951 (London: 
Routledge, 2004) 
 
Dutton, David, Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997) 
 
Egerton, George W., Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, 
Politics, and International Organisation, 1914-19 (London: Scholar Press, 1979) 
 
Feis, Herbert, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They 
Sought (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957) 
 
Folly, Martin H., Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 1940-45 (New York: St Martin’s 
Press, 2000) 
 
Gaddis, John Lewis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005) 
 
------------------------, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1972)  
 
Gaiduk, Ilya V., Divided Together, The United States and the Soviet Union in the United 
Nations, 1945-1965 (California: Stanford University Press, 2013) 
 
	 306 
Gardner, Lloyd, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970) 
 
Gellman, Irvin, Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) 
 
Gilbert, Martin, Winston S. Churchill, Volume VII: 1941-1945, Road to Victory (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986) 
 
Goodrich, Leland, The United Nations (London: Steven and Sons, 1960) 
 
Goodwin, Geoffrey L., Britain and the United Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 
1957) 
 
Greenwood, Sean, The Alternative Alliance: Anglo-French Relations Before the Coming of 
NATO, 1944-48 (London: Minerva, 1996) 
 
----------------------, Titan at the Foreign Office: Gladwyn Jebb and the Shaping of the Modern 
World (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008) 
 
Hall, Ian and Lisa Hill (ed.), British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 
 
Hanhimaki, Jussi M., The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 
 
Harper, Norman and David Sissons, Australia and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan 
Publishing Company, 1959) 
 
Helleiner, Eric, Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the 
Making of the Postwar Order (New York: Cornell University Press, 2016) 
 
Hill, Christopher, Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy, October 1938 - June 1941 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
 
Hilderbrand, Robert C., Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search 
for Postwar Security (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990) 
 
Holbraad, Carsten, Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 
 
Hoopes, Townsend and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the U.N. (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1997) 
 
Hurd, Ian, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007) 
 
Husain, Aiyaz, Mapping the End of Empire: American and British Strategic Visions in the 
Postwar World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014) 
 
	 307 
Ikenberry, John, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American 
World Order (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012) 
 
Iriye, Akira, From Nationalism to Internationalism: US Foreign Policy to 1914 (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977) 
 
--------------, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the 
Contemporary World (California: University of California Press, 2004) 
 
Johnstone, Andrew, Against Immediate Evil: American Internationalists and the Four 
Freedoms on the Eve of World War II (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014) 
 
------------------------, Dilemmas of Internationalism: The American Association for the United 
Nations and US Foreign Policy, 1941-1948 (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009) 
 
Kay, David (ed.), The United Nations Political System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967) 
 
Kennedy, Paul, Parliament of Man: The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations 
(London: Penguin Books, 2007) 
 
------------------, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External 
Policy, 1865-1980 (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1981) 
 
Kimball, Warren F., Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War (New 
York: William Morrow and Company, 1997) 
 
-----------------------, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1991) 
 
King, F.P., The New Internationalism: Allied policy and the European peace, 1939-1945 
(Connecticut: Archon Books, 1973) 
 
Kissinger, Henry, World Order (New York: Penguin Books, 2015) 
 
Kitchen, Martin, British Policy Towards the Soviet Union During the Second World War 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986) 
 
Lamb, Richard, Churchill as War Leader (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 1993) 
 
Lewis, Julian, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 
1942-47 [2nd edition] (London: Frank Cass, 2005) 
 
Louis, Wm. Roger, Imperialism at Bay, 1941-1945: The United States and the Decolonization 
of the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) 
 
Lowe Vaughan, et al (ed.), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of 
Thought and Practice Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 
 
Luard, Evan, A History of the United Nations, Volume I: The Years of Western Domination, 
1945-1955 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982) 
	 308 
MacMillan, Margaret, The Uses and Abuses of History (Canada: Penguin Group, 2009) 
 
Mastny, Vojtech, Russia’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of 
Communism, 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979) 
 
Mazower, Mark, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (London: Penguin Books, 2012) 
 
-------------------, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009) 
 
McCauley, Martin, The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1949 [4th edition] (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2016) 
 
McKenzie, Francine, GATT and Global Order in the Post-war Era (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2020) 
 
McKercher, B.J.C., Transition of Power: Britain’s Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United 
States, 1930-45 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
 
McNeill, William, America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1953) 
 
---------------------, Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
 
Meisler, Stanley, The United Nations: A History (New York: Grove Press, 1995) 
 
Milne, David, Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2015) 
 
Miner, Steven, Between Churchill and Stalin: The Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the Origins 
of the Grand Alliance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988) 
 
Mires, Charlene, Capital of the World: The Race to Host the United Nations (New York: New 
York University Press, 2013) 
 
Morton, H.V., Atlantic Meeting (London: Methuen and Company, 1944) 
 
Murray, Gilbert, From the League to the UN (London: Oxford University Press, 1948) 
 
Neilson, Keith and T.G. Otte, The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854-1946 
(London: Routledge, 2006) 
 
Nicholas, H.G., The United Nations as a Political Institution [5th edition] (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1975) 
 
Nicholson, Harold, Peacemaking 1919 (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1933) 
 
O’Sullivan, Christopher D., Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World 
Order, 1937-1943 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008) 
	 309 
 
Olson, William C. and A.J.R. Groom, International Relations Then and Now: Origins and 
Trends in Interpretation (London: Routledge, 1992) 
 
Otte, T.G., The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
 
Parmar, Inderjeet, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role 
and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 
 
Plesch, Dan, America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War II and Forged a 
Peace (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011) 
 
Plokhy, Serhii M., Yalta: The Price of Peace (New York: Penguin Books, 2011) 
 
Polonsky, Anthony (ed.), The Great Powers and the Policy Question, 1941-45 (London: 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 1976) 
 
Porter, Patrick, The False Promise of Liberal Order: Nostalgia, Delusion and the Rise of 
Trump (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020) 
 
Preston, Diana, Eight Days at Yalta: How Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin Shaped the Post-
War World (London: Picador, 2019) 
 
Reynolds, David, From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International 
History of the 1940s (London: Oxford University Press, 2006) 
 
---------------------, Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Basic Books, 2007) 
 
---------------------, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41: A Study in 
Competitive Cooperation (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981) 
 
---------------------, Warren F. Kimball and A.O. Chubarian (ed.), Allies at War: The Soviet, 
American, and British Experience, 1939-1945 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994) 
 
Reynolds, P.A. and E.J. Hughes, The Historian as Diplomat: Charles Kingsley Webster and 
the United Nations, 1939-1946 (London: Martin Robertson, 1976) 
 
Righter, Rosemary, Utopia Lost: The United Nations and World Order (New York: The 
Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995) 
 
Roberts, Andrew, Churchill: Walking with Destiny (London: Allen Lane, 2018) 
 
--------------------, Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-
1945 (New York: Harper Collins 2009) 
 
Robins, Dorothy, Experiment in Democracy: The Story of US Citizen Organizations in Forging 
the Charter of the United Nations (New York: Parkside Press, 1971) 
	 310 
 
Rosenboim, Or, The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the 
United States, 1939-1950 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017) 
 
Rothwell, Victor, Anthony Eden: A Political Biography, 1931-57 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1992) 
 
---------------------, Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947 (London: Jonathan Cape Publishing, 
1982) 
 
---------------------, War Aims in the Second World War: The War Aims of the Major 
Belligerents, 1939-45 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005) 
 
Ruggie, John Gerard, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International 
Institutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998) 
 
Russell, Ruth B., A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1958) 
 
Sainsbury, Keith, Churchill and Roosevelt at War: The War They Fought and the Peace They 
Hoped to Make (New York: New York University Press, 1994) 
 
--------------------, The Turning Point: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill and Chiang-Kai-Shek, 1943, 
The Moscow, Cairo, and Tehran Conferences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) 
 
Saville, John, The Politics of Continuity: British Labour Foreign Policy and the Labour 
Government, 1945-46 (London: Verso, 1993) 
 
Sayward, Amy L., The United Nations in International History (London: Bloomsbury, 2017)  
 
Sbrega, John J., Anglo-American Relations and Colonialism in East Asia (New York: Garland, 
1983) 
 
Schild, Georg, Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American Economic and Political 
Postwar Planning in the Summer of 1944 (London: Macmillan Press, 1995) 
 
Schlesinger, Stephen C., Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 2003) 
 
Scott-Smith, Giles and J. Simon Rofe (ed.), Global Perspectives on the Bretton Woods 
Conference and the Post-war World Order (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) 
 
Seeley, John Robert, ‘The Teaching of Politics—An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at Cambridge 
1870’, in John Robert Seeley, Lectures and Essays (London: Macmillan and Co, 1870) 
 
Shapiro, Ian and Joseph Lambert (ed.), Charter of the United Nations (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2014) 
 
Sharp, Walter, The United Nations Economic and Social Council (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969) 
	 311 
 
Simpson, A.W. Brian, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the 
European Convention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
 
Skidelsky, Robert, John Maynard Keynes, Vol III: Fighting for Freedom, 1937-1946 (New 
York: Viking Publishing, 2000) 
 
Sluga, Glenda, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013) 
 
Smith, Gaddis, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945 (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1965) 
 
Steil, Benn, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the 
Making of a New World Order (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013) 
 
Steiner, Zara, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969) 
 
Stewart, Patrick, The Best Laid Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn 
of the Cold War (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008) 
 
Suganami, Hidemi, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989) 
 
Sylvest, Casper, British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930: Making Progress? (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2009) 
 
Thomas, Hugh, Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-46 (New York: 
Atheneum, 1987) 
 
Thorne, Christopher, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 
1941-45 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978) 
 
Thorpe, D.R., Eden: The Life and Times of Anthony Eden, First Earl of Avon, 1897-1977 
(London: Chatto and Windus, 2003) 
 
Waters, Maurice, The United Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1967) 
 
Watt, Alan, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967) 
 
Watt, Donald Cameron, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place, 1900-1975 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 
 
Webster, Charles K., British Diplomacy, 1813-1815 (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1921) 
 
------------------------, The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963) 
 
------------------------, The Art and Practice of Diplomacy (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961) 
	 312 
 
Webster, Charles K., The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Volume I (London: G. 
Bell and Sons, 1931) 
 
------------------------, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822, Volume II (London: G. 
Bell and Sons, 1934) 
 
------------------------, The League of Nations in Theory and Practice (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1933) 
 
------------------------, ‘The Study of International Politics’, Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before 
the University College of Wales Aberystwyth’, 23 February 1923 (Cardiff: The University of 
Wales Press Board, 1923) 
 
------------------------, ‘The Study of Nineteenth Century Diplomacy’, Inaugural Lecture at the 
University of Liverpool, 10 December 1914 (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1915) 
 
------------------------, ‘What is the Problem of Peaceful Change?’, in C.A.W. Manning (ed.), 
Peaceful Change: An International Problem (London: Macmillan and Company, 1937) 
 
------------------------, ‘What the World Owes to President Wilson’, Extract from the 
Congressional Record for 10 January 1930 (League of Nations Union, 1930) 
 
Weiler, Lawrence and Anne Patricia Simons, The United States and the United Nations: The 
Search for International Peace and Security (New York: Manhattan Publishing, 1967) 
 
Weinberg, Gerhard L., A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994) 
 
Weiss, Thomas G. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on The United Nations [2nd edition] (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2018) 
 
Welles, Benjamin, Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist (New York: St Martin’s Press, 
1997) 
 
Westad, Odd Arne, The Cold War: A World History (New York: Basic Books, 2017) 
 
Wilson, Theodore A., The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941 
(Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1969) 
 
Woods, Randall Bennett, A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941-46 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990) 
 
Woodward, Llewellyn, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Volume II (London: 
H.M. Stationery Office, 1971) 
 
---------------------------, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Volume V (London: 






Adamthwaite, Anthony, ‘Britain and the World, 1945-9: The View from the Foreign Office’, 
International Affairs 61:2 (1985): 223-235 
 
Baylis, John, ‘British Wartime Thinking about a Post-War European Security Group’, Review 
of International Studies 9:4 (1983): 265-281 
 
Charmley, John, ‘Churchill and the American Alliance’, Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society 11 (2001): 353-371 
 
----------------, ‘Duff Cooper and Western European Union, 1944-7’, Review of International 
Studies 11:1 (1985): 53-63 
 
----------------, ‘Splendid Isolation to Finest Hour: Britain as a Global Power 1900- 1950’, 
Special Issue of Contemporary British History 18:3 (2004): 130-146 
 
Dockrill, Michael, ‘Historical Note: The Foreign Office and the “Proposed Institute of 
International Affairs”’, International Affairs 56:4 (1980): 665–72 
 
Dubin, Martin David, ‘Toward the Concept of Collective Security: The Bryce Group’s 
“Proposals for the Avoidance of War,” 1914-17’, International Organization xxiv (1970): 288-
318 
 
Edis, Richard, ‘A Job Well Done: The Founding of the United Nations Revisited’, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 6:1 (1992): 29-40 
 
Goldstein, Erik, ‘Historians Outside the Academy: G. W. Prothero and the Experience of the 
Foreign Office Historical Section, 1917–20’, IHR Historical Research 63:151 (1990): 195-211 
 
Hall, Ian, ‘The Art and Practice of a Diplomatic Historian: Sir Charles Webster, 1886-1961’, 
International Politics 42 (2005): 470-490 
 
-----------, ‘“Time of Troubles”: Arnold J Toynbee’s twentieth century’, International Affairs 
90:1 (2014): 23-36 
 
-----------, ‘World government and empire: the international historian as theorist’, International 
Affairs 82:6 (2006): 1155-1165 
 
Hazard, John N., ‘The Soviet Union and the United Nations’, The Yale Law Journal 55 (1946): 
1016-1035 
 
Heyns, Christof, ‘The Preamble of the United Nations Charter: The Contribution of Jan Smuts’, 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law 7:2 (1995): 329-348 
 
Hughes, E.J., ‘Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organization’, 
Journal of Contemporary History 9:4 (1947): 177-194 
 
Jebb, Gladwyn, ‘Review of Reynolds and Hughes’ Historian as Diplomat’, International 
Affairs 53:3 (1977): 479-481 
	 314 
 
Jebb, Gladwyn, ‘The Role of the United Nations’, International Organization 6:4 (1952): 509-
520 
 
Kettenacker, Lothar, ‘The Anglo-Soviet Alliance and the Problem of Germany, 1941-1945’, 
Journal of Contemporary History 17:3 (1982): 435-458 
 
Keyserlingk, Robert H., ‘Arnold Toynbee's Foreign Research and Press Service, 1939-43 and 
Its Post-War Plans for South-East Europe’, Journal of Contemporary History 21:4 (1986): 539-
558 
 
Kitchen, Martin, ‘Winston Churchill and the Soviet Union during the Second World War’, The 
Historical Journal 30:2 (1987): 415-436 
 
Kuklick, Bruce, ‘The Genesis of the European Advisory Commission’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 4:4 (1969): 189-201 
 
Marshall, Peter, ‘Smuts and the Preamble to the UN Charter’, The Round Table 358 (2001): 
55-65 
 
Mastny, Vojtech, ‘Soviet War Aims at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences of 1943’, Journal 
of Modern History 47:3 (1975): 481-504 
 
Mishra, Basanta Kumar, ‘India’s Response to the British Offer of August 1940’, Proceedings 
of the Indian History Congress 40 (1979): 717-719 
 
Neilson, Keith, ‘Orme Sargent, Appeasement and British Policy in Europe, 1933-39’, 
Twentieth Century British History 21:1 (2010): 1-28 
 
Otte, T.G., ‘“The Light of History”: Scholarship and Officialdom in the Era of the First World 
War’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 30:2 (2019): 253-287 
 
Prince, Charles, ‘The Soviet Union and International Organizations’, American Journal of 
International Law 36:3 (1942) 
 
Reynolds, David, ‘Rethinking Anglo-American Relations’, International Affairs 65:1 (1988-
1989): 89-111 
 
Roberts, Geoffrey, ‘A League of Their Own: The Soviet Origins of the United Nations’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, Special Section: Dumbarton Oaks in Historical Perspective 
54:2 (2019): 303-327 
 
Rofe, J. Simon, ‘Pre-war Post-war Planning: The Phoney War, the Roosevelt Administration, 
and the Case of the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations’, Diplomacy & 
Statecraft 23 (2012): 254-279 
 
Ross, Graham, ‘Allied Diplomacy in the Second World War’, British Journal of International 
Studies 1:3 (1975): 283-292 
	 315 
 
Ross, Graham, ‘Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941-45’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 16:3 (1981): 521-540 
 
Schild, Georg, ‘The Roosevelt Administration and the United Nations’, World Affairs 158:1 
(1995): 26-34 
 
Schlesinger, Stephen, ‘FDR’s Five Policemen: Creating the United Nations’, World Policy 
Journal 11:3 (1994): 88-93 
 
Steiner, Zara, ‘British power and stability: The historical record’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 14:2 
(2003): 23-44 
 
Lord Strang, ‘Prelude to Potsdam: Reflections on War and Foreign Policy’, International 
Affairs 46:3 (1970): 441-454 
 
Sylvest, Casper, ‘Continuity and Change in British Liberal Internationalism, c. 1900-1930’, 
Review of International Studies 31:2 (2005): 263-283 
 
-------------------, ‘Interwar Internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the Historiography 
of International Relations’, International Studies Quarterly 48:2 (2004): 409-432 
 
Thorne, Christopher, ‘Chatham House, Whitehall, and Far Eastern Issues: 1941-45’, 
International Affairs 54:1 (1978): 1-29 
 
Watson, Derek, ‘Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942’, 
Europe-Asia Studies 54:1 (2002): 51-85 
 
Watt, Donald Cameron, ‘Britain and the Historiography of the Yalta Conference and the Cold 
War’, Diplomatic History 13:1 (1989): 67-98 
 
Webster, Charles K., ‘Review of Europe’s Classical Balance of Power by Edward Vose 
Gulick’, The English Historical Review 72:282 (1957): 131-132 
 
--------------------------, ‘The Making of the Charter of the United Nations’, History 32:115 
(1947): 16-38 
 
Wertheim, Stephen, ‘Instrumental Internationalism: The American Origins of the United 
Nations, 1940-3’, Journal of Contemporary History 54.2 (2019): 265-83 
 
Widenor, William, ‘American Planning for the United Nations: Have We Been Asking the 
Right Questions?’, Diplomatic History 6:3 (1982): 245-65 
 
Williams, Andrew, ‘France and the Origins of the United Nations, 1944-1945: ‘Si La France 
ne compte plus, qu’on nous le dise’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 28:2 (2017): 215-234  
 
Wilson, Craig Alan, ‘Rehearsal for a United Nations: The Hot Springs Conference’, 




Chapters in Edited Volumes 
 
Bell, Duncan, ‘Democracy and Empire: J. A. Hobson, Leonard Hobhouse, and the Crisis of 
Liberalism’, in Ian Hall and Lisa Hill (ed.), British International Thinkers from Hobbes to 
Namier (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 181-206 
 
Bindoff, S.T. and G.N. Clark, ‘Charles Kingsley Webster, 1886-1961’, in Proceedings of the 
British Academy, Vol XLVIII (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 427-447. Printed 
copy in Webster Papers 27/1, LSE Archives.  
 
Dilks, David, ‘The British Foreign Office Between the Wars’, in B.J.C. McKercher and D.J. 
Moss (ed.), Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939: Memorial Essays 
Honouring C.J. Lowe (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1984), pp. 181-202 
 
Fagg, John Edwin, ‘Sir Charles Webster’, in S. William Halperin (ed.), Some 20th Century 
Historians: Essays on Eminent Europeans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 
171-199. Printed copy in Webster Papers 27/1, LSE Archives 
 
Howard, Michael, ‘The United Nations: From War Fighting to Peace Planning’, in Ernest R. 
May and Angeliki E. Laiou (ed.), The Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and the United Nations, 
1944-1994 (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1998), pp. 1-7 
 
Kagan, Robert, ‘The twilight of the liberal world order’, in Michael O’Hanlon (ed.), Brookings 
Big Ideas for America (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2017) 
 
Kent, John, ‘The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49’, in Anne Deighton 
(ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), pp. 165-183 
 
-------------, ‘The Foreign Office and defence of the empire’, in Greg Kennedy (ed.), Imperial 
Defence: the Old World Order 1856-1956 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 50-70 
 
Long, David, ‘Inter-War Idealism, Liberal Internationalism, and Contemporary International 
Theory’, in David Long and Peter Wilson (ed.), Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Interwar 
Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 302-328 
 
McKercher, B.J.C., ‘Old diplomacy and new: the Foreign Office and foreign policy, 1919-
1939’, in Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher (ed.), Diplomacy and World Power: Studies 
in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 79- 
114 
 
Otte, T.G., ‘“The Confederation of Europe”? British Views of the Congress of Vienna in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries’, in Der Wiener Kongress 1814/1815, Vol. II (Vienna: 
Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2019), pp. 321-330 
 
Reynolds, David, ‘The Atlantic “Flop”: British Foreign Policy and the Churchill-Roosevelt 
Meeting of August 1941’, in Douglas Brinkley and David R. Facey-Crowther (ed.), The 
Atlantic Charter (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1994), pp. 129-150 
 
	 317 
Roberts, Adam, ‘Britain and the Creation of the United Nations’, in Roger Louis (ed.), Still 
More Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2003), pp. 229-47 
 
Rofe, J. Simon, ‘Prewar and Wartime Postwar Planning: Antecedents to UN Moment in San 
Francisco, 1945’, in Dan Plesch and Thomas Weiss (ed.), Wartime Origins and the Future of 
the United Nations (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 17-35 
 
Steiner, Zara, ‘Elitism and Foreign Policy: The Foreign Office Before the Great War’, in B.J.C. 
McKercher and D.J. Moss (ed.), Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939: 
Memorial Essays Honouring C.J. Lowe (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1984), 
pp. 19-55 
 
Warner, Geoffrey, ‘From ally to enemy: Britain’s relations with the Soviet Union, 1941-1948’, 
in Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher (ed.), Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in 
British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 221-
243 
 
Wilson, Peter, ‘The Twenty Years’ Crisis and the Category of ‘Idealism’ in International 
Relations’, in David Long and Peter Wilson (ed.), Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-





Dolff, David J., ‘The Creation of the United Nations Organization as a Factor in Soviet Foreign 
Policy, 1943-46’, University of Alberta Libraries, 2010 
 
Richardson, Adam Philip, ‘Sir Orme Sargent and British Policy Towards Europe 1926-1949’, 
University of Leeds, 2015 
 
Sharpe, Charles Wesley, ‘The Origins of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration, 1939-1943’, University of Pennsylvania, 2012 
 
 
Articles in Non-peer-reviewed Publications 
 
Allison, Graham, ‘The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to Conventional 
Wisdom’, Foreign Affairs 97:4 (2018): 124-133 
 
Bacevich, Andrew, ‘The Global Order Myth’, The American Conservative, 15 June 2017 
 
Crowcroft, Robert, ‘A Tiger in the Grass: The Case for Applied History’, History Today 68:9 
(2018) 
 
Gavin, Francis, ‘Thinking Historically: A Guide for Strategy and Statecraft’, War on the Rocks, 
19 November 2019 
 
	 318 
Lissner, Rebecca Friedman and Mira Rapp-Hooper, ‘The Liberal Order is More Than a Myth’, 
Foreign Affairs, 31 July 2018 
 
Mazarr, Michael, ‘The Real History of the Liberal Order: Neither Myth or Accident’, Foreign 
Affairs, 7 August 2018 
 
Oğuzlu, Tarik, ‘Isolationism versus internationalism: Which course to take in foreign policy?’, 
Daily Sabah, 30 January 2020 
 
Porter, Patrick, ‘A World Imagined: Nostalgia and Liberal Order’, CATO Institute Policy 
Analysis 843 (2018): 1-21 
 
Webster, Charles K., ‘Patterns of Peacemaking’, Foreign Affairs 25:4 (1947): 596-611 
 
 
